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THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

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THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

Its Meaning and Proof

Apologetics

BY

J. SCOTT LIDGETT, M.A.

WARDEN OF THE BERMONDSEY SETTLEMENT

AUTHOR OF 'THE SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLE OF THE ATONEMENT,' 'THE FATHERHOOD
OF GOD IN CHRISTIAN TRUTH AND LIFE,' ETC.

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TO
MY COLLEAGUES OF
THE BERMONDSEY SETTLEMENT

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
IN GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
OF
THEIR STEADFAST FRIENDSHIP AND LOYAL CO-OPERATION

PREFACE

THIS book forms the sequel to my former work, entitled *The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life*. It is an attempt to explain and verify the Christian religion by means of the fatherly-filial relationship, the supremacy and meaning of which for Christian consciousness and theology, was investigated in the former work. The book has been prepared under very great difficulties, owing to the ceaseless pressure of public engagements. It is to be feared that it has suffered thereby. Moreover, its scope is so extensive that it has been impossible to fill in many details, while some important subjects connected with the exposition and proof of Christianity have been but lightly touched upon or in some cases omitted altogether. The purpose of the book is rather to establish a general point of view than to treat the subject with the exhaustiveness of a Compendium of Christian Evidences.

The popular discussion of what is commonly called the New Theology did not take place till this book was practically completed. It has, therefore, been impossible, even if it had been otherwise desirable, to enter into the current controversy on the subject. It will be found, however, that many of the subjects of the controversy are dealt with, and that a serious attempt is made to give full effect to the truth of the immanence, while steadfastly maintaining the transcendence, of God.

I am, of course, greatly indebted to many sources in working out the view of Christianity and of its relation to Reality, which is outlined in these pages. Special acknowledgement, however, must be made of the obligation that I am under to Dr. James Ward for his Gifford Lectures on

Naturalism and Agnosticism, and to Mr. J. Theodore Merz for his *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. So far as the results of the science of religion are concerned, I have derived help from many works, but not least of all from *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, by Principal Gough.

In conclusion, I would offer my grateful thanks to the friends who have so kindly relieved me as far as possible of the mechanical work of preparing the book for the press, and to the Rev. W. F. Lofthouse, M.A., who has again assisted me by reading large part of it in manuscript, and has made valuable suggestions.

I am deeply sensible of the inadequacy of the book to the great subject with which it deals. Yet it seemed a duty to attempt to complete the task previously begun, in the hope of helping some seekers after truth in a period of transition and uncertainty. I trust that my endeavour, despite its imperfections, may be used by the Spirit of Truth to this end.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

July, 1907.

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INTRODUCTION

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

ITS MEANING AND PROOF

INTRODUCTION

IT cannot be denied that widespread dissatisfaction exists at the present time with the ordinary systems of Christian Evidence. To some extent this is the case in regard to the statements of Christian doctrine which they seek to substantiate. Yet it is still more so in regard to the general point of view from which the subject is approached and to the arguments by which the truth of Christianity is upheld. Those who are not convinced in the matter feel that their difficulties have not been realized, still less met. Those who are convinced are disappointed, because the deepest grounds of their belief are inadequately set forth.

There are several main reasons for this state of things. In the first place, the philosophic outlook has greatly altered in recent years. It is true that comparatively few are directly affected by such changes. Yet philosophic thought is more closely related to the general intellectual characteristics of an age than is often supposed. A great philosophy is the formal expression of widespread tendencies of thought which are not in themselves philosophical. Because of these general relationships its main conceptions pass out almost insensibly and by many channels, till from being the property of the few they affect the outlook of the many. Hence at the present time influences are widely diffused which are in their origin philosophic, and these create the impression that the Christian Evidences of the past are built upon intellectual foundations which cannot bear the weight of the conclusions resting on them. The vast increase of knowledge has not

merely added immense stores of information to the intellectual wealth of mankind, but has forced us to revise many of our conceptions of the relations in which things stand to one another, and in which the past of the universe stands to the present. The wholeness of the universe in all its parts and throughout its history has been brought home to the modern mind as never before. Hence any treatment of Christianity which seeks to emphasize its claims by completely isolating it from the history and meaning of the world and man as a whole brings its advocates into collision with the most powerful forces of present-day thought. If the unique character and the divine claims of Christianity are to be acknowledged by those who enter into the modern point of view, it must be by laying bare its relations to the inmost nature of humanity and of the universe as fulfilling the ends for which they exist, and not by separating it in thought from the whole texture of reality in order subsequently to establish its truth by evidences, the force of which is held to be altogether due to their exceptional character.

Closely bound up with the apparent defect of Christian Evidences just alluded to is their failure to give satisfaction to the spiritual consciousness of Christian believers by giving an adequate account of the grounds of their certitude. There must be something wrong with any system of Christian Evidences which is essentially alien to the mind and chilling to the heart of the intensest Christian faith. This has certainly not seldom been the case in the past. Its effect has often been so serious as to cause a reaction on the part of simple and fervid piety against any attempt to establish by reasoning the truth of the Christian religion.

The force of these difficulties has been felt by all the more thoughtful and sympathetic theologians of recent times. Important and successful efforts have been made both to set forth and to establish the relation of Christianity to the whole order of things as being its fulfilment, and also to explain and indicate the inner reason of faith in it as the truth. Yet such attempts have so far been neither sufficiently numerous and representative to supersede the impressions of the older teaching, nor sufficiently systematic to

establish a new point of view more entirely in consonance with the fundamental principles of modern thought. Hence much work remains to be done before the old truth can be enabled to speak with convincing power to the new thought.

No student of history will be surprised that this need should exist. The systems of thought which ecclesiastical authority sometimes seeks to bind in perpetuity upon the mind of Christians were for the most part when they appeared daring innovations, or at least the final and formal expression of spiritual and intellectual changes akin to those which are taking place at the present time. Their appearance was necessitated by exactly the same intellectual unrest, both within and without the Church, which is felt at the present day. The only difference is one of degree, both as to the variety of new issues raised in modern times and the number of minds affected by them. This difference is, however, comparatively unimportant. The main facts to be borne in mind are these: In the first place, that the progress of Christianity has been primarily due to the spiritual experience and not to the formal doctrine of the Church. Secondly, that the growth of that experience and its manifold contact with the world and life as a whole has entailed intellectual consequences and given rise to many succeeding attempts at formal explanation. And, lastly, that the success of such attempts must be measured by their power to satisfy the Christian consciousness itself, and to give an account of its relationship to the universe and its history which meets all the claims, whether spiritual, moral or rational, which can rightfully be made upon it.

Three governing necessities affect the present demand for a restatement of the nature and grounds of Christian belief. In the first place, the emphasis which modern thought lays upon the principle of continuity throughout the whole range of reality. The universe as it exists involves the union of continuity and distinction, of sameness and difference. Without continuity there could be no order of things; without distinction no variety. The thought which would give a satisfactory explanation of reality must hold fast to both these elements.

Yet there are times when a deepened sense of the one endangers the position of the other. In earlier modern times, and especially in Western thought, the principle of distinction has often been so emphasized that the sense of continuity has been wellnigh destroyed. The distinctions between God, man, and the world have often been pressed to the point of regarding them as in merely external relations to one another, and sometimes to the extreme of a supposed intrinsic opposition between them. The attributes of God have been conceived as existing and working more or less independently of one another, and little or no effort has been made to show that His different manifestations of Himself are aspects of one supreme and comprehensive relationship which varies in the fullness of its expression according to the capacity or the fitness of its object. A similar tendency in regard to man has severed his spiritual from his common interests, has treated his powers as a bundle of faculties, loosely knit together by the bond of self-consciousness, and has magnified his independence of the natural order of things, to which in some sense he obviously belongs. These are but a few of the illustrations that might be given. The same tendency was equally marked in physical science, with its attempt to multiply distinct elements, forces, and operations in nature.

A variety of causes has in recent times brought the principle of continuity to the forefront. The present danger is not that distinctions should be exaggerated but that they should be ignored. Almost the whole stress is at present laid upon unity and affinity. So far as God is concerned, the effort to realize an unbroken consistency of purpose and an all-comprehending relationship has not only criticized the cruder representations of the religious imagination and superseded many artificial combinations of the divine attributes, but has, sometimes at least, imperilled all that is most essential to the belief in His supreme and holy personality. In the case of man, the attempt to separate parts and powers of his complex being from one another has been succeeded by an attempt at unification, which, rather than fail, will suppress the most direct and hitherto unquestioned testimony of his own consciousness, in order to secure the advantage of continuity

and to escape the difficulties of distinction. The same tendency is at work in physical science, alike in the effort to reach one underlying substance and to explain the whole order and history of all things by one pervading energy. Nor does this attempt to realize continuity end here. It includes in its efforts the endeavour to find an underlying unity between God, man, and the world. This is what is meant by the new insistence upon the immanence of God. The truth which is involved in this conception has never been overlooked by the highest exponents of Christian Theism. Yet undoubtedly it was endangered by the hardened distinctions which at present we term deistic, but which prevailed far beyond the immediate circle of those who can be called Deists, in the strict sense of the term. Such an effort to secure unity and continuity may, of course, be pressed so far as to ignore obvious facts, to fall into hopeless confusion of thought, and seriously to imperil grave spiritual and moral interests. Yet the very fact of its exaggerations shows the urgency of the principle in the modern mind. Clearly the task set to Christian thought is to take adequate account of the principle of continuity, while maintaining the distinctive differences upon the validity of which the integrity of spiritual experience depends.

In the second place, the scientific point of view must be borne in mind. Here, above all, the ultimate explanation is sought in the complete establishment of the principle of continuity. The immediate effect is to establish the historic, comparative, and psychological points of view. So far as the first of these is concerned, the conception of evolution causes ever increasing stress to be laid upon the description and explanation, even of the most highly specialized products, in the light of the processes by means of which they have come into existence. Inquiry is not content to take them in themselves and as a new beginning, without tracing out the whole course of their development. The same principle involves not merely continuity with the past, but also throughout the whole range of present existence, and therefore the adoption of methods of comparative description. Further, general metaphysics has somewhat fallen into the background, while psychology, both introspective and experimental, has

greatly advanced its claims, either as a substitute or as the only sure foundation of metaphysical generalization.

All these features at once affect the treatment of the phenomena of Christian religion. Modern thought assumes that whatever may be their ultimate explanation there is a natural history of their development which can be investigated. This may mean the denial of the supernatural in regard to them. On the other hand, the reality of the supernatural may be recognized, provided it be acknowledged that when the supernatural enters into history it conforms to the conditions which govern historic progress throughout. Hence the whole temper of modern thought in respect to religion prompts it to take advantage of modern investigation in regard to non-Christian religions, and insists that, however unique may be the Christian consciousness, it should be treated in connexion with all other embodiments of the religious faculties throughout history, and should justify its peculiar claims, if at all, as being the unique fulfilment of that which is more imperfectly revealed elsewhere. Such an attempt cannot succeed without increased attention to the psychology of religion.

In the third place, more distinctively spiritual influences must be recognized. A growing importance is attached in many quarters to the personal and experimental note in religion. It is felt that the spiritual consciousness must contain within itself the means of its own verification, or, failing this, that its proof can be found nowhere else. This formal conclusion is illustrated by the growing influence exerted in many quarters by the accent of personal conviction in regard to the Christian religion. This influence is not purely moral, but has distinctly intellectual elements. The reason of this is well stated by the late Dr. Hort in the introduction to his invaluable Hulsean Lectures on *The Way, the Truth, the Life*.

‘The impulse,’ he says, ‘to give the discussion of Christian evidences an argumentative shape proceeds from a right source, a sense of the untrustworthiness of beliefs founded exclusively on cravings and sympathies, and still more of the difficulty of conveying these grounds of assurance to others.

But this well-founded desire to be rational leads easily to the suppressing of personality as inconsistent with an impartial balance of judgement. Not to speak now of the personal factor which must enter into every perception of comprehensive truth, the effort to be impersonal affects injuriously the discussion of Christian evidences to at least this extent, that it beguiles Christians into setting forth the considerations which ought, they think, to be convincing to others, with little or no reference to what has actually exerted power over their own minds. This vicarious or dramatic pleading cannot escape unreality, except where either its scope is negative—that is, the dialectic refutations of objections—or it is dealing with literary or historical or physical phenomena on a purely literary or historical or physical footing; and consequently it can have no final persuasiveness except towards those peculiar minds whose own beliefs or disbeliefs are formed or retained exclusively within these same limits. With or without good reason, most men who seek foundations on which to build a conviction on grave subjects—not excuses for adhering to an opinion—find no help in arguments which, however honestly urged, bear no trace of having proceeded from an actual experience of help already needed and found.¹

The growing prominence of this demand is due to the correction of the exaggerated intellectualism which at one time prevailed in regard to the explanation of the world because it already prevailed in the psychology of man. Not only were the intellect, the emotions, and the will distinguished from one another, but it was assumed that they worked independently of one another. Thinkers attached almost exclusive importance to the intellect, at any rate so far as the interpretation of the universe was concerned. Such separation is no longer possible. Moreover, the establishment of the principle of evolution has brought the fact of activity in pursuit of ends into the foreground, and has led many to assign to it priority over the theoretic intellect, not merely in order of time, but in importance. It seems more hopeful to attempt to discover the meaning of the world through the ends which man is constrained by the nature of his being to

¹ *Loc. cit.* pp. xxx., xxxi.

seek, than by any other means. Here again it is impossible to isolate one element from the rest. Man's activity is not determined automatically, or without relation to the universe around him. Activity is conditioned by susceptibility, and susceptibility reveals the presence of realities to which it makes response. Intellectual wonder or curiosity may be one of the original springs of action. In that case the primitive and permanent attempt to know may be taken as evidence that the secret of the universe is not unknowable. But beyond this, man's susceptibility and activity are not self-contained, but are the means of his relationship to the universe, which can influence and satisfy him only because he is akin to it, and needs to find himself increasingly at home in it. Hence the testimony of men of distinguished character and deep insight as to the needs which they experience and as to the way in which those needs are met, is a revelation of the meaning of human nature first of all, and then of the universe in which human nature finds itself placed. Such a revelation is of varying degrees of importance according to the depth, the comprehensiveness, and the typical character of those whose testimony is given. This last implies that the effect of such testimony depends upon the extent to which common men find the secrets of their own hearts laid bare in the prophetic utterances of the intuitions and principles which have inspired the greatest of mankind.

Hence the importance of making the Christian consciousness speak for itself in establishing the meaning and truth of the Christian religion. It must not be allowed to reduce itself to lower forms, whether of religion or of thought, nor to take such as the criteria of its truth. It must make explicit the principles of its own life and the secret of its own experience. Yet its success in establishing its own truth by so doing will depend upon its power to demonstrate the solidarity of its own most peculiar experience with the whole texture of human life and history, and through them with the universe itself. It is as the great and indispensable Fulfilment, as the everlasting Yea to all the promises of God which are contained in the nature and needs of man, that

Christianity must exhibit both its full meaning and its ultimate verification. In carrying out this task there is need for the fullest and most many-sided expression by thoughtful Christians of 'the personal factor' to which Dr. Hort alludes; though, as he proceeds to point out, 'Everything personal is in a measure absolutely inexpressible; and further, is relatively inexpressible by reason of the complexities and gradations which distinguish vital from artificial structure.'¹

Yet it is impossible to rest in the more or less successful attempt to give expression to the personal factor. The result aimed at by such expression must be to establish a common point of view, the details of which are filled in by the manifold experiences of differing individualities. Hence fresh attempts at the systematic presentation of Christian Evidences must follow from the new endeavour to make Christian experience speak for itself. It cannot remain subjective if it is to be convincing. And if it is to become objective it must needs once more become systematic. There is need, therefore, of renewed effort so to bring out the relation of the Christian consciousness to the world of reality and truth, that it may become increasingly manifest that it contains within itself the only means of a rational interpretation of the whole.

If such an attempt be made, it may well turn out that when full justice has been done to the principle of continuity, and when full use has been made of the historical and comparative method, the unique character and authority of the Christian religion stands out in clearer light. To begin with, it should become clear that we are concerned, not to find a new religion, but simply a new philosophy of it; and further, that this new philosophy is essentially an attempt to make the old spirit supply its own interpretation, instead of seeking it from sources outside itself. If this be borne in mind it will appear to be of the first consequence that the vital deliverances of the Christian consciousness should be maintained in their complete integrity. Some of these are clearly of critical importance. For example, both the transcendence and the immanence of God have had ceaseless witness borne to them

¹ *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, p. xxxii.

in all the noblest utterances of Christian piety. Speculative Christian thought must sacrifice neither, but must endeavour so to explain both that each shall be seen to be complementary to the other. The Christian consciousness of sin and of redemption from it, is vital. If these be explained away or trifled with, what remains is not entitled to the name of Christianity at all. Again, the reality of revelation and the meaning of grace as a free and merciful self-bestowment of God must equally be upheld in any explanation of the meaning or establishment of the truth of Christianity. Lastly, all these centre in the unique position and significance of Christ Himself. A true exposition and successful defence of Christianity must exalt, and not belittle Him. Yet it may well be that the truth of His exaltation depends upon the fact that He does not stand apart from the whole course of history and from the inmost nature of man, but that He is so eternally one with both, that, as St. Paul says, 'All things have been created through Him and unto Him.'

The greatest task set to Christian theology at the present time is to give due and balanced effect to the principles both of continuity and of distinction in regard to all the great matters which have just been enumerated. To sacrifice either is fatal both to the understanding of Christianity and to the establishment of its truth. It is precisely the heavenly origin of Christianity which insures that when it makes its appearance in the world it comes, not as a stranger and foreigner, but as the end for which all things have prepared the way. The mistake of regarding it as purely external, and as maintained by supports, which though nominally divine, are really artificial, is to do feeble justice to the distinctively spiritual point of view.

The following pages represent an effort in this direction. The difficulty of such an attempt is obvious. Many important subjects must be omitted altogether, and many must be treated slightly, in order that the general point of view may be made good. Yet the establishment of such a point of view involves a survey that is extremely wide. It is impossible to deal with the present needs of Christian Evidences without reviewing their past history. The meaning of Christianity

must be ascertained, and this includes setting forth its relation both to religion in general and also to the great types of historic religion. Its proof involves the discussion of its relation to the spiritual consciousness and to the explanation of the world, the justification of its doctrine of man and redemption, and the examination of the doctrine of God that results, in order to see that it is not involved in intellectual confusion or contradiction. Such is the course marked out for detailed investigation in the three parts of the present inquiry.

BOOK I

THE HISTORY AND TASK OF CHRISTIAN
EVIDENCES

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES TO THE RISE OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

IF the question be asked, What is the function of Christian Evidences? the usual answer would be that their object is to prove the truth of the Christian religion. This would be more closely defined as meaning that their task is to prove the truth of the doctrine of God, of man, of the world, and of their mutual relations, which Christianity sets forth. Such a proof would include, at least, establishing the reality of the objects of the Christian religion, making good the position that the events which manifest these objects actually took place, and showing that the view of life which is based upon the reality of these objects and the truth of these events is reasonable and authoritative. In recent times, for reasons to be more fully explained later on, two other elements have been added to the task. It is necessary to prove on philosophical grounds the trustworthiness of the revelation by which the objects of the Christian religion are made manifest, and, correspondingly, the trustworthiness of the faculties by which men apprehend this revelation, or, to speak more generally, apprehend ultimate reality at all. Those who expound Christian doctrine, or press its claims on the consciences and hearts of men, are constrained, if challenged, to maintain its truth. A short historical survey is necessary in order to understand what is involved in this, and how it has come to pass.

I. In the first place, the necessity of making good the truth of the Christian religion is inherited from the Old Testament.

What the prophets are, above all, concerned to establish is, that Jehovah is the only *true* God. The principles of worship and of conduct which they enforce are enjoined as being the only true response to the revelation of the one true God. This is the most striking distinction between Prophetic religion and all forms of Pagan religion, whether ancient or modern. To pass from Old Testament religion to the religions of other ancient nations, for example, of Greece or Rome, is to find the unrestrained exercise of naïve and uncritical imagination. Such religions are not without rational and ethical elements; but there is an entire absence in them of any adequate ethical end, and of any rationally consistent system, showing the coherence between the objects of worship, the nature of men, and the constitution of the world. Above all, it never occurs to the worshipper, when he has recounted his myths or performed his ceremonies, to ask himself or others, Is this true? For the most part the whole religion is based upon a narrow nationalism, which is in itself sufficient to destroy its universal validity.

In all these respects Polytheism is a true reflection of the imaginative, uncritical, unsystematic, and unethical condition of mind which characterizes its creators. Sometimes religion takes brighter and healthier forms, sometimes more sombre and morbid, according to the temperament of the nation. In some cases the same religion, in varying moods, reflects now the more genial and now the gloomier or austerer influences which from time to time prevail. But beneath all superficial differences, unreflective and uncritical imagination is the universal characteristic of the religion.

In this respect, it can hardly be said to have doctrines at all in the sense in which we understand the term. These imply more or less formal definition, and, therefore, a state of reflection about the objects and acts of religion which has not been reached in ordinary Paganism. What is believed takes poetic forms, worthier or less worthy, and creates practices of outward observance, but not a body of reasoned teaching in which the facts of life are seen in systematic connexion as governed by supreme, spiritual, and moral ends.

Hence, in some cases, notably in that of Greece, as reason

and morality developed, they broke away from the popular religion and took an independent growth. Progress in both lay with the philosophers, and not with the representatives of the popular religion. In the pursuit of truth and of moral progress the philosophers became the severest critics of the accepted religion. By this breaking asunder of religion on the one hand, and of reflection and moral enthusiasm on the other, religion was left without any inner principle of progress, while philosophy and morals were largely, though not entirely, severed from the inspiration of religion. Wisdom and moral inspiration were unable, from the outside, to transform the religion. They were either at warfare with it, or conformed to it with insincere profession and with a perfunctory practice of its external rites. Only when the influence of Christianity had been felt was the attempt made by Neo-Platonism to make religion philosophical and philosophy religious by reading anew the old myths and ceremonies in the light of philosophic reflection.

On the other hand, the Roman state religion was an elaborate attempt to utilize religious principle and emotion, not for the sake of truth, but for the consolidation of the Government, and to secure loyalty for its officers and institutions.

In the case of the Old Testament, all is different. There are, however, passages of the prophetic books which show how narrowly a similar danger was averted. The prophecies of Isaiah and of Jeremiah, for example, show how near the religion of spiritual reason and ethical enthusiasm was to breaking with the cult of the temple and of the priesthood. That the danger was turned aside, and that there is exhibited an ordered progress, in which growth in wisdom and morality deepens and enriches the religion, and is inspired by the religion in its turn, is exactly one of those features which mark the unique character of the Old Testament religion and of its development.

At the same time, there are, in the Old Testament, clear and unmistakeable signs of an ordered growth from the more childlike to the more reflective stages of religion, a growth which advances step by step with the development of spiritual

life, and of mental and moral power. And as the result of this advance the religion of the Old Testament was not merely held as an immediate belief, but was declared authoritatively by the prophets, reflectively by sages, to be *the truth*.

It is well to examine the essential conditions which enable and require what has been intuitively believed to be held and set forth as the truth. Four such conditions are necessary.

1. The growth of reflection and the application of reflection to religion. While the minds of men simply pass from one mood to another and alternate between what they receive from the world in perception and what they fashion within themselves by fancy, everything presented in consciousness is by turns treated as real. Men can tolerate the greatest contradictions because their moods are so separate that their products, however inconsistent with one another, are never brought into immediate conflict. It is as men come to remember, compare, and connect that they seek to harmonize beliefs, and to bring the creations of their reason or of their imagination into defined relations with what they are compelled to treat as objectively and universally valid.

2. But ethical advance and inspiration is even more important than the growth of reflection.

Only as a man seeks to be true himself does he seek for truth in his religion. It is as he sets a standard of veracity to himself that he demands of his religion that it should correspond with facts. The man who seeks after truthfulness and truth as the chief concern of life must have a true God or none at all. Hence, when the ethical end of religion became increasingly explicit within it, it became clear that truth of character and conduct depend on conformity to truth of reality, and that the highest function of religion is to lead men to that truth of reality and to conformity of spirit with it.

In this process the intellectual interest is secondary. It is not a scientific interest which makes the Old Testament prophets demand and set forth the truth of Jehovah. It is the moral necessity, though this leads ultimately to a rational system of world-explanation in terms of the God who satisfies the spiritual and moral need.

3. Not only are reflection and moral development necessary to make the truth of religion its corner-stone, but also the presence of difference. If the man who holds this or that belief were never to meet with any one who believed differently, he would never feel called upon either to assert the truth of what he believes or to prove it. To prove the reality of anything which is unquestioned is a work of supererogation. Hence it was as, first of all, within Israel the prophets became distinguished from the multitude by their higher and more spiritual faith, and, in the second place, as Israel itself came into close and many-sided contact with nations holding a different faith, that the contention that Jehovah, as conceived by the prophets, is the only true God, was called for.

4. Once more, it is not sufficient merely to be brought into contact with difference, but to have the ethical exclusiveness which is bent on overcoming that difference. The condition of such exclusiveness is the ethical emphasis to which attention has already been directed. Such difference had to be overcome, first of all, within the borders of Israel, and later on when presented by the nations with which Israel came into contact. A latitudinarian spirit of universal toleration would have kept the prophet, if he could have existed on such terms, from insisting upon his religion as alone true. It was because contact with difference brought out the determination to overcome that difference, first by securing truth in Israel, and then by hoping and preparing for the triumphs of truth throughout the world, that the prophet was constrained to dwell upon the truth, the exclusive truth, of his religion. The prophetic religion of the Old Testament is, therefore, in conflict with all other religions directly it comes into contact with them. And, under the conditions, its victory can only be secured by the demonstration through prophetic teaching and divine manifestation that it is true.

What are the main outlines of the proof that is offered?

1. In the first place, it unfolds and appeals to a direct spiritual consciousness.

The prophets give expression to their sense of the

immediate and illuminating presence of the living, character-upholding, world-explaining God. Their consciousness confirms and enlarges the simple experience of patriarchal religion. It rises from time to time to the vividness of direct vision.¹ Whatever external evidence they bring is cogent largely by reason of this direct consciousness of God. They do not start from a godless spirit to discover an external God. They have the consciousness of the immediate presence of God, and of certain definite relations with Him. Finding Him within themselves, they go on to find Him everywhere manifest in the world to which they belong. They bring this consciousness forward as the sole source of spiritual satisfaction, of reasonable interpretation of life, and of reconciliation between the facts of inward and outward experience.

2. The ethical note is always predominant. The God whom the prophets set forth as true is the source and the standard of their pursuit of righteousness. He is the only satisfaction of it. Herein is the highest proof that He alone is true. To awaken the desire of righteousness in the hearts of the people is to make good the sovereignty of Jehovah.

3. If the moral nature and needs of men furnish the first verification of their spiritual consciousness of Jehovah, history provides the second. The history of their race and of mankind, as it is unfolded to the prophets, is being wrought out for the ethical ends which Jehovah has revealed, and those ends are served by the whole order of the world. Sometimes the will of Jehovah is accomplished by a miracle, or mighty act; oftener by the order of nature itself. Above all, the divine purpose is fulfilled by great providential events, such as the redemption from Egypt, or the raising up of leaders like Moses and David in earlier history; such as the advent of Cyrus and the return from Babylon in later times. The prophets find as they examine it that the history of the world is a unity controlled by one holy God for holy and righteous ends, which He works out by combined acts of judgement and salvation of which either the record and results remain, or they themselves have been living witnesses. The manifestation of the reality of Jehovah is to be found in that He acts

¹ e.g. Isa. vi.

ceaselessly in the world to secure fuller effect for righteousness in the hearts and fortunes of men. It is involved in this, that He is omnipotent and omniscient, as well as holy, and that He is the Creator and Sustainer of the world that thus serves His ends. The truth that He is all this becomes manifest in what He is doing in the world. Reason and conscience in man are at once awakened, educated, and satisfied by this unfolding of the character, attributes, and relationship of God. The all-holy God, whose purposes are being wrought out in producing holiness in man, is manifest throughout the complex world as sovereign over the whole, and is so because He is its creative Source.

4. Lastly, all this demands an ideal fulfilment which will ultimately bring the world, and its history, into complete accordance with spiritual and moral worth.

The final proof that Jehovah is the true God lies in prophecy; in the revelation, being fulfilled stage by stage, of the processes and events by which the world will be brought into correspondence with the ideal, and man to the enjoyment of the perfect righteousness and blessedness which his nature demands. The living, inward presence of the prophetic word ever receiving fresh outward confirmations, is the convincing evidence to the prophets that their religion is true.

Because of all this, the prophets denounce heathenism, whether within or without the borders of Israel, on three main grounds, namely, its wickedness, its irrationality, its unsatisfying vanity. To disbelieve the only true God comes from moral worthlessness, folly, and frivolity. The writings of Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah afford abundant illustration of the connexion of disbelief of Jehovah with moral worthlessness. Isaiah xl.-lxvi. sets forth its irrationality, while Jeremiah, above all others, dwells upon its unsatisfying vanity.¹ The same general attitude is taken both in the Psalms and in the Wisdom literature.

Thus there grew up the general conception of Jehovah as being Himself true. By this was meant that it is His nature to reveal Himself with complete veracity, to do so by means

¹ See Jer. xvii. 12-17, li. 15-19.

of systematic and holy purpose throughout the world, and in such wise as to show Himself to be the absolute Reality which explains all besides. It was implied also that the true God demands truth of men, because only so are they capable of receiving and setting forth the truth that is in Him. Such was the general view of God and of man, which was established as the result of the Old Testament Apologetic.¹

II. The same causes which compelled the prophets of the Old Testament to make good the truth of their religion, operated in a far greater degree in the case of the apostles and teachers of early Christianity.

In addition, there was the new spirit of individualism in religion, and also the new missionary activity, both of which are of the very essence of Christianity. Christianity is, and must always be, a great missionary enterprise for the conversion of individual men. The conversion of individuals involves, primarily, the persuasion of the heart and the awakening of the conscience. But it involves also the appeal to the reason, of which truth is the standard. Grounds had therefore to be given for the faith that Christianity was true.

1. It was as against the Jew that the Christian had, in the first instance, to prove the truth of his religion. It was out of Judaism that Christianity arose, and by reference, therefore, to Judaism that the original doctrine of Christ and the interpretation of Christ by His apostles were explained. Further, it was from Judaism that the first apostles and teachers sprang, and it was by Jewish opponents that their steps were dogged during the first generation of Christian advance. What was common to both Judaism and Christianity marked out the necessary lines upon which the proof of the latter must proceed. The Old Testament, especially the prophetic writings with their Messianic predictions, were common ground to both Jew and Christian. The Jew expected the fulfilment of these prophecies; the Christian claimed that they had been fulfilled. The whole object,

¹ Similar conditions calling for evidences, and the same features of the evidences supplied, are to be found, so far as the New Testament is concerned, in the Gospel of St. John. This is, however, treated subsequently as part of the content of Christianity (see Book II. Chap. i.).

therefore, of Christian Apologetic, from the Day of Pentecost till the controversy practically died out owing to the ascendancy of Christianity, was to make good the facts of Christ's history and work, to show that these were the fulfilment of prophecy, if not in all completeness, at least in promise and potency, and to turn aside the objections by which the Jews sought to overthrow this conclusion.¹

2. But from the time that St. Paul turned from the Jews to the Gentiles, Christian missionaries came face to face with the established religions of Greece and Rome, and to some extent of the East. In claiming all men for the service of Christ, and in offering to all the infinite satisfaction of the gospel, the Christian teacher had to establish the superiority of Christianity over all other religions. He did this by a threefold process. In the first place, he exposed the irrationality and denounced the immorality of the prevailing religions, though hardly with greater intensity than had been used by the more spiritual philosophers themselves. He went on, in the next place, to exhibit the rationality and the moral power of the gospel he preached; to show how its doctrine of God and of Christ satisfied the reason and conscience which heathenism had outraged. Finally, if he were sufficiently broad and sympathetic, he went on to set forth how the higher elements of thought and practice, which were enshrined in the myths and legends of Paganism, were shadows of the fuller and nobler reality of Christ.

3. In this conflict, the Christian teacher was led to deal with multitudes in the great cities of the Empire, who lived according to the popular interpretation of Epicureanism, and, if they philosophized at all, accepted the Epicurean doctrine of God and view of human life. For these all religion was a plaything of outward observances, if they were merely indifferent; a thing to be hated and put away if they were of intenser temperament.

The doctrine which unfolded the superiority of the Christian gospel in presence of ordinary Paganism became an appeal to the inextinguishable needs of the human heart in dealing with the moral scepticism and self-indulgence which

¹ Justin, *Against Trypho*, &c.

were the natural outcome in popular life of Epicureanism in formal thought.

Such were the inevitable tasks of Christianity in the first ages of its progress.

4. At an earlier stage another task had to be undertaken. Christianity became sufficiently well known to be confronted with public opinion, and ultimately to attract the attention of rulers. Its teaching and practices, above all its spirit, were the subject of frequent misunderstanding and of caricature, to say nothing of the calumnies which were industriously propagated by the Jews. It had to clear itself from all these misunderstandings and calumnies if it was to live. As it cleared itself, it was enabled to appeal to and satisfy the spirit of earnest inquiry, which was awakened here and there into its real meaning and aims. Especially it had to justify both to rulers and to people that exclusive spirit which was so contrary to the tolerant policy of the Roman Empire, and to the prevailing religious indifference of its people. Why could not Christians live and let live according to the general policy of the Roman Empire? Why must they be so stubbornly obstinate in refusing the slightest and most momentary compliance with those observances of the State religion, which were an indispensable cement to the social structure as it then existed? They had to present their *apologia* for this exclusive spirit, so alarming to the authorities, and they could found it upon nothing else than the exclusive truth of their religion and the exclusive right of truth to be obeyed.

5. As Christian teachers endeavoured to fulfil their great undertaking, they necessarily became thinkers. As they succeeded they were gradually recruited from the ranks of thinkers. Thus they were brought into growingly sympathetic relations with the nobler philosophy of the times, especially with Platonism and Stoicism in their most recent forms. The loftier minds of the times sought, in one or other of these philosophies, the explanation of the universe and of human life. They were, for those who held them, the highest truth, the standard by which all else was judged. There were elements in them which profoundly appealed to the Christian

mind, as affording a support and a form to its doctrine,¹ and as being congenial to many of its spiritual ideals. Moreover, there was this common ground between Christians and philosophers, that both set before themselves the attainment of truth as the end, in the former case of faith, in the latter of speculation. Christianity must needs meet the test which such philosophy applied to it, and must show its superiority both in respect of truth and as a source of spiritual and moral satisfaction. It was implied in the proof of the latter that satisfying power is one of the credentials of the truth.

In his polemic against the popular religion the Christian apologist boldly claimed the alliance of the philosopher. Both occupied a common position in their opposition, if not to popular observances, at least to popular beliefs. But the essential contention of Christian teachers was that they possessed the *whole*, of which philosophy was not even a complete foundation, but only a fragmentary part.² To the highest teaching of Plato or of the Stoics was opposed the Old Testament doctrine of God in the glory of His personality, in the fullness of His attributes, in His living self-revelation in and through a divine activity directed to supreme spiritual and ethical ends. They added the facts of the life and teaching of Christ as fulfilling the revelation of God contained in the Old Testament, as embodying the highest reason, and bringing a complete satisfaction and salvation to the human heart. They went further, and showed how the place of Christ in the universe answered to and could be expressed in terms of the highest conceptions of philosophical thought. They endeavoured to supply the element which was lacking in the most spiritual philosophy, the assurance of a personal and condescending God, who satisfies the infinite craving of the human heart with the gift of Himself.

In this work the evidence of prophecy was peculiarly important. Exhaustive efforts were made to show how the prophecies of the Old Testament had been fulfilled in Christ.

¹ Especially in regard to the Logos.

² See Justin, *Address to the Greeks*, in which he claims that Plato's doctrine was derived from Moses.

It was made clear that the foreknowledge shown in them was as much beyond unaided human thought as the fulfilment was beyond unaided human power. Herein, therefore, was a clear proof that the living God had communicated beforehand to the prophets the secrets of the history which He Himself was working out. This evidence met the needs of the Christian case as against both the Jew and the philosopher. The Jew believed in the prophecies and needed the proof that they had been fulfilled. The philosopher believed in a divine first principle, but had no conception of the manifestation, in an unfolding history, of the living God to the spirits of men.

Hence the evidence of prophecy was insisted upon more strongly than even that of miracles, with the exception of the miracle of the Resurrection, which was necessary to the existence and manifestation of the kingdom of Christ. This preference may partly be accounted for by the fact that the prevalent practices of thaumaturgy rendered the support of miracles a somewhat doubtful gain. But, still more, the revelation beforehand by God of His purposes to mankind manifested more completely the glory of His condescending and consistent personality, than the mere occurrence of miracles. And it was the fact of this holy and gracious personality that had, above all, to be brought home to the philosophers.

6. As Christianity advanced, not only in outward development, but in inward fullness of life, there grew up, at least in the intellectual atmosphere of Alexandria, the need and power of reflection upon its inner principles and meaning. The truth revealed in Christ must for believers fulfil and replace philosophy, so that by it, God, Christ, mankind, and the world could be explained in their mutual relations. It was inevitable that such a Christian philosophy should absorb the congenial elements of the philosophy of the past, but should transcend them, becoming a new thing. All this was possible only where many tendencies met, as was the case in a great world-centre like Alexandria, and where the intellectual atmosphere was created by the reflective and sympathetic mind of the Greeks. Under such influences, Christianity

was accepted as a living system of world-explaining truth ; not now in order to make good this position against the outside world so much as to satisfy the rational needs of its own adherents. For men of thoughtful temperament, salvation in Christ was incomplete without such rational satisfaction. The unique power of Christianity to supply such satisfaction was the final evidence of its truth.

Origen furnishes in some respects the most perfect example of this newer type of Christian Evidences, as he does of the ordinary controversial type. In his work *Against Celsus* he goes over with untiring thoroughness all the objections, philosophical, critical, historical, or ethical, which Celsus had raked together from all sources against the history, character, and claims of Christ, or against the temper, objects, and methods of the Christian Church. The work is a complete reservoir, containing the whole case against Christianity, as then presented, together with the answer made by the most original and gifted of early Christian thinkers. On the other hand, Origen's work, *Concerning First Principles*, exhibits his own view of Christianity as the only satisfying world-philosophy, and as more than this, since it encloses a world-philosophy in the divine revelation and fulfilment of a universally redemptive and consummating end in Christ. This latter book may be taken as a continuation of the great works of Clement of Alexandria, whose temper is still more profound and spiritual. Together they mark the last utterances of Christian wisdom before the attention of the Church was diverted by far-reaching controversies, first as to the divinity and nature of Christ ; then as to the nature, condition, and redemption of man.

III. With the general acceptance of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire, a new phase of the history of Christian Evidences is reached.

In one sense they no longer continue to exist, for nominally there is no longer an external world to convert. The dogmas of the Church now pass unquestioned, and supply both guidance to thought and direction to practical life. But the motives that prompt to philosophy could not be suppressed, nor could the field which had been occupied by philosophy

be overlooked. Further, although for centuries the remains of Greek thought only reached the great thinkers by indirect channels—through the works of Augustine, of the Pseudo-Dionysius, and of Boëthius—yet these works were steeped in Platonic thought, and exhibited that affinity between Plato and the New Testament which had been perceived and utilized by all the more philosophic of the Church Fathers. For these reasons the period known as the Scholastic Period is the time when the great thinkers of the Church combined a childlike reception of its scheme of doctrines with a ceaseless endeavour to show that they contained within them a complete explanation of the world, and gave, therefore, full satisfaction to the demands of reason. Reason, indeed, was not even an objector or a critic; it was the faithful ally of ecclesiastical authority, because the source alike of reason and of authority was seen to be the same. During this period, therefore, Christianity is not established as true against those who were without, but its truth is made manifest in furnishing a complete and consistent world-explanation, in terms of the reigning spiritual philosophy, and, therefore, as confirmed by that philosophy.

The transition to this point of view is to be found in the writings of Augustine, not to mention the Alexandrian teachers, Clement and Origen, who exercised no direct influence over Western thought. On the one hand, there is to be found in Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* a polemic against Pagan religion, its principles and practices, such as was carried on by the earlier apologists. But on the other, the work proceeds to set forth a philosophy of history, which is steeped in Platonic influences, while entirely based upon the teaching and history of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. Still more, Augustine's *De Trinitate*, while more distinctly religious in its motive and less formally philosophic than the works of the Schoolmen, is yet a foreshadowing of, and supplies material for, their dealing with the dogmas of the Church.

The great aim of the earlier or Platonic Schoolmen was to show that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the highest dogma of Christianity, is the necessary explanation of the

divine nature and also of the creation and redemption of the world. If the treatment of the subject is unduly abstract and psychological,¹ at least the earlier Schoolmen avoid the mistake made by later theology of holding the doctrines of the Trinity and of Creation in such isolation from one another that neither throws light upon the other. Hence they succeed in finding the basis of redemption in the essential relations of the Godhead to creation and to the life of man as naturally constituted. In this respect Anselm, however, is disappointing. The associations of feudal sovereignty cause him to abandon in the *Cur Deus Homo* the vantage-ground he gained in the *Proslogion* for explaining the Atonement.

The separation between the doctrines of the Godhead and of Creation, on the one hand, and between the natural constitution of the world and redemption on the other, was brought about when, in the time of the later Schoolmen, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, the influence of Plato and the Stoics was superseded by that of Aristotle. The fundamental intellectual aim remained the same, but distinctions were now introduced which prevented it from being carried out with anything like the thoroughness of the earlier Schoolmen. The strictly evidential purpose again assumes prominence in presence of the growing and sometimes daring scepticism becoming manifest in the great seats of learning, notably in Paris. Two main distinctions have affected the whole course of Christian Evidences down to the present day, as will shortly become clear. These are the distinction between Natural and Revealed religion, and that between the province of Reason and that of Faith. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity, expressed in a form largely derived from Plato, the Stoics, and the psychology of Augustine, had been, as has been said, the key with the earlier Schoolmen to the doctrine of Creation. Henceforth this position was abandoned. The world, considered as natural, was explained according to the mediaeval understanding of the metaphysics of Aristotle. It was the result of a divine First Cause, who, as Prime Mover, Himself unmoved, had set all things in motion, as

¹ Derived from Augustine.

Designer had contrived them, and as Supreme Will had ordained their existing order. Reason had, in the Gentile world, discerned this truth, unaided by revelation. Revelation had delivered it with accordant voice to the Hebrew race, and had, therefore, confirmed it to all who accepted the authority of the Old Testament. Hence for this part of Christian truth Reason might be the discoverer, though Revelation was the authenticator of the discovery when made. But redemption and the perfecting of natural life by grace, while they gave occasion for a fuller and higher revelation of the Godhead, were made known, not to reason, but to faith. By this it was meant that this higher truth was revealed to, and authenticated by, an ecclesiastical authority, which defined its meaning and imposed its acceptance upon faith. The evidence which authenticated it was not to be found in the power of spiritual insight to discover in it the working of the same divine Reason, which had already been found to be the explanation of the natural world. Its proof lay in the fact that, above and outside the natural order, miracles had been wrought both to confirm the truth and to accredit the authority which interpreted it. On the faith of the miracles, therefore, the claim of the authority was admitted, and on the declaration of the authority a system of dogmas was received, which was beyond the range of reason not only to discover, but even to verify, apart from miraculous attestation; although, no doubt, it could subsequently be shown not to be contrary to reason. Hence the reality of the divine facts became subordinate to the system of dogmas which could be extracted from them. And the facts were important just in so far as, being miraculous, they stood outside the natural order; not as being contained within and as consummating that order. The whole realm of specifically Christian truth was placed outside the order and inner reason of the world. It was indeed accidental, brought about as an external remedy for the accidental happening of sin. The remedy thus introduced could be seen—at least so the Thomists taught—to be the most reasonable that could be imagined. Still it was an artificial device to repair an accidental Fall, and the means

by which restoration was brought about stood in no vital relation to that essential life of the world, from which sin is a perverse departure. Proof of the truth of Christianity was, therefore, strictly speaking, limited to proof of the natural theology, which was common both to Christianity and to Greek philosophy. The only proof of which specifically Christian doctrine was capable was the proof of the authenticating facts, and of the rightful claims of the authenticating authority to interpret them; except that it could further be shown that there was nothing involved to which reason could properly object.

A further step was taken, however, by the Scotist philosophers and by the Nominalists. To begin with, ecclesiastical authority had been recognized as uttering in complete form the voice of reason. Later on that authority had at least acknowledged Reason, divine and human, and had arranged a partition of provinces and functions with Reason. But by the Scotists Reason, not only in men, but in the universe, was set aside. All things might have been ordained differently by God. His bare will determined them, for no reason that could be discovered, save that He so willed them. And what He had willed could only be known by the authoritative declaration of the Church. The dogmatic faith remained, its declarations being unquestioned, but Reason—as in God selecting the highest ends, and as in man discovering them—was swept away. To explain the world as a consistently rational system became impossible. God was bare Will, and the world that proceeded from Him was, with all its events, the product of bare will. Christianity was declared, not proved, to be true. It was true as an actual occurrence; not as the foundation and the climax of a reasonable and truly spiritual order.

IV. It was in such a state of thought that the Renaissance took place.

In addition to the unwelcome limitations imposed upon Reason by the Thomists, and to the scepticism encouraged by the Scotists and Nominalists, the ecclesiastical theory of life destroyed the worth of the present for the sake of the future life, and set up asceticism as the highest ideal of life. The

Renaissance was the effect of two causes, the recovery of the old learning, and the revolt of human nature against the unnatural philosophy and practice of life predominant in the Church. The revival of the past was attractive, largely because it justified and glorified the breach with the present. Men awoke from the nightmare of ecclesiasticism to discover a world of frank and poetic naturalism, that not only conceded the legitimacy but fostered the indulgence of all the natural tastes and appetites which the Church restrained or condemned. The old civilization had treated the world in which men actually live as alone real and substantial. Such a view accorded well with the demands of the ordinary passions and ambitions of worldly men. Moreover, men stood at the dawn of a new era, when the discovery of new continents awakened a new sense of freshness and vastness in human life. Trading communities also were springing up, and under the influence of trade practical scientific interests were awakening. Practical life could not be reconciled with the current ecclesiastical ideals. It seemed desirable, therefore, to throw over the incubus of Christianity; frankly to recognize the present and earthly as the real. The spirit of pagan religion, which glorified the present and rested upon a worldly theory of life, must be restored, in order that men might pursue unrestrained, on the one hand, the enjoyment of life, and, on the other, its practical concerns.

The Renaissance, therefore, represents essentially a rediscovered faith in the worth of this life, the dawn of practical and scientific interests and methods, and the reaction against the ascetic ideals which had been set forth as representing Christianity. It took place at a time when the moral life of humanity was low, and when life, especially in the cities of Italy, had become indescribably corrupt. Hence it was disfigured here and there by a complete revolt, in both theory and practice, from all ethical standards of life.

It was the conjoint influence of authoritative religion, emptied alike of rationality and of spiritual endeavour, and of revived Paganism, with its unnatural return to a naturalism that, under these conditions, could only be bestial, that necessitated and occasioned the Reformation. The circumstances

determined the evidential task of the Reformation. It lay, not in argument or in a completer philosophy, but in the renewed utterance of the inextinguishable longings of the human heart for something higher and more divine than either external religion or an earthly paradise. Its ministering to that demand lay in the experience and proclamation by Luther of a gospel which found in Christ at once the satisfaction of the deepest needs and the warrant of the lawfulness and worth of a natural life, ethically conducted. Of formal arguments, proving once more the truth of assailed doctrines or the reality of spiritual objects, there is none in Luther. Yet his message, and that of other typical Reformers, being the utterance of men possessed by the presence of God, re-established the truth of Christianity by awakening the heart to find in it the only true satisfaction and inspiration of life. In this respect the influence of the Reformers was almost as powerful over the Roman Catholicism they abandoned as on the Protestantism they created.

V. With the advent of Protestantism and the organization of Protestant Churches, each having its own articles of association, came for the first time the necessity of defining and proving in controversy particular doctrines and systems of doctrine.

The Church had often been plunged into controversy with heretics in the early ages, but for a thousand years one system of doctrine had reigned practically unquestioned in Western Christianity. The divisions of the Reformation set all parties elaborating and defining the systems of doctrine by which the faith of each was to be distinguished. The Lutheran, the Reformed, the Anglican Churches, on the Protestant side; the Roman Church, by means of the Council of Trent, on the other, occupied themselves thus. In contrast with them all was the Racovian Catechism of those who acknowledged the leadership of the older and the younger Socinus. Christian Evidences, as such, were hardly called for, and certainly did not flourish during this period. The whole energy of each Christian community was concentrated on defining its position relative to that of others, to finding conclusive evidence in Holy Scripture for its system of doctrines, and to controverting

the distinctive tenets of the rest. Such ceaseless controversy between the various Christian bodies and within them must needs have led to a general weakening of the authority of Christian doctrine, as a whole, in the case of those who stood outside the immediate interest of the discussions. While controversy led to the upbuilding of distinctive systems of Christian thought, it opened the way for a spirit which set aside the dogmas of the Churches altogether. This undoubtedly was one of the contributory causes to the rise of Deism.

VI. The history of Christian Evidences proper again becomes important with the Deistic controversy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

That controversy arose in England, and represents a type of thought distinctly English. But it spread to France, and eventually, in the Illuminist movement, to Germany. To understand Deism it is necessary to start with the philosophical writings of Francis Bacon, and to take account of the influence of John Locke.

On the Continent the transition from ancient to modern thought was made by Des Cartes. The starting-point of his philosophy was the testimony of individual consciousness, as enunciated in his celebrated thesis, 'I think; therefore I am.' By the adoption of this basis he swept away the whole structure of Greek metaphysics, in order to build up a new system, not from speculation as to the general relations in the universe between mind and matter, or between reason and sense, but from investigation into what is contained in the individual experience of thinking. It is impossible to question the validity of the affirmation, 'I think; therefore I am.' For to doubt is itself an exercise of thought, and carries with it belief in the existence of the Self, which doubts. On this basis Des Cartes set up once more, on the testimony of individual consciousness, a spiritual philosophy, which included the belief in the existence of God as derived from the innate and necessary idea of God. He thus found the justification of Anselm's ontological proof of the existence of God in the content of human consciousness itself. The consciousness of the finite carries with it, as its correlative, the consciousness

of the infinite, for finitude has no meaning except as contrasted with infinity. But not only is the idea of an Infinite Being given in finite consciousness, but of an infinitely perfect Being in contrast with the finite consciousness of imperfection. And this necessarily given idea is more than an idea. It represents the ultimate truth of things, and thus the thought of God carries in itself the proof of His existence. Hence the old conclusion was securely established upon the modern basis of an individualist philosophy.

But in England the transition to the modern point of view was made, not through a philosophical transformation, but, in accordance with the practical temper of the race, by the growth of scientific modes of thought. The inaugurator of the change was Francis Bacon, by his great work on *The Dignity and Advancement of Learning* and by his *Novum Organum*. Bacon set himself to sweep away the old abstract conceptions of the universe, whether based on theological or on metaphysical doctrines, and to substitute for speculation the method of inductive investigation of the phenomena of the external world, so as to build up by careful experimental inquiry a body of actually ascertained truth. He attempted to set out the conditions on which such a task can be fulfilled and to expose the various 'idols' of the imagination, which lead men to substitute fictions of their own for the true scientific explanation of the real facts of the universe. The predominance given to the world of sense-experience and to the methods of investigation which are applicable to that experience, taken alone would inevitably tend to throw into the shade all other realms of reality, and all other means of attaining to truth. But, in addition, the distinction which had passed current since the time of Thomas Aquinas between natural and revealed religion, between reason and faith, began now to manifest its consequences. Revelation was formally recognized by Bacon, but politely bowed out of the world of ascertained knowledge. Two quotations will make this clear. In dealing with natural theology, which 'may be justly called divine philosophy,' Bacon says, 'Divine philosophy is a science, or rather the rudiments of a science, derivable from God by the light of nature, and the contemplation of His

creatures; so that with regard to its object, it is truly divine; but with regard to its acquirement, natural. The bounds of this knowledge extend to the confutation of atheism, and the ascertaining the laws of nature, but not to the establishing of religion. And, therefore, God never wrought a miracle to convert an atheist, because the light of nature is sufficient to demonstrate a deity; but miracles were designed for the conversion of the idolatrous and superstitious, who acknowledged a God, but erred in their worship of Him—the light of nature being unable to declare the will of God or assign the just forms of worshipping Him. For as the power and skill of a workman are seen in his works, but not his person, so the works of God express the wisdom and omnipotence of the Creator without the least representation of His image. . . . And, therefore, the being of a God, that He governs the world, that He is all-powerful, wise, prescient, good, a just rewarder and punisher, and to be adored, may be shown and enforced from His works, and many other wonderful secrets, with regard to His attributes, and much more as to His dispensation and government over the universe may also be solidly deduced, and made appear from the same. And this subject has been usefully treated by several.

‘But from the contemplation of nature, and the principles of human reason, to dispute or urge anything with vehemence, as to the mysteries of faith, or over-curiously to examine and sift them, by prying into the manner of the mystery, is no safe thing: “Give unto faith the things that are faith’s” . . . so that it is a vain attempt to draw down the sublime mysteries of religion to our reason, but we should rather raise our minds to the adorable throne of heavenly truth. And in this part of natural theology we find rather an excess than any defect; whither we have now, however, turned a little aside to note, on account of the extreme prejudice and danger which both religion and philosophy hence incur, because a mixture of these makes both an heretical religion and a fantastic and superstitious philosophy.’¹

In dealing with the relations between reason and faith, Bacon lays down, ‘The prerogative of God extends over the

¹ *Advancement of Learning*, Book III. chap. ii.

whole man, and reaches both to his will and his reason; so that man must absolutely renounce himself, and submit to God: and therefore, as we are obliged to obey the divine law, though our will murmur against it, so are we obliged to believe the Word of God, though our reason be shocked at it. For if we should believe only such things as are agreeable to our reason, we assent to the matter, and not to the author: which is no more than we do to a suspected witness. . . . And, therefore, the more absurd and incredible any divine mystery is, the greater honour we do to God in believing it; and so much the more noble the victory of faith.' ¹

Here, then, is the conclusion of the matter. A real world is set up for scientific experiment, which can only be considered as the work of an intelligent Designer, whose attributes are manifest in His work, but not His Person. On the other hand, there is revelation, which has its own methods of establishing itself, but appeals to faith and not to reason. Faith is the more perfect the more independent it is of rational grounds of belief. The truths of religion, therefore, as distinguished from the general explanation of the world as the product of design, are incapable of proof and set entirely beyond the bounds of reason.

The second influence which it is necessary to take account of is that of Locke, in many respects the typical representative of English philosophy. The outstanding metaphysical controversy in his time was as to whether human knowledge is, or is not, to be explained by the presence of innate ideas. The great continental philosophers, Des Cartes and his successors, held that knowledge cannot be explained without innate ideas, which belong to the mind as part of its original outfit, independent of and before all possible sense-experience. Sense-experience, they held, could not give either the universality or the necessity which belongs to many of our judgements. Locke, on the other hand, set himself to destroy the doctrine of innate ideas, laying down the principle that there is nothing in the intellect which has not first been given in sense-experience. The mind of each individual is originally a *tabula rasa*; sensation is the only source of

¹ *Advancement of Learning*, Book IX.

knowledge, and knowledge results from sensation by the processes of reflection.

But in this sense-limited world Locke is confronted with the presence of religion, and in what he has to say, however theoretically unsatisfactory, his perfect good faith is undoubted.

Locke devotes the eighteenth chapter of the Fourth Book of his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* to the subject of 'Faith and Reason, and their Distinct Provinces.' He starts by laying down that 'till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.' Proceeding to give his own explanation of the matter, he says, 'Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection. Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition not thus made out by the deductions of reason; but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call revelation.' He then proceeds to lay down that 'no man inspired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas, which they had not before from sensation or reflection'; that 'whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us, than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation'; and that 'no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge, still less if the revelation be traditional and not immediate and original.' There are, however, 'many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith.'

‘Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above reason; and where the principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine.’ Finally, ‘there can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as that of the principle of reason; and therefore nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged, or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do.’

Locke, in effect, fences round the world of knowledge, as derived exclusively from sense by the processes of reflection, from the world of revelation given to faith. The only realm in which faith is to reign is that wherein knowledge, which belongs to reason, is impossible or defective. There the propositions communicated by revelation (for revelation deals entirely with propositions) must be accepted, if they do not contradict reason; but they must be held by faith, which is a faculty entirely separate from reason, though subject to its criticism.

The present concern is not to criticize this view, but to show how Locke co-operated with Bacon to prepare the way for the Deists. Passing by the fact that the general view of the relation of God to the universe and to man is in both cases that of deistic apartness, both Bacon and Locke, in assigning a function for revelation and faith, make clear that the propositions embodied in revelation and accepted by faith cannot lay claim to be treated as knowledge. They are to be held indeed, but on grounds of inferior certitude to those of sense-experience.

The result of such explanations was to place revelation and supernatural religion generally in such a precarious position as to invite attack. And this attack was delivered by the Deists. Accepting just so much of religion as Bacon declared could be justified by natural philosophy, they threw over both revelation and faith. Many of them went so far

in rejecting religious beliefs as to deny the immortality of the soul, but they retained belief in God as being necessary, and, in so far as necessary, to account for the origin and order of the world.

Without entering into minor details, this explanation is sufficient for the understanding of the new task set to Christian Evidences. In particular it gives the key to the greatest work which the controversy produced, namely, *The Analogy of Religion*, by Bishop Butler; dealing in the first part with natural, and in the second with revealed religion.

The task which Butler set himself so far as natural religion is concerned, was, assuming the conclusions of the Deists 'as to the constitution and course of nature,' to show that on the same principles belief in a future life, in the government of God by rewards and punishments, in the moral government of God, and in a state of probation, might be justified. The same reasons as were urged on behalf of the narrower, justified the fuller faith, and no greater difficulties beset it. The matter is thus stated by Butler in his Introduction. 'Let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral system of Nature; the acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece. And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very much so; that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of divine conduct.' The difficulties which in Butler's mind were incidental to the system of the world were resolved by the consideration that the 'government of God considered as a scheme or constitution' is and must be 'imperfectly comprehended.' As finite creatures in an infinitely complex world, men cannot expect to understand all parts of it. Life, therefore, cannot fail to present difficulties, which are at present insurmountable by our reason. In this way natural religion, involving the existence of a moral Governor, who is concerned to train character by the combined means of rewards and punishments, and who, owing to the immortality of the soul, has unlimited time in which

to work out His purposes, is established, as being in the highest degree reasonable, on grounds common to the Deists.

From this conclusion reached in the first part, Butler proceeds to deal with revealed religion in the second. Here he attempts to show by similar reasoning that the essential features of revealed religion are foreshadowed in the ordinary course of nature. Three main objections to Revelation are dealt with by Butler: firstly, that it is believed to be miraculous; secondly, that it involves faith in a Mediator; and thirdly, that there is only partial knowledge and belief of it. His observation of the course of nature shows Butler something in it analogous to all these features of revelation. The origin of the world, for example, demands, according to Butler, a kind of forthputting of the divine power differing from that which is involved in maintaining it. Moreover, fresh methods of divine working become manifest in the world, from time to time, and each is, in a measure, miraculous in relation to that which went before. Similarly, there are instances of mediatorial action and of vicarious suffering throughout the whole course of human life. And, finally, almost all knowledge, and many of the highest goods of life, are possessed by comparatively few; the knowledge and enjoyment of them can only gradually, if ever, become the portion of all men. Once more, the principle is invoked, by the aid of which Butler accomplished so much, that the whole system of the world is a scheme at present imperfectly comprehended. Thus, in the case of revealed religion, Butler succeeds, as he had done in that of natural religion, in showing that there is no more difficulty of belief than exists in regard to the natural Theism which the Deists expounded. Probably, nowadays, every one would agree with Butler that to travel as far as the Deists, is to be compelled by the necessities of thought ultimately to go the whole course.

The seventh chapter of the second part of the *Analogy* treats 'of the particular evidence for Christianity,' 'dealing with the evidence of miracles and the marks which establish the trustworthiness of the testimony to them, with prophecy, and with collateral evidence, which, taken as a whole, supplies a cumulative proof of the truth of Christianity.'

The ordinary course of Christian Evidences in Great Britain from the time of Butler has followed pretty closely the lines which have already been traced. It will be necessary shortly to offer some criticism of Paley, who may be treated as the typical English writer on this subject. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to note that the distinction between natural and revealed religion has been maintained throughout, and that the chief stress has been laid upon the argument from design, so far as the existence of God is concerned, though not to the exclusion of the evidence of the existence of a moral Governor afforded by the testimony of moral consciousness. Revealed religion has not, for the most part, at least till recently, been treated in as close a connexion with the ordinary course of human life as was done by Butler in the second part of the *Analogy*. Stress has generally been laid upon its confirmation by the miracles of the gospel, and upon establishing the trustworthiness of the witnesses of them. Many special lines of evidence have been followed in recent times. Works have been written in support of the belief in miracles on philosophical grounds, dealing with the moral and other difficulties of Christianity, and so forth. But the main lines followed have, almost up to the present, been those which have just been explained.

VII. A much more far-reaching question was opened up by the critical philosophy of Kant. The philosophy of Kant can only be understood in relation to that of David Hume. It was Hume who 'first interrupted' Kant's 'dogmatic slumber' and gave his 'investigation in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction.'¹ As has already been pointed out, the great problem with philosophers from the time of Des Cartes was to explain the universality and necessity of certain of our judgements. How can universality and necessity be predicated of certain propositions, which, so far as actual experience goes, are only established by very limited observation? Hume fastened upon one of these judgements, the proposition that 'every event must have a cause.' Metaphysicians before his time had, with the exception of sensationists like Locke, fallen back upon the innate

¹ Kant's *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic* (Introduction).

idea of Causality as the explanation. Hume absolutely denied both the fact and the explanation. There is no such necessity given in thought, and there are no such innate ideas. A merely subjective necessity arising from custom has been treated as an objective necessity of real knowledge. When we lay down that every event must have a cause, what we ought to mean is, in substance, that every event which takes place in time has had an antecedent, that, so far as our experience goes, particular events have always been preceded by particular antecedents, and that, therefore, customary association leads us to expect that the experience of the past will, in similar circumstances, be repeated in the future. Partly, therefore, by inevitable association, and partly for the practical guidance of life, we universalize our experience and treat it as necessary. But in so far as this is done for theoretic, and not merely for practical purposes, our procedure goes beyond the evidence, and is invalid. It was to this explanation of the principle of causality that Kant's attention was particularly drawn.

Two remarks should be added by the way. In the first place, as Hume dismissed the concept of Causality, so he dismissed that of Substance. Berkeley's idealism had explained away the substantial existence of matter. Hume completed the work by denying the substantial existence of mind. Secondly, it was by means of the same principle of customary association that Hume destroyed the proof of miracles. At first sight it might appear that to resolve the sense of necessity and universality, attaching to the concept of Causality, into a beneficial but unfounded illusion, made belief in miracles, which violate the supposed natural order of the world, easier. But Hume interposed between men and this conclusion in his celebrated *Essay on Miracles*. The current proof of Christianity depended almost entirely upon establishing the trustworthiness of the witnesses of the gospel miracles. Hume attacked this one stronghold of faith by arguing that, according to universal experience, it is more credible that testimony should be false than that miracles should be true. No amount of evidence, therefore, according to him, that in any particular instance the testimony was

true and the miracle did actually take place, can be sufficient to break down this conclusion of the human mind, derived from general experience. The influence of this attack will be apparent when Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* are considered.

Reid and the Scottish school of philosophy replied to the general scepticism of Hume by an appeal to the 'original constitution of our nature' as made known by the common sense of mankind. The fundamental deliverances of human consciousness testified to the existence of a real Ego, of a real world external to and independent of the percipient, to the validity of the principle of causality, and so forth. Belief in all these things is part of the general outfit of mankind: to doubt them makes life impossible, and therefore they must be accepted as true on pain of reducing thought to imbecility.

This appeal, as he understood the matter, to the common sense of uninstructed mankind, Kant was unable to admit. He set himself, therefore, to work out an independent solution of the problem raised by Hume. He found that men do pass certain judgements relating to objects in space and time, as being necessarily, and therefore universally, true, not only in advance of, but entirely apart from, sense-experience. The sciences of pure mathematics are conclusive evidence of this. In like manner, coming to pure physics, it appeared that the human mind treats the whole world as necessarily subject to laws, and this quite apart from proving by observation and experiment that law is universal. It is clear that such a proof is beyond human power. Yet, notwithstanding this inability, the whole body of natural science is based upon the belief, not only that the subjection of all things to a uniform system of laws is true, but that it must necessarily be true.

How can these facts be explained? How are pure mathematics and pure physics possible? In addition, how are metaphysics, and especially metaphysics as a science, possible? Kant's answer is practically that the mind is originally constituted in three great departments. These are the Sensibility, with its forms of space and time; the Understanding, with its categories; and the Reason, with its ideas.

All these are essential to our experience in its completeness. Their activity is awakened in order by the presentation to our sensibility of the *non-ego*, in itself unknown.

To begin with, we cannot experience any object except as having a certain place in space, and as occurring at a particular period in a time-succession. But space and time are not in the objects perceived : they exist only in percipient minds. They are the necessary subjective conditions of our perception of the *non-ego*. Therefore we can attain necessary truth in pure mathematics because they are entirely concerned with the forms of time and space. We can arrive at necessary judgements in the sphere of mathematics so long as we do not stray outside the necessary forms which condition our sense-experience ; that is, so long as our judgements are kept consistent with the indispensable conditions laid down by the forms of space and time in themselves.

In like manner, as to the possibility of pure *a priori* physics. The object which is presented to us under the forms of the sensibility, space, and time is at the next stage subsumed under the categories of the understanding. The so-called categories had been in use for the purpose of formal logic since the time of Aristotle, who brought them together and gave them their precise definition. Kant, after years of reflection, thought that he had 'been able to produce a complete list of these categories,' or concepts of the understanding. He arranged a transcendental table of the pure concepts of the understanding under the four heads of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, as follows :—

1. <i>As to Quantity.</i>	2. <i>As to Quality.</i>
Unity (the Measure).	Reality.
Plurality (the Quantity).	Negation.
Totality (the Whole).	Limitation.
3. <i>As to Relation.</i>	4. <i>As to Modality.</i>
Substance.	Possibility.
Cause.	Existence.
Community.	Necessity.

Again, necessary *a priori* knowledge is possible, so long as, in the case of pure physics, no attempt is made to travel

beyond the content of these concepts, which are part of the original outfit of the mind, and therefore not dependent, save for their awakening into activity, upon sense-experience.

But the functions of the sensibility and of the understanding are not sufficient to explain knowledge as a whole. They would give us, indeed, knowledge of particular objects, but not of the world as a systematic whole. For that purpose the Reason, with its ideas, is necessary. These ideas are three in number—the Psychological, the Cosmological, and the Theological; in other words, the ideas of self, of the world, of God. Experience is unified into what we know as the system of the universe by our necessary use of these three great ideas.

But an all-important distinction is now made in respect of the ideas of the Reason. Whereas theoretic knowledge is possible by means of the forms of the sensibility and the concepts of the Understanding, it is not so with the ideas of the Reason. These latter have only a regulative, as opposed to a theoretic, validity. We can only explain the world *as if* these ideas were true; but we can never prove that they are true, or discover what the reality corresponding to them is in itself. Kant takes each of them in succession and subjects it to criticism. He first of all dismisses the rational psychology of his time with its doctrines of the immateriality, the incorruptibility, the personality, and the spirituality of the soul. It is shown that we can 'lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation I, which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions.¹ It is contended that no science of the Ego in itself, *as apart from* the general texture of experience, can be attained to by means of the self-reference which accompanies all consciousness. Again, advancing to the Cosmological idea, Kant shows that contrary propositions can be advanced as to its nature, with equal assurance and with equally cogent proofs. Finally, coming to the Theological idea, Kant surveys in succession the so-called ontological, cosmological, and

¹ *Critique of the Pure Reason*, Transcendental Dialectic, Bk. II. chap. i.: 'Of the Paralogisms of the Pure Reason.'

physico-theological (design) arguments for the existence of God, and finds them all hopelessly insufficient. The ontological argument confuses existence as assumed in thought, with the existence in the sense of external reality. This is illustrated by the difference between the imagined and the real possession of a hundred thalers.

The Cosmological argument, which urges that if something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist, is dismissed on various grounds. The most important of these is that, in so far as this proof is distinct from the ontological argument, it rests on the principle that 'everything that is contingent must have a cause—a principle without significance, except in the sensuous world. For,' continues Kant, 'the purely intellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any synthetic proposition, like that of causality, which is itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic except in the phenomenal world. But in the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere.'¹ Once more, the physico-theological, or design argument, can at most only 'demonstrate the existence of an *Architect of the world*, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works; but not of a *Creator of the world*, to whom all things are subject.' Moreover, we can at best only reach by this means the existence of a cause *proportionate* to the order and design visible in the universe, and not that of a perfect Being.²

Are these ideas, then, to be rejected as valueless? By no means. Duly criticized and limited to regulative uses, they are necessary to the unification and explanation of our experience. As to the idea of God, Kant says, 'The expression suited to our feeble notions is, that we conceive the world *as if* it came, as to its existence and internal determination, from a supreme reason, by which notion we both cognize the constitution which belongs to it (the world) itself, yet without pretending to determine the nature of its cause *per se*, and, on the other hand, we place the ground of this

¹ *Critique of the Pure Reason*, Transcendental Dialectic, Bk. II. chap. iii., fifth section.

² *Ibid.*, sixth section.

constitution (of the rational form in the world) *in the relation* of the supreme cause to the world, without finding the world sufficient by itself for that purpose.'¹

But this is not the end of Kant's contribution to the subject. By means of the Practical Reason Kant, in effect, restores what he had put beyond the reach of the Pure Reason. Man, as an object of the understanding is governed by necessity, but as the subject of duty he must be conceived as a free agent, and the conditions under which alone the moral law is possible necessitate the existence of God. For justice demands that morality should be attended by blessedness. This result can never be realized in this imperfect world, and is often entirely falsified. Morality, therefore, postulates the existence of God and the prospect of immortality, in order that ideal justice may be secured by divine holiness and power in a heavenly world. It is not necessary here to explain this ethical doctrine in detail, still less to criticize it. But it is important to note its influence in developing the view that religion must be justified, not on the 'ground of intellectual certitude, but as a postulate essential to morality, and as depending for its verification on a practical judgement of the absolute worth of morality, and therefore of all that is involved in its deliverances.

Enough has been said to show that Kant supplies the philosophical basis of what is now known as Agnosticism. Once deny that the ideas of the Reason can be theoretically known, and their regulative use becomes precarious. Men may refuse to explain the world as if these ideas were true. Then, if this assumption be an indispensable condition of world-explanation, those who refuse to make it are necessarily reduced to that state of entire suspense as to the origin and meaning of the universe which is meant by Agnosticism. Again, let the unique character of moral consciousness be denied, and the practical considerations urged by Kant in support of Theism fall to the ground at once. Both these positions have since been taken up. As to the latter, a determined and sustained effort has been made so to use the doctrine of evolution as to give a purely naturalistic

¹ *Prolegomena*, section on the 'Limitation of Pure Reason.'

interpretation to the phenomena of morality. As to the former, Kant's influence upon Sir William Hamilton, and through him upon Mansel, supplied both the impulse and the intellectual foundation for the agnosticism of Huxley and of Herbert Spencer.

Sir William Hamilton's *Philosophy of the Unconditioned*, adopted by Mansel, set forth a doctrine of God as the Absolute and Infinite. This was defined as signifying His existence outside all relations. But knowledge of an object involves its relation to the knowing mind. Therefore, the knowledge of God is impossible, partly because of the incapacity of the mind to rise above the relations of sense-experience, but chiefly because the supposed glory of the Absolute God is incompatible with His being known as He really is. Mansel, in the interests of the Christian creed, adopted this philosophy, and sought to establish the creed as giving a regulative knowledge of God, who in His proper nature must of necessity be unknown and unknowable. Thus a convenient proof was found of the necessity of the creed, while it was exempted from too searching criticism. The reasoning of Hamilton convinced Huxley, and led Spencer to discover 'the ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty . . . that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.'¹

It is easy to note the outstanding features of the Critical Philosophy. First of all is its setting up of abstract 'things in themselves,' the existence of which is implied in experience, though the knowledge of them is for ever impossible. In the second place, there is the absolute separation assumed at the start between the Ego and the non-Ego. The two are set in opposition, and then the problem is to bring them into the relation involved in knowledge. Thirdly, there is the abstract division of the different functions of the mind between the Pure and the Practical Reason, then between the Sensibility, the Understanding, and the Pure Reason, with different standards of values for the conclusions of each. Again, the treatment of the ideas of the Reason as being necessary for the organizing of knowledge into a consistent whole, but as

¹ *First Principles*, third edition, p. 46.

theoretically invalid, is absolutely new. Scepticism as to the deliverances of human faculties had indeed appeared from time to time in Greek philosophy. But no Greek would have thought of attributing a higher measure of objective validity to perception, and what is involved in it, than to the higher faculties of the mind. It was the limitation and confusion of knowledge by sense that, to the Greeks, laid it open to general suspicion. To assign a higher measure of truth to the concepts of the Understanding than to the ideas of the Reason would have startled, not only Plato, but even Protagoras; while both would have been equally astonished to find ideas treated as essential to the completeness of knowledge, yet as being themselves incapable of confirmation as true. Once more, there is the assumption that all that is implied in the principle of Causality is a phenomenal connexion, and that this principle being thus given in phenomenal experience, cannot be used to explain the origin of that experience itself. To adopt such a principle in such a sense as to preclude all explanation of the meaning and constitution of the world, is a contradiction of an intuition of mankind which has been almost unquestioned till now, and has directed all the highest efforts of human thought. This very fact suggests that, in this point at least, the testimony of consciousness has been misread.¹

For the present, however, detailed criticism is out of place. What we are concerned to note is that this development has imposed an additional task on Christian Evidences; namely, to establish the claim of human thought that when it is applied to the highest and ultimate objects it can attain to knowledge; and to provide an adequate account of the nature and philosophy of Revelation.

There is no need to pursue the subject by giving an account of the various forms of Transcendental Philosophy, which, starting from the Kantian standpoint, attempted in various ways to attain complete consistency of thought by means of absolute idealism. The most thorough-going and influential of such systems is, of course, that of Hegel. In some respects Hegelianism has brought powerful intellectual support

¹ See Martineau, *Study of Religion*.

to the Christian religion. The comprehensive attempt to set forth the rationality of all that is real, and to give to Christianity its dominant place in the unfolding of Reason and the realization of Spirit, has placed the whole question of Christian Evidences on a higher plane of thought. But the characteristic danger of all such systems of absolute idealism is to represent the last abstractions of thought as the first realities of existence. The abstract character of Hegelian speculation is largely responsible for raising the speculative difficulty of attributing personality, and therefore consciousness, to God. The problem raised, therefore, concerns the combination of self-consciousness with infinitude. Moreover, the exaggerated intellectualism of the system has obscured the significance of will, and treated the existence and history of the world and humanity as due to the immanent and indeed automatic but impersonal unfolding of reason in its characteristic triplicity of movement through the three stages of Position, Opposition, and Reconciliation.

With the loss of personality at the source, and of will in the creation and ordering of the universe, has gone the ability to do full justice to the meaning of personality in man. The collective life of humanity has counted for more than the individual, and the ultimate manifestation of Spirit in the life of humanity has cast the need of personal immortality into the shade. On all these points, therefore, transcendental idealism has raised new problems for Christian thought.

CHAPTER II

THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING SYSTEMS OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES TO SATISFY THE MODERN POINT OF VIEW

WHILE the changes described in the last chapter have taken place in philosophical thought, it is equally necessary to take account of the steady and many-sided advance of the physical sciences, by means of inductive inquiry and experiment, and of its effect upon Christian Evidences. At each stage of this advance, men have reflected upon the intellectual instruments and methods by which they have reached their conclusions, until they have formed a great body of Scientific or Inductive Logic, which has thrown into the shade the old Formal Logic of Aristotle. Bacon, as has been seen, exposed the misconceptions to which the human mind is liable in attempting to explain nature. He expelled theological and metaphysical causes from the domains of natural science, and attempted to lay down the general principles and methods of truly inductive inquiry. But Bacon spoke to a large extent by anticipation. Natural science had done little in his time to use the instruments which, as he pointed out, lay ready to hand. But with every subsequent use of these instruments the reflective understanding of them has grown. Hence there is a double result. On the one hand is the immensely extended range of the physical sciences. On the other is the elaboration of a great system of principles and rules, enjoined as laws upon the human mind in its pursuit of truth in these departments of inquiry.

What, then, happens when men treat the so-called physical world as the object of the exhaustive inquiries which are

pursued by modern science? First of all, the attitude taken up is frequently that the field to be investigated is independently, and probably that it is exclusively, real. In the next place, that the methods by which it is explained are the only methods which can lead to objective truth.

Even if this be not the complete philosophy of the physical inquirer, it is the mental attitude into which he is forced to throw himself for the immediate purposes of his task.

The world, which he investigates, whether his interest be mathematical, astronomical, physical, chemical, or biological, is treated as external to the man who observes it, and as independent of him. While he is absorbed in observation of it, he sinks to the level of a mere unheeded onlooker. The particular relations in which that world stands to him, and he to it, are ignored. It is for him, even more emphatically than for the ordinary man, something which has its reality and its conditions wholly apart from the consideration whether he and other men, or any conscious being whatever, exist or not.

When the physical nature of the world is thus cut off from its relation to the spiritual consciousness, and treated as an isolated reality, certain conceptions must be called in as the basis of whatever explanation of it is possible under such conditions. Among these, for example, are the conceptions of matter, force, energy, atoms, and molecules. For the purposes of scientific inquiry the independent reality of some or of all these conceptions is assumed without question.

Then the physical world, which has thus been isolated for the purposes of a limited explanation in terms of these physical conceptions, is often treated as if it were primary, and the means by which everything else is to be explained. Those who have allowed themselves, unreflectively, to be dominated by these great physical conceptions, consider it both legitimate and necessary to think away for scientific purposes the distinction between mind and matter. The world explained in terms of force, energy, atoms, &c., is the one reality. Mind must be reduced to it, and explained in its terms. If it is now impossible to take the older and cruder way of the materialists, and boldly to treat thought as a

product of phosphorus, yet it is both possible and common to treat the physical side as the reality, and the side of consciousness as what is termed an 'epiphaenomenon,' or, in other words, an inoperative shadow.

Thus a systematic attempt is made to naturalize spirit. First of all, the intellect, the moral nature, and the religious sentiments are treated as physically inoperative. In the next place, an attempt is made to get over the mystery of their present enormous development by tracing their gradual evolution from small beginnings, as though the importance and distinctness of the product could be explained away by considerations of the time which had been taken and the methods used in producing it.

Hence the naturalistic treatment of spirit involves the assumption that what is abstracted for the purposes of scientific investigation supplies, objectively, the totality of existence, and subjectively, the conditions of whatever world-explanation is possible.

Of course, when this attitude is taken up, what Dr. Martineau has well termed 'the reverential estimate of human nature' vanishes, and with it not only belief in, but respect for, Christianity; for Christianity has infinitely exalted the consciousness of men, and the estimate of their worth. Naturalism thus inevitably becomes the foe, not only of the articles of Christian faith, but of the fundamental principles of the Christian temper.

Here, then, is an added task for Christian Evidences. It is necessary to criticize the alleged sufficiency of scientific conceptions for the complete explanation of the world, to reduce them to their proper position, as assumptions made for the purpose of a limited inquiry; and to show that they unduly contract the world and destroy the possibility of its explanation directly they are applied beyond the narrow practical limits which belong to them. The limited problem of science calls out only a portion of the powers which belong to human nature. It is necessary to vindicate the powers, spiritual and moral, which have been slighted and suppressed, and to make good their claim to take part in the discovery of the full reality of the universe.

But the metaphysical and scientific objections which have been noticed are by no means the only difficulties which the modern mind feels in regard to the Christian religion. These must be taken in connexion with many other influences, which have to do rather with the imagination than with the reason or understanding; rather with the effect of scientific discoveries upon the general intellectual outlook than with any actually ascertained conclusions. A large number of *Hesitations* have become widespread, which in the earlier ages were hardly felt.

1. In the first place, men feel—as never before—the vastness of nature and the insignificance of men. Of course this feeling has always been more or less present to men's minds. But in the old days, when astronomy was limited in its range, and when the earth was supposed to be the centre of the universe, it was easier for most people to think of man as being a supreme end of the purposes of God than it is now. The result of modern discoveries upon the minds of many is to overwhelm and almost stupefy them with a sense of the vastness of the universe and of its processes of evolution, so that they cry out with the Psalmist, 'What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that Thou visitest him?' without the deep consciousness of divine grace and of human dignity by which the Psalmist so quickly recovered himself.

2. In the next place, there is the impression made upon many minds by the study of nature that its methods and ends are entirely impersonal. The man who has placed himself at the modern point of view finds himself in the midst of a vast loom, which weaves its products throughout infinite space and time by an unceasing evolution; decay and reformation alternating. The whole process appears so vast and so mysterious, its inmost laws so mechanical, that there seems no trace within it of a personal spirit and of a personal concern.

Men, having blotted out from their memory the great pageant of human history, stand in presence of what is left, and find all signs of meaning and purpose gone. Even when history is recalled to the mind thus overwhelmed, it is urged that its development is so diverse, so incomplete, and so

impermanent as to afford no sure indication that it is the end for which the world exists; or, even if it be so, of what the precise end involved in human nature and its history is. Men point to the very real differences in the moral standards, and in the religious thought and practices of different races, and urge that in presence of so great and far-reaching divergences no conclusion can be drawn. They assert that the history of the world is so incomplete as to be utterly disappointing from any spiritual point of view. They ask what assurance there is in a universe which, so far as its present physical constitution is concerned, seems hastening towards ultimate exhaustion, that the triumphs of spiritual consciousness, taken at their best, are so lasting as to be the real key to the whole.

3. With this general attitude of mind comes a doubt as to the competence of human powers, and above all of the most spiritual of them, to read reality aright; especially the doubt how far human consciousness is any guide to the existence and nature of God. This doubt announces itself as a protest against Anthropomorphism. It has its philosophical justification, as we have seen, in the Critical Philosophy, and its confirmation in the absurdities into which religious extravagance and unphilosophical theology have sometimes fallen. But in its essence it lies deeper than either of these influences, and extends more widely than the sphere in which they have been, at least with clear consciousness, felt.

Matthew Arnold gave literary expression to this doubt in his criticism of orthodox Theism as the worship of 'a magnified non-natural man.' He interpreted the thoughts of great multitudes of men who are not philosophical, but are in a state of confirmed scepticism as to the worth and importance of human nature in the world. Matthew Arnold did not, of course, intend his protest to be carried so far. He understood the universe to reveal the presence and working of a 'Power not ourselves which makes for righteousness.' This is all that Theists contend for, provided it be conceded that if a power is to make for righteousness in Arnold's sense, it must be inherently righteous, and that it can only be inherently righteous provided it is self-conscious.

4. In connexion with this reluctance to find in human faculties the key to the nature and ends of God, there is the imaginative deification of evolution, as if it were the real cause of all events. The man who forbids it to be said that God did this or that, imagines himself on safe ground when he declares that evolution did it. Of course, if thoughtful and competent, he is obliged to confess, when challenged, that evolution did nothing of the kind. All these terms—Evolution, Natural Selection, the Survival of the Fittest, and the like—are descriptions of a method, or of a result, and not the definition of a cause. Yet to mistake a result, a method, or a description for a reason and a cause is the failing of the common talk of many Evolutionists, a mistake from which Darwin, at least in his circumspect moments, kept himself entirely free.

5. In addition to all these influences must be added a deepened sense of the mystery of evil. It is needless to enlarge upon this. In part it is accounted for by increased knowledge of what takes place in nature. In part it results from the heightened sense, in modern times, of the evil of physical pain: in part from a deepening of sympathy. It is ministered to by a spirit of selective pessimism, which gives undue prominence to the proportion of evil in the whole texture of the world: darkening the problem still further by reading into many forms of evil a moral significance which does not belong to them. Above all, there is the weakening of the sense of moral responsibility. With it comes a tendency to treat moral evil as a misfortune and not as sin, to underestimate the part it plays in the total misery of the world, and to value moral responsibility so little, that the possibility of evil appears too great a price to pay for its possession.

6. Once more, the modern mind is dissatisfied with any view of Christianity which isolates it from other religions and treats it as accidental, external, and merely miraculous. There is an uprising against the conception of earth as 'a ruined world,' and of Christianity as a purely miraculous remedy for the accidental fact of sin. This is in part due to the failure of the sense of sin, in part to the weakening

of belief in moral freedom. As a consequence, it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine any dealing of God with the world which is beyond the range of natural law. It has a measure of justification owing to the exaggerated way in which Christianity is represented by some of its advocates. When to such a representation is added a conception of the Christian remedy which sometimes crudely applies to God either considerations drawn from modern politics and judicial procedure, or conceptions similar to those of human magic, the revolt becomes complete.

Such are some of the objections which gather round the more strictly speculative and scientific difficulties already described.

They, again, set a new task to Christian Evidences, namely, to expound and to justify the view of the value of human life upon which the Christian religion is built up, and to bring home that only by the acceptance of that value can a completely human life, in all the range of its powers, be lived out. It must be shown that man never has breathed, and never can breathe, the breath of life within the narrow confines by which he is now supposed to be limited, and that what is necessary to his highest life and completest health is thereby authenticated as true. If the power of human faculties has to be vindicated against Agnosticism, the primary deliverances of spiritual consciousness must also be vindicated against the invasion of unmanly doubt.

In this respect the limitations of Christian Evidences are apparent. It is often said that Christian Evidences have never converted any doubter. If this were true, it would not condemn them, for spiritual consciousness must complete itself by giving account of its principles and reasons. It must explain and justify itself to the world. The statement is, however, exaggerated; for the process of conversion, due to deep and silent forces working within, has often been assisted and completed by the removal of intellectual doubts. At the same time, it is true that the effective removal of those doubts and hesitations is brought about, not so much by arguments as by the accession of new power to trust

the intuitions and needs of the spiritual consciousness as trustworthy guides to the inmost reality of the universe. By this means, most difficulties, if not resolved, lose their practical importance, because they become subordinate to a still more constraining conviction of truth. It must be the work of Christian Evidences at this stage so to interpret the intuitions of Christian consciousness in their relation to nature as to afford to faith something like a speculative justification of itself.

It becomes necessary to consider how far the systems of Christian Evidences generally accepted as representative meet the present necessities of the case, as they have now been surveyed.

In examining this, two preliminary considerations must be borne in mind.

In the first place, the Christian Evidences, accepted at any time, are, of necessity, bound up with the most congenial philosophy current at that time. Partly it is in reference to the leading conceptions of philosophy and to its representatives that the claims of Christianity must be made good. Partly the men who attempt the proof, being themselves creatures of their generation, are of necessity steeped in the general philosophic conceptions of their time. Hence it inevitably comes to pass that frequently the proof of Christianity is presented in terms of a philosophy which is already becoming out of date. Not being, for the most part, philosophical specialists, theologians are apt to use general conceptions for their own purposes after the best thought of their time has ceased to be satisfied with them. Thus Christian Evidences tend to be expressed in inadequate forms and based upon inadequate, or incomplete, suppositions.

If this has been the case at various periods in the past, still more is it inevitable at the present time, when the vast increase of knowledge and the approved apparatus of scientific and critical research have created a greater gulf between the thought of the twentieth century and that of the eighteenth, than has been known before throughout the Christian era.

And, in the second place, it must never be forgotten that many special contributions in aid of various interests of

Christian Evidences must be made before the whole system of such evidences is transformed to meet the requirements of the latest thought. The pressure of particular controversies, and the exploration of particular provinces, produce much enlargement of view before their results are incorporated in general systems; still more before such systems win wide recognition. This will be increasingly the case as the field of investigation is enlarged, and the points threatened are multiplied. The present day abounds in such contributions to theological thought, revising both the exposition and the defence of Christianity by the help of the most recent knowledge, and in regard to the latest objections that have been raised.

Dealing now, however, with the recognized presentation of Christian Evidences in systematic form, it is manifest that the distinction between natural and revealed religion has determined both their method and their substance down to the present time. Butler, for example, adopts precisely the same general point of view as Aquinas. Religion being divided into natural and revealed, it is the office of revealed religion, that is of Christianity, to give a 'republication of natural religion' in an authoritative way,¹ and then to supplement the truth thus acquired by a revelation of the way of salvation through the Son of God and the Holy Ghost. Butler even goes so far as to say that 'the essence of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to *God the Father Almighty*.'²

Starting with this distinction, the general course of procedure has been, until recent times, somewhat as follows.

First of all, God is defined as an Infinite and Eternal Spirit, the First Cause of the universe. This position is made good by the use of any or all of the three great arguments, known as the Ontological, the Cosmological, and the Teleological, to which may be added the argument from General Consent, and so forth. Having established by these means the existence of a necessary Spiritual Being, who is the Author of the universe and its Orderer, as exhibiting system and marks of design, the next step is to establish His

¹ *Analogy*, Part II., chap. i.

² *Ibid.*

possession of the natural attributes which are necessary to the immensity of His task, and subsequently of those moral attributes which are necessary to explain His relationship to man. Here comes in the moral argument for the existence of God Himself as a moral Personality. At the next stage, those considerations are brought in which deal with man not merely as a natural or a moral being, but as one having religious susceptibilities; conscious of being dependent on God and seeking fellowship with the Author of his being. God is, therefore, seen as the Source and End of religion, giving a revelation in order that men may think right thoughts of Him and may entertain a right disposition towards Him: communicating to them the knowledge of their ultimate destiny which is necessary both to reinforce their moral nature and to satisfy their religious aspirations. Finally, the fact of sin is recognized and the need of redemption. Hence, by a new series of arguments, mainly concerned with historical evidences, it is sought to make good those facts and doctrines of redemption in Christ which are, above all, the distinctive marks of the Christian religion.

Each stage is on a different plane. When the existence of God is established, as necessary to the understanding of nature, the starting-point is that of man as designer and constructor, and a passage is made from the world of man's products to the universe as a system, revealing a divine Designer and Constructor. At the next stage, man as a moral being comes in view; judging himself and others, conscious of being himself judged. From this new tract of experience the argument of a moral Governor is derived. Thence advance is made to man worshipping, craving a more than finite and natural satisfaction. Herein is found the evidence of God as the object of religion and the giver of revelation. Finally, there is the consciousness of sin and the need of reconciliation and redemption. Herein is found the confirmation of the gospel, which makes known Christ as Reconciler and Redeemer.

The first criticism to be passed upon this general system is that it does not reflect the history of theological belief, that its successive stages rather invert than reproduce the process

of religious advance in the human mind. Taking it as it stands, we might imagine that man was put down in the natural world, in the first instance, as an independent observer in a state of primitive atheism; that on examination, he came first to the conclusion that the world must have had an adequate cause, advanced thereby to a theoretic belief in a Divine Being, and was led on gradually to define His attributes. Then it might be supposed that subsequently man became conscious that he was called by God to a spiritual communion, in which light was to be thrown upon his own duty and destiny; and that, in the last place, he received the knowledge of a special and supernatural dispensation, called into existence to remedy the sin into which he had fallen.

The more, however, religion is studied, whether as presented in the Holy Scriptures or throughout human history, in its more primitive or more elaborated forms, even in its growth in individual minds among ourselves, the clearer it becomes that men have not built up from evidences outside themselves a theoretic faith in God, proceeding thence to fuller determination of His attributes, and multiplying abstract conceptions about Him. A religious consciousness of God has come first.¹ That consciousness has three conditions. It depends upon inner deliverances of the human spirit itself; these deliverances are used to explain the outward phenomena and events of the world, and they are moulded by the practical influence of religion, into which every human child has been born. Religious belief, wherever we find it, starts from the consciousness of Another, to whom the spirit stands in immediate relationship; a Person, so far as the consciousness of personality in the worshipper is complete enough to enable him to attribute personality to the object of his worship. The description of this Other and the conception of His relation to the phenomena of the world varies according to the temperament, the development, the experience, and the training of the particular worshipper. It may harden into the One or be broken into the Many of Polytheism; it may rise to the grandeur of the Hebrew Monotheism or may be degraded to

¹ We are not at present concerned to consider how it was suggested, or from what sources it was derived.

the level of African fetish-worship. It may be set forth and interpreted by the highest forms of philosophical doctrine, or it may be held in the primitive and concrete fashion of the simplest and least intellectual type. But, however it is held, its source and nature are not primarily intellectual, in the usual sense of the term, nor is it attained by a process of world-explanation. All religions have partaken of the directness and spirituality of revelation. The one element common to the highest and lowest forms of religion, and throughout all its varieties, is the consciousness of Another revealed, to whom religion makes a suitable response, according to the mental, moral, and spiritual development of those who are conscious of the divine presence. Reason and revelation are not two separately working sources of the knowledge of God. The history of religion is the history of revelation, of the real or supposed presentation of God to the spiritual consciousness. Reason has been concerned in the apprehension of this object, has subsequently worked upon the content of what has been presented to it, and has evolved its doctrines from that content. So far, therefore, from God having been first of all conceived as the Cause and Designer of a world, and then as having come into spiritual relations with men, the exact opposite is the truth. He has first been apprehended as being in relation to men, and has then been discovered to be the only key to the interpretation of the world.

The Old Testament furnishes an illustration of this process. God is known, first of all, as the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob; the All-sufficient God, who watches over their journey through life, shaping it and sustaining them in it by His fellowship and strength. From that simple patriarchal experience the idea of God develops. He is seen in succession to be the God of Israel as a nation, of all nations, and of the universe, until from the childlike sense of His immediate presence the climax of the Old Testament theology is reached in the doctrine of God contained in the last twenty-six chapters of Isaiah. Corresponding stages can be discovered in the growth of religious consciousness in a little child at the present day.

The origin of religion is in the primitive consciousness of

Another, in whom life is grounded, the relation to whom is of supreme significance. Its appearance marks the first dawning consciousness of the distinction and yet the unity between the finite and the infinite. History shows no trace of a primitive race of men capable of attaining by reason to a great conception of a world-creating and a world-designing God, who then becomes the object of religion. It shows a primitive and advancing religious consciousness which is investigated by reflection at every stage of its development, and made to yield ever fuller definitions and larger deductions for the interpretation of that nature and unity of the world and man which a growingly rational consciousness unfolds to the human race.

Those systems of Christian Evidences which have been moulded by Aquinas have, therefore, failed by misreading the distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion. Further, by this means they have obscured the fact that all religion has its origin in an act of faith. Again, they have frequently conceived God as so external to the world that revelation has become external and mechanical; to our present modes of thought, incomprehensible. They have made an almost absolute breach between Christianity as the religion of redemption and religion generally; instead of treating Christianity as the consummation of all religion, and as accomplishing redemption because it embodies in the highest and most perfect form influences of grace and truth, which have been implicit in religion from the first. The conception of God as First Cause, or as Absolute Being, so far from being the starting-point, is the last abstraction from the concrete content in which He has been presented to spiritual consciousness. A result of making that first which in reality came last has been the setting up of a mechanical explanation of design in nature which the growing acceptance of evolutionary philosophy has shown to be inadequate to the facts of the world as they stand. A true philosophy of religion, while owing to changed scientific conceptions it may lay less stress upon particular evidences of design, such as the construction of the eye or ear, will make much more of the indwelling presence of a Divine Being, working in and

through all things for the accomplishment of spiritual purposes, which become increasingly manifest in the history of the world and to the consciousness of men.

Once more, it is of the greatest importance to remember that, after all, the particular theistic doctrine, which is supposed by such writers as Aquinas, Butler, and Paley to be reached by reason, is simply an abstraction from the complete Christian doctrine of God, and represents just those elements of that doctrine which are thought necessary either for the explanation of nature or for the explanation of man as a moral being. The rest, having been thus put aside, is brought back as a Christian appendix, given by revelation. Thus just that portion is abstracted from the original fullness of Christ's teaching which is needed for the solution of a particular intellectual problem. Then the complete Christian doctrine is tested by the abstract doctrine of God which has been set up, and is supposed to be independently known by reason. And, in the last resort, an independent method of proof is sought for that portion of the doctrine of God which has been transferred to the realm of revelation.

It is simple matter of fact that the doctrine of so-called Natural Theism, which the Evidence writers treat as derived from reason, is as truly and distinctively Christian in its source as any doctrine of the New Testament. The reason that this is not recognized lies in the fact that it happens to approximate to the teaching of Greek philosophy, and especially to that of Aristotle. But waiving the question how far the doctrine of Aristotle is derivable from reason in the sense in which Aquinas and Butler understood it, it is made to set forth Natural Theism only by importing into it elements of the Christian doctrine of God, to which it did indeed approximate, but without ever fully reaching them. No greater mistake can be made than that of Butler, when he assigns the knowledge of God the Father to Natural Religion, as he understood that term. Personality, the encompassing of a condescending love, the offer of a divine fellowship, which are necessary to any intelligible belief in 'God the Father,' are just what neither Plato nor Aristotle ever fully realized, and what reason, by itself, has never

reached. Thus an arbitrary division of the religious consciousness, and the undue abstraction of portions of a complete doctrine of God, have led to the misreading of history, and to a misstatement as to the grounds and growth of theistic belief.

No more striking illustration of the mischief which results from this general treatment can be found than is supplied by Paley's *Natural Theology*, and by his *Evidences of Christianity*. And this quite independently of the question as to whether his arguments as to particular marks of design in nature have been invalidated by the doctrine of evolution or not. The whole of Paley's argument in his *Natural Theology* grows out of the celebrated illustration of the finding of a watch upon a heath, and the inferences which would be drawn by the discoverer from the observation of its contrivances and action. From this masterpiece of human design, Paley proceeds to survey the whole universe of natural objects, ranging throughout the realms of vegetable and animal life, and passing thence to the heavenly bodies, in order to show that everywhere are to be found equally convincing marks of contrivance, the complexity, vastness, reproductiveness, and vitality of which point to a Divine Wisdom and Power infinitely beyond what is displayed in the works of man. All these objects are investigated from the physical or physiological standpoint. They are treated as isolated objects, equally distinct from God, from man as a conscious being, and from one another. There is no consideration of the spiritual man, as such, nor of the spiritual community in which human life is consummated. Still less is there any consideration of the universe, as a whole, to which spiritual consciousness belongs, and to which it is relative.

As to this world of natural objects, found everywhere with marks of design upon them, Paley argues, 'Contrivance, if established, appears to me to prove everything which we wish to prove.' 'Among other things,' he proceeds, 'it proves the *personality* of the Deity, as distinguished from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes called a principle.'¹ Our evidence, therefore, of the existence of a Personal God is to

¹ *Natural Theology*, chap. xxiii.

be found in contrivance throughout nature. The presence, magnitude, and ends of such contrivance enable us to find out what are 'the natural attributes of the Deity.' 'The *attributes* of such a Being, suppose His reality to be proved, must be adequate to the magnitude, extent, and multiplicity of His operations; which are not only vast beyond comparison with those performed by any other power; but, so far as respects our conceptions of them, infinite, because they are unlimited on all sides.'¹ The attributes thus disclosed are said to be Omnipotence, Omniscience, Omnipresence, Eternity, Self-existence, Necessary Existence, and Spirituality.

Further, 'of the "unity of the Deity,"' Paley says, 'the proof is, the *uniformity* of plan observable in the universe.'² 'The goodness of the Deity' is established as follows. 'The proof of the *divine goodness* rests upon two propositions; each, as we contend, capable of being made out by observations drawn from the appearances of nature. The first is, that in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the contrivance is *beneficial*. The second, that the Deity has superadded *pleasure* to animal sensations, beyond what was necessary for any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary, might have been effected by the operation of pain.'³

The following is the conclusion of the whole work. 'In all cases wherein the mind feels itself in danger of being confounded by variety, it is sure to rest upon a few strong points, or perhaps upon a single instance. Amongst a multitude of proofs, it is *one* that does the business. . . . There is no subject in which the tendency to dwell upon select or single topics is so usual, because there is no subject of which in its full extent the latitude is so great as that of natural history applied to the proof of an intelligent Creator. . . . The existence and character of the Deity is, in every view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, is it more so than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of *Revelation*.'⁴

Since, then, the whole of Paley's argument is confined to

¹ *Natural Theology*, chap. xxiv.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xxvi.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. xxv.

⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. xxvii.

establishing a Divine Artificer sufficient to account for the objects of the natural world, his *Natural Theology* ends without ever rising to the highest meaning or to the highest proof of the perfection of God. The whole burden of proving the goodness of God is laid, as we have seen, upon the testimony of the beneficial results of most natural contrivances, judged in the interests of animal life, and from the evidence of sensation in the animal creation.

From this proof of the existence, nature, and attributes of God, Paley passes at a bound to the *Evidences of Christianity*.¹

First of all, what is the meaning of the Christianity to be proved? Paley thus describes it. 'Of what a revelation discloses to mankind, one, and only one, question can properly be asked. Was it of importance to mankind to know, or to be better assured of? In this question, when we turn our thoughts to the great Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, and of a future judgement, no doubt can possibly be entertained. He who gives me riches or honours, does nothing; he who even gives me health, does little in comparison with that which lays before me just grounds for expecting a restoration to life, and a day of account and retribution, which thing Christianity hath done for millions. Other articles of the Christian faith, although of infinite importance when placed beside any other topic of human inquiry, are only the adjuncts and circumstances of this.'²

Why is it that Paley attaches such unique importance 'to the great Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, and of a future judgement,' that it even excludes from his view the Christian revelation of God, and of the relations in which He stands to mankind, save as the Dispenser of rewards and punishments? This is an inversion of our more recent point of view, which makes the revelation of God the primary object of Christianity, and ultimately rests our belief in immortality upon our belief in God. The answer is that the doctrine of Paley's *Moral Philosophy* is accountable for this emphasis. Man, according to Paley, is so constructed that

¹ The two works are separate.

² *Evidences of Christianity*, Part III. chap. viii.

the pursuit of selfish happiness is the only motive that appeals to him. Hence the only way in which morality, as obedience to the law of God, becomes possible, is by giving to him a trustworthy revelation that everlasting prospects are before him, and that his everlasting happiness can only be secured by his successful resistance of those solicitations which are inconsistent with the divine commands.

But if Christianity consists, above all, in authoritative information that we shall live for ever, and be rewarded or punished by God in that future existence, how is it to be proved? Paley's answer is, 'In what way can a revelation be made, but by miracles? In none which we are able to conceive.'¹ The proof of the articles of religion depending, therefore, upon the miracles which were wrought to authenticate them, the proof of the miracles themselves depends upon the trustworthiness of the testimony to them. Here Paley is brought face to face with the contention of Hume's *Essay on Miracles*, that it is more probable that testimony should be false, owing to dishonesty or incompetence, than that miracles should be true. He has to show that, at least in respect of the gospel miracles, this estimate of probabilities is mistaken. He accomplishes this task by establishing the two following propositions. Firstly, 'that there is satisfactory evidence that many, pretending to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undertaken and undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth of those accounts; and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct.' Secondly, 'that there is *not* satisfactory evidence, that persons pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar miracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth of those accounts.'

Paley then supports his case by what he calls the 'Auxiliary Evidences of Christianity.' These are prophecy fulfilled, the morality of the gospel, the candour of the writers

¹ *Evidences of Christianity*—'Preparatory Considerations.

of the New Testament, the identity of Christ's character in all the accounts given to us, the accordance with history of the New Testament accounts, undesigned coincidences, the history of the resurrection, and the propagation of Christianity. The part of the argument concerned with undesigned coincidences, Paley developed in his remarkable work, the *Horae Paulinae*. Finally, he devotes attention to 'some popular objections.' These are concerned with the discrepancies between the several gospels, erroneous opinions imputed to the apostles, the connexion of Christianity with Jewish history, the rejection of Christianity by the Jews, the fact 'that the Christian miracles are not recited or appealed to by early Christian writers themselves so fully or frequently as might have been expected,' the want of universality in the knowledge and reception of Christianity, and of greater clearness in the evidences and with the supposed effects of Christianity.

Just as Paley failed to see that the Christian doctrine of God is the primary content of Christianity, and to establish it as essential to the understanding, the justification, and, above all, the satisfaction of human life, so in his *Evidences* no attention is paid to Christian experience as affording a spiritual verification of the revelation of the gospel. Christianity is the revelation of our future existence by means of miracles. The fact which Paley feels called upon to explain, that the early Christian writers do not by any means rely so exclusively on miracles as they might have been expected to do, should have suggested to him that their faith in Christ rested upon altogether deeper grounds than the fact that immortality had been revealed by miracles adequately attested. The ultimate result of Paley's defence is that Christianity is treated simply as an external occurrence, and that all we have to ask about it is, as in the case of any other historical event, whether we have satisfactory evidence that this occurrence really took place.

There is little cause for wonder that such evidences have aroused the suspicion and dislike of deeply religious men. There is scarcely anything that can be called strictly religious from beginning to end of Paley's theological writings. The

only powers called into exercise by them are those used in drawing inferences from physical phenomena, and in establishing by investigation that particular historical events have taken place. Such inquiries are most useful, but they have nothing to do with the inmost life of religion; nor is the Christianity which can be established by such means the Christianity of the New Testament. Thus the revolt against Paley's *Evidences* is due, not merely to the fact that they are inadequate to the demands of modern thought and science, but that they are inadequate to the religious consciousness, and to its testimony as to the grounds upon which the Christian revelation, worthily conceived, is accepted as true.

Somewhat similar objection, as to neglect to examine the spiritual consciousness as a whole, must be taken to Dr. Martineau's work, *A Study of Religion*. It is almost superfluous to refer to the great services which Dr. Martineau rendered to the cause of ethical Theism as a lifelong opponent of materialistic philosophy. Especially is that cause indebted to him for his defence of the validity of human knowledge of God against Agnosticism, for his reinstatement of the argument from design as against Kant, and for the way in which he has faced the objections against Theism, on the ground of the existence of evil. Perhaps he rendered a yet greater and more lasting service by the way in which he gave expression to many of the highest intuitions and aspirations of the spiritual consciousness in his more devotional writings. To criticize the premisses or the methods of such a writer, where they appear inadequate to the present needs of religion, is not to be insensible to these very great services.

Coming to Dr. Martineau's *Study of Religion* in this spirit, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that its cogency is impaired by undue abstraction throughout. Although the work is entitled *A Study of Religion*, yet no particular religion is studied from beginning to end. Above all, the Christian religion is left out of account, though Dr. Martineau defends doctrines of God and of man which are derived from Christianity, albeit they do not represent the full content of the Christian doctrine.

Dr. Martineau says in opening, 'Understanding by Religion

belief in an ever-living God, that is, of a Divine Mind and Will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind, he [the reader] will hope, on the one hand, to be led to the innermost seat of this belief in the constitution of human nature ; and, on the other, to see developed from it the dependent varieties of thought implicit in so fruitful a germ, and the cognate truths inseparable from it by collateral relations.’¹ He adds, ‘It is only our artificial analysis that separates the two, and insists on calling the intellectual side of the fact a *theology*, the affectional a *religion*.’ Undoubtedly the separation of these two sides is not only artificial, but is disastrous to the interests of both. But if the affectional aspect is not to be separated from the intellectual, still less is it to be submerged by the intellectual. And the general impression produced by the whole argument is that the affectional elements of religion, except that of reverence for moral perfection, are left practically out of account.

Further on, Dr. Martineau lays it down that, ‘If we live in union or affinity with God at all, it must be in several relations, not in one alone, for our being is complex, and must touch His at every point. We suffer, we think, we will ; what we feel is the pressure of His laws ; what we know is the order of His reality ; what we choose is from His possibilities, and how can there fail to be a path to Him from the sensitive, the intellectual, and the moral passages of our history ?’² The important truth contained in this passage is obscured by an artificial analysis, which separates too completely the sensitive, intellectual, and moral ‘passages of our history,’ after the fashion of those older psychologists, who treated the mind as a bundle of faculties, each working separately from the others. Undoubtedly all the ‘passages of our history,’ and all the elements of our being, contribute to our experience and knowledge of God. But man is a unity. He is never for a moment entirely sensitive, or entirely intellectual, or entirely moral. Therefore these various means of his experience by no means constitute different relationships with God, but simply contribute various elements to an apprehension of God which includes them all. Man must be conceived, not as

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 17.

standing in separate relationships to God according as one part of his being or another is predominantly affected, but as entering into a relationship sufficiently comprehensive to include all the elements of God's manifestation and of man's response to Him.

In the case of the belief in God, it is, above all, necessary carefully to set out what it is; then clearly to demonstrate its consistency with all the other facts made known in human consciousness, and its necessity to the full understanding of those facts in the system of relationships which they occupy in the world. Dr. Martineau says, 'All religion resolves itself into a conscious relation on our part to a higher than we; and, on the part of the rational universe at large, to a higher than all, i.e. to a mind supreme above the whole family of minds. The conditions of such supremacy are twofold. (1) *Dynamical*, consisting in the command of all methods needful for the accomplishment of contemplated ends. (2) *Moral*, consisting in the intrinsic ascendancy of the highest ends, infallibly conceived and externally pursued, as the springs of the Divine Will.'¹ There is some difficulty in understanding exactly what is meant by a 'conscious relation . . . on the part of the rational universe at large, to a higher than all,' as contrasted with individual consciousness. But taking the first clause, it is clear that if 'all religion resolves itself into a conscious relation to a higher than we,' then the first work of a study of religion is to set forth the exact nature of that consciousness, and the relation which is revealed in it. But Dr. Martineau passes at once from this conscious relation to the conditions upon which it is dependent, and never returns, unless incidentally to the consciousness itself.

Proceeding to consider the conditions of religion, Dr. Martineau discusses, in the first place, the dynamical; in the second, the moral. But again, by undue abstraction, he keeps the two entirely apart.

First of all, he attempts to show how men came to believe in God as Cause. Giving the general results of an elaborate and lengthy inquiry, the following is the process which is said to have taken place. (1) In the first place, man becomes

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 137.

conscious of the opposition between the ego and the non-ego. (2) Then he interprets this non-ego by positing behind it many wills in conflict with his own. (3) In process of time, as his mind matures and his experience becomes enlarged, he comes to perceive the unity of the non-ego, so that as the world is one system, there cannot be many wills, but only one Will accounting for it. He comes, further, to realize the immediacy of that Will. As Dr. Martineau says, he does away with 'deputies,' and recognizes that he is face to face with one Will active throughout. (4) Finally, he substitutes the conception of plan and purpose running throughout the whole for changing impulses. Hence, all Causality in nature is at last seen to reside in one supreme God.¹ This account is open to serious criticism, and suggests most important questions.

To begin with, is it true to treat the distinction made in consciousness between the ego and the non-ego as a sense exclusively, or even pre-eminently, of conflict?² That conflict from time to time arises is certain, but is the sense of that conflict the primary and prevailing testimony of early consciousness? Is not the sense of underlying unity equally primitive and influential, to say the least of it, as that of occasional conflict? Is not an undue stress laid upon a distinction, when it is represented as an opposition? But in the second place, even supposing that there is no exaggeration about this, why is the source of our belief in God sought exclusively in the non-ego? At what stage does the consciousness come in that the ego is itself an effect, or, at all events, is dependent upon a supreme Being? Further, is the idea of God by any means so exclusively an idea of will? Is there not here an exaggeration of the influence on the mind of the one concept of Causality? Surely the tendency to personify, to individualize, has a larger meaning than mere ascription of will. It, of course, includes the possession and the activity of will, but it includes much more, even if it be conceded that strictly moral elements enter at a later stage. And, lastly, what becomes of the affectional sources of religion

¹ *Study of Religion*, Book II. chap. i.

² In taking this view, Dr. Martineau was probably influenced by Fichte, whose position, again, is derived from the Kantian doctrine of Perception.

to which Dr. Martineau paid a passing tribute at the beginning of his exposition? The principle of Causality is very remote from affectional religion. What of that element of primitive religion which craves after and, according to the belief involved in it, enters upon fellowship with the object of its worship? If the answer be made that man, in the first place, becomes conscious of a non-ego in conflict with himself, deifies that non-ego, and then seeks to pass, by means of reconciliation, from conflict to communion, it must be answered that, even if this be so, the sense of affinity which desires fellowship is at least equally to be taken into account as that of opposition; indeed, more so, except in those degraded religions where, owing to degeneration and unhappy experience, fear has altogether excluded trust. The primary instinct which prompts to fellowship involves a sense of unity beneath that of momentary opposition.

This, however, is the deduction which Dr. Martineau offers. He completes his account by considering what are the implicit attributes of God as Cause. The ultimate results 'which are yielded by the principle of Causality' are, that 'there is one universal Cause, the infinite and eternal seat of all power, an Omniscient Mind, ordering all things for ends selected with perfect wisdom.'¹ It might be thought that this account represented, not an explanation of the actual growth of religion among men, but the contribution made to actual religion, by the working of the principle of Causality. But this does not appear to be Dr. Martineau's intention, for he concludes this first part of his work by saying: 'It would be interesting to seek, in the history of mankind, for actual religions constituted on this type and exhibit their overgrowth in one direction, their atrophy in another. But this fascinating bye-path would withdraw us too far from our main track; and we must enter at once upon its next stage, which introduces us to a new and independent source of religious truth.'² It would, indeed, have been interesting to learn what actual religions Dr. Martineau thought to have been constituted on this type. Without his help it is difficult to find them. Nature-religions there are in abundance, in which

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 417.

² *Ibid.*

personification plays an almost unrestrained part, and in which ethical ideals are practically non-existent. But they yield none of the august attributes, bound up with the principle of Causality, even if that principle is at the heart of the personification. On the other hand, men may react from such frank naturalism to such forms of thought as are presented in the philosophy of Plato or in the Vedântist philosophy of India. The latter certainly excludes morality, and likewise personality, power, and intellect, from the Divine Being. It is a moot point how far they are recognized, except in his mythopoetic moods, by Plato in any such sense as Dr. Martineau attaches to them.

We now pass to the second and independent condition of religion, the moral, 'disclosed to us by our conscience.'¹ 'In the act of Perception,' we are told, 'we are immediately introduced to an *Other than ourselves* that gives us what we feel; in the act of Conscience, we are immediately introduced to a *Higher than ourselves* that gives us what we feel; the externality in the one case, the authority in the other, the causality in both, are known upon exactly the same terms, and carry the same guarantee of their validity.'² 'For our true moral life and education,' it is explained, 'we are dependent on the presence of some nature higher than our own; without which the mere subjective feeling of relative worth among the springs of action would rarely pass from knowledge into power. All the Dynamics of character are born of inequality, and lie asleep amid unbroken equilibrium.'³

To the objection that this only implies 'hero-worship,' and that 'we are carried no further by all this than the story of our humanity,' Dr. Martineau replies as follows: 'Be it remembered, however, that this law applies, not to our particular selves alone, not merely along the ascending steps of moral and mental elevation, but just as much, nay even with intenser force, at the summit-levels where the culminating saints and heroes stand. They too are human; and are they then cut off by their position from all dependence? . . . On the contrary, to none is such an attitude more

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 30.

repugnant and even odiously false. That they are what they are, because they are carried out of themselves by that which transcends their will, is their profoundest consciousness; of all dependence theirs is the deepest and most clinging; of all faces theirs the most habitually upturned; and the less they encounter any higher visible righteousness, the more flows in upon them from an invisible Highest of all. And thus, through the hierarchy of moral ranks, we are led up to a supreme objective, Perfection, without which these grandest and loveliest natures could never be.¹ We come here upon the explanation of moral nature which was elaborated by Dr. Martineau in his *Types of Ethical Theory*. Man is what he is because he possesses a number of springs of conduct, which range themselves into a hierarchy according to their higher or lower moral worth. Moral consciousness is an intuitive power of deciding, when any two such springs are present, which is the higher, and eventually as the range of life becomes so widened that all these springs are called into play, a register of the scale is produced, conformity to which measures moral goodness. The higher and nobler springs of action, we are now told, are revealed in the lives of saints and heroes, and by means of such men the consciousness of their presence and the resolution to prefer the highest are awakened in men of inferior mould. But as the highest men can find no higher than themselves on earth, they are obliged to look upward to find their inspiration and strength in God. Subsequently Dr. Martineau terms this theory 'a momentary concession.' He says: 'This momentary concession I must now withdraw, large as the operation is of some leader's mind upon the led, it is by no means co-extensive with the advance of character; and many a struggle upwards, whether by patient steps or by some flight of conversion, takes place, where no visible master-touch infuses the needful energy.'² It is a pity the concession was made, if only for a moment. A community of spiritual nature is revealed in the power of the highest character to evoke a response from ordinary men. What is implicit in the lower is made explicit in the higher. The basis should have been laid in this community, instead of

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 35.

treating, in the first instance, the lower as dependent upon the higher in a purely human relationship, leaving the higher to press upward into a totally new relationship to God, which has not been taken into account from the first. The treatment of the testimony of the moral consciousness never recovers from this defect at the start, which seems to have had a deeper root in Dr. Martineau's mind than a mere temporary necessity of argument.

The moral attributes of God considered, not merely as Cause, but as moral perfection, are said by Dr. Martineau to be three; namely, (1) Benevolence towards sentient beings, (2) Justice towards moral beings, (3) Amity towards like minds.¹ But again, there is the weakness of abstract treatment. Dr. Martineau does not investigate the testimony of the religious consciousness as such, to begin with. Hence, throughout the book, he never asks the question, What is the relationship to God of which the religious mind is conscious? Thus the three attributes, benevolence, justice, and amity, are left unexplained. Had the testimony of the religious consciousness been examined, the fact would have been brought out at once, that the relationship of which Christian believers are conscious is the Fatherhood of God. Then these three attributes would have been seen to be the natural outcome of that Fatherhood. And another would have been added, the most characteristically Christian of all, namely, the grace which raises men to fitness for the fellowship of God and satisfies them with it.

Lastly, individual men do not stand alone. Hence follows the discovery of 'a new fact, that' God 'stands in *one relation to all of us*, giving the same warnings, ordaining the same strife, inviting the same affections, breathing the same inspirations. Hence the knowledge of Him and the life in Him emerge from the level of a solitary faith, and become a principle of union interpenetrating the social attachments, interpreting their intensity, and steeping them in new and fairer meanings.'² Thus the idea is reached 'of our united human life as constituting a *kingdom of God*.'³ Was the

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 42-49.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 49, 50.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 50.

idea of the community, and of that community as a kingdom of God, originally reached by any such deliberate reflection? Surely common acts of worship and of human fellowship came before the development of strictly individual religion; and a mutual sympathy organized men as a kingdom of God, and not the comparison of experiences between individual souls. In deserting the affectional and intuitive source of common religion, Dr. Martineau has passed out of the field of historical religion altogether. Men had the sense of community before they reasoned it out, and it was bound up with affectional ties which alone rendered their lives religious, as well as social and political.

It is a somewhat violent transition to pass from Martineau to the proof of Christianity offered by the Ritschlian School. Widely contrasted, however, as is the latter system, it affords an equally striking illustration of the effect of undue abstraction upon Christian Evidences.

As is well known, the leading characteristic of Ritschl and of his followers is that they attempt to expound and explain Christianity exclusively by means of the conception of the Kingdom of God. According to all the members of the school, the fundamental mistake of Christian theology has lain in its adoption of the Logos-Doctrine as the principal means for the interpretation of Christianity, with the consequence that it has thereby turned Christianity into a means for the theoretic explanation of the world. Such an attempted explanation is held to be beyond the scope of religion, and to be futile. The essential meaning of the Christian religion is to be found in its relation to the needs of the religious consciousness, and for this relation the conception of the kingdom of God, as set forth by our Lord, is of supreme importance. This changed point of view affects not merely the essence of the Christian religion, but its proof. This latter is to be found in the fact that it—and it alone—meets the needs of spiritual consciousness, and the evidence of this is to be found, not in speculative thought, but in the testimony of history.

It is necessary to consider this proof as it is elaborated by Kaftan, the more strictly evidential writer of the Ritschlian School.

The first part of his work, entitled *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, is devoted to an elaborate criticism of the old methods by which Christianity was set forth and defended as a world-philosophy by the help of Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions. Having demolished any pretended proof resting upon such foundations, Kaftan proceeds in the second part to develop his own proof of the truth of Christianity. Man, he argues, has two elements in his being—the intellectual and the practical; it is not, however, the intellectual which is foremost, but the practical.¹ Will, striving, effort, are first on the scene in a child's life. Intellect only awakes subsequently, and is always subservient to will, which seeks practical ends. The question at the outset is, 'whether in the last resort man is to be interpreted and understood from the point of view of the world, or the world from the point of view of man.'² Only if the latter alternative be true can Christianity be proved; but directly that alternative is adopted, the will and its pursuit are of primary importance, not the intellect with its reflection. Man can be explained only by the ends which he pursues; and only in the light of those ends can his knowledge be organized into a consistent whole.³ The ends which man pursues are 'writ large' in the development and history of the community to which he belongs.⁴

From all this it becomes apparent that man is so constructed by nature that he necessarily seeks for himself a Chief Good.⁵ But a Chief Good is not entirely realized in actual experience.⁶ Its reality cannot be demonstratively proved. It cannot be brought to that touchstone of experience under the Categories of the Understanding, which is the test of ordinary knowledge. Speculation outsoars it, experience lags behind it. The reality of the idea of the Chief Good must be verified, so far as it can be verified at all, by an act of faith in its value, and by the fact that human life, as we know it, would fall into incoherence and incompetence without it.⁷

¹ *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, Second Division, chap. i.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 154.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 182 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 182 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 219 *et seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 328.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 384, 385.

To this practical need the doctrine of the kingdom of God corresponds. 'We shall have to prove,' says Kaftan, 'that the Christian idea of the kingdom of God as the Chief Good of humanity answers to the requirements which must be made of the true, rational, absolutely valid idea of the Chief Good.'¹ There are two features of that Chief Good.' In the first place, it is supra-mundane. 'If we ask what sort of Chief Good it is for which the reason of man, as it is recognizable in history, testifies, the first answer is to the effect that such a Chief Good is not to be found in the world.'² It must secure 'perfect and unconditional satisfaction for the human soul,' and this is impossible by means of earthly life. Hence all systems of speculative philosophy bear witness to this fact, since they have 'quite spontaneously assumed a *religious character*.'³ Hence, 'as soon as culture has sufficiently developed, a piety, a species of faith emerges, which has simply the religious idea, as such, as its religious motive, namely, the insufficiency of the world, and the longing thereby awakened for a life above the world, for divine life.'⁴ 'The witness of this fact cannot be set aside as worthless; for we cannot bring ourselves to contemplate the historical development of humanity as something that should not be.'⁵ 'Accordingly, the rational idea of the Chief Good must undoubtedly be conceived in the sense of religion.'⁶

A second feature, however, becomes equally apparent. The idea of the Chief Good must be conceived as a product of historical development, and, therefore, as positive.⁷ It must, therefore, be a moral good, and it must be shown that moral development forms the very kernel of history. 'That rational idea of the Chief Good which we are in search of is consequently the idea which combines the religious and the moral points of view in the closest manner with each other. Such an idea we have in the Christian idea of the supra-mundane kingdom of God, which has the kingdom of moral righteousness on earth as its intra-mundane correlative.'⁸

¹ *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, vol. ii. p. 325.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 328.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 325.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 336.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 339.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 341.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 338-341.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 366.

This idea has been introduced by the Christian Church. There can be no completion of moral life without it. Therefore the exact sense of the Christian kingdom of God is necessary to fill out that human conception of the Chief Good, without which the history of man cannot be explained.¹ Hence 'we infer that the Christian idea of the kingdom of God is the rational idea of the Chief Good.'²

'But,' Kaftan continues, 'this kingdom of God must be a divine proclamation'; it can only have been given by a divine revelation.³ 'Consequently the postulate of a supramundane kingdom of God, in which lies the goal of human history, is simply the postulate of a special revelation of that kingdom of God in history.'⁴ Hence 'the proof of the truth of Christianity is the proof of the reasonableness and absolute-ness of the faith reposed in Christian revelation.'⁵ 'By faith in Christ we do not put ourselves in opposition to reason, but by faith we attain first of all the unity of our personal life, and also the consummation of our reason.'⁶ All this, however, puts Christianity beyond the possibility of demonstrative proof. There is no power to compel or to persuade to absolute unanimity as to what constitutes the Chief Good. The development of history shows how the idea has been revealed and has wrought, and that development cannot be condemned. But no judgement as to the nature and reality of the Chief Good can be reached 'without a judgement of reason, which is always, in part, an expression of personal conviction.'⁷

It must be recognized that this account contributes elements of the greatest importance to a complete statement of Christian Evidences. It remedies that neglect of the vital relation of Christianity to the spiritual life of mankind which has been the most serious fault of ordinary Apologetic. The recognition of the divine method of evolution, and of its extension to the spiritual life of man, necessitates our regarding human life, whether of the individual or of society, as a gradual

¹ *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 325 et seq.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 377.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 382.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 383.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 384.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 390.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 193.

unfolding, which seeks to realize a satisfying end. In this respect also what are called 'judgements of value' are of great importance. For Christian Evidences must needs lay greater stress on the contention that human life can neither be satisfied, maintained, nor explained, if the Christian faith be set aside. By resting Christian Evidences upon the historical facts of religion, and upon those facts in their relation to the satisfaction of spiritual life, in the only way in which, as we know it, such satisfaction is possible, there is presented one of the most important, perhaps the most important, line of Christian defence.

Yet there are serious shortcomings in this account, arising again from the undue abstraction from which Christian Evidences have found it so difficult to keep free.

In the first place, the whole argument depends upon the extreme separation made by Kant between the Pure and the Practical Reason; between the mind seeking and organizing knowledge and the mind willing to seek ends. Even if the priority of impulse over reflection, and the primacy of the will over the intellect, be granted, yet this by no means entitles us to deny to theoretic Reason a real place and a legitimate function in world-interpretation. Even if the experiences arising from action come first, they may, and do, provide material for a purely reflective process, which has its own independent task to fulfil.

Similarly there is, in the next place, too sharp a separation between nature and man. Nature is looked at too exclusively as being in contrast with man, or as the mere scene of man's activities, and not sufficiently as a whole summed up in, and explained by, man. It is necessary both to recognize and also to transcend the distinction between the two. It is certainly impossible to explain religion, save in the light of the historical progress, the practical ends and the spiritual needs of mankind. But these are facts, not merely for the faith which accepts them on pain of dissolving human nature and defeating human progress. They are material of the highest importance to be handed over to the reason when it seeks speculatively to determine what is the nature and constitution of the universe in which these spiritual facts play such an important part.

The union between the theoretic and the practical may perhaps be found by bringing into account an element which Kaftan, in common with the rest of the Ritschlian school, has entirely omitted, namely, the affectional aspects of religion. Neither religion in general, nor Christianity in particular, can be completely explained either by means of the speculative thought which seeks a theoretic explanation of the world, or by the practical demand for a Chief Good above the world and beyond the reach of mortal life. Even the two in combination are insufficient. An additional element has been left out—that of religion as the consciousness of certain definite relations to a present Divine Being, at once supplying material for an explanation of the world, and a ground of confidence in the reality of the necessary Chief Good. Man neither explores the universe unaided, as Paley's traveller inspected the watch on which he chanced, nor does he accept the tidings of the kingdom of God entirely because his life would be reduced to imbecility or despair if he rejected them. Beneath both these is what he believes to be the experience of immediate relationship to that Divine Other than himself, who is yet—in some sense—his true self. Out of that experience he explains the constitution of the world, which for him, at least, finds its unity and its climax in himself. Out of it, also, he draws the assurance that the good which alone can satisfy him is real because of the goodness of that God whose presence he realizes in his own inner life, and whose experienced goodness casts light both upon his own path and also upon the historic path which humanity has trod. Ritschlianism must be supplemented and corrected in all these ways before it can become a trustworthy guide to the reasons why men believe Christianity to be true.

CHAPTER III

THE TASK SET TO CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES IN THE PRESENT TIME

THE general survey, which has now been completed, of the history of Christian Evidences, and of the conditions of thought and sentiment prevailing in our own times, suffices to show how greatly enlarged is the present task of Christian Evidences as compared with that laid upon them in any previous period of Christian thought.

We have seen, further, that the systems of Christian Evidences hitherto recognized are disqualified for discharging this task. And for three reasons. In the first place, because of their mediaeval inheritance; because of the abstract conceptions and divisions which have appeared unchallenged since they were received from the Schoolmen. In the second place, because they have been stereotyped by the endeavour to justify Christianity in conformity with, rather than by criticism of, the conceptions, the assumptions, and the temper which have prevailed in modern physical science. An excessive prejudice against the aims and spirit of physical science has not been accompanied by a searching criticism of its postulates and methods in order to show that what is represented as hostile to religion will not stand the test of reflection when the whole of the Reality is taken into account. And, in the third place, because they have been rendered out of date by recent discoveries of all kinds, and by the changed point of view which those discoveries have brought about.

These criticisms are, in the main, accepted at the present time by the more thoughtful theologians of every school.

The inquiry has further shown what must be the main

line taken by any satisfactory attempt to establish the truth of the Christian religion. It has revealed that in proportion as the religious spirit has been strong and deep, the testimony of the spiritual consciousness itself has been mainly relied upon, whether to arouse or to justify Christian belief. And not merely so; it has been seen in what difficulties Christian Evidences have been involved directly men have departed from this primary position. Revelation has then become the deliverance of abstract propositions about God, man, and the world. From that standpoint it has been difficult to show how these propositions have been introduced by God at all into the mind of man by the method of revelation. Assuming that method, its results have been acknowledged to rest upon a foundation of inferior certainty to the knowledge acquired by sense. The outcome of thus weakening alike the nature, the authority, and the proof of Revelation, has been the strengthening of agnostic doctrines, which have denied both the power of God to reveal Himself and the power of human faculties to apprehend the revelation. These consequences have befallen all explanations which have begun by throwing the human faculties altogether out of the life of God, until it has needed a miracle, the proof of which must necessarily be less than absolute, to put them into relationship with Him once more.

In order to prove that Christianity is true, two things are necessary. First of all, its faith and facts must be shown to have a vital place in the order of Reality considered as a connected spiritual and rational system. In the second, it must be established, not only that this faith and these facts are a part of the system, but that they reveal its meaning by manifesting and making good the relations in which, and the ends for which, the whole system exists.

What is meant by proving this? Many understand it to involve simply a demonstration that the Christian view of the universe is highly probable. They found themselves on the assertion of Butler, that for men 'probability is the very guide of life.'¹ It would be absurd to say that there is no place in a system of Christian Evidences for estimates of probabilities.

¹ *Analogy*. Introduction.

Yet surely if the proof of Christianity be intended to show that its objects and supposed experiences are in the highest degree probable, this falls entirely short of the characteristic testimony of Christian faith. Upon a convinced believer in Christ, the impression produced by such an attitude is that it is in almost fatal disagreement with the temper of mind which is habitual with him. And the more saintly he is, the more will he feel this to be the case. Surely that cannot be the highest aim and the best method of Christian proof which almost affronts the most Christian minds.

Closer examination will perhaps reveal that a confusion exists between two perfectly distinct tasks of Christian Evidences. This may be illustrated by our relationship to the external world. When the occurrence of any particular event is in question, the performance of any particular action, or the particular motive which inspired it, evidence is sought to show that the reality of the event, the action, or the motive, is in the highest degree probable. Our evidence of that which is beyond our own consciousness falls short of immediate certainty, though often almost imperceptibly. But this is not the way in which the reality of the external world, as a whole, and the independent existence of our fellow men are dealt with. Self-consciousness itself depends upon the truth both of the one and of the other. Even the idealism of Berkeley is forced to secure the independence, and, in that respect, the externality of the world, by representing it as the product, not of individual consciousness, but of the consciousness of God. All that we can do with this original belief is to assume the consciousness implied in it, carefully to describe it, to trace the relationships which are manifest in it, and, so far as possible, to set its factors in their proper place as parts of a consistent whole. If the initial act of faith fails, the basis of the whole is gone. No compulsion, even by argument, is then possible. The belief is original, and ultimately finds its justification in this, that only on its basis does life fall into a whole which can be rationally explained, and in which purposive action is possible.

So it is with our consciousness of God, and our belief in

Christianity. Any particular event, or any particular explanation of an event, can at the utmost only be proved to be in the highest degree probable. When, for example, men attempt to establish the particular facts of our Lord's life, whether common or miraculous, they are in the position of ordinary historians. Their only course is to establish the probability of these facts. So, again, when men speculate as to the reasons why the universe is constituted in this way and not in that, or why God did this rather than that, they are within the sphere where only varying degrees of probability can be attained. Such facts may fall into a series, and on behalf of each and of the whole of them successive arguments may be found, which combine to yield what is called a 'cumulative proof' of Christianity.

But all this, even when taken together, does not constitute exactly what is meant by the Christianity of which the Christian believer is conscious, and in regard to which his attitude is one, not of estimating probabilities, but of the highest degree of certitude. He has—if his own account be taken—a specific consciousness of divine relations, as direct and as well defined as those of which he is conscious in regard either to the external world or to his fellow men. Just as in the case of that experience of the world and of his fellows which began upon the breast of his mother, so, though in a yet fuller measure, this consciousness gives a meaning to life and the world. That meaning is seen by his reason and seized upon by his will as giving a clue to the ends he should seek and the methods he should pursue. The meaning which is perceived in this consciousness is confidently held to be there, because it has been *seen*; and the more confidently since it causes all things to fall into line as parts of a spiritual and rational system; since, further, it both manifests and promotes the end which gives unity and satisfaction to his life. The consciousness is there. It is given. It is not built up by means of arguments. In the most typical cases it feels no need of arguments, and is, perhaps, as much at a loss to produce them, when called upon, as most men would be if summoned to give reasons for believing in the existence of an external world, or of their fellow men. The consciousness is

accounted to be verified by the illumination, the satisfaction, the practical power and inspiration, which are contained within it and nowhere else.

There is, of course, one important distinction between belief in Christianity and belief in an external world. The latter is universal, while the former is not. The importance and explanation of this difference will be considered later on. Meanwhile, all that needs to be said is that the lack of universality of Christian belief does not affect the way in which it is held by those who enjoy it, and that unless Christianity can be justified by means of the consciousness of Christians there seems to be no other way remaining of establishing it. The contents of Christian consciousness must be set in relationship to all other tracts of human consciousness, and it must be shown that to depart from Christianity means, at every point of the departure, to lose something of the full power to explain human life and the world. In this power to explain the whole will be found, if anywhere, the final verification of Christian faith. That faith must not, therefore, even for its own sake, be withheld from discharging this office in regard to the whole realm of truth.

In this respect it must be contended that Ritschl has strengthened the position of Agnosticism by the absolute separation which he has set up between what he terms respectively, theoretic and religious knowledge. 'Theology,' he says, 'has performed its task when, guided by the Christian idea of God and the conception of men's blessedness in the kingdom of God, it exhibits completely and clearly, both as a whole and in particular, the Christian view of the world and of human life, together with the necessity which belongs to the interdependent relations between its component elements. It is incompetent for it to enter upon either a direct or an indirect proof of the Christian revelation by seeking to show that it agrees with philosophical or juridical views of the world; for to such Christianity simply stands opposed. . . . To subordinate the ethical to the idea of the cosmical is always characteristic of a heathen view of the world, and to its jurisdiction Christianity is not amenable; before it, Christianity will never succeed in justifying itself. Even

when such an explanation of the world starts from an idea of God, it offers no guarantee that it can prove the truth of Christianity.'¹

The point of view adopted in these pages is in agreement with the contentions of Ritschl, in so far as they insist that the first condition of the proof of Christianity is to be found in the clear indication of the contents of the Christian consciousness, and in the exhibition that those contents are necessary in order to satisfy the human spirit, and to give a rational view of its position in the world. Apart from the pre-suppositions of Christianity, it must be shown that the position of man becomes, not only unintelligible, but contradictory. The criticism is further justified, in so far as it protests against the subordination of the ethical to the cosmical. This, as has been shown, was the mistake into which such writers of Christian Evidences as Paley have fallen, by conducting their argument on a cosmical level, without ever rising to consider the spiritual constitution of human nature, as shown in the spiritual relationships into which men enter with God and their fellows. But Ritschl falls into error when he presses his point of view until he makes Christianity to stand in absolute opposition to all philosophical views of the world.²

In the subsequent course of his reasoning, Ritschl is himself obliged fitfully to break down the absolute opposition which he has set up between religious and theoretic knowledge. For example, he notes the presence of religious elements in Greek philosophy. This he accounts for as follows: 'In these cases the combination of heterogeneous kinds of knowledge—the religious and the scientific—is beyond all doubt. And it is to be explained by the fact that philosophers, who, through their scientific observation of nature had destroyed the foundations of the popular faith, sought to obtain satisfaction for their religious instincts by

¹ *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Redemption* (English translation), pp. 24, 25.

² The relation of Christianity to juridical views stands upon a somewhat different footing, and need not detain us here. It has been discussed by the author in his work on *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, chaps. iv. and v.

another path.'¹ This really means that a man can never exclude his religious instincts from his philosophy, and that, therefore, it must be deeply coloured by their testimony. Nor did the introduction of religious interests into their philosophy by the Greek thinkers necessarily vitiate their work in philosophy. The reason why that work is incomplete from the philosophical standpoint and unsatisfactory from that of the Christian consciousness, is that the testimony of the religious instincts in the time and place of the Greek philosophers was imperfectly developed, and that, therefore, the religious assumptions which colour their philosophy are incomplete and insufficient to satisfy the many-sided spiritual problem with which they had to deal.

Further, Ritschl is himself unable totally to separate between theoretic and religious judgements. Religious judgements are, as he calls them, 'value-judgements,' that is judgements which are justified, not by scientific proof, but by their worth to the completeness and satisfaction of human life. But he is obliged to admit that value-judgements enter, to a certain extent, into philosophical reasoning, that unless there were some kind of interest in the matter men would not trouble themselves about it.² The distinction is, therefore, made between so-called *concomitant* and *independent* value-judgements. 'The former are operative and necessary in all theoretical cognition, as in technical observation and combination. But all perception of moral ends or moral hindrances are *independent* value-judgements.'³

It becomes clear, therefore, that there is no absolute division between the two classes of judgements. In seeking the truest scientific judgements there must be a certain subjective demand for satisfaction urging men to sustain the labour and sometimes to encounter the risks necessary to attain to them. On the other hand, there must be a certain theoretic element in the independent value-judgements. The judgements which religion passes must have their place in furnishing our completed knowledge of the real nature of the world. They necessarily involve judgements,

¹ *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 208.

² *Ibid.*, p. 204.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 204, 205.

be they well- or ill-founded, as to the nature of the world.

Ritschl, in urging the superiority of the moral argument for the existence of God over the ontological or cosmological, explains his position as follows: 'In theoretical knowledge,' he says, 'spirit treats nature as something which exists for it; while in the practical sphere of the will, too, it treats nature as something which is directly a means of the realization of the common ethical end which forms the final end of the world. The cognitive impulse and the will both take this course without regard to the fact that nature is subject to quite other laws than those which spirit obeys, that it is independent of spirit, and that it forms a restraint on spirit, and so far keeps it in a certain way in dependence on itself. Hence we must conclude either that the estimate which spirit, as a power superior to nature, forms of its own worth—in particular of the estimate which it forms of moral fellowship, which transcends nature—is a baseless fancy, or that the view taken of spirit is in accordance with truth and with the supreme law which is valid for nature as well. If that be so, then its ground must lie in a divine will, which creates the world with spiritual life as its final end. To accept the idea of God in this way is, as Kant observes, practical faith and not an act of theoretical cognition. While, therefore, the Christian religion is thereby proved to be in harmony with reason, it is always with the reservation that knowledge of God embodies itself in judgements which differ in kind from those of theoretical science.'¹ Does not the fact that the 'cognitive impulse and the will' take their course 'without regard to the fact that nature is subject to quite other laws than those which spirit obeys,' suggest a doubt whether the mutual independence and opposition between nature and spirit are as final as they seem? Is even the surface contradiction as real as it looks? And in so far as it is real, may it not be established in the interest of spirit itself, and in order to provoke the spirit to overcome it, and to realize that deeper harmony in which nature serves the ends of spirit? Certainly if we are to justify this action of spirit in cognition

¹ *Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 224, 225.

and will we cannot regard it as self-enclosed, but must treat this characteristic activity as throwing light on the inmost meaning of the universe, and as showing it to be so bound together in one system as to serve the purposes of spiritual life. Hence the Christian consciousness must be vindicated by showing how it completes and supplies the means of interpreting all other provinces of reality.

We are now in a position to set forth the course which, according to the view taken in these pages, Christian Evidences should take.

I. In the first place, Christian Evidences must begin with a statement of the Religious Datum. Its content as a professed revelation and experience must be ascertained. The best means of defending it is to let it speak for itself. Even if this be not so, the only way of undertaking its defence is to place in clear light what it is that we have to defend. Above all, Christianity claims to be a revelation, to and in human consciousness, of certain relations in which God stands to man. What these are must be investigated. In order to this, Christianity must be taken as a whole and at the full, as it first manifested itself. Its main features must be determined. What is contained in our description of it must be shown to be its kernel, and not mere husk; to be part of its abiding meaning, and not an accommodation to the age in which it appeared.

II. In the second place, Christianity must be shown to be the supreme expression and satisfaction of spiritual life. The relation of Christianity to preparatory and to other religions must be traced, the natural history of religion in relation to the validity of the spiritual consciousness being here dealt with. The connexion of Christianity with all other tracts of human consciousness must be set out, and it must be shown not only to be consistent with them, but to complete and explain them. It must be shown thus that the Christian consciousness in its highest and completest form is verified by, and in its turn verifies, history as the divine unfolding of an all-comprehending world-end; an unfolding which, while it is incomplete, carries within it the prophecy of final realization. It must be made good that Christianity stands in vital

connexion with the world, as consummating it; as bringing its end into consciousness, in and through the divine relationships it reveals. It must be delivered from the suspicion of being accidental because it is remedial, and it must be shown that in order to be remedial it must be a vital part of the life which it redeems. Thus Christianity must be shown, not merely to be compatible with other truth, or to supplement other truth where reason fails, or to be a real world lying outside the world of which natural knowledge takes account, but to be the final and full manifestation of the Spirit by, in, and for which the universe exists.

III. In the next place, the value-judgements of the Christian spirit must be dealt with. It must be shown that they are capable of affording an explanation of the world, and the only explanation which is consistent with its most important facts. This must be done by exhibiting the spiritual unity of the world, its system, and its organic relation to the spirit which becomes manifest in it.

Arising from this, it must be shown that the theistic basis which Christianity provides is the necessary foundation for a world standing, throughout its system, in such relations to spiritual life. In this connexion it is more important to settle what is the nature of the universe, than what was the method of its origin. Probably it will never be possible, under human limitations, to arrive at a complete philosophy of creation, for we are men and not God. Christian Evidences may therefore be most profitably employed in making good the divine and spiritual nature of the world, and the relations to God revealed in it. It must be made clear that the Divine Spirit who is the ground and explanation of men is the ground and explanation of the nature which is one with man. Only that which is adequate to the explanation of man is adequate to the explanation of nature.

IV. All other principles of world-explanation must be shown to be partial abstractions, which are incompetent to explain the whole. Only the full expression of spiritual consciousness in Christianity avoids this limitation, and is all-comprehensive.

In particular, the objections of Agnosticism must be

examined, and the Christian explanation of the world must be vindicated as against these objections, whether they arise from despair or from a false theory of knowledge, and of the nature of reality. This vindication must be accompanied by the admission that the ends of the universe are wider, and the divine method more immanent, than human consciousness can adequately represent to itself.

V. Those phenomena of the world which seem to be in contradiction to Christianity must be considered. In so far as these are real, they must be shown to be either explicable in terms of Christianity, or so subordinate that while no solution may yet be possible, they cannot be held to invalidate our main conclusions.

VI. The Christian account of the divine dealings with man, especially in redemption, must be considered, with a view to establish the fact that while they transcend nature, as ordinarily understood, they are in vital connexion with all that has been made manifest of God elsewhere.

VII. The nature of the Christian doctrine of God, and the way by which it has been reached, must be examined, in order to show that it does not conflict with reason.

Such is the general course marked out for our subsequent inquiry.

It will be convenient to treat of these subjects in two parts; the first dealing with the meaning and place of Christianity as the absolute religion, and the second with its proof.

BOOK II

CHRISTIANITY AS THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION

CHAPTER I

THE CONTENT OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

WHAT is the content of the Christian Religion? This is the first question to be asked and answered in dealing with the problem of Christian Evidences. These, like every other subject of human inquiry, must begin with some datum. There is something, that is to say, which they take for granted, and have to explain and justify. What is it which in the case of Christian Evidences is given to be explained? The only satisfactory answer is, that this is Christ—His place and influence in the world, and what is made manifest thereby. This includes, on the one hand, the explanation of Christ in the world, and on the other, the explanation of the world with Christ in it. Thus the question becomes: What is revealed as to the nature of the whole universe of reality by the presence and place of Christ within it? The two elements must be kept well in view. But, first of all, there is Christ Himself, as He is revealed in His own personal history, in His direct influence upon the life and progress, upon the spirit and experience of men, in the measure and meaning of His affinity with the characteristic faiths and strivings of mankind. Anything less than the whole, which includes all these elements, comes short at some vital point of the Christianity which has to be explained. The Person, His influence, His relation to what is fundamental in human nature—these are the three elements of the complete manifestation of what Christ is. To leave out of consideration any one of these is to omit something that is essential. To examine any part of this whole simply in the form of a theoretic doctrine is to weaken its force by abstracting

from the spiritual experience of mankind wrought out in history, out of which the formal doctrine proceeds.

The first step, therefore, in a satisfactory presentation of Christian Evidences, is carefully to ascertain what is distinctive of Christ Himself. This means, above all, the determination of the content of His own spiritual consciousness, as it is presented to us in the records which have come down to us; establishing, so far as is necessary for this purpose, their authenticity. It involves, further, the establishment and explanation of certain facts about Him, without which His own consciousness could not have created His influence in the world. It includes, further, the investigation of that influence in order to seize upon what is characteristic of it, and to interpret the doctrines about Him and His work which were developed in order to describe and explain the characteristic influence He exerted. It necessitates one additional step; namely, the inquiry as to how the influence of Christ, thus set forth in doctrines about Him, stands related to the general texture of human consciousness, and to the deliverances of the human spirit working in apparent independence of the history and the Spirit of Christ.

In modern times, at least, no satisfactory beginning of Christian Evidences can be made from any other starting-point than this. It is the great service rendered by the Ritschlian school that, with certain grave defects in their treatment of Christ and Christianity, as well as of the relation of both to the world, its teachers have emphasized the cardinal necessity of founding the truth of Christianity upon the relation of Christ to the Christian consciousness, and through it to the general spiritual life of mankind.

This starting-point, proper in itself, will be felt to be the more necessary in proportion as the unique place of Christ in the evolution and history of religion is realized, and also the unique nature of the bond which unites believers to Him. How unique that bond is such thinkers as Martineau recognize as expressly as do the more orthodox. In his earlier days he wrote, 'Whoever sees in Christ, not an original source of truth and goodness, but only a product of something else, is destitute of the attitude of mind constituting religious

discipleship; which implies, not that we have been convinced by the reasoning of an equal, but that we have been subdued by the authority, and possessed by the intuitions of a higher mind.'¹ In later years he wrote, 'Supreme in the hierarchy of inspiration, standing unique at its culminating point, identical in filial will with the Infinite Father's perfection, is Jesus Christ, the moral incarnation of the love of God.'² Still later he declared, 'I have no faith in a religious future for those who renounce their allegiance to that personality, whether to try a philosophic Theism or a bare Ethical Ideal without him.'³

The first question is, therefore, that of the nature of the religion which Christ embodies and conveys. What is it? How does He convey it?

I. In the first place, Christ gives a final theology to the world as the expression of a perfect religion. That His theology is final, that His religion is perfect, may be taken as generally agreed. If either is abandoned, it is not in order to find a better, but because religion is pronounced an illusion and theological conclusions are declared to be beyond the reach of human faculties properly exercised. The next point is equally important, namely, that it is by means of the perfect religion that Christ announces the final theology. The whole of His theological teaching is expressed through a religious realization of, a response to, a manifestation of, certain divine relationships which He describes. His teaching, His outward life, His inner spiritual experience, constitute an indissoluble unity, to which the inner experience is the key. In every other case there is some disparity between the two sides. Religious instincts may find little consistent expression in doctrine, may even diverge widely in substance from the dogmatic forms in which they are expressed. Still more may theological teaching become theoretic and abstract; derived from the exercise of the logical understanding rather than from the deeper spiritual and moral sources of the heart. The fact that theological science has so often broken away

¹ *Rationale*, 3rd ed. (1845).

² Letter to R. H. Hutton (1885), *Life*, vol. ii. p. 80.

³ Written in 1888, *Life*, vol. ii. p. 218.

from such sources, and even neglected to correct itself by their help, has frequently rendered it artificial and unsatisfying. But in Christ the unity of religion, life, and teaching is complete. Each element contributes a consenting voice to the others. The teaching is reflected in the life; teaching and life proceed from experience; the experience carrying within itself a direct and immediate assurance of its own truth, and being verified by its power to inspire the spirit and conduct by which the life is carried to a satisfying and triumphant close. Hence there is in Christ a unique combination of conscious union with God, and also with man; of intensest devotion with the total absence of any sense of sin. The first step towards understanding Christianity is to ascertain the nature of this harmonious union of religion and theology in a completely consistent life.

1. If inquiry as to the nature of this union be made, it will be found that the religion expresses through the theology our Lord's consciousness of the Fatherhood of God, realized in and through a consciousness of Sonship in complete correspondence with that Fatherhood. The Father is made known to, and is made manifest by, the Son. The consciousness of perfect correspondence with the Father pervades His life. The saying, 'I do always the things that are pleasing to Him' (John viii. 29), sums it up.

First and foremost is the consciousness of perfect spiritual and moral affinity between Himself and the Father. In that consciousness lies at once His own knowledge of the Father, and His power to reveal Him to men. What the Father is, what God therefore is—for the Father is simply God revealed in the one supreme relationship of Love and Life—is manifest to and in the spiritual and moral qualities of the Son. These are directly derived from the Father. Therefore the Father is what the Son manifests Him as being in the perfect life of Sonship.

This relationship between the Father and the Son is unique. Christ is the Son as none else is, or can be. This consciousness of distinction is present throughout our Lord's consciousness and teaching.

Yet the very peculiarity of His Sonship contributes the

basis of a unity between Him and mankind, and lays down the nature of His office for mankind. 'No man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him' (Matt. xi. 27). The life of Christ, therefore, as He is conscious of it, is a manifestation of the Father: 'I have glorified Thee on the earth' (John xvii. 4), is His own summing-up of both the nature and the completeness of His life at the end.

The Fatherhood manifest in the Sonship shapes His course throughout. Every power which He possesses is derived from it. Every temptation which He withstands is an incitement to depart from the perfectly filial spirit by way of some form of disloyalty. Throughout His life, this direct, personal, all-determining and unique experience of relationship to the Father is the key to our Lord's life.¹

What, then, was the Father revealed to the Son as being? In the first place, spiritual and moral perfection. 'Your Father which is in heaven is perfect' (Matt. v. 48). Secondly, this all-perfect Father is in direct relations with Him, and a continual source of inspiration to Him. 'Jesus therefore answered them, and said, My teaching is not Mine, but His that sent Me. If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from Myself. He that speaketh from himself, seeketh his own glory: but He that seeketh the glory of Him that sent Him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in Him' (John vii. 16-18). This all-perfect God, who is in this immediate relationship to the Son, is, further, His unfailing support. 'Ye shall leave Me alone, and yet I am not alone, because the Father is with Me' (John xvi. 32). Finally, throughout His life, and in all its circumstances, the Father brings to the Son perfect spiritual satisfaction. 'Jesus saith to them, My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, and to accomplish His work' (John iv. 34).

Of all this the Son is immediately certain. 'I know Him: and if I should say, I know Him not, I shall be like unto you, a liar' (John viii. 55). While the Son is the only

¹ See further on this the author's *The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life*, pp. 13, 14. Also, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, chap. ii.

complete embodiment of divine revelation to men, yet the Father Himself influences men to recognize and receive the truth which is revealed in and by the Son. 'I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes' (Matt. xi. 25). 'Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven' (Matt. xvi. 17). Spiritual and ethical perfection, manifest in the relations of life and love, bestowing illumination, strength, and satisfaction, known with an immediate certainty, which needs no evidence, save that of the blessedness it brings, this is the doctrine of God in His relationship to the Son, declared out of the fullness of His consciousness by Christ. It makes no difference that many of these testimonies are taken from the Fourth Gospel, whatever view may be taken of its authenticity. The passages quoted do but present in somewhat sharper outline the same essential features as are found in the other Gospels. If the least favourable view possible were taken, they would yet represent, if not the direct statements of Christ, the impression produced by them upon the minds of His early followers. And this for our special purpose would be hardly less important.

If this is the doctrine of God, revealed in and to the consciousness of His Son, what is God, as Christ knows Him, to mankind and to the world? This question may be answered in words used by the present writer elsewhere. 'The disposition which He attributes to God is everywhere the fatherly in its perfection. . . . It is the cause of unflinching mercifulness towards sinners, as is shown in the Parable of the Prodigal Son; and in the command to the disciples: "Be ye merciful, even as your Father is merciful" (Luke vi. 36). It pities and cares for the weak: "It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these should perish" (Matt. xviii. 14). It inspires a sleepless Providence which watches over each and all in order to satisfy all their needs: "Behold the birds of the heaven, that they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your Father feedeth them. Are not ye of much more value than they?"

(Matt. vi. 26; Luke xii. 24). There is therefore no need of anxiety concerning the necessities of life: "For your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things" (Matt. vi. 32). This care extends to the humblest creatures, and to the minutest interests: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father: but the very hairs of your head are all numbered" (Matt. x. 29, 30).

'The love of the Father, therefore, foresees our need, and waits to satisfy it, without requiring to be urged: "Your Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask Him" (Matt. vi. 8).

'And His generosity exceeds that of all earthly fathers, both in its bounty and in the readiness of its response: "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him?" (Matt. vii. 11; Luke xi. 11-13). And His gifts are irrespective of desert; in His fatherly magnanimity, "He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust" (Matt. v. 45). So He rejoices to reward His faithful children: "Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom" (Luke xii. 32). And His love is the motive of the whole work of salvation. As to this, one great saying may stand for the whole of our Lord's teaching: "God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have eternal life" (John iii. 16).'¹

Such teaching involves all the attributes of God which technical theology delights to expound by formal definition. Take the simple text, 'Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father: but the very hairs of your head are all numbered' (Matt. x. 29). Omniscience, Omnipresence, Omnipotence, the greatest natural attributes, so-called, of God are there; for God fulfils the obligations which He has imposed upon Himself as Creator by ordering the life of the humblest creatures which He has made. And all these attributes act in

¹ *Fatherhood of God*, pp. 52, 53.

the service of a love which transcends and suffuses them all. The whole, therefore, of formal theology as to the nature and attributes of God, is contained in this testimony of Christ to His providential care. The same is true of such a simple saying dealing with the religious life as this, 'Thy Father which seeth in secret shall recompense thee' (Matt. vi. 4, 6). Sometimes such theological teaching as to the nature of God comes nearer to a formal definition, as when our Lord says, 'With God all things are possible' (Matt. xix. 26). Everywhere, however, the attributes of the Father are made manifest to the Son in the life and work of love. It is by love that God is, above all, made known; in the manifestation of love, through its life-giving work, all His spiritual and natural attributes are revealed.

In the consciousness and teaching of Christ, the processes of formal theology are reversed. These generally attain to love as last in the order of thought and manifestation. They begin by demonstrating the Being, Unity, and Personality of God before they advance to His spiritual and moral perfection. The experiences of the spiritual consciousness reverse this order. With our Lord the spiritual presence, which enfolds Him, comes first, and in that presence are involved all those great attributes which formal theology afterwards abstracts and defines. Thus in our Lord's consciousness of God both His transcendence and His immanence are blended. He is above the world, enthroned in perfect Personality and sovereign will. Yet He is in closest relationship to the world; present throughout its whole order and ministering to its every want. He is so perfectly spiritual as to be the immediate source of every noble motive and of every holy affection. Yet He is so all-embracing and is able so to condescend to the life of the humblest of His creatures that He clothes the grass, colours the lily, orders the fall of the sparrow, and numbers the hairs of the head. His underlying reality and His determining will are the sole cause of permanence in the world. 'Every plant which My heavenly Father planted not shall be rooted up' (Matt. xv. 13). His sovereign will is the explanation of all things from their original creation to the spiritual condition of men's lives.

This last is declared in the striking saying, 'All that which the Father giveth Me shall come unto Me; and him that cometh unto Me I will in no wise cast out' (John vi. 37).

The whole of this doctrine of God is, as has been said, revealed in the life of Sonship as a religious and life-ordering experience. In the directness and completeness of that experience is shown the unique peculiarity of the Son, as distinguished from all other men. The metaphysical nature of His Sonship is revealed in and through this spiritual and moral experience. Apart from the spiritual splendour of Jesus Christ, the dogmatic propositions about His nature would be incredible. Just as the so-called natural attributes of God are made manifest in His spiritual revelation, so the metaphysical relationship of the Son to the Father is manifest in and through the unique spiritual and moral relationships in which He stands to Him, as shown in a life that is permeated by the Father's presence and power. The more this spiritual consciousness of Christ is considered, the stronger becomes the impression of its unique nature; by reason alike of its directness and intimacy, of its fullness and certainty of knowledge, and of its perfect spiritual response. Yet, although this unique relationship removes Christ, not only in degree but in kind, from the ranks of all other men, it is, notwithstanding, the complete fulfilment of the promise made in human nature.

Our Lord's consciousness of being the Son of God is all-important for the understanding of His life and work in the world. Of the two conceptions by which Christ is explained—His divine Sonship and His Messiahship—His Sonship is the more important; for it was by this consciousness of Sonship that He interpreted the meaning of His Messianic office for mankind. It is usually said that our Lord spiritualized the Messianic ideal current in His time, and substituted a spiritual and inward kingdom for the outward and miraculous conception of the Jews. That He did this was entirely due to His consciousness of Sonship and to His realization of what that Sonship meant as to the nature and purposes of God, the nature of man, and the way of salvation. It has been argued that our Lord came gradually and

comparatively late to a distinct consciousness that He was the Christ; it is not open to question that His first and original consciousness of Himself was that He was the Son of God.

2. But if our Lord's first and all-determining consciousness was that He was the Son of God, coupled with and growing out of that consciousness was the consciousness of being the Son of Man. That title is Messianic in its origin; it rests upon the vision of 'one like unto a Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven' contained in Dan. vii. 13, 14. While this vision represents a miraculous advent, yet the whole quality of the Messiah thus revealed is spiritual and moral. It is as the complete embodiment of a perfect humanity coming forth from God, upheld by God, and serving God, that the Son of Man introduces an everlasting kingdom of abiding humanity, before which the successive kingdoms of the wild beasts pass away. Thus, when the whole context of Daniel is taken into account, the title, 'the Son of Man,' lends itself perfectly to our Lord's consciousness of being the Son of God. It was in this direct relationship to His Father that His authority, the certainty and permanence of His kingdom, were grounded. It was in His complete consciousness of Sonship that His perfect embodiment of the ideal of human nature was contained, as being at once free, reasonable, and loyal, in contrast to all that is typical, not of man, but of the wild beast.

Hence, it is not surprising that in the mind of Christ the spiritual and moral elements of the title, 'the Son of Man,' became supreme. It was used by Him to set forth His typical humanity, His breadth of human sympathy, and even, with a reminiscence of its ordinary prophetic use,¹ His human frailty and apparent insignificance. Christ came 'not to destroy, but to fulfil.'² If this was true of His relationship to the law, it was true, above all, of His relationship to the human nature, which underlies all law and makes law possible. To fulfil the law involves fulfilling the human nature, which is subject to, embodies, and responds to the law. This was our Lord's office as the Son of Man—an office which He could so fulfil only because of His life through, in, and to the Father as His Son. This consciousness that He completely realizes human

¹ See Ezekiel.

² Matt. v.

nature in such wise that He is united with, and not separated from mankind, is vital to the understanding of our Lord's teaching as to His life and work.

3. Our Lord is conscious of being the Christ. It has been alleged, on very insufficient evidence, nay, by distorting the evidence that is produced, that Jesus never claimed to be the Christ, and that such statements of His Messiahship as are to be found in the New Testament are the invention of His disciples. Taking all the conditions into account, it would, on the other hand, appear almost inconceivable that He could claim to fill so unique a position towards the spiritual life of Israel and of the world, without having the consciousness that He was the Christ. Both the titles, which were frequently on His lips, the Son of God and the Son of Man, carried with them the suggestion of Messiahship. We have seen that this was the case with the latter. But as to the former, it will be remembered that Jehovah said of Solomon, 'I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to Me a son' (1 Chron. xxi. 10); while of Israel He said, 'Out of Egypt have I called My son' (Hosea xi. 1). The perfection of Divine Sonship, therefore, suggested to any one acquainted with the Old Testament the position of Messianic authority and power.

That our Lord's express references to Messiahship are comparatively scarce is true; that He even forbade men to declare Him to be the Christ is also true. It is further true that He totally transformed the conception of Messiahship, and made it infinitely more spiritual than the greatest of the prophets had foreseen that it would be. Moreover, He enriched the ideal of the Christ by expressly including in it the Servant-prophecies of Isaiah xlii. and liii., with their prophetic, priestly, and sacrificial implications.

When these last two facts are taken into account, they explain our Lord's slight use of the title Christ, and His prohibition to men to make Him known by it. He preferred to perform Christly offices rather than to take to Himself the misleading title. He preferred to take names which, while they implied His Messiahship, set in the forefront its spiritual conditions and ends.

Our Lord's interpretation of the meaning of the Messianic

office can only be understood in the light of His consciousness of being the Son of God and the Son of Man. In each respect, He, in the first place, stands apart from men, having a unique relationship to God and also to them. His relationship is, however, not only unique, but representative. It is through His consciousness of God and of fellowship with Him that He embodies and completes human nature in Himself. It is just this twofold fact, that He completes human nature in Himself by perfecting its divine relationship, and that He stands in relationship to all men by realizing all that is contained of promise and need in human nature itself, that lays upon Him the Messianic office and defines its nature. He is the Revealer of God and of man in the true relationships in which they stand to one another. He is the Redeemer, ransoming from the evil that blights that promise and renders its fulfilment hopeless. He is the Life-giver, revealing Himself and redeeming mankind in bestowing the spiritual power by which the life of men is completed and satisfied in the likeness of His own, in fellowship with and allegiance to Him. His Messiahship stands for the office and work by which He, the Son of God and the Son of Man, brings men in and through Himself to share in His relationship to the Father and in the fullness of a redeemed and perfected spiritual life. To claim the name of Christ, as that name carried with it distorted and materialized conceptions, was to defeat His object. To accept and transform its inmost meaning in the light of the spiritual relationships which He held towards God and man was the first essential of His ministry. Thus understood, our Lord's claim to Messiahship was indispensable. Only by means of it could He connect Himself and His work with the historical preparation for Him, while yet giving expression to spiritual truths and influences which, if they had ever been fully identified in the public mind with Messianic expectations, had long ceased to be so. The idea is not imposed by the faith of His disciples upon their Master, and then accommodated to His spiritual mission, after their ordinary Messianic dreams had been scattered by His cross. On the contrary, just the conception of the Gospels is contained in our Lord's fundamental consciousness that He is the Son of God and the Son of Man.

From all this it follows that the personal relationship in which men as individuals are to stand to Christ is everywhere emphasized. Discipleship, not merely as the means of acquaintance with His truth, but as the condition of entering into inward and outward fellowship with His life, is the way by which His kingdom is set up in the hearts of men.

This fellowship by the way of discipleship is not only the satisfaction of human need, but brings salvation from sin. Everywhere behind and with inhuman need Christ sees the presence of sin as its cause. This fact is so familiar, and the evidence of it is so manifest throughout the Gospels, that it is needless to enlarge upon or to establish it. For the present purpose it may be taken for granted. A study of the gospels will show that Christ's ministry as Redeemer from sin has three aspects, which were naturally developed at a later stage into the doctrine of His three offices—the Prophetic, the Priestly, and the Kingly. First in order comes His work as the Revealer of the Father in grace and truth; the imparting of a knowledge, which He alone possesses, to men whose spiritual nature is in such need of it as to be unfulfilled without it, but who can apprehend it only in Him, as His words become to them 'spirit and life.' Secondly, there is His Priestly office, not so clearly outlined in the Gospels as the Prophetic, yet to be found there, and emphasized in the closing scenes of His life, especially according to the Gospel of St. John. Thirdly, there is the Kingly aspect of His work, resting upon spiritual foundations, and spiritual in its nature. Its essential feature is that all the teaching of Christ becomes an authoritative command over the life, unfolding a law of life and love to be received by faith, and to be embodied in action. 'Ye call me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am.'¹ Master and Lord, not by virtue of a merely external authority, but by virtue of dominion over the hearts and lives of men, who are constituted for faith in the Son of God.

These three offices, or aspects of Christ's work, are bound together in the closest unity. Each is co-extensive with the whole of His teaching, doing, and suffering. Every element

¹ John xiii. 13.

of His life belongs to a complete unity, which is, according to the point of view from which it is regarded, entirely prophetic, entirely priestly, and entirely kingly. Into that unity the death of Christ is brought, not as an unforeseen, a meaningless, incident, but as a vital part, even *the* vital part, of His Messianic work. He gives 'His life a ransom for many.'¹ Upon the cross His identification with man becomes complete; His taking over the burden of their sin and sorrow is perfected in a great act of vicarious suffering; His obedience to the Father attains its consummation. By a final act of revelation, of self-surrender, and of love for men, He enters into the fullness of His Christly office through the sacrifice of Himself.

Still the personal relationship is supreme. Perfecting His work of revelation and redemption by His death on the cross, our Lord becomes in His risen life, the life of His disciples. The ultimate end of His work is His glorification. His glorification is that of the 'grain of wheat,' which by falling into the ground and dying, 'bringeth forth much fruit.'² This fruit-bearing is brought about by means of the outpouring of His Spirit, to which He looks forward as completing that personal influence which brings about the salvation of men.

Thus the Christly office of our Lord, manifested in its prophetic, priestly, and kingly aspects, is redemptive; brings men out of ignorance, sin, and incompleteness, to the Father in Him, and to that fullness of life which can only be the outcome of this completed relationship. The whole of this work of salvation is wrought out by means of a combination of all-embracing sympathy with men, and of dynamic influence over them, which reveal His spiritual relationship to them all; for without such a relationship neither the sympathy nor the influence can be explained. This original relationship is consummated in the personal fellowship of the Spirit and faith.

Naturally our Lord, in this revelation of His work as the Christ, adopts, and in adopting transforms, the Apocalyptic teaching of the Old Testament. The prophets had foretold the coming of the 'Day of Jehovah,' when there should be a

¹ Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45.

² John xii. 24.

final consummation of those spiritual processes of judgement and salvation which they beheld going on around them continuously. In the intuitions and needs of the human heart the eternal realization and the temporal process are ever connected; the arrival at the historic goal with the spiritual development. To look for the divine accomplishment without the spiritual process is to expect an irrational miracle. To dwell upon an unending process without the satisfaction of an eternal realization is equally unsatisfying to the spiritual reason. In the teaching of our Lord both are held together in a perfect whole. The working-out of salvation is spiritual, gradual, secured by supernatural means through an orderly and inward development. But at the end is the goal of a final and complete consummation, when these spiritual issues shall have been wrought out in a world-embracing redemption. The emphasis in the Gospels is now upon the one and now upon the other of these two aspects of the perfect whole. The essential feature is the subordination of the history of the universe to the spiritual life which consummates and explains it. In this aspect our Lord's teaching is the prophetic announcement of that which satisfies the spiritual intuitions of man and the spiritual instincts, which manifest themselves most fully in the highest spiritual and moral—but to some extent in all natural—endeavour. Such is the general outline of the work of Christ presented in the Gospels.¹

4. Our Lord's filial consciousness, and the conception of His work as Christ, which was consequent on it, involved His transformation of the accepted doctrine of the kingdom of God.

The conception of the kingdom of God was accepted by Christ, and formed the basis of His teaching. No phrase is so frequently on His lips as that of 'the kingdom of God,' or 'the kingdom of heaven.' The form is Jewish; representing the theocratic conception which was embodied in their state, and formed the substance of their expectation of the future. But while in form the conception lent itself to those external and mechanical views which, with their childish imagery and their nationalist ideals, characterized Messianic

¹ The miraculous element is considered later on. See pp. 132 *et seq.*

hopes in our Lord's days, yet in substance the doctrine of the kingdom of God was an attempt to give expression to the underlying consciousness—essential to all true religion—of the absoluteness of God, of His complete control over all human life and over the world. It represented also, though in inadequate form, the faith, also essential to the highest spiritual life, that God, who is absolute in His sovereignty, exercises His sovereignty to secure adequate, spiritual, and moral ends, bringing with them satisfaction to human hearts and heirship of the world to men of faith. That the conception had become impoverished was due to the lack of adequate depth, breadth, and content in the spiritual and ethical ideals of those who held it. It needed the uplifting and enlargement of those ideals in order to make it satisfactory.

Our Lord adopted this conception, and made it the basis of His teaching, not only because it was the connecting-link with the past, but because it did thus express certain elements which are vital to a living spiritual faith. A kingdom entering into human life from above, representing the absolute sway of God exercised for supreme spiritual ends, and adjusting the universe to those ends as they are wrought out,—this was the starting-point of our Lord's teaching.

Three great changes in the conception, however, were brought about by the filial consciousness of our Lord. In the first place, the absolute God, whose will controls all things and brings about their consummation, is the Father. Hence a new graciousness, spiritual depth and breadth, and even geniality, are brought to the ideal of His kingdom. The sovereignty of God is His sovereignty for the accomplishment of fatherly ends by fatherly means. His Kingship is the authority and executive power of His love and grace.

Secondly, entrance into the kingdom of God is conditioned, not by external peculiarities or advantages, but by the reception of the filial spirit, which responds to the Father's love, and which creates and maintains righteousness, purity, and love upon earth.

Hence, thirdly, the conception of the kingdom as affecting the community and embracing the material universe shares in this spiritual transformation. It no longer represents the

external supremacy of bare will, as though God were a Supreme Other and Outsider, imposing His kingdom by an omnipotent decree upon the refractory material of the earth. In perfect balance, the kingdom of God is represented as both transcendent and immanent, as a gift from above and a growth from within, as a divine event, and as a natural process depending on spiritual forces. Hence the breadth of God's providence, which includes the sparrow and the lily.

ence the inwardness of the kingdom, which is not Here or There, but is within man. Hence its expansive growth as the mustard-seed and the leaven; although in its manifestation it encounters opposition and falls like seed upon all kinds of ground to take its chance. In this process it works judgement on those who will not receive it. Within its comprehensiveness these great spiritual and moral issues are clearly recognized. Personality is so emphasized in God and freedom in man, that the doctrine of immanence is guarded at all points against Pantheism. God's presence in man is not due to the fact that man is a part of nature. On the contrary, the presence of God throughout nature is due to the fact that nature is a province and an instrument of the spiritual life, which becomes manifest in the dealings of God with men.

5. It will be objected that there is accommodation in all this; that our Lord's teaching is not absolute truth, because at every point the influence of particular and transitory conceptions rooted in Jewish life can be traced.

In a sense, the truth of this must be admitted. Absolute truth can only enter the world by a temporal process; by a gradual unfolding which causes the present to connect itself, at each moment, with the past, and to adjust itself to that spiritual consciousness which has been developed through all the stages of the past. The principle of evolution forbids absolute new beginnings in the midst of an unfolding order; lays down the condition recognized by our Lord Himself, that His coming was 'not to destroy, but to fulfil.'¹ A revelation out of connexion with the historic past, keeping no terms with the spiritual and moral presuppositions of the present,

¹ Matt. v. 17.

is to men nowadays unthinkable. A Christ entering the world as a winged passenger from without, unaffected by all those conditions which educate the spiritual and mental faculties of every child born into the world, whatever else He might be, would be in no rational sense the Son of God *incarnate*. For incarnation involves not merely the visibility of the flesh, but the entrance into all those conditions of human life of which the flesh is the natural sign. Our Lord's own doctrine of the immanence of the kingdom of God as against its merely miraculous transcendence involves this, that He stands in such vital relations to the history of the past that in His fulfilment He absorbs and reproduces it. Therefore, in order that Christ might connect His religion with the past, and might make it intelligible to the men to whom He came and through whom He would work, it must needs be that the truth, as revealed in Him, should bear the marks of His time. There must be a protective sheath of historically explained conceptions round the full bloom of His fulfilment. The all-important matter, however, is that within the local form thus historically explained there is a spiritual fulfilment that gives complete expression to ideal relations and supplies a full revelation of truth, which in its essential principles can never be enlarged, but only more and more completely realized in human character and relationships. As to this, it remains true that every growth in spiritual consciousness, every attempt to explain more adequately the divine relationships and the spiritual experiences of the human heart, is carried out by means of a return to Christ, in whom they are ideally expressed, and not of an advance beyond Him. And, further, those who come by this way to apprehend the sovereignty of Christ over the spiritual consciousness of mankind, will be led from that apprehension to a larger conception of providential design in preparing for Him just that body of presuppositions, conceptions, and expectations which He, by adopting them, transfigured.

6. But what of the authenticity of all this? It is impossible within our limits to deal with the details of the gospel history, or with the establishment of this or that incident, miraculous or otherwise, of our Lord's life. All

these must be brought to the test of historical criticism, like every other professed fact of human history. But whatever may be the result of applying such standards to this or that detail, it remains abundantly clear to all rational observers that a vast spiritual change took place with the advent of Christianity, that that change took the form of an ascertainable apprehension of the relations of God to men, and that it was due to the unique consciousness and the unspeakable influence of Jesus Christ Himself. For our immediate purpose this is sufficient. No other fact of history is so certain. It can only be denied by a prejudice against which no other record could stand.

Doubtless there were foregleams of the Christian teaching about God. There is no need to claim what is called absolute originality for the teachings of our Lord. Only a narrow idea of revelation can make that seem of first-rate importance either to upholders or to antagonists of the Christian faith. Doubtless, also, the quickened and deepened spiritual experience of the successors of Christ had vast influence upon the religious thinking and aspirations of men. Yet they themselves attributed, alike their experience, their thought, and their influence, to their knowledge of Christ. Their theology is only a throwing into intellectual form of the experience through which they had derived from Christ a consciousness of God, akin to that which gave to Him the name of the Son of God. Such an uplifting of spiritual consciousness could only proceed from a supreme spiritual Personality. The testimony of human experience shows conclusively that it were far easier for a literary committee to have created Shakespeare than for a company of apostles and evangelists to have created the figure and teaching of Christ, except as an attempt to describe and to explain a transcendent Personality who had lived before their eyes and had reproduced Himself in their lives. This is the ultimate fact of Christianity. And it cannot be resolved away.

7. One additional subject remains to be considered before passing away from the teaching of our Lord as reported in the Gospels. It is the doctrine contained in the Gospel of

St. John as to the means by which the revelation of Christ is received by men.

The grace and truth which He manifested in His life as the Son of God and the Redeemer of mankind do not carry universal conviction to the hearts of men. The Gospel of St. John is itself the story of the growth, side by side with one another, of an ever stronger faith in Christ on the part of His disciples, and of an ever intenser opposition to Him on the part of the general body of the Jews. Thus it is clearly recognized from the beginning that, however complete may be the truth of our Lord's life and teaching, it does not avail to secure the universal consent of men.

The Gospel of St. John deals with the problem, and presents to us an account of the means by which belief in Christ is reached, which may be said to afford the materials for a complete philosophy of the Christian faith.

The truth of Christ comes to man as an illumination. The frequency with which the term, 'The Light,' is applied to our Lord in this Gospel brings this into prominence. Similar teaching is conveyed by St. Paul, when he says, 'Seeing it is God that said, Light shall shine out of darkness, who shined in our hearts to give the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.'¹ This illumination proceeds from Christ as the Life: 'the life was the light of men.'² The term, 'the life,' carries with it two elements. First, that our Lord completely realizes in Himself and reveals the true life of men. Secondly, that His embodiment of this true life is life-giving; that He conveys to others the life which He Himself thus possesses. Behind both these elements, and explaining them, is His eternal relationship to the world as the Word of the Father.

But the light needs a special faculty of vision, in order that it may be apprehended; and that faculty of vision is itself the consequence of receiving the spiritual life of which Christ is the source. 'Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God.'³ 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.'⁴ Add to these sayings

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 6.

² John i. 4.

³ John iii. 3.

⁴ John iii. 6.

the declaration, 'The words that I have spoken unto you are spirit, and are life,'¹ and the whole doctrine of the Gospel becomes clear. The truth of Christ is apprehended by a spiritual faculty. That spiritual faculty is the outcome of spiritual life. Spiritual life consists in entering through Christ into completed relationships with the Father. These spiritual relationships are realized only by a 'birth from above,' which emancipates and completes the inner spiritual nature, causing it to transcend the merely natural, and setting it free from sin. The means by which this birth from above is brought about is the quickening influence of the spiritual and living words of Christ.

This doctrine gives an account of actual spiritual experience. It has analogies outside the apparent frontiers of Christianity. Cases of conversion are by no means unknown beyond its limits; while such experiences are shadowed forth by the sudden birth and development of many other faculties in the life of men. The spiritual, in its influence upon human life, is, it must be recognized, far wider than the specifically Christian. The conversion of a Buddha is equally real with the conversion of a Paul. The difference lies not in the fact, which is true in both cases, that a higher nature supersedes, or rather fulfils, a lower, but in the different degrees of completeness in which the full truth of life is presented in the one case and in the other. The phenomenon of which our Lord speaks, when He lays down the necessity of a birth from above, is not imaginary, but indisputably real. It is the highest example of facts with which all are familiar, namely, the birth of new and higher affections and sympathies, or the manifestation at special epochs in the life of men of new faculties, which, only faintly present before, transcend, or even replace, the old interests of life, so that life itself is remodelled into a new whole. The experience under the influence of Christ is of a frequency, of a degree and quality not found elsewhere; but it represents with the utmost intensity and completeness spiritual changes, the possibility of which is inherent in the constitution of human nature itself. The question becomes, therefore, not of the reality of such changes,

¹ John vi. 63.

but of their explanation and of their relation to truth : how far that which is revealed within them is thereby authenticated as being reality and not fancy.

In the next place, our Lord lays stress, according to St. John, on the fact that faith in Himself is ethically conditioned. 'If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself.'¹ This saying, though it does not stand in immediate connexion with the doctrine of the birth from above, yet throws light upon it. Indeed, the will to do God's will must have preceded such a completed experience as enables men 'to see the kingdom of God.' The willing to do the will of God may be taken as the first stage of the process which is completed in regeneration. The latter doctrine must not be interpreted in too abstract a fashion. Before a birth takes place there must be a life ready to be born. The preparation is complete for its entrance into a larger sphere. The very figure shows, therefore, that regeneration is not to be treated as a pure miracle ; as if it were the instantaneous creation of something which did not exist in promise before. The birth from above is the completed realization of a previous potentiality, the attainment by a spiritual process of its appointed end, the coming into full manifestation and freedom of powers which were present but restrained before.

The faculty which apprehends the truth of our Lord's teaching is not pre-eminently an intellectual faculty. It is spiritually and morally determined : involves a state of the conscience, the will, and the affections, as well as the intellect. Further, it is an act, not only of assent, but of adhesion ; a movement to a spiritual attitude, which not only commends itself to the intellect as being true, but to the conscience as being right, and to the affections as being satisfying.

The element of satisfaction is the last upon which stress is laid in the Gospel of St. John. Everywhere it meets us as being bound up with faith in Christ, and a convincing verification of it. 'If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give Me to drink ; thou wouldest have asked of Him and He would have given thee living water.

¹ John vii. 17.

² John iv. 10.

This is from the side of him who offers satisfaction. From the side of those who receive it comes the response, 'Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life. And we have believed and know that Thou art the holy one of God.'¹ Many other passages might be quoted to the same effect. This emphasis on spiritual satisfaction is prominent also in the synoptic gospels; as for example, in the great invitation, 'Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.'²

If it is the life which supplies the light by creating the faculty that perceives it, so, in its turn, the light is verified as being light by the unfolding, perfecting, and satisfaction of all the powers of life and activity which are evoked by it. This is the only verification of the sayings of Christ offered in the Gospel of St. John. 'The words that I have spoken unto you are spirit and life.'³ He who receives the illumination of Christ by receiving it lives and 'sets to his seal' that that by which he lives is true.

Such is the doctrine of spiritual discernment, of the conditions which govern it, and of the satisfaction which verifies it, that is contained in St. John's Gospel. How does such discernment stand related to reason? How does it stand related to the means by which men attain to conviction of truth in other matters? What light does it throw upon the moral responsibility of all men for coming to apprehend Christian truth? We are obliged to consider these questions before our understanding of the doctrine is complete. There are those who answer them by affirming that the doctrine before us withdraws Christian truth from the sphere of reason altogether, that it sets up a doctrine of evidence unlike anything that prevails in regard to other subjects of discussion, and that, if it be true, it removes all blameworthiness from those who are not led to faith in Christ, since they have not the faculty by which He is apprehended.

Each of these assertions rests upon a misunderstanding of the doctrine. In the first place, any complete conception of what is involved in and needful to reason must include in it

¹ John vi. 68.

² Matt. xi. 28.

³ John vi. 63.

much larger and deeper elements than those which are required in order to assent to a mathematical proposition. Perfected reason would mean the complete apprehension of the relations in which man stands to the realities which condition his being. The final statement of the propositions which convey his doctrine on this matter may perhaps be determined by purely intellectual activity. But the sources from which the material for his final statement is supplied must include every element of his being, every form of his relationship to the universe of which he is part. The sources of the completed reason, therefore, include, in addition to the strictly intellectual, at least, the moral and affectional elements of his being. In and through all these his nature is manifested, his relations to the universe are realized. By all these the world affects him, and he, in turn, affects the world. Only, therefore, through them all can he learn what the world is, what he himself is, and what the relations of these two sides of reality are. Hence, according to the completeness of his being in all its faculties and affections, is the fullness of a man's material for drawing satisfactory conclusions as to the full nature of reality. To be short of a sense or a faculty is to lose an aspect of reality, and thus to have incomplete means of representing to and by reason the nature of the whole. This which is true of sense-perception is true also throughout the whole range of human knowledge. When, then, completed spiritual life and true ethical intention are treated by our Lord as being indispensable to the full knowledge of the truth, His doctrine is that of the reason itself, provided always that what He requires can lay claim to be real. Whether this be so or not can only become clear when our inquiry as to what is meant by Christianity is complete.

Thus there is no distinction in principle between our Lord's doctrine of the apprehension of spiritual truth and that which holds of any other kind of truth. Even so far as assent is determined by the more narrowly intellectual faculties there is close resemblance between the two. To the non-mathematical mind, for example, the formulae of the higher mathematics are at least as meaningless, as to the non-religious mind are the declarations of Christ. If it be answered that this is because

of a defective faculty, which so far as it goes travels towards assent to the propositions of mathematical science, perhaps in the end it may be found that the same thing is true in the case of weakness of spiritual faculty. And the resemblance is yet closer in the case of the creations of art, music, and the higher poetry.

Again, the power to apprehend truth constantly changes, according to the influence exerted upon the mind by its own predominant interests. The faculty of perception and appreciation grows in certain directions, is atrophied in others. The case of Darwin is constantly cited as a striking illustration of this. This law extends beyond the individual life, and accounts for contrasted types of human temperament, and, therefore, of religious belief.

Finally as to the measure of moral culpability for the rejection of the word of Christ. The general doctrine of St. John's Gospel is undoubtedly that each man is responsible for that ethical condition which enables him to see, and predisposes him to believe truth, wherever and so far as it is presented to him.

Each man is held accountable for his prejudices, for his unwillingness to accept the truth, which requires from him a higher standard of spiritual and moral life than he desires; in short, for all causes which predispose him to unbelief, regardless of the evidence presented to him.

Moreover, it may even be said that, according to the teaching of the Fourth Gospel, right, spiritual, and moral conditions not only prevent prejudiced opposition to the evidence presented, but actually predispose to the belief of that evidence. Christ is the true representative of completed truth, in whom everything that is of the nature of truth is included; to whom therefore every indication of truth in all departments of human life ultimately leads. He who through love of truth comes upon any truth is on one of many roads, which when they reach their destination converge in Christ as their goal. Especially Christ is 'the Truth,' who alone brings satisfaction, harmony, and freedom to the spiritual nature of man in all his relationships with the universe. From this point of view, therefore, man is responsible for

having a state of heart which actually needs and rejoices to find Christ when He is presented.

This broad fact of moral responsibility must undoubtedly be qualified by various considerations, especially by that of early training and associations.

But it is the assumption upon which all human life proceeds; without which indeed human life is impossible. The only ground for supposing that its basis is destroyed by the Gospel of St. John is the overstrained understanding of the doctrine of re-birth, to which attention has already been directed.

Speaking broadly, the regenerated life, according to St. John's Gospel, is life completed in all its relationships, particularly in the divine. The divine and supernatural, however, does not supersede, but enspheres and pervades the merely natural. On the other hand, the merely natural is the home of sin, with its alienation from God, its selfish and unholy principles of life. The way of completion, therefore, is the way of redemption. In coming to the Father through the spirit of sonship by Him who is 'the Way, the Truth, and the Life,' human nature is at once fulfilled and delivered from the bondage of sin. The completed life of regeneration is therefore in the highest sense normal, and in the broadest sense of the term natural.

II. It is necessary, in the next place, to regard our Lord as the source of the Christian religion, so far as He is presented to us as being this, not by means of His own consciousness and teaching, but by means of the consciousness of those who receive the religion from Him. If the Gospels represent our Lord's Christship from the standpoint of His own consciousness, the remainder of the New Testament, especially the writings of St. Paul and of St. John, set forth His Christship, as it is realized by the faith of believers, who receive through Him, by reason of it, the gifts of salvation. Coming on, then, to these two great types of apostolic teaching—and they may stand for the remainder of the New Testament—five great features stand out at once.

First of all, the whole basis of their teaching is experimental. They are neither philosophers nor dogmatists;

neither dialecticians nor controversialists. The basis of what they teach is, according to their claim, a direct spiritual experience. This is represented in the most intuitive form by St. John. 'The things which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye may have fellowship with us' (1 John i. 3). 'Hereby know we that we know Him, if we keep His commandments' (1 John ii. 3). 'Whosoever sinneth hath not seen Him, neither knoweth Him' (1 John iii. 6). The assumption throughout is that the doctrine of God set forth rests upon a personal acquaintance with Him similar to that which we enjoy with our fellow men, save that it is more intimate and influential. The same is true of St. Paul, though the starting-point of his personal experience is not, as in the case of St. John, the Incarnation of our Lord, but His supernatural manifestation on the road to Damascus. That external vision, to which reference is made more than once in the epistles of St. Paul, is connected with an inner and direct revelation. This is made clear, for example, in such passages as—'We all, with open face reflecting as a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory' (2 Cor. iii. 18). Or in the similar passage, closely following upon it, 'It is God that said, Light shall shine out of darkness, who shined in our hearts to give the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' (2 Cor. iv. 6).

In the second place, that which is experienced is the entrance into a spiritual life, which is dominated and inspired throughout by the relationship of sonship to God. Everywhere in the writings, both of St. John and of St. Paul, the controlling relationship in which believers come to stand to God is, as was the case with Christ Himself, the relationship of sonship.

Thirdly, it is equally characteristic, both of St. John and of St. Paul, that they regard this experience of sonship as being received directly by means of a spiritual relationship to Christ Himself. It is not something which they receive independently of Him, and of which He merely informs them. 'To them that received Him,' says St. John in the Prologue to the Gospel, 'to them gave He authority to become sons of

God, even unto them that believe on His name.' In the same way the whole of St. Paul's experience is brought about by Christ, and is conditioned by that spiritual state which he describes as being '*in Christ*.' To imagine that experience of sonship as separated from the consciousness of continuous fellowship with Christ as the means of its reception, is to depart entirely from the teaching of the New Testament.

Fourthly, the experience of sonship thus brought about is attended by immense spiritual and moral consequences. The new relationship to God gives an inward consciousness of entirely new relations to the whole realm of life, both present and prospective. 'It is not yet made manifest,' says St. John, 'what we shall be. We know that, if He shall be manifested we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him even as He is. And every one that hath this hope set on Him, purifieth himself, even as He is pure' (1 John iii. 2, 3). Kindred teaching is found in St. Paul; first of all in his doctrine of heirship, and in the next place in the whole of his doctrine of life in the Spirit. The Spirit who is the Spirit of Adoption, the Spirit of Christ, becomes the inspiring Spirit of the whole of life, quickening and shaping it, developing continually fruits of the Spirit, which are manifest in holy conduct and dispositions throughout the entire range of human relationships.

Lastly, the whole of this is brought about by means of redemption from sin. Christianity is sometimes spoken of as the religion of redemption. There is truth in this statement, though it is sometimes expressed in a one-sided way. It would be equally possible to speak of Christianity as the religion of revelation, or as the religion of consummation. The very intuitive character of St. John's Gospel, for example, shows how essential is the apprehension of the revelation in Christ. Moreover, so far as Christianity is the religion of redemption, that redemption is wrought out in large measure by processes which are those of revelation and of consummation. The true knowledge of God is of vital importance in the work of redemption, and the freeing men from sin is accomplished by an inner quickening and transformation,

which enable them to complete that true idea of their being which has remained unfulfilled, or has become distorted under the influence of sin. But while our conception of the relationship of Christ to the spiritual life of His people must be large enough to embrace all these conceptions, thus closely inter-related, it remains true that the typical Christian experience, as represented to us in the New Testament, is an experience of redemption through Christ.

The experience of sonship as brought about by Christ, and involving a spiritual transition, is the key to the whole doctrine of salvation contained in the New Testament. The transition involves change at every point of outward relationship, and of inward spiritual disposition. First of all, there is the change of relations with God. Hence out of this direct experience through Christ comes the doctrine of Reconciliation, which has so large a place in the theology of St. Paul. The new experience as involving a transformed relationship to God is accounted for and described by means of this great conception of Reconciliation. The change of status which results from reconciliation is described by the term Adoption in relation to sonship, by that of Justification in relation to forgiveness.

Again, the birth of the new affections, which enable men to fulfil the relationships into which they are brought by adoption and justification, is due, according to St. Paul, to the death of an old nature and the resurrection of a new. Or, according to St. John, it is brought about by a birth from above, which, in completing the spiritual nature, redeems it, alike from the limitations and the sinfulness of that which is merely born of the flesh, and is flesh.

But the entrance of this quickening Spirit is attended by divine power, rescuing from the thralldom of evil and bringing into the possession and enjoyment of good. Therefore the conception of redemption in the more special acceptance of the term, as deliverance from the tyranny of evil, is the fit and necessary description of that feature of the transition.

Finally, through all these changes there is brought about an unworldliness, an inward harmony, an unquestioned

supremacy of the higher over the lower, and a directing of all powers to the ends of the kingdom of Christ, which is conveyed by the doctrine of Sanctification, or of the Spirit on its practical side. Thus it is the experience of sonship, as brought about by an all-pervading transition, which contains within itself all the elements described by means of the Christian doctrines of the Spiritual Life.

Again, the transition which needs for its explanation and description the doctrines of reconciliation, adoption, justification, regeneration, the life of the Spirit is, as we have already seen, brought about in and through Christ. He is experienced as the source and the means of the whole change in every aspect of it. Thus the description has to be completed by the doctrine of the work of Christ, in regard to all these aspects of salvation. The reconciliation with God is brought about through Christ, and especially through His death; hence the doctrine of the Atonement. Adoption, justification, regeneration, redemption, are all received in and through Him; hence the doctrine of life in Christ, and through Christ. Finally, the gift of the Spirit; and the life of the Spirit is an experience immediately and always depending upon a certain prior relationship to Christ Himself. Thus out of the experience of sonship, as that of a changed relationship to God brought about by Christ Himself, there grow naturally and necessarily all the descriptive doctrines by which the work of Christ in its relation to the salvation of men is set forth in the New Testament. They are all conditioned from beginning to end by this conscious experience of a divine relationship, as involving spiritual change, and as brought home and sustained by relationship to Christ Himself. The critical change brought about by Christ is that He converts and completes human nature by bringing men into that consciousness of sonship which He enjoys Himself, and into the fullness of that filial spirit which is the contrary of sin, with its rebelliousness and secularity. This fundamental experience is the key to the whole of the apostolic theology. All else rests upon it, explains or describes it. The reality of the experience so described is the chief verification of all the doctrines as to what is involved in it. The establishment of

that reality is again shown, therefore, to be the chief task of Christian Evidences.

In the next place, the transformed experience of the Christian life is bound up with certain facts of the life of Christ. What Christ is and does for His disciples, He is and does by means of the facts of His historical life, above all by His atoning death,¹ His resurrection, and His ascension into heaven. We are thus brought face to face with the miraculous element in the gospel, and particularly with the greatest of all miracles—our Lord's resurrection from the dead. It is conceded on all hands, that apart from the belief in the Resurrection, Christianity would have been impossible. It is conceded further by all Christian Theists, even by those who are perplexed by, or even deny, the physical miracle, that the Resurrection represents an objective fact in the life of our Lord, and is not a mere subjective hallucination on the part of His followers. Further, the fact of the Resurrection, as believed in by the Early Church, has coloured and shaped the whole of Christian theology. It is not too much to say that the whole Christian view of the nature and destination of the universe, as presented to us in the New Testament, rests upon our Lord's resurrection from the dead. A Christianity which ceased to believe in that greatest of miracles would be a Christianity forced so entirely to remodel the whole round of Christian doctrine as presented in the apostolic writings, that it would become practically a new religion. It may be asked whether the Christian view of the world would be greatly affected, if it were held that the presentation of the risen Christ to the vision of His disciples was a real manifestation of His continued life, and due to a direct act of the Father, but not involving the actual resurrection of His body. The answer is that it would. For the physical reality of the resurrection of our Lord is important as a demonstration of critical importance, that the whole nature of the world is in the last resort spiritual, that the spiritual in it is

¹ The meaning of the Death of Christ, as apprehended by the Christian Consciousness, is dealt with in Book III. chap. v. See also the author's work, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*. And also chap. viii. of his book on *The Fatherhood of God in Relation to Christian Truth and Life*.

not in subjection to the so-called material, but is dominant, and that according to the dignity, worth, and meaning of the spiritual personality is the measure of its dominance over the material.

The Resurrection is, further, the highest manifestation of the personality and will of God. It is that which stands between the modern world and a view of God, which, while it may be in intention ideal and spiritual, does, in fact, tend to lose sight of and hold upon His personality, and to consider Him as the impersonal ground and spiritual end of all creation rather than as its sovereign Lord. The particular evidence of the Resurrection is not here in question; but only the place which it occupies in the Christian religion. The contention that it literally took place does not imply that there is not abundant reason for further reflection upon the relation in which the resurrection of Christ, believed in as an outward and historical event, stands to the ordinary constitution of the universe. It is the miracle of miracles, and therefore raises the whole question of what is meant by a miracle, and of how it stands related to the ordinary course of the world's events.

In the case of the resurrection of our Lord the miracle must be seen, if it is to be treated as the New Testament treats it, first of all in its vital relation to the whole of His work; secondly, in its relation to His unique personality; and thirdly, in its relation to the whole miraculous element which is found throughout His life. It is absolutely impossible to separate the so-called miraculous from the non-miraculous throughout the whole narrative of our Lord's history. His life and teaching are interwoven with the mighty deeds in which He exercised His compassion in the healing of men. Even those who are little disposed to take the orthodox view upon these matters find it less and less easy to explain away altogether that element in our Lord's life; more and more necessary to recognize that there are untold secrets as to the power of the spiritual over the natural, of the personal over the impersonal, of mind over physical conditions, whether in the subject himself or in others whom he influences. The limits of such power cannot at present be determined. It is

from this point of view that we must approach the gospel narratives and the miracles in the life of our Lord. At every point the miraculous stands in the closest relation to His personality. In the more humanitarian descriptions of Jesus, justice is seldom done to that aspect of His character and influence which shows that, above all, He exercised divine authority. He is resolved away into a beautiful spiritual and poetic dreamer; He is set forth as an ardent and somewhat impatient reformer of abuses, or as a supreme martyr to the loftiness of His ideals, and, perhaps, to the impracticability of His methods. But in all such representations of Him, one salient feature which stands out in the gospel narrative is overlooked, namely, that men in contact with Him were, above all, conscious of the unique authority which He exercised over their spirits. The intensity of opposition which He aroused, while it is a witness to the freedom of the human will and to the depravity of the human heart, is a testimony to His infinite power. That spiritual power, extraordinary and unique in itself, is represented naturally and inevitably as having extraordinary and unique consequences in relation to His own bodily life, and to that of others. On His part, and on theirs, His power was spiritually conditioned. The statement 'He could there do no mighty work,'¹ associated with a reference to their unbelief,¹ shows that the condition of His healing power lay in the influence of His spiritual authority, quickening here and there a spiritual life, and by His influence throughout it, working to the healing of disease, in a degree of which no other example can be found. The miraculous therefore, in the Gospels must be described and interpreted in its vital connexion with the spiritual personality of Jesus, and must be illustrated by the fainter manifestations of such power in the life and influence of those immeasurably inferior to Him, who have yet exercised a spiritual ascendancy of an exceptional kind over their fellows. If in their lives there is the shadow of the miraculous, how much more the substance of it in one who so infinitely transcends them!

Such is the general relationship in which the miraculous,

¹ Mark vi. 5, 6.

as it stands in the New Testament, is related to the unique character, work, and influence of Christ, and to the supreme epoch in the world's history at which He appeared. Granted all these, and the Resurrection itself, in all the fullness of its material meaning, is essentially in keeping with the whole spiritual manifestation, and its revelation of the real nature, meaning, and end of the universe, and of the paramount forces within it. It is largely in the light of pre-suppositions, favourable or unfavourable, that its evidence will be considered. That there are difficulties must be conceded. It is natural that there should be. Our philosophy of the fact must be adjusted to a new and enlarged conception of the relations between the miraculous and the non-miraculous. In the case of nature, there is more of the miraculous, in the sense of the direct activity of God, than is ordinarily understood; while the miraculous is truly natural, in the sense that it is not merely exceptional, but is interwoven with the whole texture of God's unceasing activity throughout the universe. Such a view does justice to the whole spirit of the New Testament, which is not lightly credulous or superstitiously ready to see violations of the ordinary course of things everywhere. Restraint, rationality, lifelikeness, subordination to a spiritual character and its spiritual ends, stand out most strikingly in the New Testament narratives of the miraculous, and put them in contrast with all other such narratives in the whole history of the world. The miraculous in the gospel is as ideal as the gospel itself. The Christ who wrought the spiritual transformation of the New Testament is the Christ to whom the miraculous is the natural. The Christ to the conception of whom the miraculous becomes impossible may remain an ethical ideal and inspiration, but will cease to be the Christ known in the inmost spiritual experience of the saints throughout all the generations that are past.

The essential features which we have passed under review lead to the completion of the teaching of Christianity by its doctrine of the world-place of Christ, and by the doctrine of the Godhead which that world-place demands. Christ appears, as we have seen, according to Christian doctrine, first of all in

a unique relation to the Father ; secondly, in a unique relation to the spiritual life of His followers ; thirdly, as a personality, who in the fullness of His spiritual gifts and power transcends the ordinary conditions of human life. Each of these elements, separately, and, above all, these elements combined, are at the source of that doctrine of the relationship of the Son of God to the creation, the order, and the end of the world, which is contained in the writings of St. John, especially in the introduction to his Gospel, and in those of St. Paul, in the Epistle to the Colossians, in the most developed form. The divine relations and influence of Christ are the manifestations of Divinity. The Incarnation rests upon a prior and preparatory relation of the Son of God to the universe, which makes incarnation as a stage in an ordered development, and as the means of spiritual advance, possible. The presence of Jesus Christ in human history is the revelation of the subordination of the whole universe to those spiritual purposes which become manifest in Him. The state of Jewish theology or of Christian speculation may have supplied the forms in which this doctrine is set, but it owes its essential features, not to them, but to the three great factors which have just been named, allied with certain other profound spiritual intuitions of the human heart. As a matter of fact, the whole secret of Christ's life from beginning to end is based upon His consciousness of a peculiar relationship to God. The whole faith of His disciples is based upon the peculiarity of their experience of salvation as derived from Him. Both are bound up with the belief in the supernatural nature of His personality.

In addition to all these, and strengthening their testimony, is the deep sense that that which is manifest under conditions of finitude in the course of human history rests upon the eternity and infinity of God, and is a direct manifestation of Him ; that all which is involved in the spiritual consciousness of Christ and of His disciples must be treated, not as an accidental happening, but as the utterance of the deepest secret of the constitution and meaning of the universe. With this is combined the sense of the universal sovereignty of the spiritual as the ruling end of all things. This sense is natural and vital in all periods of spiritual exaltation, and finds

expression in that doctrine of 'heirship' which sets forth St. Paul's habitual attitude towards the world of passing events, and of material conditions.

These great influences are the explanation of the doctrine of Christ the Son, as the ground, the bond, and the end of all created things, and as securing through this relation to them their spiritual consummation. With the doctrine of the world-place of Christ, coupled with that of His relation to the Father on the one hand, and to the indwelling Divine Spirit on the other, there enters that doctrine of the Godhead as a triune fellowship of light and love which, found practically in the New Testament writings, is developed more or less successfully in the dogmatic teaching of the Christian Church. It represents, not *a priori* speculation as to the necessary conditions in which the divine life subsists, but, in the first place, the practical results of Christ's teaching, and of His disciples' experience of Him. These lead to such formulæ as that of the apostolic Benediction, to the positive statements of the divinity of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, which are found in the New Testament as the outcome of historic facts and of vital experience. In them is contained the material for a doctrine of the Godhead, which has been developed in successive stages, under manifold conditions and under the stress of almost continuous controversy. It is the last product, and the final safeguard of that experience of Christ which the New Testament sets forth. With it the essential content of Christianity is complete.

The Christianity which has been outlined is the Christianity which, as a living and connected whole, was manifest in the world during the first century of the Christian era. It is possible to abstract from it this or that element, but what is thus taken away remains an abstraction from the larger whole. Criticism may deal with this or that element, may even attempt to formulate the whole afresh; but that which is so dealt with becomes practically a new product, reached by some attempt like that of Dr. Martineau,¹ to separate the so-called divine from the so-called un-divine elements of Christianity. In so doing, a transformation takes place,

¹ *The Seat of Authority in Religion.*

which makes the new, not a revision of the old, but something essentially different from it.

The problem of Christian Evidences is therefore to discover in what relation the Christianity which has been outlined stands to the spiritual consciousness of mankind, and to the interpretation of the universe as it is conceived in modern times.

CHAPTER II

THE FACTORS OF RELIGION

THE subject which must next be considered is the relation of Christianity to other religions. It has been claimed that Christianity is the perfect religion, expressed through the final theology. If this claim is to be more than a mere assertion, it must be made good by exhibiting Christianity in its living relations to other religions, comparing and contrasting it with them. But in order that we may understand the relations in which Christianity stands to other religions, it is necessary to begin by considering the subject of religion in general, its characteristic features, its making, and its relation to the ordinary faculties of human life, before discussing the peculiarities of different types of religion. Many definitions of religion have been proposed from time to time ; but, speaking broadly, religion has always been understood to mean the consciousness of certain personal relations in which the religious man stands to a Divine Being or Beings ; his conception of, and disposition towards that Being or those Beings, together with the character and conduct which result ; including in this last both the moral temper and the particular rites and customs of outward observance. That which is essential in the minds of those who ordinarily speak of religion, however, is the realized relationship between persons, divine and human. This does not appear in some of the more recent definitions of religion. There are those who are anxious to preserve the religious temper, or certain elements of it, without having any belief in the reality of the generally recognized object of that temper, or at any rate in that object as capable of entering

into relations with the religious man. Such thinkers have, therefore, offered definitions of religion in which the element of personality in its object, and therefore of personal fellowship, ceases to be vital. Some speak vaguely of religion as being the sense of the Infinite. Matthew Arnold defined religion as 'Morality touched with emotion.' Herbert Spencer treated the object of religion as being the inscrutable Power whose existence the universe manifests to us.¹

Such definitions, however, offer to us pure abstractions. When we speak of morality touched with emotion, the term morality is an abstraction; the common name for certain qualities which attach to certain kinds of action, and to the disposition which prompts to these actions. Emotion, again, is a general name for feelings which, as actually manifest, are of many kinds, and are determined by the sorts of objects which call them forth. Before such a definition as that of Matthew Arnold can be brought into relation to the facts of the world's life and history, it should be converted—even if the abstract term morality be allowed—into morality touched by *affection*; and this not towards the abstract quality called morality, but towards the source of morality—the authority, whatever it may be, from which it springs—and towards the ends which are proposed by that source to be realized through morality.

Again, religion has always addressed itself to its object, not as being unknown and unknowable, but as being *known*. Every religion has conceived its object; it may be under the concrete form of what we call an idol, but at any rate under the form which spiritual imagination has created for intuition and reason. It is true that, in developed forms of religion, the object, though worshipped as known, has been felt to be infinite, passing complete knowledge; that the intuitions and imaginations by which God is set forth are felt to be inadequate to represent all that He is and does. But the religion has rested upon that which is knowable of Him, and not upon that which is unknowable. Therefore those definitions which seek to suppress the personal in the object of religion, if applicable at all, are applicable only to a very

¹ *First Principles*, 3rd ed., p. 46.

late stage in religion, and involve a deliberate thinking away from the usual and the historic sense of the term. Wherever religion has existed, this sense of personal relations has been characteristic of it, except where some crudeness in the conception of personality, or some distrust of the importance of personality as containing the key to the meaning of the universe, has occasioned a more or less philosophic revolt from the use made of it in popular religion. Wherever what seems to be the negation of personality becomes apparently the basis of religion, it is so because in some way or other imagination contributes to the object of religion the personality which reason denies. At least for the purposes of religious moods, the impersonal object of religion has to be credited by imagination with power, intention, and even in all higher forms with the moral qualities of justice and benevolence. Therefore, the conception of a real or supposed relationship between divine and human personality is essential to religion.

In describing the elements of religion it is important to have a clear conception of what is meant. It would be futile to seek in the first instance for causes making a hitherto non-religious being religious; still more to suppose that such a change could be produced by deliberate reasoning or reflection. Any such explanation of the natural history of religion is untrue to the facts. Nor if we speak of revelation, even in the case of the highest religion, must it be supposed that that revelation is given independently of, and externally to, the human faculties, both higher and lower, in their best exercise. To suppose this would involve a doctrine of the externality of God, which fails to realize His indwelling and all-comprehending presence. If He is revealed, it is not merely to, but in and through, the human faculties which apprehend Him. What is necessary is a description, rather than a deduction, of religion; and of religion as manifesting in itself the working of certain factors, or as revealing the presence of certain elements, which are native to the human spirit.

Two cautions must, however, be borne in mind. First of all there is a difficulty about all origins. If we attempt to

realize how man became what he is, we have to think ourselves back into a condition of existence in which he was not what he is, and this we are utterly unable to represent to ourselves, except in the most incomplete manner. How man's consciousness became what it now is, is therefore almost incapable of investigation, and gives rise to the wildest guesses when it is attempted. And in the next place, religion manifests itself as a complex whole, which is developed quite as soon as the factors which go to make it up, and far earlier than the comparatively mature forms of these factors which we can reflectively examine by a psychological inquiry. The factors of religion, moreover, exist in organic union, and do not work in mechanical separation. It is possible for purposes of abstraction and description to regard them as isolated elements, but in actual fact they never exist in such isolation.

Religion understood in its general sense of personal relationship with the divine, offers itself as the satisfaction of the needs of self-conscious beings. It arises in some form or other by a natural necessity, and universally, as soon as men become self-conscious, realizing themselves as at once part of what we call nature, and distinct from it; as members also of a human fellowship which is developed, alike because they are superior to nature and because they are united with it. When self-consciousness is thus realized, the consciousness of God is in some sense given. There will probably be general agreement about this, the only question being whether, or how far, what is thus presented to men as real, is truly so or not. Thus it may be affirmed that religion is natural to man, but only in proportion as in the development of self-consciousness he comes to realize that he is supernatural himself. The old conception that religion is a merely artificial institution, established by the decree of rulers, or by the device of priests for their own selfish purposes, has long been abandoned. No doubt the influence of rulers and of priests exerted for the ends of their own order, has put deep marks upon religion in various times and places throughout the world's history. But the power of priest and ruler has been dependent upon manifold emotions, instincts, and needs

already present. They did not create the religious disposition which they manipulated, but only availed themselves of it. This shallow view set up by antagonists of religion corresponded to a similarly shallow and abstract view of religion set forth by the defenders of religion, who conceived it as being due to a purely external revelation, established and proved by merely external signs and sanctions. Upon this basis the old theologians entered into elaborate discussions as to the antecedent probability of revelation, and as to the means by which a revelation could be recognized when it came. Their arguments were vitiated by the same imperfect conception as that of their antagonists. They treated man as though he came into the world complete for all the natural purposes of his life without religion, as though religion were a totally distinct and separate faculty in human life, and as if the divine supply of spiritual needs came entirely from outside and worked in independence of the spiritual needs which it met. Moreover, the divine gift, thus bestowed, has been treated as conveying regulative information, rather than spiritual satisfaction. The relationship of religion to the human spirit is much more inward and vital than this. Speaking broadly, it may be claimed that man is never man until he is religious, and is only man so far as he is in some sense religious.

Upon this basis an attempt may be made to set forth the factors which are present in man's experience as he attains to developed self-hood in the world, and to detect the religious and theological implications involved. It will probably then become apparent that exactly the same faculties, which when they are applied to the part are called natural, when they are applied to the whole, as presented to a fully developed self-consciousness, become religious and yield theological results. The same considerations which enable us to explain the perfect result of religion may probably be useful in accounting for its variations when incomplete or abnormal.

I. It is necessary in the first place, and above all, to note that man is primarily an active being. From the first he seeks to satisfy his needs by activity, and as his activity in the effort to satisfy needs is developed, it becomes in the end

deliberately purposive. If a description of human development from its rudimentary to its highest stages is wanted, an account must above all be given of the activity put forth by men in order to satisfy needs. Man's development is measured by the range of his needs, and of the action initiated to satisfy them. Thought is apparent first of all in action, and for the purposes of action: though the self-distinguishing which is essential to activity leads early to the manifestation of curiosity in man as to forms of activity not his own. Hence secondarily the mind comes to embody the results of action in abstract or purely intellectual forms. It begins by fixing as rules the conditions of successful activity which have been hit upon by accident, impulse, or guess-work, previously.

But as such action to meet wants grows in range and acquires increased power to appropriate and transform nature to the needs of man, its success is due to that compelling of nature which is at the same time an acceptance of the fundamental conditions which nature lays down. The relation to nature into which the successfully active man is brought is a relation in which mastery and obedience are one and indivisible. The very effort to shape nature to his ends involves an attempt to read the meaning of nature itself. The result, so far as it is successful, involves not the victory of man over nature, or of nature over man, but what may be termed a sympathetic co-operation between the two. In the attempt at sympathetic co-operation reason—by which is meant comprehension of the whole—is apparent; first of all in an intuitive and practical, later on in a reflective form. This successful action involves making trial by means of assumptions as to the behaviour of nature, which are first of all instinctively adopted, then tested by experience, finally remembered and collected. From this trial of nature proceed rules and principles for dealing with nature.

The whole of this process involves an instinctive belief in the solidarity of nature with man. His principles as they become mature are its principles or laws. They have been found by him as he came to the full exercise of self-consciousness in unity with nature, and yet in distinction from it.

He has come to this body of principles by his own experiment, yet they speak back to him from nature as being its conditions. They were his, and would never have been discovered by him except in action, but they belong to it.

Herein is the first manifestation of that anthropomorphism of which, in even the narrowest exercise of mind under the least spiritual categories, man cannot divest himself—anthropomorphism which grows from stage to stage until it comes to the completest and most formal efforts to explain the world. Man can never get outside himself. He finds himself in finding nature; in finding nature he realizes himself. Whenever he tries to escape from what is called anthropomorphism, he escapes only from an element of it, in order to take refuge in the residue which is left. That residue may be extremely vague; but however vague it may be, it is yet something which appears in his own consciousness. In that case, man finds in nature something answering to his own mood of self-suppression. Thus as the world appears to distinguish itself from the mind which acts upon it, and to look back upon the actor, it always does so through the forms by which man has approached it, and which he has imposed upon it. It looks back upon him, therefore, naturally, according to the vigour of his activity, with the aspect of personality and will, in the idea of an end sought and of means used. It may do so at first as a vaguely realized whole. By-and-by, in some instances, at least, it will do so through each lesser whole which man calls a thing. Later on, it will be assemblages or grouped wholes which thus look back upon him through the eyes of personality. Eventually, as a naturalizing process goes on, it may be only, or chiefly, through that which appears dominant among these outward things. For example, the practice of sun-worship, where the world, as a whole, is tending to sink to what we understand by nature, is an illustration of this. In doing man good and harm, the sun appears to him, under certain spiritual conditions, with the eyes of personality. By-and-by, the universe itself may become to man a complete system, under which all lesser groups have been brought, and to which, as a whole, will and purpose outside himself are seen to be related in the same way that in

his own consciousness they are related to the instruments which he uses for gaining his ends. Thus, when the world, as merely natural, comes to be clearly distinguished from man, the personality in it, which man had confused with it, is placed above and behind it, just as at that stage he has placed his own personality above and behind the system with which at one time he confused himself.

In all this personifying activity man is assisted by the fact that he already knows other personal wills than his own. He knows the wills of his fellows as being sometimes in conflict, and sometimes in agreement, with his own. Perhaps also he seems to himself to know other wills than those of his fellow men. The ghost, for example, which has appeared to him in the dark or in his dreams, and has seemed to bid him to do something, may help him to transfer the reality of selfhood to existences outside the present sphere of human life. But whatever may have been the force of subsidiary influences, the main conclusion is that as man has become an active and purposive being in the world, he has found in the world with which he deals a purpose akin to, harmonizing with, and, when his dependence upon it is taken into account, regulative of his own.

This discovery is the basis upon which special recognition of design in nature is ultimately built up. The argument from design in nature represents the last reflective expression of that appearance of personality and purpose in the universe which can only be so interpreted by fully developed persons. As man studies in the light of his own will the fashioning of the world, whether as an organic system attaining ends, or as containing particular objects which can only be explained as seeking ends, he is compelled to invoke the same principles by which he has explained the direct action of the world upon himself.

II. But if man is active, and eventually comes to be purposive, equally is he dependent, and comes to realize growingly his dependence. He is conditioned by sense. The world which he interprets and moulds to his needs by means of principles and rules drawn from his own activity, from the first shapes and controls that activity. It presents through

the senses the content upon which his activity is exercised, and limits the range of his efforts in dealing with that content. This conditioning through sense is not, on the whole, as at first it might seem, a rough interference with his activity. It may be sharply distinguished from his activity in thought, but the limits which condition man are given from the first through his consciousness, in perfect union with his activity, and the limitations of his senses serve the purposes of his practical activity.

At the same time, the sphere in which man moves is discovered, as his consciousness of selfhood becomes developed, to be the not-self. If it is a sphere fitted for his activity, it is yet distinguished from him, and may check, and even punish, his untutored spontaneity. Indeed, in the end it may defeat his elaborate purposes, unless they are framed with due regard for and with adequate experience of the world in which he lives. Yet his primary experience is that of a limiting world, which, within these limits, rewards his activity and nourishes his life. The first lesson man learns about his dependence comes to him through the combined associations of bounty and restraint. And this experience of dependence is not abstract. Man is not conscious in general of being a dependent existence, loose, seeking for a point to which to attach himself. Such an abstract situation may figure in theology, but never in real life. A dependent being *in vacuo* has never actually existed. Indeed, man generally has no abstract idea of dependence at all, and probably when he realizes most fully that he is dependent, he is quite incapable of that conception. He is supported, fed, surrounded, and checked by the universe which he perceives. The joint influence of bounty and control which the universe exercises over him is mediated in his infancy through the family into which he is born. It is in relation to the family that he comes to realize first both his selfhood and his dependence. Persons, so far as he can apprehend persons, are more influential than things. Things, for the most part, reach him only through persons and therefore the experience of dependence upon the universe is apprehended first of all as dependence upon persons, who mediate the universe for him,

controlling the causes by which it affects him. That upon which, therefore, man is dependent is felt and perceived, not abstractly conceived; and in the perception of dependence is given an incipient characterization of that upon which he depends, which grows more determinate as his consciousness becomes developed. That upon which he is ultimately dependent is intuitively treated as personal, just as soon as, and in so far as man knows himself to be personal, and to be surrounded by persons other than himself. The conception of its personality is made possible and is deepened by the influence of those personalities which have controlled his own infancy.

In so far as man distinguishes himself from nature, he distinguishes the Being which controls him, and upon which he is dependent, from nature. For through his own activity man learns instinctively his practical supremacy over nature; while, in so far as his experience teaches him that he is subject, he conceives that nature is subject also. Indeed, as he comes to have a determinate conception of things as such, though this is at a late stage, nature becomes to him an assemblage of quasi-individuals, which all exist together on precisely those terms of dependence of which he is himself conscious.

Thus nature, as such, is apprehended as selfhood is realized, and when nature, as such, is apprehended, it sinks from the position of the absolute and supreme to that of the relative and dependent. Hence as this process continues, and man realizes his own selfhood, with its limited supremacy over nature, that upon which he is dependent becomes to him a Supreme, Self-conscious Being, which is more or less free from the limitations to which he knows himself to be subject. Hence his Supreme Being is taken out of nature, and is seen as having varying degrees of power over nature. In some cases it is only a mighty apotheosized ancestor. This conception represents to him in its fullest sense the paternal—or in some cases maternal—authority which he first knew in his home, carried by means of death and subsequent exaltation into a position to exercise influence unthwarted by the limitations of sense. In some cases the sun or the heavens are taken artificially out of the sphere of dependent beings

and treated as the manifestation of that Supreme Self which stands in contrast to finite selves and to the finitude of nature. In the purest expression of it, the conception is of one Supreme Self, seen in complete detachment from, and superiority to, all such creaturely existence.

Thus with the growing definition of himself and of nature as finite, there comes to man the sense of the Infinite as the correlative. With the growing realization of selfhood comes the realization of that Infinite as the Divine Self. And with the mingled sense of power over nature, and of subjection to it, the Divine Self is ultimately seen to wield completely the supremacy which man feels to be due to the spiritual in himself, strives after, but never completely attains.

There have been two great types in which this ultimate result, the realization of the Infinite as over against the finite, has been exhibited, according as intellectual mysticism, with its constant depreciation of practical life, has prevailed, or ethical religion, with its enforcement of the power and responsibilities of personality. In India there has been a reaction, which will be considered later on, against the worth and meaning of active personality. Therefore, the Infinite Self, Brahma, becomes conceived as impersonal and inactive thought; all activity being due, first of all to a cosmic, and then to a human illusion. On the other hand, in Old Testament religion the ethical prevails; the worth of active personality is realized, and therefore the Infinite Self is seen in the glory of perfect and supreme activity as Creator. The finite world of men and things is the effect of His activity, as first and spiritually perfect cause. The two types are as widely contrasted as possible, yet each according to its manner gives expression to the presentation of the Infinite, and especially to the sense that that upon which the finite self is dependent can only be an Infinite Self. Each represents the final expression of the sense of dependence, not upon a merely outward and similarly finite being, but on an Infinite given within the spiritual consciousness itself, whose presence within that consciousness reveals oneness and distinction in combination. The Brahmin treats that distinction as something to be overcome that he may sink, or rise, into the

absolute oneness of impersonal and unconscious life with the unconscious Infinite. The Hebrew preserves both the oneness and the distinction, and expresses both in the consciousness of spiritual and moral relations, the worth of which depends upon a perfect balance between oneness and distinction being maintained in a fellowship which demands the completeness and not the suppression of personality, on both sides of the relationship.

III. The experience of man, as an active and yet as a dependent being, brings him to realize the presence of superior purpose in the world, and to realize the sources of that purpose as personal, as akin to himself, as bountiful, and yet as restraining. The relations between persons, however, are not merely external and practical; they are, above all, affectional. They gravitate towards one or other of two extremes: the one of love and trust, the other of hate and fear. Whether they tend towards the one or the other, though sometimes influenced by subtle personal affinities or antipathies, is largely determined according as wills, bound together in the nexus of social relationships, agree and serve, or oppose one another. In the former case the personal relations tend towards love and gratitude, as from an inferior to a superior; towards love and friendship, as between equals. In the latter case the clash of wills as between equals sets up a state of resentment, which may pass into steady hatred, or, in the case of the disposition of an inferior to a superior, into the emotion of fear. But human life, as we know it, is only possible as relations of love and trust come first. Man and the beginnings of home arise together. Indeed, human progress is conditioned by the evolution of the home. It may fairly be said that the measure of human development is determined by the extent of infantile weakness on the one hand, and of parental care on the other. For all human progress has depended upon the strengthening of the parental bond and the enlargement of the parental influence. That influence becomes a human providence, calling forth and satisfying an answering affection in the child until home is made an ever larger sphere of education and of fellowship. Hence human progress means advancement in love and in

the manifestations of it. And this not only because of the intrinsic worth of love, still less on account of its emotional element, but for its practical power and spiritual potency, as shaping character, determining conduct, and modelling the form of the relations upon which conduct depends.

It is from a first experience of love, which approaches most nearly to the family instincts so strikingly present in many of the lower animals, that the child in a human family grows up, receiving and returning a parental affection which has larger spiritual manifestations with every growth of his faculties. So dominant is this spirit of love in the true and normal experience of childhood, that the instinctive affection of the child which responds to it tends to overflow the personal relations in which he has experienced it, and to expect it outside them. He makes advances to strangers until he is repelled by them. He lavishes his affection on things by personalizing them, until his growing intelligence shows that they cannot return, and therefore cannot receive the affection which he has spent upon them. Hence there is an intensity in the affection of love and trust developed within the home, which causes it to make trial of the world by overflowing to it, even to the extent of fictitiously creating in childlike fancy personal objects, towards which this affection may be manifested.

But it is very clear that if certain family groups are found in union, certain others are found in opposition. The family groups and the hostile clans exist side by side. The relations of love within the one have combined with them relations of enmity towards the other. The intense affection which prevails within the family is repulsed when it manifests itself outside the family. It is itself gradually reversed, and the education which cultivates love and loyalty within the family is equally used to cultivate hatred and opposition to those who belong to an unfriendly clan. Hence the very vividness of clan-fellowship has meant a similar vividness of hatred between rival clans. For it is only gradually and as the supreme fruit of human evolution that intensity of love and intimacy of fellowship widens in range from family to clan, from clan to associations of clans, and ultimately to a

national or even larger unity. It has done so under the forms, real or supposed, of the family. Common fatherhood generally determines common fellowship, and where common fellowship has arisen it has been based on either the reality or the supposition of common fatherhood;¹ a descent perhaps from some heroic ancestor, who has been deified, and who acts as divine patron of the association of tribes in such wise as to manifest something like the guardianship of the home, and to call forth a common filial response.

Thus man's relations are, in the first place, with persons; in the second, with nature as quasi-personal. These personal relations are of necessity affectional, and tend towards one or the other of the opposite poles of love and faith, or of hatred and fear. This fact is of immediate religious significance. As has been seen, the activity of man personalizes either nature or its cause; while his sense of dependence leads him to realize that this personality, whether he confuses it with nature or sees it as apart from nature, whether it is one or manifold, controls his life. He conceives, according to the stage of his rational development, that it does this either steadily or only impulsively, that it has an absolute or only a qualified supremacy over him, that it is one or that it is many. But, however it may be in all these respects, the Supreme realized as personal exercises an influence over his own life. Immediately the Supreme, whether one or many, becomes the object of affections. The nature of these affections is determined by the relationships in which, and the conduct by which, the Supreme is made manifest. Eventually such conduct is treated as springing out of moods: the Divine Being is either pleased or angry. If the manifestations are steady and constant, they reveal character. The more intimately connected with the clan-life, probably the more helpful, and therefore the more fatherly, is the Supreme. Such a Being, therefore, is treated with trust and love. The more remote from the relations constituting the clan-life, in all probability the more hostile will he be; he therefore becomes the object of fear. If the phenomena of the natural world are personalized, then it is obvious that

¹ Occasionally of common motherhood.

some arouse fear and some arouse trust. The brightness of the dawn, for example, suggests beneficence, while the darkness of the storm-cloud suggests anger and danger. Hence under such conditions the deities in or behind such phenomena are deities whose fellowship is to be cultivated, or whose appearance and activity is to be warded off. If there is some vague unification of the whole of nature, then its differing manifestations succeeding one another, either in time or in man's successive experience of them, are treated as indicating different modes of the divine. It may be that the Sun or the Heavens is treated as the embodiment of the Divine Person who controls the life. In that case the radiant heavens and the genial sun are signs of favour, while the smiting sun-ray, an eclipse, or a storm-cloud, is indicative of wrath.

The divine seen to be personal and supreme, felt to be in active relationship with the man thus conscious of Him, becomes necessarily the object of affections. Hence just as the progress of man as man within the limited human sphere depends upon his growth in love and trust, the development of parental care calling forth the filial response, so it is as to his progress in regard to the whole range of human life. Man's development depends entirely upon his growing realization that the Supreme is the object of trust. The temper of trust responding to beneficence must gradually overbalance and subordinate the emotion of fear as called forth towards that which is unfriendly and threatening in man's environment. The good must at least have some measure of supremacy, whether this be conceived as limited, or whether advance is made to a spiritual optimism which treats good as absolute, and as so powerful that it transforms apparent evil into real good. Only as this spirit prevails, and as principles of conduct based upon it steadily direct conduct, does human life in any progressive sense of the term become possible. Where fear predominates in religion, so that before its advance the brighter and more beneficent aspects of life have faded away, this prevalence is the last evidence of human degeneracy, and affects man's whole outlook upon the world. It is probably accompanied and prepared for by the moral

and social evils of an undeveloped home. It is accentuated by specially unfavourable circumstances in the physical environment. Yet even when fear, instead of qualifying the more genial aspects of religion, seems to have entirely swallowed them up, the spirit of trust to some extent vindicates its claims. For the divinity which is treated as maleficent, and which therefore inspires fear, can be propitiated, and religion becomes then an apparatus for propitiating or driving away the harmful divine. Human life is impossible under the reign of unmitigated fear, and where trust is displaced from its supremacy, it lingers to the very verge of the extinction of spiritual and moral sense, in order to make the slender remainder of life possible.

But when fear predominates it is not a fear introduced from outside by religion. Such a view rests upon an entirely false psychology. It is not that religion, as a malign influence, has entered from without, first of all to qualify and then to destroy the experience of an otherwise joy-inspiring world. It is that, owing to various evil influences, those phenomena in the world which occasion fear have first been personalized, and then their predominance in the world has been unduly emphasized. A religion of fear is not the first cause, but the last result, of an experience of the world which is felt to be fearful. Doubtless, after men have reached this pitiable attitude towards the world, and have fashioned their religion in accordance with it, the religion reacts upon their whole outlook, and, with the conservative influence that religion often exercises, deepens the impression, and turns the instinctive habits which grow out of that impression into a standard of life. On the other hand, if through any cause, perhaps a new and more favourable experience of nature, a new uplifting of disposition from mysterious depths within the spirit takes place, then with a more genial experience or interpretation of nature, fear falls away, and with it religion is at once transformed. Then if its outward forms remain, a new significance is attached to them. Always a religion of fear is the result, and is not the cause; is derived from an unfortunate temperament, or an unfavourable experience of the universe as such, and

not brought in or received from without as chastening natural joy.

By what relationship, then, shall this experience of kinship with, of dependence upon, and of confidence in the divine, which dawns on the spirit under ordinary conditions, be expressed? The relationship lies ready to hand in Fatherhood; or occasionally, where the organization of society is different, in Motherhood. In some cases, as in the Semitic races, and particularly among the Hebrews, what is chiefly felt is the supremacy of the Absolute as over against the Finite. Where this is so, lordship or sovereignty is conceived as being the true relationship of the divine to the human. Even then the conception of lordship will be found to be an abstraction from the paternal. It is one of the aspects of fatherhood, becoming dominant as lordship is emphasized, first of all within the family, as one of the attributes of fatherhood, then in the tribe or nation, as its head becomes king, and finally in theology, as the experience of kingship upon earth is extended to the conception of kingship in heaven. According as the element of authority in fatherhood grows, fatherhood is transformed into sovereignty. To some extent, at this stage sovereignty in religion may come to emphasize the opposition between God and man rather than their kinship. Yet even then, through his special relation of lordship, the Supreme is fatherly towards his subjects, although his fatherhood may be receding into the background, and may need some special influence, if it is once more to be made manifest.

Hence, wherever the apprehension of the relationship between God and man as that of fatherhood takes place, there is at once action and reaction between the ideals of theology and the ideals of human life.¹ The human standard is inevitably applied to God. Man makes God in his own image. The ideal of what is accepted as truly human becomes the ideal of the divine. When so accepted, this ideal tends to accentuate

¹ This action and reaction may take place where the relationship is conceived as that of kinship rather than that of fatherhood and sonship. This is the case, for example, in totemism, where, owing to the organization of the family, kinship is insisted upon, while fatherhood is in the background.

and promote a spirit and conduct in human relationships which is modelled after that of the divine. In especial, the more love becomes ascendant in man, the more likely, apart from other modifying influences, will it be to be attributed in the highest and noblest sense to God.

IV. With the recognition of Divine Personality as in control of human life comes the connexion between religion and morality. This connexion exists more or less from the very birth of each. The divine is the ultimate source of moral authority as recognized in primitive life; it shapes the standard and rules of conduct, and vindicates them by sanctions of rewards and punishments. In this way the Supreme Being is conceived as being moral just so far as His worshippers have themselves become moralized. Individuals and the community are involved together, but the combination of individuals in the community is only possible through law. The interests and order of the community, without which it is impossible, must have authority to control the desires of the individual, so far as they diverge from the accepted standard, or interfere with the common well-being. Thus the existence of the community, whether in the narrowest unit of the family or in its widest circles, is impossible without the enforcement of a common law. Upheld by a social sanction, and, if needs be, by the application of force, the possibility of maintaining such a law within the community turns upon the inward recognition on the part of the members of the community that it is right, and that there is an obligation to obey it. To outward law, therefore, corresponds the inner sense of obligation. The authority is exercised by means of the authoritative person. Such a person, the recognized head of the tribe, for the most part, is the responsible trustee of the traditions of the past, which it is his duty to enforce, and to apply to the conditions of the present. In so acting he gives expression, by virtue of his position, to the general sense of the community, and is met by its obedience, or is supported by its approval and strength in repressing and punishing the disobedient. To put individual desire before the obligation to obey the will of the community, as thus expressed, is rebellion.

Yet the whole of this common life depends upon the sense

of obligation to obey. Only when it exists does the community, in the most elementary sense of the term, become possible. For the purposes, therefore, of explaining man, the sense of obligation must be treated as original. Attempts are constantly made to deduce it; to derive it from elements more primitive than itself. It cannot be said that such attempts have succeeded. To treat the sense of obligation as being simply respect for superior force, with the material punishment which it can apply, or as springing from fear of opinion, with its manifestation of disapproval in social ostracism, seems exactly to miss the mark. Powerful to influence the sense of obligation when it is present, there seems nothing in these influences to create it. They are powerless to bridge the gulf between 'I must' and 'I ought.' It is the wisest course to attempt to explain a human faculty or a deliverance of human nature, not in its most rudimentary, but in its most developed form. And the sense of obligation in its most developed form is often clearly exhibited in the very refusal to conform either to superior force or to the pressure of popular opinion. Indeed the acutest penitence may often be felt when the sense of obligation has been sacrificed to either of these.

But even supposing that the sense of obligation to obey could be explained by influences which do not already assume its presence, when it appears it becomes a new and altogether higher thing than that from which it is derived. It clearly enters upon a course of fresh and independent development. It is with it just as it would be if the genesis of life itself could be explained as directly due, without any addition, to some complex combination of non-living elements. Supposing such an explanation should be successfully made out, life would still remain for all scientific purposes a new thing, to be investigated on its own principles, and not on the principles of the more primitive elements from which it had been derived. A theory of how phenomena came to be cannot be allowed to destroy the evidence contained within them of what they now are. Hence, even were the attempts to derive the sense of obligation more successful than they have hitherto been, they could not alter the facts as to what that sense is, and as to the way in which it works in the consciousness of historic man,

as he recognizes social obligation, and knows himself to be the subject of duty.

Religion and morality came into existence together. Religion provides sanctions for the current morality; morality as accepted provides the forms under which the Divine Being is characterized. As to this latter, we have seen that man's purposive activity compels him to discover, or at least to imagine, purposive activity in or behind the world itself. Every step forward, therefore, in moralizing his own activity, naturally leads him to take a corresponding step forward in moralizing the activity which confronts him in or behind the world.

In the same way, in respect of man's dependence, everything which enlarges the sense of dependence and brings home its inwardness, causes the social fabric and the morality on which it rests to be seen as also dependent. Its source is traced back to the divine. Thus human law and human morality, which strives to express itself through law, are seen to rest upon divine legislation, and to be upheld by divine power. Hence, the moralized divinity vindicates and upholds the laws and customs of moralized society. Thus there is a twofold exchange: morality enlarges the meaning of religion; religion in its turn becomes the conservator of accepted morality. In so far as moral ideals become predominant in the community, mere nature-worship becomes impossible, and the divinity represents, above all, the fulfilment and the upholder of the moral ideal which prevails. Here is a turning-point in the history of religion.

This state of things, on the whole, exists through long periods of human development. As moral individuality, however, grows, if it is accompanied with a keener sense of religious dependence, the contrary may be exhibited. The individual in whom a superior moral standard begins to manifest itself, coupled with a deep sense of religious obligation, may stand out as a breaker of the accepted law and as defying the accepted standards of moral conduct, in order that he may assert a nobler morality or inaugurate a higher civilization. In such cases the religion which usually upholds the past breaks away from it by means of a great religious and living personality. And by this breach

religion sets up morality on a religious basis as independent of and higher than human law. On the other hand, if moral individuality advances without so keen a sense of dependence upon the divine, there may take place such a breach between the accepted religion and the new morality as was witnessed in Greece, where the popular religion and the new morality of the philosophers became growingly divergent. Morality then becomes a force making for progress, largely in independence of religion. It seeks a new basis in reasoned philosophy, giving to this new basis a more or less religious character. It turns its criticism, and even its opposition, upon the current religion which has failed to keep pace with it. Speaking broadly, however, the religious view of the world is made up by fusion of the contributions brought by every human faculty. Hence morality, as it is evolved in the course of human progress, takes its part in fashioning the religion which from the first is bound up with it, and the theology by which the nature of the divine object of religion is set forth.

V. While all these elements are active in the development of religion, one additional element must be added. It may perhaps be called the desire of the Infinite, which manifests itself more or less in all deliberate efforts after progress, yet is unexhausted and unsatisfied by them all. This desire of the Infinite is provoked, and not satisfied, by means, not only of failure, but even of success within the limits of the finite. At every step of his development powers within man are unfolded which constrain him to remould the finite to a larger and deeper assimilation with himself. Every such effort, however, is but a relative and partial success. When all his activity has been spent upon the world in which he lives, its imperfection stands out in contrast to that vision of the ideal which appears to him in the glory of a sunlit but hazy dawn.

As he seeks a complete system, entirely subservient to the ends of life, the world breaks in upon him as incoherent here and there. The growing depth and range of his sympathies cause him to find it hard and unsympathetic. The very vastness of his desires brings home to him its insufficiency. He is forced to make trial of it. The higher, the more comprehensive,

and the intenser his energies, the more continuous and comprehensive must be his efforts to discover in the world, or to create in it, that which answers to himself. The more strenuous his endeavour, the more disappointing, in the ideal sense, becomes the result. Hence the human spirit, working under this great compulsion to subdue a more or less refractory world to itself, is forced to seek the contrary of the world as its goal. The Infinite, and not the finite, becomes growingly the object and the home of religion. The effort which has supplied religious inspiration to the finite ends by taking refuge in the Infinite, the two being held together in balance, and seldom, if ever, completely fused. The desire for the Infinite may take distinct forms, according as certain elements in it become predominant, and either extinguish or subordinate the rest. There may be a desire for the intellectual Infinite—the One and All of Pantheistic thought—ever hovering between the two extremes of absolute nothingness and of all-including reality. The mysticism of Indian philosophy and of some phases of philosophical thought in Greece illustrates this tendency. Or the desire for the Infinite may take an inspirational form, representing an emotional endeavour to escape from the bonds of the finite. To this phase belong all those ecstatic movements of religious life which it is sometimes the object of religious arts to excite. The best known of such phenomena are the Bacchic orgies in Greece or the rites of Cybele in Asia Minor in ancient times. Down to the present, occasional outbursts of such manifestations take place.

Or, lastly, there may be the desire for the moral Infinite, for the goal of ethical perfection in human life, and for the Divine Being, as already realizing in Himself the perfection which is sought for as the supreme end of human effort. This last has power to absorb, as elements necessary to itself, both the intellectual and the emotional demands which have been just noticed. This perfection in the Infinite appears as the supreme end which is sought by religion, its nature being determined by the elements which are uppermost in the subjective spiritual life of the worshippers.

With the growing influence of the Infinite as the home of religion comes the growing desire after the divine object of

religion, conceived as infinite ; that is, as transcending, in the glory of His character and His power, the narrow limitations, whether of the finite world or of the finite spirit. As the goal and the object, so the Divine Being is felt to be the source of the life which seeks Him. He who at first was made in the likeness of the finite is at last seen in His perfection as being in contrast to the finite, invested with all the attributes with which the forms of human consciousness inevitably clothe Him, but realizing in Himself that of which human faculties come short, alike in their range, their intensity, their purity, and their fruition.

Where this last influence is strongly felt, religion becomes the most pervasive desire and emotion of life. Its response to the divine may take various forms, according to the differences both of inward and of outward experience. In some moods or stages the intuitive realization of oneness with the Infinite may supersede alike all sense of difference and all need of effort. More normally, such union is seen as the goal of effort, the prize, not only of the conquest of spiritual evil, but of a self-surrender which takes manifold forms—active and passive—according as the Divine Will is apprehended in regard to the tasks of life.

VI. All the factors thus seen to be present in religious life are stirred into activity by *particular events*. Were the world in which man lives absolutely stationary and unchanging, none of these powers, or demands, or axioms (whatever they may be called) would ever be stirred into life. It is because change takes place in the world outside him that man recognizes a world other than himself, and proceeds at once both to distinguish it from himself and to assimilate it to his own life. It is the changes which take place in the world that are attributed at the outset to the volition of a personal and controlling Divine Being. The occasional rather than the permanent affects the mind of man ; the particular rather than the universal. This is the case, in the first place, with the phenomena of nature. The striking manifestation of change involved in the sunrise after darkness, in the overclouding of the sky in storm, in the eclipse of the sun, or the appearance of the rainbow—all these indicate the activity of a Divine

Being other than, yet akin to, man himself, whose activity is their explanation. Or, as man's experience enlarges, new phenomena come within his horizon, which are so unique as to suggest the miraculous in comparison with anything to which he has hitherto become accustomed. Such exceptional phenomena, whether because of their power, their beauty, or their very strangeness, may suggest a special presence of the divine, whether in spring or in grove, or even in wild beast. But not only the occasional occurrence of striking change in external things. Dreams and visions of the night represent changes which in every religion, from the Old Testament, or even the New, down to the lowest, have specially stirred the religious sense of the divine. The dreams especially which afford direction and inspiration to the after-life, or those which suggest that that life is in the clutches of daemonic power, represent changes midway between the merely outward and the purely subjective, which have operated in stirring religious emotions and in giving a theological interpretation to the world.

Finally, at a later stage there are inward changes of mood and disposition, which are made for man rather than by man, and therefore suggest external spiritual interference with his inner life as controlled by himself, similar to the effects produced by the meeting of a friend or of a foe. Sharp as the distinction between darkness and dawn are some of these transitions of inward feeling, accounted for in the present day by what is called 'subliminal consciousness,' but suggesting to all ages the special intervention now of the divine, now of the diabolic. In all these cases with growing inwardness, the consciousness of change, referred to a volitional cause and affecting the inner life of man, is connected with a divine intention, springing out of either the momentary temper or the steadfast disposition of a personal agent. Such intervention is an actual experience of communication between the divine and the human. That communication may take place in order to befriend or to injure those who are the object of it. It may tend to their salvation as they understand it, or to their destruction. If the intervention be purely and always beneficent, it gives rise to the sense of fellowship. If it be

threatening and possibly destructive, it gives rise to the sense of antagonism and to the need of appeasement. If such manifestations, opposite though they seem, are unified as springing from the same source, then religious emotion and the theological scheme which accounts for it become complex. A religious cultus is set up, aiming at securing permanent relations of goodwill, including reconciliation in case of unwitting, or even wilful, offence. Worship corresponds to the varying manifestations of divine temper in order to the establishment of a permanent peace, which may be broken occasionally, but which, with due safeguards, is never absolutely destroyed. Hence the constant repetition of helpful intervention, together with processes of special selection, which have general similarity but minor differences, lead to the recognition of tutelary deities, whether national or local, whether of special provinces and interests of human life or generally providential.

With the establishment of tutelary relations comes the development of the rites of worship, with religious sacrifices and offerings. In the case of gods with whom constant and special relations of fellowship exist, these offerings are communion-offerings, the peace-offerings of the Old Testament. They represent among ruder nations a provision for the semi-physical needs of the Divine Being, who must actually be fed, if not on the grosser material of the food presented to him, at least on the sublimated substance of the fire and smoke and incense which ascend from it. If he does not need such nutriment, at least his rights are recognized by its being offered. Such offerings express on the part of the worshippers their trust and gratitude. They become the national or communal feasts which express the unity of the nation or city which offers them. They may even set forth under the forms of a sacramental feast that the bond of this unity consists in a common divine life, derived from the deity who is worshipped. Thus they celebrate the pact between the god and his worshippers, and express the fellowship both between him and them, and between the worshippers themselves on the ground of their common worship.

On the other hand, where either the relations are

prevailingly hostile, or where pacific relations are from time to time invaded by misdeed on the part of the worshipper, or, it may be, by unaccountable anger on the part of the divinity, rites and sacrifices of expiation become necessary. The appeasement of the Divine Being must take the form of the placation of his anger, of compensation for the material or moral injury done to him, or perhaps even of a bribe to secure for the future his favourable consideration. It is here that, according to the deepening of religion or the reverse, the great field of spiritual and moral development is found. Man's moral nature grows rather under the experienced wrath than under the experienced favour of God. It is as he feels that God is dissatisfied with him that he learns to be dissatisfied with himself; although undoubtedly, if the full effect of this education is to take place, it is necessary that the displeasure should be seen to be the manifestation, not of an always wrathful and hostile God, but the occasional displeasure of one with whom it is normally possible to be on terms of fellowship. When that is the case, according to the spiritual development of the people are the educative influences of their doctrine of propitiation. The felt displeasure of the Divine Being may suggest a material injury done to Him, a mere ritual offence, a crime as He comes to be seen as ordering and protecting the humanities of life, the expression of insolence in temper, which is contrary to the humility becoming man in the presence of God, until it grows to the most inward and searching consciousness of sin which can be found in the penitential psalms or in the confessions of the saints. According to the degree of the depth and inwardness of this sense of sin is the crudeness or the spirituality of the doctrine of expiation, reaching up in its highest form to the New Testament doctrine of the Atonement. It is important to add that the sense of sin—its reality and dreadfulness—is proportioned to the elevation of the conception of God and to the depth of the religion. It is a fact that spiritual progress so deepens the sense of sin that isolated acts of wrong-doing are felt to proceed from an underlying condition of sinfulness, however this may be accounted for.

With every stage of this practical religious development comes the need of two great representative persons, whose functions develop with the development of the religion, and whose spiritual worth is determined by the worth of religion. First of all the prophet; the man who is experienced in interpreting in the earlier stages the signs of the Divine Mind as manifest in outward phenomena or historical events; later, who is experienced in the interpretation of the Divine Mind, not merely from its external manifestations, but from the inward experiences of which he is the subject. Corresponding to his office of interpreting the Divine Mind is the prophet's function to evoke the right response to the divine in the human heart and in human conduct. Wherever is the religion, there is the prophet; as is the religion, so is the prophet, sinking to a mere medicine-man on the one hand, rising to an Isaiah on the other.

Secondly, there is the priest; whether the father of the family, the head of the tribe, the king of the nation, or by-and-by specialized as a separate officer of the state, exclusively devoted to the service of God. He represents the community, and ultimately the individual, in presenting the offerings, whether sacramental or expiatory. He becomes the depository of the traditions which fix the ritual of all such ceremonies. Gradually, as representing the law which determines all special practice in the matter, he is not only the appointed representative of the nation before God, but is also the representative of God, embodying His claims upon the people. And again his position and his influence are in strict accord with the spiritual worth and rationality of the religion.

Religion thus organized as the expression of stable relationships existing between the divinity and the community becomes the patron and the cement of social order. Of that order God is the vindicator. National life is based upon a religious communion of all the members of the community with the divinity and with one another. In consequence of this solidarity between the human and the divine, the integrity of all human relationships is guarded by religion. Hence in the development of the system of organized religion man finds, in the first place, his safety from those physical or

spiritual dangers which are threatened by divine hostility. He secures those benefits which are brought about by divine favour. Subsequently the religion thus developed gives stability to the social fabric, teaching all its members to recognize the authority of law as proceeding from a divine source and upheld by divine power. And lastly, as desires after the spiritual are developed, the higher satisfaction which we call blessedness is pursued in and through the practice of religion, which in its earlier stages sought more material ends. If this last work of spiritualizing religion is carried through to its completion, the whole becomes transformed. It is then conceived in higher and fuller forms with every advance in the range, depth, and worth of human consciousness.

Such are the general facts presented to us by the study of the phenomena of historic religion as a whole. The whole man is involved in the whole process. The division into provinces of life called sacred and secular, or the attempt to distinguish in religion between what has been revealed by God and what has been discovered by man, comes only at a much later stage. Such distinctions arise with the growing complexity and manifoldness of human life. They are developed according to man's power of forming abstractions, first for the practical and then for the theoretic purposes of life. For example, such abstraction takes place for the purposes of practical life, when the business of religion is entrusted to a special officer expressly set apart for it, the priest. It is an ordinary primitive case of the division of labour, qualified, no doubt, as elsewhere, by the sense of a special aptitude or calling belonging to a particular man or a particular family. For the purposes of life the manifoldness of its interests leads to a process of division, and hardens into beaten paths of thought and life. The perpetual traversing of such paths affects and hardens character, multiplying divided interests and divided aims in the internal as in the external life of men. As such interests become specialized, first of all externally, in institutions, then internally in the temperament of those who are attracted to, and play their differing parts in, the various activities of the community,

it becomes a task of ever-increasing difficulty thoroughly to reconcile the divisions thus set up. These were not present at the first, but became manifest and then hardened, first of all in the practical sphere, and afterwards in the theoretic, owing to the limitations of human action and human character. At the end it becomes matter of the highest praise to say of any one what the late Dr. Hort said of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: 'With him, as with every one to whom truth is more than a subject for speculation, there is no line of separation between the different subjects of his thoughts, still less between his thoughts and his life.' Only by such a process of reconciliation through love of the truth as a living and inspiring whole does it become possible to return to the simplicity of the beginning, a simplicity which now holds together in thought and sympathy the many elaborated interests of life, which were one at first simply because they were undeveloped.

Thus the practice of men in the work of life has led, first of all to a religion, then gradually, as thought has become reflective, to an abstract theology. The latter, in its earlier stages, contains truths, principles, and assumptions, from the fullness of which selection is made for the various interests of practical life. Every such practical principle at present applied to a purely secular end is a branch broken off from the tree of primitive religion, and contains within itself distinct testimony to its origin in that primitive interpretation of the world which we saw to be essentially theological.

Meanwhile religion is embodied in concrete forms and institutions, which represent the actualized and formalized belief of society in the reality of a divine communion. This organized religion tends in the many to become a mere formal observance. On the part of the more earnest it tends to awaken, to deepen, and to shape religious sentiment; while in the case of the more abstract-minded few it tends to produce a formal theology. But it is never entirely without theology. Religious observances and feeling always have some thought of the nature of their object present to them, just as religious sentiment and religious thought are never entirely separated from practice. Thus the unity of religious observance,

religious sentiment, and theology forms a living whole, representing the total personal reaction of men upon the whole of the world as it is presented to and apprehended by their consciousness, awakened into this full activity in pursuit of the aims of life. The range, the depth, the worth of religion are determined in the first place by the completeness of the impression made, and secondly by the sincerity, the vigour, and thoroughness of the reaction.

The religious result attained by any particular race is affected by its special peculiarities, by its natural experience in the world, as well as by the events and stages of its historic progress or downfall. Taking the races of mankind as we find them, there are, firstly, certain common elements underlying all religions; secondly, peculiar variations, which have been developed and stereotyped by national specialization, and by special historic experience. Thirdly, there are also manifest the influences of approximation, of what is called syncretism, brought about by contact, whether through commerce, or conquest, or the wider intercourse of human life. These have led to the adoption of foreign faiths, and to the modification of domestic religion.

In particular, the result has many factors affecting its final form in addition to all the principal elements which have been considered at the outset of our inquiry. (1) In the first place, there are intellectual factors. The theological interpretation of the universe naturally corresponds to the state of the mental faculties of those who interpret it. With some the universe is not unified under any philosophical or scientific principles. It represents, therefore, a chaos, with some attempts at the regulation of contending elements and phenomena. So long as the mind can tolerate the world as so conceived, it naturally creates and maintains a polytheism in its worship. The manifoldness and distinctness of the phenomena of the world as personalized are reflected in the religion. It sees a separate Deity in or behind all these separate, co-operating, or clashing elements of reality. The system which tolerates or creates polytheism may, however, be modified by the disposition to recognize the unity of the world for the purpose of any particular interest of life.

Only gradually when men come to grasp the whole of the world as composing one system are they able to bring together its parts and to reconcile its oppositions as being mere aspects or subordinate agencies in the larger whole, and therefore subject to one sovereign will.

(2) Again, the result depends upon moral factors. Its details are differently conceived according to differences of social organization, and therefore of the moral standpoint implied in them. At every stage the moral ideal colours the theological conception. According to the predominance of moral interests does it become possible to conceive of a God who has consistent moral purpose and character. According as moral interests become supreme in men does it become possible for them to conceive of these moral interests as being supreme in the universe. It seems to them impossible that the will is governed by mere brute-necessity. And, further, according to the ideal nature of the morality so adopted and held, becomes the nature of the moral purpose entertained and enforced by the Deity throughout the whole of His government of the world.

(3) In the third place, the secular experience of the race has important consequences for the shaping of its religion. Natural environment, encouraging energy, satisfying hope, linking religious zeal to a sense of mastery in action and of understanding in thought, helps a genial and progressive theology. On the other hand, where the environment is the reverse, depressing and distracting the life of men with the sense that the universe is man's enemy, the effect becomes clearly marked upon theology, and still more clearly so as the environment progressively deteriorates the race. This downward tendency is accentuated when to the hostility of nature are added the catastrophes of history.

(4) Above all, there are mysteriously varying springs in human nature, reaching from the mundane, though worthy, moralism of Confucius, so characteristic an expression of that which is best in the Chinese race, to the soaring aspirations of those whom we treat as the typical representatives of saintliness, whether in the Old Testament or in Christian times. And even where the sense of the Infinite is developed

it seems sometimes to be almost accidental whether that sense shall tend towards Pantheism, which finds the One and the All in nature conceived as a whole, or whether it shall recoil from the whole of life as thus presented to seek its infinite satisfaction elsewhere. Thus the tendency of the whole of Aryan religion, including, of course, the religion of Greece, is to embody the divine in the finite, whereas the tendency of Hebrew religion is to accentuate the distinction between the two.

Even in the case of advancement of religious thought and life it by no means follows that human nature should advance in all directions, equally or in harmony. Throughout, the spiritual and moral factors—the most mysterious and inexplicable of all—count for more than the purely intellectual, or than the influences of mere physical environment. Conscience has done more for the unification of theology than philosophy, although it has invoked the aid of philosophy before it has finished its work. And while advance may take place in very varying degrees along different lines, in some nations the mundane interests, which gradually become specialized apart from religion, may come altogether to predominate, throwing religion into the background, or even actively opposing the considerations which it brings to bear. Thus religion may be starved by what is called worldliness, or opposed outright in the interests of worldly progress; though sometimes this takes place as a revolt on behalf of moral and intellectual interests against a religion which has failed to keep pace with general progress, and has sunk to be a mere superstition.

Again, there may be moods and phases of such antagonism to religion, growing out of more or less temporary influences upon the spiritual life of nations as of individuals. All these causes, and more, operate to produce that diversity which marks historical religions, although each religion embodies in its own way the representation by a particular race of supreme purpose and personality, in the singular or the plural, controlling the life of man, becoming the object of faith or fear, and offering a satisfaction of those spiritual needs which are not met by the ordinary intercourse and activities of finite life.

Upon all these influences it depends how man conceives the God he needs, and with whom he realizes communion. In the same way, it depends upon his general spiritual development where he places his divinity. For example, it is only when self-consciousness is fully developed (under divine influence, it will be subsequently contended, and in such-wise that full self-consciousness involves the consciousness of God), and when the world in its materiality is at last seen as the antithesis of that self-consciousness, that man comes to say in any full sense of the term, 'God is Spirit.'

It must always have more or less serious consequences for religion and life if a man confuses the finite and the infinite, the divine with any particular phenomenon of the natural world; for example, when the sun is identified with God. Yet it is none the less true that any phenomenon of nature may be invested by the mind of the worshipper with practically infinite attributes for the needs of religion, and may preserve these attributes until either the growth of science dispossesses it, or the development of the spiritual life outgrows it. So with the confusion of idolatry. The idol is never a merely material object of worship, although undoubtedly, owing to the superficial and degraded temper of many of its worshippers, it may approach indefinitely towards becoming such. It is created in the first place as the best representation which its worshippers can fashion of some being, or of some aspect of life, which it symbolizes. As the work of the imagination of its fashioner, it seems to him not merely a symbol of the divine, but its very abode and the means of its manifestation. But behind or within the idol the worshipper realizes the spiritual attributes with which his fancy has endowed it; and it is with the spiritual being which is conceived that his religion has to deal, at least in those more thoughtful moments when his own spiritual life is active.

Thus the most important matter is always, not where man places the divine object of his worship, but how he conceives it, and, in a sense, what he brings to it. By this ultimately the nature, course, and interpretation of the religion will be shaped. In this inner consciousness and representation as

finally developed will lie whatever revelation of God is present; found alike in the search after Him and in the response to Him. Both in the case of particular men and of particular races the upward or downward course of a religion will be determined by the vigour or the decay of spiritual intuition, and by the moral consciousness. Thus it is conceivable that there might be in different instances the same halting-places at which different religions might meet, some on an upward and some on a downward course. In some cases particular phenomena of religious life may be a starting-point for advance, in others a stage on the road of steady decline. Whether they are the one or the other will depend, as has been said, on the conditions, vigorous or otherwise, of the spiritual consciousness.

No attempt is here being made to supply a history of the evolution of religion. It may be doubted whether the time is yet ripe for this, or whether the course of it approaches uniformity in different races. But without making any such attempt, what has been said, if there be truth in it, may enable us to dispose of several theories of the development of religion which have been widely held in recent times. In the first place, it is contended by many that all religion has been developed from original animism, the worship primarily of ghosts, extending gradually to the worship of the spirit present in natural phenomena, conceived after the analogy of ghosts, and rising eventually to the conception of supreme gods, who have been evolved from the ghosts of super-eminent ancestors, or from the spirits of exceptionally impressive natural phenomena. There is much evidence, however, from savage religions in all lands that this is not the case—that ghost-worship has superseded an earlier and higher religion as men have become superficial, materialist, panic-stricken, and degraded. Much interesting evidence on this subject has been collected by Mr. Andrew Lang in his works, and by others. Similar testimony is given by Mr. Robert Hamill Nassau, who was for forty years a missionary in West Africa. ‘Where did you get the name of God?’ asked the missionary of a native. ‘Our forefathers told us that name. Njambi is the one who made us. He is our father. He made these trees, that

mountain, this river, and these goats and chickens, and us people.' 'Why, then, do you not obey this father's commands, who tells you to do so and so? Why do you not worship him?' Promptly they replied: 'Yes, he made us; but having made us, he abandoned us, does not care for us; he is far from us. Why should we care for him? He does not help nor harm us. It is the spirits, who can harm us, whom we fear and worship, and for whom we care.'¹ A remarkable story of the passing away of the deeper and more spiritual elements in religion before the immediate pressure of more urgent religious concerns, created by the growth of that spirit of superstitious fear which is the first mark of spiritual and moral degeneration.

Secondly, it has been contended that Polytheism is the first step towards Monotheism. Man first, with a wealth of imagination, peopled the whole world with divinities; and only gradually, in the course of scientific enlightenment, reduced them to one, helped by the superior influence on his life, perhaps, of the sun, or by the discovery that the universe constitutes a complete and inter-related system, and, therefore, must spring from one source. It is probable that when the stage of Polytheism has been reached men may be helped by such considerations to the goal of Monotheism. But it by no means follows that the goal which man finally reaches was not his starting-point before Polytheism was developed; for the worship of many gods involves a specialization. In its more elaborate forms there is the distinct marking out of provinces, whether of natural phenomena or of human experience, between this god and that god. This delimitation of frontiers involves a step onward, either from a previous chaos, or, at least, from the vague and undefined. It is, therefore, at least, equally possible that Polytheism proceeds by way of determinations from a previous vague apprehension of the Divine as One. All the evidence goes to show the probability of this view. The tribe, in its early life, has a selected god, perhaps a totem. That selected god is invested with all the attributes, rights, and functions, so far as they are at that stage conceived, of supreme godhead for that particular race.

¹ *Fetichism in West Africa.*

Subsequent events tend rather to enlarge than to narrow its Pantheon.

Further, it becomes evident how a fusion may take place between the older religion and the newer practice of ancestor-worship, and how religion may oscillate between the worship of a Supreme Being, perhaps now identified with the sun or the heavens, and that of a divine ancestor. God may be conceived as the Divine Father and Creator, as in the West African case just quoted. The first Ancestor is, therefore, the first of His sons. This relationship may lead to the bringing down of God into the realm of human life by a conception of Him as the first Father of the race, or the ancestor may be elevated to the heavens, and may be confused with the Heavenly Father there. Or, as in the case of the Greeks, the original relationship between Zeus and the race-ancestor may be preserved by the myth which tells the story of the hero's birth.

The course of religion in its development everywhere has been influenced by great religious personalities, a few of them being in the highest degree creative. In this respect, as in so many others, religion resembles other great interests of human life. But there is this difference, that whereas in some departments of life genius has a peculiar form of self-confidence and self-assertion, in religion eminence is marked pre-eminently by a higher degree of sensitiveness and receptivity towards influences felt to be above and beyond the immediate personal life of those who are affected by them. In the case of religious leaders, therefore, inspiration is the source of their spiritual power, revelation the way in which the truth which they proclaim comes to be received and held by them. But while they receive that which they set forth by means of a peculiar sensitiveness to the supposed divine source of revelation, their natural mark is that they take the religion of their time in earnest, working out and applying in a more thorough way than others its faith, its assumptions, and its consequences. It may be that they develop in a deeper and more consistent form what has been held before them; or it may be that the earnestness with which they test the religion of their time reveals to them its insufficiency, and produces in

them a reaction, more or less far-reaching, from it, either in the realm of thought, which gathers up its underlying principles and truths, or in the realm of practice. Of course, however original such great religious creators may be, and however close they may stand to the spiritual source of their inspiration, they are conditioned by their starting-point, by the characteristics of the race and the time to which they belong, by environment, and, to a great extent, by the life-experience through which they pass. Even in the case of revelation, however direct and supernatural it may be, there are limits to the possibility of a new beginning. To transgress these limits would be to transgress all the principles of that ordered progress of human life which indicates a supreme divine method, not to be violated at any point. Indeed, to violate it would be to produce such discontinuity that the supposed product of revelation would become unintelligible.

Thus the prophets of humanity, while they transcend their times and their fellows in the purity of their insight, the fullness of their devotion, and the completeness of their proclamation of that which they receive, are in the closest solidarity with their race and their times. This solidarity may lead, as has been pointed out, to a further development, to a reaction, or to a step forward, in which reaction seeks a fuller development of the principles implicitly contained in the religion. All these conditions are illustrated in the case of the two supreme religious Personalities of the world, Christ and Buddha, omitting for the moment the world of distinction which separates the one from the other. Neither can be understood apart from the conditions in which he arose. Each offers a religious solution of the problem of life, which, while representing a reaction from the current religion, gives fuller and completer expression to the underlying principles of that religion. This is obvious in the case of Christ. But in the case of Buddha, the fact that his doctrine of Nirvana rids men from the interminable distress of transmigration, and from the burden of an oppressive evil, is only due to the more thorough though sympathetic way in which Buddha reaches the ideal of religion, as understood by the men of his race and his time, namely, the triumphant escape from that world of

conscious personality and effort in which lies all human misery. The point of distinction in the case of Buddha is not so much that his remedy differs from that of his time, as that he makes it more accessible to the multitude instead of limiting it to the few. In order, therefore, to apprehend the superiority of Christianity to Buddhism, it is necessary to take full account, not merely of the higher worth and the directer revelation in the case of the Founder of Christianity, but also to do justice to the higher worth of all that had gone before in the spiritual history of Israel as compared with that of other races.

In the evolution of religion, there is room, not merely for the work of the prophet, but for that of the critic. The great forward movements led by the spiritual prophets of mankind are also served by the criticism of those whose spirits are keener to detect the insufficiency of the present than to discover the remedy for it. Such men help to destroy solidarity and satisfaction with present thought and practice. Their influence goes to loosen the burden of it, and to make room for a higher revelation and a higher standard of conduct to take its place.

Religion, as a whole, must be tested in its most perfect form; that is to say, we must endeavour to ascertain where religion has reached the highest end of its development. There, and there only, can its meaning be rightly judged, and the efficient cause of its existence and development be discovered. Even in that case, however, the perfect religion must be seen and judged in relation to and in the light of imperfect religions, whether they are in direct relation with it or not. Aristotle has well laid down in the *Politics*, that in all cases of development, the product must be judged by what it is when complete, and not by its incomplete beginnings. It is therefore a most serious mistake to attempt to discover the meaning of religion by describing its incompletest and most degraded forms, by endeavouring to discover certain elements which are common to all religions, or by attempting to find out what it was in its beginnings. All such inquiries may have a relative importance at a later stage; but just as in the world of nature life is understood,

not by the study of those obscure forms of it which approach most nearly to the non-living, but by means of its highly developed types, just as the same method is applied to the understanding of the political institutions which have been created by men, so must it be in the case of religion. Religion resembles a tree; and in treating it as such we must remember that its trunk is to be found not in religion itself, but in human nature as a whole, out of the essential nature of which religion grows. To separate religion from man, and to treat it as the tree itself, is to start with an abstraction, and not with a reality. Religion, as manifested, is the response which human nature itself, as placed in the universe, makes to the whole by which it is surrounded, so far as that whole is apprehended by it. That whole, if its testimony be true, consists of God and of the forces controlled by Him which condition the life of man. The perfect religion can only emerge by means of revelation as the expression of a perfectly developed and balanced spiritual consciousness in entirely healthy action and reaction upon the whole world. This is not to say that such a perfect religion need come last in order of time, in the history of human progress. The outcome of religion is determined by the selecting conditions which govern its start and its progress. These selecting conditions are as special in the case of religion as they are in the case of any other contribution to other great interests of human life. The form of all religion is revelation—the unfolding of the Divine to an intuitive faculty—followed by the response of trust in, and submission to, what has been revealed, so that—according to the measure of its worth and fullness—illumination, insight, inspiration, and power proceed from it. The perfect religion, therefore, will represent a unique perfection of revelation acting upon a specially sensitive medium, specially conditioned by its environment, and educated by its contact with the world.

Religion, therefore, judged in its most perfect form, must be tested (1) by its containing a complete expression of all the factors by which, as has been seen in the opening examination, it is constituted; (2) hence, by its superior power to meet all the demands which developed consciousness

and advanced knowledge can apply to it. These tests are fourfold. Firstly, tests applied by reason in the light of knowledge and reflection. Secondly, tests applied by an elevated moral standard, reached as the race advances towards maturity. Thirdly, tests similarly applied by the spiritual needs of the race, seeking inward liberation from sin, reconciliation with the whole of life, power for its tasks, and satisfaction under its conditions. Fourthly, tests applied by the practical needs of human life in an advancing world. Such are the preliminary tests to be applied to religions before we reach the final question of their absolute or relative truth, as unfolding the inmost reality and the ultimate meaning of the universe.

Regarding religions from the standpoint of life, before the relationship of life to truth is considered, they must be tested by their power to act as factors in the normal and final development of human nature, by their power to exist side by side with, to appropriate and inspire all progress, by their realizing man as called to live alike in the world and above it. Especially they must be tested by their power to become catholic; that is, to become central and complete for man when he reaches maturity, by a normal and complete development. The perfect religion must be in harmony, not with the narrow experience of a part, but with the world as a whole, and must be adequate to the life-task and the social relationships of the most advanced human society. From this point of view, and assuming human nature as it has been manifested in human history, we may perhaps lay down the following detailed tests by which religions must be tried, in order that their relative fitness to survive may be determined on the ground of serviceableness to the well-being of humanity.

1. In the first place, in a progressive world, religions must not exclusively consecrate the past. 'Life,' to quote Mr. J. R. Illingworth (*Christian Character*, p. 107), 'has, we have seen, development. Expansion, realization, is that which all its instincts demand.' It is quite true that such development or expansion is at particular times limited to particular cases. For example, up to the present time we

have been accustomed to speak of the West as being progressive, and of the East as stationary. How precarious statements of that kind really are, is shown by the recent transformation of Japan, with all that is conceivably bound up with that transformation. But whether progress be universally possible or not, the future of the world lies with the progressive races, and every race, however stationary at the present time, must, at some period or other of its history, have been itself progressive. Hence, while a religion which exclusively consecrates the past may suit the temporary needs of a stationary or retrogressive race, it cannot be true to the needs of the world as a whole, nor can the attitude which it enjoins be brought into harmony with its own past.

2. Secondly, in a world which educates and disciplines men, in so far as they treat it as real and as important, religions must not negate the world as being unreal, or disparage it as being unimportant. The whole history of mankind shows how human powers have been developed in unceasing interaction with the world around. Man can only become real as he frankly and fully concedes reality to the world. He is obliged to do so for all the minor purposes of his life. To reverse this at any arbitrarily selected point is to introduce a contradiction alike into the inner and into the outer world. To assume the unreality of the whole is to take up an attitude of inner distrust, which expressly denies without evidence the veracity of the whole basis of life.

3. Religions must not set up a recognized dualism in life, whether that dualism be objective or subjective. An objective dualism pronounces certain phenomena of the world intrinsically good, and certain others intrinsically bad, and, according to their nature, traces them back to a good or evil origin. A subjective dualism bases the distinction between good and bad in outward things upon their supposed influence upon spiritual interests. But whether the dualism be natural or spiritual, it, in either case, transgresses that experience of the world which forces us to realize that it is one inter-related system throughout. Whatever may be the explanation

of its different aspects or of particular phenomena, its unity as an organic whole must be the starting-point of thought and life. Perfect character, therefore, can only be built up by means of ordered relationship to the whole, and not by attempted exclusion of any part.

4. For the same reason, namely, that the world is one organic system, religions must not rest satisfied with conflicting and incoherent elements or aspects. The world being a cosmos, religion must not be a chaos.

5. Religions must not personify the merely natural, and elevate it in its otherness and finitude to supremacy. To do so is to misread nature, and to do injury to the spiritual heirship of man.

6. Religions must not make light of personality, or show hostility to full conscious existence in a world which is being created by the expression of personality in the belief that conscious existence is good. It has been by the development of selves that the world has been made. It is a suicidal principle to suppose that the goal of a world which has been made by the creation of selves should consist in the extinction of selves, either in the outward form of annihilation or in the inward form of the suppression of those motives upon which personal existence depends.

7. Religions must not treat the Divine as merely external to the world, and manifest in it only as will and cause. The Divine, however it may be defined, cannot be separated from a world which bears upon the face of it the marks of immanent dependence upon its source, and of organic evolution from within. To represent the Divine as merely external to it is, therefore, to press the consciousness of will in man to theological consequences which both exaggerate the separation of man as will from nature, and contradict any true philosophy of the evolution of the world.

8. Finally, religions must not minimize evil, or, what is the same thing, maximize it, by tolerating it or assuming it. Evil, especially spiritual and moral evil, is that which ought not to be, and therefore exists to be got rid of. In short, this might be taken as a definition of what evil is. In religion, to legitimize evil, therefore, is to betray human nature and to

abdicate its functions. Redemptive power must, therefore, be the final test of religion.

Our account of the elements which enter into fully developed religion, of the influences which modify it, and of the conditions which a religion must fulfil in order to be permanent and to become universal, is now complete. We must pass on to review existing religions in its light.

CHAPTER III

THE ETHNIC RELIGIONS

THE next step is briefly to review, in the light of the principles which have been laid down, the leading types of ethnic religion, as they have become manifest in history. It is not necessary for this purpose very carefully to consider the question of classification, or to enter into minute details which are beyond the scope of the present inquiry, and for which space is not available. It is possible to classify religions upon several distinct principles, but for our purpose a simple enumeration of types will be sufficient. Excluding for the present the religion of the Old and New Testament, the religions of the world may be considered under the following heads: firstly, Nature-worships; secondly, Ancestor-worship and Animism in various forms; thirdly, Humanism, as seen particularly in the Homeric religion; fourthly, Moralism, as exemplified by the system of Confucius; fifthly, the more or less philosophical reactions from all these, as, for example, certain elements in the religion of the Greeks, Brahmanism, and Buddhism; sixthly, Dualism; seventhly, Abstract Monotheism, as represented by Mohammedanism.

It must be understood that these types do not always exist in isolation. It is easy to find religions which in different moods, for different wants, or by different accretions, pass from one division to another, or combine several. Actual religions may often be found in which naturalist and animist elements of many grades of development are combined. The moralism of Confucius frankly accepted the ancestor-worship of the Chinese, and such elements of nature-worship as were present in the current religion. The

humanism of the Greeks was also held in combination with animist and naturalist features, which were never suppressed. The philosophical reactions from popular religion, whether in the East or in the West, have never become entirely independent of these popular elements. They have tolerated them as a religion for the common people, and as a system to be recognized even by the select few in the preliminary stages of religious development.

Dualism, again, exemplified by Zoroastrian religion, while on a much higher level than ordinary nature-worship, is not incompatible with a very marked presence of naturalistic features, as, to take only one example, in the respect which is shown for the elements of the earth, air, fire, water, and for the principle of life itself. Nor is a similar admixture totally absent from the abstract monotheism of Mohammed, although the mission of Mohammed himself was a warfare against idolatrous and superstitious observances among the Arabs. All of these types of religion show clearly the marks of man's effort to give expression to his sense of a controlling purpose above him, ordering his life; to his sense of dependence, and to his consciousness of the need of fellowship with the Divine. In varying degrees all exhibit an endeavour to place the moral life, as understood, under a religious sanction. All again, in different ways, and in larger or smaller measure, attempt to give expression to the sense of infinity in man's life.

The first four of these types—Nature-worship, Ancestor-worship, Humanism, and Moralism—make little or no attempt to answer the question as to the origin of the universe. Speaking broadly, the question of origins does not arise for them. The world is given as the starting-point. Their theological doctrine, therefore, has to do with controlling influences in the world as it exists, not with any question of a First Cause, by which it is brought into being. Not one of all these religions, including even Mohammedanism, presents a view of the Divine Being as at once transcending, constituting, and unifying the whole of nature and man. It is impossible, within our limits, to examine in detail the doctrines of these religions, even on such important subjects

as those concerning sin and redemption. Nor is it necessary for the present purpose. They may be sufficiently judged by their representation of the divine object of religion, and by their religious spirit, whether as a response to that object or as an attitude towards the world and life.

I. Nature-worships, with which our inquiry must begin, are represented in their best-known forms by the religion of the Vedas, by the popular Greek religion, though in that case with the naturalist elements receding, by the Scandinavian myths, and by other forms of early Aryan religion. To this type of religion belongs so widespread a worship as that of the heavenly bodies. The question arises whether these religions can in any way be regarded as primitive. The answer is at once given in the negative by those who regard Ancestor-worship or Animism as the starting-point of all religions. According to that view, all forms of nature-worship, whether of the heavenly bodies or of natural phenomena, are a comparatively late development from the primitive ghost-worship. For reasons which will be given subsequently, it seems impossible to regard this as in any way a satisfactory answer.

On the other hand, there is much evidence, such as that to which reference has already been made,¹ of a primitive belief, very widely held, although subsequently superseded, in a creative All-Father or Supreme Being. The way in which the Supreme Being was presented to the minds of those who recognized Him, and the causes which gave rise to that recognition, must remain obscure. This is the case, partly because the worship is practically superseded, partly because of the difficulty which uncivilized races find in giving clear expression to their conceptions on such matters, and partly owing to the risk that under cross-examination by those who have reached the standpoint of developed Theism, more may be read into the minds of uncivilized men than can accurately be attributed to them. But when all such allowance has been made, there is distinct evidence pointing in the direction of a primitive sense of a Divine Father, who is the Creator certainly of the human race, and perhaps also of the world. Subsequently, He is identified with natural phenomena, above

¹ See p. 171.

all, with the heavens or with the sun, as growing prominence is given to the influence of these natural phenomena upon human life. This prominence marks a somewhat advanced stage of human consciousness. There is for the time an eclipse of the more directly spiritual elements in early religion. In particular, as has been seen, the question of origins recedes into the background, and religion is concerned not with cosmogony, but with the dominant influences upon human life, which have to be recognized and either sought after or averted.

Another form of nature-worship is to be found in Totemism, so widely prevalent in primitive times. Survivals may easily be met with, while the worship of the sacred beasts in Egypt is thought by many to represent an elaborate development from this origin. In such cases there is a combination of tribal organization with the selection by each tribe of some particular animal as a symbol and embodiment of the Divine Being. The animal under such circumstances is not seen as a mere natural member of a zoological order, but as the special embodiment of that controlling divine presence and providence upon which life is felt to be dependent. When the imaginative elements in such a worship are duly recognized, Totemism may perhaps seem to be in some respects a more spiritual worship than that of the heavenly bodies. And this, not only because life, even animal life, takes higher rank than merely material phenomena, but, above all, because in the selection and maintenance of such an object of worship, with the sacramental and other observances connected with it, there is a higher manifestation of the spiritual elements which go to determine the meaning and the worth of religion than is found in the mere acceptance as divine of physical elements or phenomena because of their vastness and of their manifest influence upon human existence. When the animal becomes divine there is, perhaps, a higher exercise of the qualities of spiritual imagination with its mysticism than is the case with ordinary nature-worship, though the breadth and tenderness of poetic feeling are greater in the latter.

Totemism in general corresponds to a particular stage in tribal organization, and flourishes before that wider view of

the world has been brought about which leads to more extended naturalism in religion or to an articulated Polytheism. The selection of the particular animal-god, with which the tribe is in special and sacramental relation, may be, in the first instance, due to an accident; but it possibly derives its permanence from the admiration originally felt for certain qualities manifest in particular animals, as, for instance, swiftness, strength, fearlessness, though the relationship is subsequently preserved by mere custom. Community is recognized between such qualities in animal and in man. There is a belief in a larger measure of community than really exists between man and the animal creation, due both to the exaggerated belief in the personality of the animals and to a lack of developed personality in man. It is out of such a state of mind that the legends of mixed beings, partly man and partly animal, and of talking animals, have sprung. It is easy to see how from this stage of worship development is possible either upwards towards a more adequate spirituality in religion, or downward towards a more purely naturalist worship. On the one hand, it is conceivable that the spiritual should throw off its inadequate embodiment and be developed in the direction of pure Theism. Or, on the other hand, the naturalist elements may become predominant with less and less exercise of spiritual imagination in the case of decaying tribes, or, in the case of progressive tribes, may become a stage towards that ordinary naturalism which embodies the presence of deity in the vaster and more impressive physical phenomena.

Behind Totemism, and akin to its fundamental idea, was the presence of the tendency to localize the presence of the Divine Being, which is illustrated in the case of sacred stones, whether natural or prepared by human hands. Apparently, this tendency points to a stage of religious consciousness far anterior to that in which the Divine is distinctly personalized in Polytheism, distinct functions being given to each particular divinity, and attempts being made to set forth the distinct individuality of each by means of a characteristic image or idol. The Divine is vaguely felt as encompassing the life of the worshipper and controlling it. For the purposes of

worship it is localized in the particular natural object which attracts the attention of the worshipper. This object or monument is the home of the god, the chosen place or means of his manifestation. It must not be confused with the divinity itself. Gradually, however, the Divine, which was originally seen simply to have its dwelling-place and the means of its manifestation in the selected object, tends to become confused with that object. Yet, however lowly and primitive such manifestations of the religious spirit may be, two facts are clear about them. In the first place, the conception of the god who inhabits, or who is confused with either the inanimate monument, the tree, or the animal, may represent a practical monotheism, only to be refused the name of monotheism because the distinct alternative between one god and many has never been presented to the primitive mind or determined by it. Further, the deity so conceived may be endowed with the highest qualities that the mind of its worshipper is at that stage able to conceive. In the next place, such primitive worship bears exactly the same marks as the subsequently developed naturalism, which finds its divinities in the sun, moon, and stars, or other natural objects. The only difference is that in this humble stage of its development the human mind is attracted by comparatively trifling objects, and has neither the range nor power, by which selection is eventually made of the vastest or most influential natural phenomena as being the most adequate representation of the Divine. In all these types, stages, or manifestations of naturalism, the essential principles are identical.

It is hardly necessary to sum up the reasons why such a religion fails to satisfy the spiritual needs of men as their consciousness becomes more highly developed. Nature-worship, whether in its more primitive or in its more advanced forms, represents either an undue localization of the Divine in particular objects, or a naïve personification of the Divine in nature, which is untrue to fact. No doubt the beauty or impressive grandeur of nature speaks to the heart of primitive man with a mystic influence which lives still in the highest poetry. In its early stages, the human spirit

realizes community with nature rather than distinction from her. In communing with the phenomena of dawn and sunset, of storm and of calm, men felt a kindred influence within, so that these natural phenomena came to symbolize spiritual conditions, and spiritual conditions were used to interpret natural phenomena. The truth contained in such impressions must not be forgotten or disparaged. Out of this underlying sense of the unity of man with nature spring the myths and legends of bygone religion, which are instinct with poetry, and represent both the dawning observation of nature and the glimmerings of spiritual truth. Yet it is impossible, upon the basis of naturalism, to do any justice to the meaning of human personality or to the higher terms and interests in human life itself. Nature-worship must, at the best, be unmoral, and when it has survived as a lingering presence amid higher subsequent worships, it has always sunk until it has become immoral. It has been attracted to and held fast by the mystery of the processes and phenomena of purely physical life, and has never been able to rise to a higher point of view. In its latest forms of developed polytheism the very division of different elements in natural life, and different qualities in human character and temper among different divinities, has made it impossible completely to subordinate such aspects as in nature are unmoral and such qualities as in man are immoral to one supreme spiritual and ethical purpose. Hence the worshipper, at one moment offers his service at the shrine of a divinity, who represents some moral quality or beneficent office conceived as worthily as at that stage is possible. At another time, and under different conditions, he proceeds to pay equally sincere worship to divinities representing agencies which, taken as separate from the whole texture of natural life, appear malevolent; or qualities and modes of action in human life which are actively and even disgracefully immoral and criminal. On the basis of naturalism, therefore, whether in its higher or its lower forms, no development of the moral life is possible.

The practices of naturalism are in many cases supplemented by those influences of a orgiastic religion which stimulate unnatural and even frenzied exaltation in the worshippers.

Such practices characterized the worship of the Great Mother in Phrygia, the Bacchic rites in Greece, and similar practices in Rome. This exaltation is often assisted by actual intoxication. The god of the spiritual exaltation is also the god of wine. There is a combination of lofty with repulsive and bestial features. The human spirit manifests a delirious desire for communion with the Infinite, but is not raised either by its theology or by its religious spirit to the ethical temper which alone can find the true Infinite in a holy God. Living on the level of pure nature-worship, its chief sense of the divine is found in the natural bounty of which the fruit of the vine seems the most generous gift. It dwells within the realm of the phenomena and sensations of purely animal life, and, under these circumstances, the very urgency of its religious emotions intensifies the unspiritual and immoral nature of the result. Even the higher influences which were present in the developed worship of Dionysus failed to separate the quickened religious enthusiasm from these evil ingredients and results. Thus naturalism, reinforced by the desire for the Infinite, with the enthusiasm which it produces, ends not with a more spiritual worship, but with a demoralizing frenzy.

On the other hand, there were the Mysteries. These represented in Greek religion a survival of the old naturalism under the conditions of Hellenic worship. This survival was used as a basis alike of semi-philosophic teaching and of mystic religious rites. The same combination of the beautiful and the repulsive is found here as elsewhere, due to the same causes. The subject of the Mysteries is the processes of physical life in nature and in man. The object of its exaltation is to bring the worshipper into communion with the spirit of these physical processes. Doubtless the unity of the world and life causes the light of the spiritual to shine through the natural, and makes the natural the vehicle of certain higher truths and influences. Yet both the mysticism and the secrecy are unfavourable to the development of moral life, because in the Mysteries, despite all the ritual warnings which were given against sin, and the demand of purity of intention man sinks from his position as a spiritual and moral being to

the level of merely animate and animal nature, seeking to understand and to do reverence to those features of life which he has in common with the vegetable and animal world, instead of transcending them.

II. The second type of religion to be considered is that of Ancestor-worship and Animism. Such worship has been, and still is, widely prevalent. It remains the predominant religion in China, Japan, and, in lower forms, among many savage races. Its social and political consequences are strongly marked. Whether in its nobler or in its baser forms, it has probably arisen from the appearances of the ghost, either in dreams or as an apparition. Its subsequent course of development, whether upwards towards a developed family cult, or downwards towards the most degrading superstitions, depends upon the moral worth of the particular race, and upon the persistence of reverence and affection towards the dead. It is associated closely with the due tendance of the corpse, a duty which, as is well known, has assumed great proportions in almost all early religions, as can be seen, for example, in the conspicuous instance of the tombs of Egypt. Such tendance springs, not merely out of feelings of respect and affection for the deceased, but out of the belief that the continued life of the spirit in the unseen world stands in close connexion with the proper sepulture and even permanence of the corpse.

The subsequent course of the development of ancestor-worship may take either of two directions. In the first place, it may lead to the establishment of a hierarchic series of divinities, approaching, in many respects, at the highest to what Theists understand by deity. In such cases there is generally to be found a threefold worship—the domestic worship of the family ancestor, the communal worship of the tribal ancestor, and, as the nation comes into fully organized existence, the national worship of the more or less mythical founder of the nation as its supreme divine ruler. Such a development is maintained so long as ancestor-worship remains either the recognized, or, at any rate, the most influential, religion of the people.

On the other hand, such worship may be subordinated, either originally or by gradual loss of influence, to other

forms of religion. In that case, there may come to be gods of the upper and gods of the lower world. For example, in Greece, Zeus reigns in heaven, Pluto among the shades beneath. Thus as the sphere of the dead is found in the under-world, and not in the upper, their supposed influence is lessened both in range and power till it becomes simply a disturbance of the normal due to some exceptional conditions. Associated with and, it is suggested by some, resulting from ancestor-worship comes the imagination of nature-spirits inhabiting and presiding over the grove or the stream or the mountain. The world is thickly peopled with nymphs and naiads, dryads and other unseen beings having a local and limited influence over men. Such beings become the subjects of myths and fairy-tales. Here is found the connecting-link between ancestor-worship and naturalism.

It has been frequently assumed, as by Mr. Herbert Spencer and those who represent the ordinary evolutionary view of religion, that ancestor-worship is the one primitive form of religion and the root of all its higher developments. To such a view the strongest objections must be taken. In the first place, there is some evidence, as has already been seen,¹ of a primitive belief in a universal Father, who is not a first ancestor merely, but, so far as the primitive mind is able to conceive Him, the Creator of man and of the world. According to such evidence, spirit-worship is an intrusion, becoming more and more influential in exact proportion as the particular race deteriorates.

In the next place, there is no passage from ancestor-worship, as such, to a religion which includes the whole world or reaches back to the origin of all existence. The ancestor, however influential he may be conceived to be, is still a finite individual, who has appeared in the world, and passed out of it in the way which is natural to all human beings. If, as he recedes into the background, he should ever come to be treated as practically sovereign over nature, this can only be because a whole range of considerations drawn from the sources studied in the previous chapter operates upon the primitive belief. In short, this will only happen when

¹ See pp. 151-4.

the highest and deepest influences which lie at the heart of religion have adopted and more or less transformed what was originally an interloper. In particular, where, as in the Shintō-worship of Japan, the supreme ancestor tends to be conceived almost in the light of a creator, this is due probably in the first instance to external influences, existing side by side with and modifying, but not superseding, the previous religion. In addition to this, it is due to an instinctive metaphysical sense of the general relations of spirit to nature, of mind to matter, which is not involved in ghost-worship pure and simple, whether considered as expressing a belief in the continued survival of the dead, and as cultivating reverence and affectionate relations with them, or as due to the fear of them as a disturbing presence to be driven away.

In the third place, it is very clear that from the beginning other influences more abiding than the occasional apparition of ghosts must have operated on the mind of early man. After all, even primitive man was more than a gluttonous savage, troubled at night with bad dreams. Despite such ghosts, however frequent they may have been, he was a human being surrounded by the universe of natural phenomena, with their ordered march, their seasonal changes, and their beneficent or harmful disturbances. These changing influences upon him must have appealed to him as early and as forcibly, to say the least, as the occasional visits of departed spirits. Hence, not to speak of primitive Theism, at least the factors which go to create nature-worship must have been as primitive as those which go to create the worship of ancestors. Of course, the developed cult of a supreme ancestor is immeasurably superior to the superstitious fear of, or belief in, ghosts. But it is evolved from such lower forms of spirit-worship, and while ultimately it may tend to cover the whole field of religion, and to displace all other conceptions of divinity, as in Shintō-worship, yet in the earliest stages, before deliberate creative effort plays its part in the making of religion, other influences must have affected men as directly as that of departed spirits. Indeed, there seems evidence that naturalism and ancestor-worship have existed side by side in varying proportions, and that there has come in different religions a period when it has

become necessary to establish some kind of relations between the two. This has been done when the supreme god, probably the Sun, has been connected with the first ancestor of the race, or with its first recognized and perhaps mythical ruler, as Father.

The social consequences of ancestor-worship are everywhere apparent. Such worship is connected with patriarchal or communal government. It does much to strengthen family bonds, not only between the living and the departed, but through the common homage, which all the living must pay to the departed, between the living themselves. The family feasts which bring together the remotest kindred to pay common honour to an ancestor undoubtedly strengthen the family bond. They deepen loyalty and affectionate remembrance. They strengthen the spirit of subordination, which is one of the most striking characteristics of such races as the Japanese. Within somewhat narrow limits such a religion gives expression to the sense of supernatural purpose, guidance, and help, manifest in human life. Moreover, it emphasizes, though in an inadequate way, the truth that, of all which reality contains, the spiritual and personal is most entitled to worship. No religion, certainly not the Christian, is entirely hostile to the general view by which such worship is explained. The marks of the sense of community between the living and the dead are dimly present in the Old Testament, and are strongly manifest in the New. The religion of the risen, ascended, and spiritual Christ cannot deny a measure of truth to that tendency of the human mind which refuses altogether to part company with the departed, or to set up an absolute gulf between the world of spirits and that of men. Even scientific men, to whose temper in the past we owe the present sense of abstract opposition between the visible and the invisible, are many of them coming on scientific grounds to modify this sense of opposition.

On the other hand, it is very easy to perceive both the evil and the shortcomings of such religion. The reverence for the past, and respect for the family bond, upon which such stress is laid in ancestor-worship, lead practically, as can be seen, to such conservatism as that of China, to the tyranny

of the past over the present, of custom over inspiration, of authority over the individual. The individual is sacrificed to the community, not perfected in it. The present is bound in the chains of slavery to the past, and the seen, which is the sphere of man's activities, is in most cases surrendered to the unseen, conceived in such inadequate forms that it becomes practically the mystic presence of antiquity. If this result is ever avoided, as is the case to a large extent in Japan, it is because worship becomes little more than affectionate and grateful remembrance and sense of continued solidarity with the departed. The Divine, even at the highest point, remains finite and merely external to man. No ultimate or unifying principle binding the whole universe together in an all-comprehending union is present, nor can it be developed from such religion without an admixture with it of elements which have no natural connexion with it, either in the original influences out of which it sprang, or in the consequences which are logically bound up with it.

III. The next type of religion which claims attention is the Humanism of the Greeks. Hellenic religion represents the latest and most artistic form of religion which prevailed in Greece. That religion contains elements derived from the early cults, commonly known as Pelasgian, and representing the nature-worship of the early inhabitants of Greece. It embodies certain elements which were imported into it from Oriental religions, and particularly from Phoenicia. But in its developed form it is above all the work of great poets, especially of Homer and Hesiod, though undoubtedly this literary religion never fully absorbed or superseded the rich and many-sided naturalism of ordinary Greek worship. These names stand not so much for individuals as for the creative efforts of many poets, who reproduced and developed under literary forms the beliefs as to faith and morals which became prevalent in the Greek mind. The religious conceptions thus expressed underwent still further development at the hands of the great tragic poets, Aeschylus and Sophocles. From that time they began to be disintegrated by the influences of rationalist or sceptical philosophy, as becomes apparent in the tragedies of Euripides, and in the rough

handling which the gods receive in the comedies of Aristophanes. The early stage of Hellenism as presented to us in Hesiod shows not only the growth of artistic conceptions and of religious myths, but the awakening of a spirit of philosophical and ethical reflection. In its results are contained the germs of those later philosophical tendencies which ultimately broke off from Greek religion and received independent development. Hellenic religion, as distinguished on the one hand from the primitive nature-worships, and on the other from those deeper elements which found expression in the great conceptions of the tragedians, is an embodiment rather of the beautiful than of the true or the good. Its monument is to be found not so much in the religious or moral condition of the people as in the marvellous remains of its classic art. Undoubtedly some of the worships contained in it did provide the cement of religious inspiration, the sense of religious obligation to the constitution of the state. In particular, at times and in places, the worship of Zeus, Apollo, and Athena gave expression to a lofty ideal of religion; in the case of Zeus to growing Monotheism, in the case of Apollo to the idea of religious inspiration and its serviceableness to the progress of life, and in the case of Athena to the humane ideals of a refined civilization.

But to the last there is something artificial about the constitution and conception of the Hellenic Pantheon as derived from Homer. It is a literary, and not a religious, creation. This very fact made it unstable, liable to modification at the hands of advancing reflection, and to encroachment from the side of more enthusiastic religion. Its motive is indeed not purely literary. It aims at unifying distinct worships in a graded system, at subordinating the various divinities which it recognizes to the supreme godhead of Zeus by means which reflect the ordered functions of government in a Greek oligarchy. The fullest measure of religious feeling belongs to the nature-worships and myths, by which it is coloured. Sufficient has been said of these in the section on nature-worships.

Yet when note has been taken of the lack of inspiration, of the literary character and political aims of Hellenic

religion as moulded by Homer, it remains distinguished as the one great expression in the history of religion of pure Humanism. The gods are magnified and etherealized men and women; men and women, also, in whom the intellectual and moral qualities of the Greek race—its virtues and its vices—are writ large. In no case is it more conspicuously true that man makes the gods. Hellenic religion stands as a witness that what God is, is to be discovered, not by attempting to get outside man, but by idealizing him. The wonder and seductions of nature, while still felt, have ceased entirely to enthrall. Man himself has become the subject of the highest wonder and interest; is seen now in his distinction from, and superiority to, nature. The giants of natural forces have been hurled from heaven in order that their place may be taken by the ordered power of rational self-consciousness and will. But the religion never altogether escapes from finitude. The multiplicity of the divine is never completely transcended. The Many are never effectively subordinated to the One. A growing effort in this direction is made, but it never completely succeeds. The gods personify various functions, interests, and moral or intellectual qualities of human life. An attempt is made to treat them as subordinated to the supreme god Zeus, in whose connexion with heaven and conceived relationship as Father a transformation of previous nature-worship, and of a yet more primitive faith in the Divine Being as Father of men, can be discerned. The developed belief in Zeus embodies from time to time lofty ethical ideals and germs of noble theistic thought. It can even be stretched to include, in the hymn of Cleanthes, the Pantheism of the Stoics. But, on the whole, the other gods are too many and too strong for Zeus. The frank and crude anthropomorphism of the whole prevents a complete escape from the limits of finitude. Hence, because Zeus never becomes firmly established as the perfect Infinite and Absolute Being, he remains, with some notable exceptions, the creature of Necessity and the servant of Fate.

The very insufficiency of such a religion, whether regarded from the spiritual or from the intellectual standpoint,

incites to the provision and development from outside of supplementary religious conceptions. Just as Hellenic religion generally is unable perfectly to absorb more primitive elements or so to satisfy the religious needs of the Greek race as to prevent intrusion from outside, so the worship of Zeus can only occasionally and fitfully satisfy completely the idea of the true object of religion. Necessity, fate, the working throughout the universe and in human life of great impersonal laws making for a transcendent righteousness, are discerned, and for the most part Zeus is subject to their working rather than their living embodiment.

Thus, there is on the surface of Hellenic religion such a development of humanism in religion as presents a community of heavenly beings dazzlingly bright with aesthetic charm, but making a most imperfect appeal to religious needs, and unable to stand the test of rational reflection. And behind these is the impersonal Divine, seen as a spiritual power, encompassing and controlling alike gods and men and the world, which calls forth in their utmost intensity the sentiments of awe and dread, and abases the serious man in humble submission. Yet while such profounder conceptions deepen the sense of the solemnity and the mystery of life, they represent the Divine as rather to be reckoned with than to be trusted, and depress rather than exalt the moral personality of man. Religion in this, its more august form, represses more than it inspires, provokes the finite longing of human desire in order to extort its final surrender to the inexorable decree. Thus there is a continual struggle between two unreconciled elements in religious life—the consciousness and desire of life, and the sense of law. Each element has its peculiar object. The vivacity of sparkling life finds itself at home in the festivals of the joyous Hellenic divinities; but when experiencing the deeper solemnities of life, the more thoughtful spirits withdraw from the divinities of the popular religion into the presence of masters of human destiny, who are as cheerless as they are sublime.

IV. Confucianism or Moralism in religion. Confucianism may be held to represent the prevailing religion of China. Its literature belongs to the classics of the Chinese people. It

represents a blending of nature-religion, verging upon Monotheism, with ancestor-worship, and with a prevailing moralism which reflects both the peculiar bent of Confucius himself and the characteristics of the Chinese race. Confucius was a great moral influence in the life of China, rather than a channel of directly religious inspiration. Hence Confucianism represents religion passing into mere moralism. Even in respect of moral influence, Confucius is not one of the great creative forces, but rather a conservative influence, giving expression to well-recognized principles of family, social, and national life. He calls himself 'a transmitter, and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients' (*Analects*, vii. 1).

Confucius was born in the year B.C. 55. He was of exemplary morality. His own description of his life is given in the *Analects*. 'The Master said, "At fifteen I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty I stood firm. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the decrees of heaven. At sixty my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right"' (*Analects*, ii. 4)—a description which sets before us an estimable, if a somewhat self-complacent, character. Yet Confucius was distinguished by an ardent love of truth. One of his sayings was, 'They who know the truth are not equal to those who love it; and they who love it are not equal to those who find delight in it' (*Analects*, vi. 18). Again, when it was reported to him that one of the dukes had inquired about his characteristics, and had received no answer, Confucius said, 'Why did you not say to him, "He is simply a man, who in his eager pursuit of knowledge forgets his food, who in the joy of its attainment forgets his sorrows, and who does not perceive that old age is coming on"' (*Analects*, vii. 18). He is described as having had no 'foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism' (*Analects*, ix. 4). When asked how virtue was to be exalted and delusions to be discovered, he said, 'Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles, and be moving continually to what is right—this is the way to exalt one's virtue' (*Analects*, xii. 10). Despite certain moods of self-complacency, the humility of Confucius was on

the whole strongly marked. The following may be taken as a sample of many similar sayings. 'In letters,' he remarks, 'I am perhaps equal to other men; but the character of the superior man, carrying out in his conduct what he professes, is what I have not yet attained to' (*Analects*, vii. 32).

That which distinguishes the moral teaching of Confucius above all else is his unquestioning loyalty to the existing order of things. The laws of heaven, the laws of the state, the customs of the family, are all alike sacred to him. Human well-being depends pre-eminently upon reverent submission to these laws. Such submission involves due subordination to the recognized authorities by whom these laws are represented. 'Extravagance,' he said, 'leads to insubordination, and parsimony to meanness. It is better to be mean than to be insubordinate' (*Analects*, vii. 35).

His ideal of well-being in the state is thus expressed: 'There is government when the prince is prince and the minister is minister; when the father is father and the son is son' (*Analects*, xii. 11)—that is to say, when all constituted authorities exercise their rightful powers, and all others duly submit to them. In the same sense he declared, 'What is necessary is to rectify names' (*Analects*, xiii. 3), by which he means that all disorder arises where a man's conduct departs from the meaning of the name by which his true relations to others are described. At the same time, Confucius recognized the responsibility of public authorities to secure the well-being of those who are governed by them. As he says, 'Good government obtains when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far are attracted' (*Analects*, xiii. 16). The good effect of such a state of things will be unquestioning contentment among the people. 'When right principles prevail in the Empire, there will be no discussions among the common people' (*Analects*, xvi. 2). The pursuit of virtue is therefore dominated by this highest law of duty. 'To subdue one's self and return to propriety is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him' (*Analects*, xii. 1). This saying shows how the dominant ideal of submission tends to produce as its result and as its safeguard

that deference and courtesy of demeanour which is so strongly marked in China. When asked further about perfect virtue, Confucius said, 'It is when you go abroad to behave to everyone as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family' (*Analects*, xii. 2). The carrying out of maxims like this creates the elaborate ceremonial, but also the gentle graciousness of the best types of Chinese civilization.

While having few or none of the characteristics of a great seer or prophet, Confucius had yet a very deep sense that his gifts and mission were divinely bestowed. When his life was threatened, he said, 'After the death of King Wăn, was not the truth lodged here in me? If Heaven had wished to let this cause of truth perish, then I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K'wang do to me?' (*Analects*, ix. 5). Similarly, he says, 'Heaven produced the virtue that is in me. Hwan T'uy—what can he do to me?' (*Analects*, vii. 22). This sense of dependence gives religious significance to a passage which closely follows, in which Confucius is reported to have said, 'Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous, and lo! virtue is at hand' (*Analects*, vii. 29).

Religion, therefore, was conceived by Confucius as virtue; and virtue consisted for the most part in the spirit of sincere submission to the laws laid down by constituted authorities, divine and human. The discovery of the meaning of these laws constituted the great task of learning, and needed for its achievement absolute sincerity of mind and heart. Yet Confucius, although reverent, was extremely reserved in the matter of religion. Where the Chinese classics, the *She-King* and the *Shoo-King*, had spoken clearly of a personal God, Confucius always preferred to use the ambiguous term 'Heaven.'¹ According to the *Analects*, his frequent subjects of discourse were the Book of Poetry, the Book of History, and the maintenance of the relations of propriety (*Analects*,

¹ See Legge, *The Life and Teachings of Confucius*, 5th edit., p. 100.

vii. 17). He taught 'letters, ethics, devotion of soul, and truthfulness' (*Analects*, vii. 24), but 'prodigious things, feats of strength, states of disorder and spiritual beings,' he did not like to talk about (*Analects*, vii. 20). Thus, while Confucius accepted the religious thought and customs current in his time, both in regard to the divine government of the world and to the worship of ancestors, yet the whole stress of his influence was laid upon ethical interests; supreme among these being the essential moderation of the law-abiding spirit, respect for authority and order in the state, filial reverence and obedience in the home. The maxims and influence of Confucius entitle him to the highest respect, as the teacher of a worthy if somewhat narrow and inadequate moral ideal. Yet that ideal is insufficiently based upon religious certitude. It responds only to the ethical side of religious inspiration. It minutely defines a man's attitude in the finite relations in which he is placed, but does nothing to satisfy the longings of his spirit to be lifted into the ampler world of a divine fellowship beyond these limitations. Divinity is for such a system conceived under the forms of externality, which are characteristic of moralism. God represents, at the highest, a controlling order, not a quickening spirit.

V. Philosophical reactions from popular naturalistic religion.

Some of the most remarkable developments in the history of religion appear in the form of reactions from popular faith. The history of Greek thought in this respect is familiar. Side by side with the ordinary naïve nature-worship and humanism of the Greeks, as has been seen, there was developed the dread doctrine of Fate or Necessity, which in the treatment of great dramatic poets was used to set forth a transcendental and impersonal Law making for supremely righteous, though sometimes incomprehensible, ends. These conceptions supplied more or less the material, not merely of a profounder religion, but of a reflective theology based on philosophy. But philosophical reflection, as it advanced in Greece, raised ever wider and more purely intellectual issues than those of these great transcendental conceptions. The relations and relative degrees of reality of Being and Becoming,

of the One and the Many, of Spirit and Matter, of Reason and Sense, or rather of the objects presented to each—upon these great problems the whole of the Greek philosophy turned, however different may have been the answers given to each of these questions by different schools. The philosophy of Plato was a vindication of the supremacy in the universe of the conceptions of Reason, understood, not as personal, but yet as active, sovereign, and architectonic. The philosophy of the Stoics gave a similar supremacy to Reason, pantheistically conceived. Aristotle, holding the same general convictions as to the relations between mind and matter, investigated more fully the conception of Cause, and introduced the famous fourfold division of causes into formal, material, efficient, and final. The first two of these causes represented the relations between mind and matter in the universe in a way which was derived from the Platonic school, though differing in minor details; while the two latter introduced the conceptions of purpose and effective power, which are commonly understood when modern men speak of a cause. Under the influence of these last two Aristotle reached the conception of the Supreme Being, who is pure activity, and who, Himself unmoved, is by the power of His own attraction the source of universal motion. By this ordered motion the mutual relations of all the parts of the visible universe are controlled. Thus, by philosophical means, religion was purged from its naïveté and finitude. The supremacy of a world-reason was vindicated in the system of Plato by means of the doctrine of the Ideas against the confused world of sensible objects and of becoming, which only deserved in the most imperfect way to be counted as real. The standard of worth set up by the moral judgement of men was satisfied by assigning supremacy over all the other ideas to the Idea of the Good. The Stoics discerned the presence of Reason in the world as a supreme law-giving and vitalizing principle, one throughout the whole and inseparable from the whole. Aristotle made the nearest approach to the Deity of what is called natural theology, considered as the cause of that whole, whose order, motion, and very existence are not self-explained, but must be traced back to an ulterior and infinite source, freed from all the

limitations which are manifest in the visible creation. In all these philosophies, what is sought is not a philosophy of religion, but a rational explanation of the universe. Hence, while religious in spirit, the relationships manifested in religious experience are not set forth or investigated by them.

Yet more striking for the present purpose is the reaction from popular religion manifest in the philosophy of Brahmanism. The genesis of this philosophy can only be explained by taking into account the various influences which affected the Aryan conquerors of India as the result of many causes operating upon them after their settlement there. The early simple and vigorous nature-worship of the Vedas was speedily transformed. Those who held it were brought into external contact, and later were commingled with races holding a far inferior religion. The commixture of races resulted, as usual, in syncretism of religion. In this case it resulted, further, in a great deterioration of the Aryan race. In particular, religious development was influenced by the absorption of elements, which included the prevailing worship of Siva, the Destroyer, manifested in all the unfriendly influences of nature, and the temper of fear which selected such an object of worship. The whole spirit of religion was adversely affected by the adoption of the doctrine of metempsychosis, which has exercised so powerful an influence in many lower religions. Hence the sharp contrast between the Vedic religion and the later forms of Indian religion is to be explained, not as a process of development, but as the consequence of the introduction from without of disturbing and inferior influences. The Caste system reflects the history of this Aryan conquest and the settlement which succeeded it. The Brahmin, representing the priestly element, takes the highest place, and represents the supremacy of the religious interest in the life of the people. The Kshatriya, or military caste, to which all kings, princes, and rulers originally belonged, represented the conquering race; while the Vaisyas, or cultivators of the soil, and the Sudras, or labouring classes, represent the conquered inhabitants of the land. To this primitive organization were added as time went on the vast multitudes of outcastes. With the

development of this social system came its religious consecration. Social organization represents not only divine law, but even ordered grades of divine creation. Thus the religious spirit of the people stereotyped, not only by religious sanction, but by theological dogma, the social gradations created by ruthless conquest, or by economic and industrial growth. Sacred law was developed side by side with the settlement of the social organization.

The religion itself, however, has a twofold further development. On the one side is the creation of what are known as the Brahmanas, the collection of ritual precepts by which the popular religion is governed. On the other hand is the philosophy of the Upanishads, with the elaborate body of commentaries furnished by the Vedantists.

To some extent the same philosophical problems presented themselves to the Indian thinkers as were dealt with in the schools of Greece. But they were presented in the confused and imperfect way which was alone possible in the case of a race so inferior to the Greeks in general mental power. Yet the distinction and relations between being and becoming, substance and phenomena, the permanent and the changing, the infinite and the finite, reality and the conscious perception of it, thought and the thinker, all are presented to us in an unmethodical way throughout the Upanishads. The pressure of these intellectual distinctions was in itself sufficient to raise criticism of the popular religion—both as to the reality of its objects and the worth of its observances—in the mind of the more thoughtful and earnest; though with the lack of energy which characterizes Indian life, intellectual criticism never passed into a real movement of practical reform.

But far more than intellectual causes were at work in the development of the philosophy of the Upanishads. The system of religion presented to us is due to a variety of influences which have produced the deepest pessimism as to the meaning and worth of conscious life, and of all its experiences. In the first place, these influences are due to that infusion of inferior elements into the original Aryan religion to which reference has already been made. The prevalence of the spirit of fear, and the doctrine of transmigration, with

its endless cycles of unsatisfying change and its manifold forms of reincarnation, have profoundly altered the whole temper of religion. The growing sense of evil, the belief that this evil is a retribution for wrong done in previous states of existence, and that the cycles of sinning and suffering are practically inevitable and endless, made religion a standing witness to the hopelessness of conscious existence, however prolonged. The steady pressure of depressing influences deepened this conviction. India is a weary land to live in. The sensuous elements of life are brought by its climatic conditions into prominence. The burdens of sense, its weariness and troubles, the temptations which are inherent in it, all are accentuated, and this the more because of the depression of the active faculties which takes place in the enervating heat. Activity tends to be felt as in itself an evil, while the sensuous consciousness, with its troubles and its incitements, becomes a burden grievous to be borne. The blessedness of life is to be found in dreamy contemplation, while the moral task of life, if recognized, is conceived to be the ascetic purging away of the sensuous influences of life. When the present evils of existence are believed to be a retribution for misconduct in previous lives, the memory of which is absolutely blotted out, when the sensuous is beset with travail and temptation, and when the active pursuits of life tend only to accentuate the misery and to prolong the weariness of unsatisfying effort, it is not difficult to see what the conception of salvation is likely to become, unless some higher spiritual and moral influence supervene. Intellectually there will be a reaction from the finite, and from all the conceptions which are contained within its range; morally, there will be a reaction from the practical concerns of such a finite existence; while, aesthetically, the weary soul will turn with longing to any prospect which promises the extinction of its conscious ills.

The system of Brahmanism simply represents this result. In the first place, its doctrine of the Divine is derived from these influences. The experience of perception contains within itself the distinction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. This becomes in reflection the

distinction between the thinker and his thoughts. But it is possible so to hold the active and even the sensational in suspense that by a process of dreamy abstraction the subject may be wellnigh absorbed in his thought. The sense of distinction between the two may be for the time practically obliterated in reverie. Not only activity and emotion, but even self-reference in consciousness, may be wellnigh suspended. Under the conditions of Indian thought and life which have been described, such suspension appears to be the nearest approach to truth and blessedness. Hence the conception of an abstract and completely inactive Self—of a Thinker who is so one with his thoughts that all consciousness of self is lost in them, becomes the ideal. Such a Self is the only worthy conception of the Divine. The conception of such a Self, reached by the stripping off in successive layers of all that constitutes ordinary consciousness, can only be set forth by negatives. It is pure Being without any further definition. 'Words turn back from it, with the mind not reaching it.' It can only be spoken of as 'not this, not that.' 'It is thought by him that thinks it not; he that thinks it knows it not; it is unknown to them that know it, known to them that know it not.'¹ This is Brahma, whose name signifies Unlimited Vastness or Infinitude. 'It is neither cause, nor not cause, nor both cause and not cause.'² 'It is other than the known, above the unknown. This have we heard of the ancients, who proclaimed it to us.'³

'This same imperishable is that which sees unseen, hears unheard, thinks unthought, and knows unknown. There is no other than this that sees, no other than this that hears, no other than this that thinks, no other than this that knows.' 'Over this imperishable the expanse is woven woof and warp. As in dreamless sleep the soul sees, but sees not this or that, so the Self in seeing sees not.'⁴

¹ Kena Upanishad, quoted by Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 3rd edit., p. 37.

² Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Śvetasvatara Upanishad, quoted by Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 39.

³ The Kena Upanishad, quoted by Gough, p. 39.

⁴ Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, quoted by Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 40.

The closest human analogy therefore to the divine is to be found in dreamless sleep, in which the faculties exist, but without consciousness of their existence; during which their powers are presumed to persist in entire independence of an object. Completely to strip off self-consciousness, with its finitude, its sensations, its desires, and its sense of distinction between itself and its objects, this is to discover what the divine is, and to be at one with it.

Hence, secondly, there is the reaction against the reality of the supposed objective world. In Greek philosophy, as has been seen, a distinction was made between Being and Becoming, and full reality was accorded to Being alone. But in the Brahman philosophy this is carried to much greater lengths. The ideal of the supreme Self, which stands for the divine, condemns to absolute unreality the objective world, and with it the whole of that active life of finite self-consciousness which stands related to it. Even one of the inspired sages of the Rig-Veda says of the external world, 'It was not entity, nor was it non-entity.'¹ But the Vedantist philosophy, which was developed by the great Indian thinker Śāṅkarāchārya developed this doctrine of the unreality of the world till it took the final form which treats it as Māyā, 'illusion.' The mystery of the world and life consists in the eternal union between Brahma, the Infinite Self, and Māyā, this strange principle of unreality. To quote Gough's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 'Māyā overspreads Brahma as the cloud overspreads the sun, veiling from it its proper nature, and projecting the world of semblances, the phantasmagory of metempsychosis.'²

From this union between Brahma and Māyā proceed successively the emanation, Īśvārā, which represents the sum of living things in dreamless sleep, the subordinate emanation of Hiranyagarbha, the same sum-total of living things in dreaming sleep, and the lowest of all, Virāj, this sum-total in active consciousness. Īśvara, the first emanation from the infinite Self in its mysterious relation with illusion, is the creator both of the world presented to finite consciousness,

¹ See Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

and of finite consciousness itself. It is the author of an illusion which exists wherever, and lasts as long as, finite consciousness persists. To this world of illusion, the handiwork of Īśvara, belong not merely men and things, but the divinities who are worshipped, the heaven and hell which the doctrine of retribution sets forth; in short, all the objects of popular religion and of common life.¹

To this world of unreality belongs the whole of ordinary human consciousness. That which alone is real is the one and only Self. Finite individuality passing through the continuous cycles of incarnation is but an emanation of the cosmical illusion. The true and abiding Self is clothed by means of this illusion in five successive vestures or folds, namely, the beatific, the cognitional, the sensorial, the vesture of the vital airs, and the nutrimentitious vesture or visible body in the world of sense.²

¹ Śankarāchārya's exposition of the Aitareya Upanishad thus describes the nature of spiritual entity. "First, there is the one and only Self, apart from all duality, in which have ceased to appear the various counterfeit presentments or fictitious bodies and environments of the world of semblances; passionless, pure, inert, peaceful, to be known by the negation of every epithet, not to be reached by any word or thought.

'Secondly, this same Self emanates in the form of the omniscient Demiurgus, whose counterfeit presentment or fictitious body is cognition in its utmost purity; who sets in motion the general undifferented germ of the worlds, the cosmical illusion; and is styled the internal ruler, as actuating all things from within.

'Thirdly, this same Self emanates in the form of Hiranyagarbha, or the spirit that illusively identifies itself with the mental movements that are the germ of the passing spheres.

'Fourthly, this same Self emanates in the form of spirit in its earliest embodiment within the outer shell of things, as Virāj or Prajāpati.

'And finally, the same Self comes to be designated under the names of Agni and the other gods, in its counterfeit presentments in the form of visible fire and so forth. It is thus that Brahman assumes this and that name and form, by taking to itself a variety of fictitious bodily presentments, from a tuft of grass up to Brahmā, the highest of the Deities.' (See Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 55, 56.)

² This philosophy of unreality has become predominant in Hinduism, but it does not stand alone. The philosophy of the Sankhyas, which was developed in opposition to Buddhism, recognizes a real and independent principle of emanation called Prakriti, and a plurality of selves called Purushas. This philosophy represents a partial return to the view of common sense, necessitated by the practical needs of life and by polemic interests. But it is not in command of Indian thought, and does not represent the general tendency of the religious development.

The doctrine of the supreme Self and of the unreality of the world determines, in the third place, a corresponding reaction in the doctrine of salvation. The immediate practical concern is to secure an escape from the fruitless succession of finite changes and release from the infliction of retribution, ceaselessly experienced throughout all these changes. The form of salvation must necessarily be the return to reality from the persistent illusion which perpetuates the misery of conscious existence. Blessedness is to be found in complete escape from *Māyā*, the world-illusion, by coming to recognize, and thereby enter into, the true identity with *Brahma*, the eternal Self, which is alone real. The greatest text of the *Upanishads* is the text, 'That art Thou,' in which the identity of the finite individuality with the eternal Self is affirmed and reaffirmed.¹

But this return to reality is by no means easy. It may, indeed, require the effort of many successive lives to accomplish it. Within the sphere of experience it can only be carried out by a complete renunciation of all earthly ties and interests, and by successively stripping off the five vestures which have come to enwrap the true self. Salvation depends upon securing a condition of complete ecstatic exaltation, which involves an equally complete apathy so far as outward objects and interests are concerned. Under this influence all the successive phases of conscious existence, higher or lower, are resolved into *Brahmā*. The process by which salvation is wrought out leaves behind, therefore, all moral distinctions. Correct morality is indeed deemed necessary in the first stages of the process, but it is eventually superseded as being no less an illusion than its opposite. Elaborate steps must be taken to produce the abstraction necessary in order that this process of salvation may be carried on. In this process the recitation of the mysterious symbol, OM, in appropriate posture, plays an important part. 'The mystic utterance OM is the bow, the soul the arrow, the Self the mark. Let it be shot at with unfailing heed, and let the soul, like the arrow, become one with the mark.'²

¹ Sixth *Prapāthaka* of the *Chhāndogya Upanishad*.

² *The Mūṇḍaka Upanishad*, ii. 2.

But the carrying on of this process of ecstatic contemplation cannot be immediately undertaken even by the Brāhmin. He must pass through four stages of life. The first is that of Studentship. The second is the stage appointed for the payment of the three debts. The first of these debts is to the Rishis, the inspired and divine teachers of the past, and is paid by the repetition of the sacred hymns and texts. The second is paid to the Pitris, by begetting children; and the third is paid to the recognized gods, by offering the appointed oblations. The third stage is that of ascetic self-mortification. Only when all these stages have been passed through is the preparation for the fourth and final stage—that of contemplation—complete. The Self, having discharged its duties and been disciplined to a complete self-denial, is ready for the last stage of emancipation from the bondage of individuality and conscious life.

In the whole doctrine and practice thus outlined there are features which reveal a spiritual philosophy spoiled by the deep-seated influence of pessimism. The Self in man, however imperfect may be the conception of it, is treated as the revelation of inmost reality. It, and it alone, contains the key to the nature of all that is. Strip it of its finitude and behold the divine. Witness is borne to the sense of kinship between the human and the divine, to the immanence of the divine in the human. The sense of separation from God, or of being apart from Him, is an illusion which salvation removes. The importance thus assigned to the Self, and to the unity of Selves, apprehended as finite, with the Infinite Self, is an important contribution to the philosophy of religion.

But the method taken of arriving at true infinity by negation ends in empty abstraction. The real infinite is to be found by the addition, and not by the subtraction, of attributes. The reality which is at the heart of all things must be the sufficient reason, and not the negation of them all. Its infinity must be learned from its creative relations in life to the actual universe, and not merely by abstract speculation. The vision of the divine as the Infinite Self is indeed true. But its state is misconceived, and hence activity, sovereignty, and influence are denied to it. The result of this withdrawal

into the nonentity of a pure abstraction is bewilderment among all the contradictions of a false infinity. Moreover, the whole idea and end of religion is nullified in the Indian process of salvation. Fellowship with the divine is sought by the religion. The satisfaction of that demand, nay the demand itself, is destroyed by a doctrine which is not even that of absorption into the divine, but depends upon the recognition of absolute identity with the divine. A place is found for reflective contemplation, although reflective thought is itself left behind in the final ecstasy of contemplation, but affection and activity are dispossessed not merely from the service of true religion, but even from human nature itself as finally conceived. All the standards of spiritual and moral worth which have been gained by intense struggles and determination, together with the well-being of ordinary life, are absolutely discharged from their place in the nature both of God and of man. Such is the effect of a false conception of the meaning of infinity, both upon the doctrine of the nature of God and upon the religious ideal of man who feels himself akin to God and under the necessity of seeking a share in His infinity.

This false theory of the infinite, coupled with weariness of the finite, is responsible for the doctrine of *Māyā*. This doctrine rests upon an unprovable, unnatural, and inapplicable theory of universal deception. The standard of truth by which all else is tested and found to be false is artificial and impracticable. The assumption of universal falsity is in direct antagonism to every judgement of common sense, which, even if held to be equally unprovable, has at least the unvarying instinct of initial faith upon its side. Our starting-point is necessarily the reality and veracity of self-consciousness, and of the cosmos in and by which self-consciousness is realized. Naturally this must supply the standard of reality to us, and not a doctrine of the impersonal reached only by an elaborate process of artificial abstraction. Man has been made what he has become as the consequence of activity, assigning worth in varying degrees to the practical objects which he has sought. The subject, as revealed in finite consciousness, is relative to the object. If the object is

absolutely unreal, so equally is the subject which exists only as one side in the antithetic relationship. Hence pure being falls into pure nothingness. And even a Divine Self, which contains no principle of objectivity, is in itself unthinkable.

The contradiction involved in the theory of universal illusion is clearly marked in the philosophy itself. It has its Achilles' heel, wherein it can be pierced with a mortal wound. For 'it is everywhere taught in the Upanishads' that the doctrine of the Self, or Brahmā, 'was revealed by this or that god, or other semi-divine teacher, and handed down through a succession of authorized exponents.' There is a text, 'A man that has a spiritual teacher knows the Self.'¹ But this spiritual teacher, whether he belong to the past or to the present, so far as he exerts personal influence, belongs to the world of illusion. How, then, can one whose whole doctrine and influence reduces him to the world of conscious and active existence be a trustworthy guide to the doctrine that the whole of conscious and active existence is illusory? On the view that the whole of the individual life is a falsity, a divine guide coming down into unreality and using its instruments in order that he may conduct us to a reality beyond, becomes a clear contradiction in terms. It is not wonderful, therefore, that both in theory and practice there should be a contradiction of the process by which man has become what he is. So far as man has attained deliverance from the reign of sense and sin, it has been by becoming a larger and intenser self in whom the fullness of spiritual and moral faculties has been realized. To reverse the process at the end is to be inconsistent with the whole principle of spiritual development. The difficulty of this position is clearly seen in the appointed means of practical redemption; for the Brahmin is enjoined in the earlier stages of his career to pay debts to the very falsity which it is his main business to escape. He is not only to honour gods who belong to the realms of unreality, but to secure the perpetuation of illusion by providing for the continuance of the human race in his offspring. And the contradiction is carried still further by

¹ See Gough, p. 98.

the frank exclusion of the multitude from any hope of salvation. For them the ordinary concerns of life and the common observances of established religion are sanctioned and prescribed. The way of salvation is a spiritual luxury, practicable only for the few. Even for the few it is possible only as a violent reversal of earlier stages of life equally enjoined as divine, and by a spiritual process which, in obedience to a speculatively impossible conception of reality, contradicts all that is immediately given as real.

The next religion which we have to consider is Buddhism, which in its original form represents a still further reaction against popular religion than Brahmanism. The scanty information about the early life of Gotama is well known. Born between five and six hundred years before Christ, he was the son of a Rajah of the Sākya clan, and married his first cousin, the daughter of a neighbouring Rajah, in early life. In his twenty-ninth year, after a long spiritual struggle, he finally abandoned his home. Having sought in vain from many teachers for a way of salvation, he devoted himself for six years to a life of penance. At the end of this time he passed through a second great crisis, and at its close attained under the Bo-tree of Buddha Gaya to that state of salvation which it was the business of his life from that time forward to proclaim.

The essential meaning of Buddhism is to be found in its reaction from the whole doctrine of the Self, which is found in Brahmanism. The doctrine of the non-reality of all things is held with such thoroughness that it encroaches upon and destroys the reality of the primary Being which Brahmanism asserted. Thus in the first place as to the existence of the Infinite Self. It is true that the Buddha exhibited a large measure of tolerance for established beliefs, and for existing observances of life as far as they did not necessarily conflict with the purposes of his mission. But the Buddhist scriptures contain clear indications of the sceptical attitude which was taken up towards the existing theoretical beliefs. For example, in the *Tevijja Sutta*, Gotama is represented as carrying on an argument or discussion with two Brahmin inquirers, in which, having secured the admission that their

teachers and authorities have never seen Brahmā, and know not where, whence, or whither Brahmā is, he scornfully exclaims that the Brahmans say, 'What we know not, neither have seen, to a state of union with that can we show the way!' ¹

Thus the primary Being of Brahmanism is resolved into its practical equivalent, Non-being. This doctrine of non-being provokes the opposition of Sankarāchārya in his commentary on the Vedāntas, in which he meets the arguments of the Buddhists, reaching the conclusion that 'this tenet, then, of the emanation of the existent out of the non-existent is inadmissible; inasmuch as we see, on the one hand, that entity does not issue out of non-entity—you cannot make a bow out of a pair of hare's horns, or a garland out of sky-flowers; and, on the other hand, that entity does issue out of entity, as golden trinkets are made out of existing gold, and other things out of things that are.' ²

In the second place, this reaction against the existence of the Self is pressed in regard to the doctrine of man. Buddha, to some extent, accepts the faith of the Brahmans as to transmigration and retribution; but in accepting it he transforms it by his disbelief in the importance, and even in the principle of individuality. The subject of transmigration is not so much the individual as the Karma, which represents the character formed in successive stages of existence. That which survives after death is not the individual, but his Karma, the total result of his mental and bodily actions.³ This Karma persists so long as it finds an individual with which it becomes one. But the existence of such an individual depends upon the persistence of that craving desire (Tanhā), which is the cause of sentient life with all its troubles and evils. It is the craving to live in death which perpetuates the succession of lives, and with them the Karma, which becomes one with them. In the same way it is this craving which lights the fires of lust and hatred and of all the delusions which are bound up with conscious existence.

¹ Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lecture*, p. 59.

² See Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 3rd edit., pp. 188, 189.

³ See Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lecture*, pp. 91, 92.

The great task of life, therefore, is the destruction of *Tanhà*; and this understood not merely as the transformation of inordinate affections and desires until they seek worthy objects in due proportion and in subordination to the supreme ends of life, but as the extirpation of that desire for life itself, which is the source of all the consequent evils of mortal existence. The *Book of the Great Decease* recounts how 'the Blessed One addressed the disciples of Bhandagāma, and said, "It is through not understanding and grasping four conditions (four things), O Brethren, that we have had to run so long, to wander so long, in this weary path of individuality, both you and I." And what are these four? The noble conduct of life, the noble earnestness in meditation, the noble kind of wisdom, and the noble salvation of freedom. But when the noble kind of conduct of life, of earnestness in meditation, of wisdom, and of salvation by freedom are seen face to face, and are comprehended, then is the craving for existence rooted out, that which leads to renewed existence is destroyed, and there is no more birth.' ¹

This state of extinction of all desire for existence is Nirvana, a word which means 'the going out, becoming extinct.' To reach this condition of mind is to attain to the blessedness of Arahatsip. This state of mind is essentially a condition of insight into the reality, or rather into the non-reality, of all things. The *Book of the Great Decease* divides this insight into seven kinds: 'Insight into impermanency, into non-individuality, into corruption, into the danger of evil-doing, into sanctification, into purity of heart, into Nirvana.'² To attain to this is to reach the blessedness of full salvation.

Buddhism has three divisions into which its adherents are divided. In the first a common morality and observances are prescribed for ordinary people. The second marks the pathway of a recluse at the outset, but only those who enter upon the third, 'the noble eight-fold path,' as it is called, reach the highest and true system of Buddhism, in which the impulse which leads in the second stage to abandonment of the ordinary relationships and interests of the world becomes

¹ See Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lecture*, pp. 99, 100.

² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

completed in the discipline by which the craving after life itself is overcome.

Such is the general doctrine and discipline of Buddhism. But if Buddha was distinguished on one side by scepticism as to the reality, and pessimism as to the worth of life, he was also distinguished for the graciousness, the gentleness, and sympathy of his disposition. Hence, in the first place, the universalism of his doctrine of salvation. The way of salvation is not reserved exclusively for the favoured Brahmin caste, but is open to any one, however humble, who will resolve to seek after it. It is a message of salvation to all. In the next place, the kindliness of Buddha seeks to eliminate the evils of existence, and to destroy the inordinateness of desire, by consideration of all living things. Yet while universalism and gentleness represent the gracious spirit of the Buddha, the essence of his system is, as has been seen, thorough-going belief in the unreality of all things, including not merely the realm of objects perceived, but also the subject which perceives them. Buddhism therefore represents the transformation of Brahmanism on the one side by a more thorough-going scepticism, and on the other by a sympathetic humanitarianism. Renunciation is its solitary and all-comprising virtue. Yet that renunciation is enjoined, not in consideration of the value of human fellowship or of the worth of universal ends, but because of a recognition of the worthlessness of life, with all its concerns and relationships, and as essential to individual salvation. While, therefore, self-renunciation in Buddhism may assume the form of sublime unselfishness, and in many respects resemble self-renunciation in the Christian life, its grounds, ends, and essential spirit are totally unlike. In Christianity it is in order to the perfecting of human fellowship. In Buddhism it is undertaken with a view to the speedier extinction of the beings upon whose existence fellowship depends. The common element in the two is simply to be found in the pitifulness which is the mark of both, and which in one respect becomes deeper in the case of Buddhism than in that of Christianity, because in the former case it is entirely unrelieved by hope.

In the practical spirit of Buddhism there seems to be an inversion of the true method of ethical life. Blessedness, as ordinarily understood, is the reward of striving. Its nature, as conceived, determines the spirit in which the striving after it is carried on. When blessedness is complete, striving comes to an end by reason of satisfaction. Buddhism, on the contrary, attempts to secure blessedness by suppressing, not by directing and satisfying, striving. Salvation is to be found in such separation from all the objects of life that self itself dies out; not in the attainment of worthy objects of desire. It represents the extreme recoil from the weariness of living, from the fever of unregulated desire, and from the conception of unending cycles of finitude which had become a burden too great to be borne. On the more philosophic side, it is the triumph of a purely sensational against a more spiritual or ideal explanation of existence. That it is so attractive is due, not to its essential view of life, but to the personality of its author. In comparing it with Brahmanism on its spiritual and ethical side, one is forced to discuss the relative worth of a godless love or of a loveless God; the latter being the result of the whole view of the relation of the Divine Being to the world of finite existence set up by Brahmanism. In one sense Buddhism is more consistent than Brahmanism, for it is impossible permanently to maintain the reality of Self, whether infinite or finite, when the reality of the objects of Self has been entirely dissolved.

On the other hand, Buddhism is open to the same general criticisms as have been offered in the case of Brahmanism. It is a still further reaction against reality as revealed to us by the common sense and experience of mankind. Its doctrine of salvation is in an even extremer form a reversal of the process by which man has come to be what he is. It also fails of complete internal consistency; for while individuality in common with its objects is explained away, it becomes necessary to treat Karma, the result of that individuality, as being real, until by the suppression of desire in any particular case it is done away. Buddhism is superior, therefore, to Brahmanism simply in the sympathy which made it, so far as practical conditions allowed, not merely a discipline for the

few, but a gospel preached to the many. When, however, it became a gospel preached to the many, it underwent of necessity a total transformation. Buddhism as a philosophy of life is for an elect few. Buddhism as a popular religion is compelled to restore to a large extent what has been taken away, by the doctrine which is set forth as to the person of its author.

Buddhism as a popular religion depends not upon its ultimate philosophy of life, or upon its discipline, which is practicable only for the few, but upon the virtual deification of its author, arising out of homage paid to his noble ethical character. It is the Buddha, the gracious and benevolent teacher of mankind, accounted for by a growing wealth of mythological narratives, who takes the place of God in the Buddhist religion, and has given to it a popular influence, which could not result from its body of teaching as such. Thus the practical superiority of Buddhism as compared with Brahmanism is just this emphasis upon the ethical. Brahmanism has its faith in the divine, but a faith so abstract that personality, with all the moral distinctions which rest upon it, is dissolved away. Buddhism, without any theology, enthrones in the human heart and imagination the sublime figure of a great moral personality, and of a moral personality distinguished by those graces of sympathy, gentleness, and unselfishness which represent the tenderer manifestations of love. In subsequent times the apotheosis of the Buddha took the form of representing him now as a supreme King, now as the perfectly wise Teacher. But whether as the former or as the latter, grace and goodness were the characteristics alike of his rule and of his teaching. Hence many of the practical results of religion have been wrought out by Buddhism, when its influence has been most living. Yet at its highest there remains the gulf fixed between the baselessness of all existence taught by the philosophy and the reality of the gracious personality adored by the religion. There remains also the fact that, great as is the regard paid to the moral personality of the founder, no means is found of interpreting the worth of that personality in its relations to any permanent meaning or ultimate end of the universe itself. Not only is the moral worth

of the Buddha a spiritual portent unexplained by anything in the universe which gives it birth, but that portent in the world of being arises by a contradiction out of ultimate non-being and returns to it again. Thus, whatever may be the worth of the character of Buddha, or of his specific spiritual guidance, as to which it is not necessary now to offer any detailed criticism, it must be pointed out that the practical effort to supply an object of worship by means of the apotheosis of the Buddha is vitiated by the faults of the philosophic system of Buddhism as such. The want of God at the beginning cannot thus be atoned for at the end. Buddhism, therefore, fails absolutely to supply a primary need of religion, namely, an adequate spiritual basis for the activities of life and a rational explanation of those positive ends which such activities presuppose.

VI. Dualism.—In many respects the transition from Brahmanism to Zoroastrianism represents as complete a contrast as can be conceived. And yet the most convincing evidence has established the descent of the religion of Zoroastrianism from the same source as the religion of the Vedas. The personality of the supposed founder of the religion has so entirely faded that many have regarded him as a purely legendary personage. Probably this is a mistaken view, but at any rate it is entirely out of the question to attempt to discover what his positive contribution was to the religion, the only record of which is now to be found in the scanty literature of the Zend-Avesta. The common starting-point both of the religion of the Avesta so long prevalent in Iran and of the Vedic religion is to be found in the elements of a common nature-worship, which, while characteristic of the Vedas, leave their traces everywhere throughout the Avesta. Zoroastrianism, originally the religion of the Magi in Media, gradually spread over the Persian empire, and attained an ascendancy which only gave way when extreme and puerile developments of it exposed it as an easy prey to the advancing forces of Mohammedanism. While Zoroastrianism can be traced back to a common source with the Vedic religion, the subsequent development is, as has been said, completely different. In the case of Brahmanism, the mixture of races leading to the

adoption of inferior beliefs and practices, together with other effects of the environment, resulted in the development of a religion growing ever less practical and moral. Brahmanism represents the vagueness of ecstatic contemplation in its extremest form. Zoroastrianism, on the other hand, stands for a practical and ethical energy unequalled anywhere else in ancient religion, save only in that of the Old Testament. It is the worship, in the first place, of Ahura Mazda, the Lord of Wisdom, a personal, spiritual, and beneficent being who approaches nearly to the God of pure Theism. While, as his name signifies, a spiritual personality, the descriptions of him are not free from traces of previous nature-worship, and there are clear evidences that he has only gradually attained to the primacy of an unquestioned dominion. Other divinities, however, of a previous stage of the religion, have by the time of the Avesta sunk to a subordinate position, so that he represents a divine sovereignty over the whole hierarchy of heavenly beings, and over all terrestrial existences, so far as they are beneficent.

But Zoroastrianism is face to face with the mystery of evil. It is impossible for it, with its practical spirit and its energy, to explain that mystery away. Evil is in itself a reality so definite and intractable, that it is impossible to trace its origin back to Ahura Mazda, or indeed to allow the assumption that Ahura Mazda is absolutely supreme. Evil must be traced to a source distinct from and independent of him. That source is Angra Mainya, developed probably from a storm-god. He represents an originally malign power, who thwarts the purposes of Ahura Mazda, confronts every act of his by an evil counterpart. The phenomena of nature, the classes of animals, the characteristics of men, are divided as the sheep from the goats. Those which approve themselves as good to the judgement of the author of this religion are seen to be the creation of the servants of Ahura Mazda. Those, on the other hand, which are accounted evil, are credited to Angra Mainya. Between those two opposing forces, with their attendant hosts, a ceaseless warfare is carried on within the system of the universe. In this warfare the ethical faith of Zoroastrianism counts upon a final victory for Ahura Mazda

and his forces over the opposing power of evil. Meanwhile this warfare prescribes the conditions of moral life to man. It is his business to keep himself apart from Angra Mainya and all his works, and to take part in the warfare by which evil is to be overcome of good. In this he is from time to time assisted by the appearance of saviours, who arise as the leaders and deliverers of their fellow men.

The optimism which prevails in Zoroastrianism as to the ultimate end of the great strife, together with that endeavour after effective unification of the system of the world for thought which theistic belief always prompts, made it impossible for this religion permanently to be content with so extreme a dualism. The later stages of the religion, therefore, were marked by efforts to reduce the principle of evil till it becomes a subordinate aspect of Ahura Mazda, or to deduce both the one and the other from a First Principle including both. But, taking the religion as it stands in the Avesta, the dualism is, so far as the use of experience is concerned, crude and exaggerated, while the explanation given is in clear opposition to that objective unity of the world in one system of law which is brought home, not only by scientific investigation, but by the demand for complete unity in thought, which is the primary impulse of philosophy. As to the former, there is confusion between phenomena and creatures causing inconvenience and danger to man on the one hand, and evil tempers and passions which are traceable to a moral source on the other. The whole arrangement is entirely haphazard, dependent upon the immediate and apparent interests of men, and not upon any knowledge of the part which the facts complained of play in the whole economy of the world. The moral evil which is traced back to a quasi-divine creation is, by that very means, more or less justified and entrenched in existence, although the motive of its creation may be diabolic. Its very independence tends to make it impervious to the good. The moral energy of Zoroastrianism declared war upon evil and predicted its extinction; but its theoretic basis, by making the source of evil as original as the source of good, by separating things evil into a distinct class of existences, and by conceiving the whole process by which good overcomes

evil by means of the cruder associations of warfare, renders it impossible to attain either a satisfactory philosophy of the universe, or to supply any sufficient guidance and inspiration for the inner tasks of the spiritual and moral life. Thus Zoroastrianism fell owing to irresistible influences both on the one side and on the other. Among the select minds, represented by the small remnant of the modern Parsees, it gradually relinquished most of its distinctive features, ending in a system of Deism, with the addition of certain practices which represent the continuance of that religious reverence for the elements—earth, air, fire, water—which has come down from ancient times. On the other hand, ordinary Zoroastrianism, developed by a sacerdotal caste, became ever more childish and servile in its observances and prescriptions owing to the incurable habit of confusing moral with physical evil, and especially of regarding all the phenomena of decay as in themselves evil, and hence brought within the sphere of the moral interests of religion.

VII. The last form of religion other than Christianity to which attention must be drawn is Mohammedanism. Of this only a few words need be said. In the form in which it was proclaimed by its founder, Mohammed, it represents a doctrine of abstract Monotheism. In the strict sense of the term, this doctrine was not original, but was derived from the Jewish and Christian sources with which Mohammed was more or less familiar. The mission of Mohammed must be understood as primarily a protest against Christian Trinitarianism, tritheistically conceived, against current superstitions which had established themselves in the effete Christian life with which he was familiar, and against the crude idolatry of the Arab tribes. It was against these, and particularly the last, that Mohammed, with the intense zeal of a convinced monotheist and iconoclast, waged war. The substance of his testimony was to the abstract unity, the absolute sovereignty, and the omnipotent will of God. He claimed the practical authority necessary to carry out his reforming task and to enthrone his own dominant faith in the hearts of others, by adding the dogma that of the one sovereign and omnipotent God he was, in a unique sense, the Prophet. ‘Allah is Allah,

and Mohammed is His Prophet,' becomes therefore the complete creed of the Mohammedan. A universe so conceived is simplified to the last degree. All that happens is immediately referred back to the fiat of the divine will. Fatalism becomes the key to the world's meaning as it affects the life of men. Submission, which is signified by the very term Islam, becomes the supreme and only duty of religion. Such was the conception of religion which appealed to the austerity of the Prophet. Owing to another and voluptuous side of his nature, which gradually manifested itself under the combined influence of prosperity and of the sense that as supreme Prophet he was a law unto himself, Mohammed, however, developed a doctrine of the rewards of Paradise, which afforded in the world to come ample and sensuous recompense for the submission which was exacted in the present. The supreme faith of Mohammedanism nevertheless remains an abstract and rigid dogma. The form of it is explained by the fact of its being a protest against abuses existing round about the Prophet. Its simplicity and intensity were due to the peculiar temperament of the Prophet himself, although that temperament was so characteristically Arab that it evoked in the end a permanent response from the Arab mind.

The general view of all these religions which has now been completed has made it clear that each one of them transgresses at one or more points the principles which were laid down at the outset as essential to the final persistence and the general acceptance of any religion. It is not necessary exhaustively to summarize the particulars after the detailed criticisms which have already been offered. Naturalism in all its forms becomes impossible as a religion directly man attains to the full dignity and maturity of self-conscious spirit. Ancestor-worship and humanism in its naïve forms fail to satisfy directly he becomes sufficiently spiritual to demand moral perfection in the object of his worship. The developments of Oriental thought, whether in Brahmanism or Buddhism, are as impossible for thought as they are unavailable for practice, so long as men recognize the worth and the possibilities of conscious life. Above all is this the case so far as men realize the primacy and meaning of love,

alike as the highest possession of human spirits, as demanding for its satisfaction not only their permanence but their desire to be permanent, and as becoming thereby the guiding clue to the nature and meaning of the universe. Again, men must transcend all forms of dualism so soon as they discover throughout the world the marks of unity and of system, and find further that unity and system are shown in a supreme law working in and through all things for the overcoming of evil by good. Finally, abstract Monotheism becomes impossible directly men realize not only the transcendence but the immanence of God.¹ It thereby becomes clear, not only from the point of view of scientific discovery, but also from that of great religious conceptions, that the method of God's dealing with the world is by a process of self-giving, of which evolution is a general description. Under that method, not only has positive life its assured place and worth, not to be destroyed by a bare formula of submission, but also religion in a world so ordered must not only make room for, but must actually be founded upon and develop the principle of freedom.

Sufficient has been seen, however, to show that all these various religions flourish at different altitudes of the human spirit, and are natural to them. In no case are they artificially created apart from general spiritual conditions, which alike fashion, foster, and maintain them. Each represents the natural effect of some real experience of the world, held at some stage or other of the ascent or descent of the human spirit to be the determinative factor supplying the meaning of the whole. In some cases, as has been seen, the religion represents a reaction, strange and impracticable to other minds, from a received religion which has been found to be inadequate. The negative has assumed greater prominence as a contradiction than the positive which, while it casts aside that which is outworn, accepts the underlying principles of truth in it, and develops them in a more satisfying way.

All these religions have brought their measure of spiritual satisfaction, and even of uplifting to the human spirit, in certain stages and under certain conditions of its experience.

¹ Sufism, in Mohammedanism, bears witness to this.

Even when they have exhausted this service they are of permanent value to the religious history of mankind—for two reasons. In the first place, each one embodies some aspect, not only of general truth as imaginatively apprehended, but of spiritual need demanding satisfaction. In the second place, by means of them the various possibilities of the explanation of the world, its source, its meaning, and the ends which are to be wrought out and satisfied in it, are explored. These are left for the permanent guidance of the human mind, which brings them to a twofold test; first of all, by the standards of rational truth growingly apprehended, and secondly by those of the spiritual nature and its needs, as these are gradually unfolded in the life-history of the human race. By means, therefore, of these natural expressions of the human spirit in response to the various influences of the universe, all possible alternatives of world-explanation, of the conduct and satisfaction of life, are gradually laid bare. Their relative adequacy may be estimated, and the elements in them which are of abiding and universal significance are enabled to play their part in permanently affecting the faith and conduct of mankind. At the same time, as has been seen in detail, not one of the forms which has been reviewed can, owing to its shortcomings, be treated as permanently or universally serviceable to mankind. Nor can any one of them be so completely rationalized as to give a final explanation of the world, assuming for the moment that the world is capable of receiving a completely rational explanation.

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY AS THE FULFILMENT OF RELIGION

WE come, in the next place, to consider how far Christianity fulfils the idea and satisfies the end of religion imperfectly set forth by the ethnic religions which have been examined. In common with all other religions, but in a pre-eminent degree, the Christian religion appears as a revelation. All other religions depend not only upon the idea, but also in some sense upon the experience of revelation. The solution of the mysteries of human life proposed, and the satisfaction of human needs offered by each, is something which has been received and not discovered. Even the Brahman theory of life, which seems to us to represent the last result, first of ascetic practice, and then of abstract contemplation, is something which, as we have seen, is held to have been revealed in the first place by a Divine Being. The superficial contradiction in this view, which has already been criticized, is witness to this general standpoint, and makes the religion the more significant. Yet while this is a common feature of all religions so far as they represent anything more articulated than mere childlike imagination, it is peculiarly true of Christianity, the watch-word of which is 'Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.' In Christianity the consciousness of revelation is so absolute and pervasive as to determine the whole form of the religion. Nay more, the seat and substance of its revelation are found in Christ Himself. In Him the completed revelation finds a direct personal manifestation which is unique. It is given in One who has been worshipped throughout the ages as the supreme expression alike of divine and of human perfection.

Christ therefore embodies in Himself not only the content of revelation, but its authentication in the perfect satisfaction of a religion which is in itself the expression of all the highest powers of the Spirit. The contents of the Christian religion are in a unique way both something new in the spiritual experience of mankind and the fulfilment of the old. The limiting conditions of the human spirit are such that, however new the religion, it must postulate a certain spiritual condition on the part of those who apprehend it; and that spiritual condition must be the result of a long evolution in a specially favourable environment. Yet while the original reception of Christianity depends for its very possibility upon such a preparation, it represents a transcendent influence, that raises thought and experience of God, alike in Himself and in His relation to the world and man, which find their unity in Him, to a new plane. It is a fulfilment of the past, which contains within itself a reaction against many of the religious influences prevalent at the time of Christ, which brings about a restoration of spiritual forces that had long declined, but which can be explained neither as reaction nor as restoration, because in its capacity as the religion of fulfilment it marks a living advance into a realm which belongs to it alone. Its relation to the past must be glanced at shortly. Meanwhile it is necessary only to point to the remarkable evidence which it gives alike of the consciousness of a unique revelation and of a growth by means of selective processes from narrow and limiting conditions to a comprehensive and catholic position.

But if Christianity is a revelation, it is also emphatically an experience, that is to say, a state of mind, heart, will, and conscience which, however divinely it may be conferred, becomes habitual to those who receive it.

Christianity cannot be interpreted by means of its abstract theology as embodied in creeds, nor by its ecclesiastical institutions, nor by its practical efforts and observances. It represents, above all, a new consciousness of relationship to God, and equally a consciousness of new relations to God.

This consciousness is, as has been seen, that of sonship,

having in correspondence with it, and as its cause, the apprehension of the Fatherhood of God. The conception of the Divine Fatherhood unites in itself the elements of spiritual perfection, of self-communication as the principle of the divine life, and of a transcendent yet immanent sovereignty, which unites law and life under the supremacy of love. This consciousness of sonship was primary in the perfect God-consciousness of Christ. It is secondary, but not the less real, in His followers, being dependent in them upon a revelation, a reconciliation, and a redemption mediated by Christ.

I. This experience is, in the first place, the fulfilment of the idea and end of religion. It represents the complete victory of faith over fear. 'Be not afraid, do nothing but believe,' was the exhortation of our Lord. 'Perfect love casteth out fear' was the testimony of His follower. In the experienced relationship of sonship, while the intrinsic conditions of individual life are not only maintained but asserted, the sense of kinship with God, of dependence upon Him, of obligation, is complete. All these elements are held together in perfect balance in a fellowship which is only perfectly realized when each one of these separate factors has full justice done to it, alike in conception and in disposition. God becomes the supreme object of a personal affection, which touches all the powers with a new sense of infinity. Thus the Christian religion, in so far as it approaches adequate realization, holds together in organic union and harmony all the elements which have been seen to be included in religion. Affinity is saved from falling to the extreme of absorption; obligation from passing to the extreme of separation. Dependence is understood in the light both of kinship and of obligation. These two sides are combined in a union which, while safeguarding the worth of the individual, transcends bare individualism; escaping alike the pantheistic mistake of confusing God and man—the negation of personality in either—and, on the other hand, the abstract separation between God and man, whether of naïve polytheism, of dualism, or of Mohammedanism. God is at once transcendent and immanent. He is absolutely sovereign, but His sovereignty is manifested in and through the universe,

especially in and through self-conscious life, and is therefore not the contradiction but the condition of liberty. God is ideal perfection, yet He manifests Himself progressively in and through man, both in his distinction from and in his union with nature. The truth which such a religion as that of Mohammed seeks to assert is therefore held by Christianity in a spirit which makes it friendly, and not hostile, to those ideals of independence, freedom, and progress which are indispensable to the highest human life. Faith, hope, and love become the primary graces in a personal relationship to God, which is thus realized as perfectly combining kinship with dependence, freedom with the obligation of service. A final reconciliation is reached between the spiritual and the natural. The distinction between the two, which may be pressed too far in a reaction against crude naturalism, is maintained. Yet their ultimate union is apprehended on condition that the natural, so-called, is seen to be based upon and subordinate to the spiritual, and that it is ethically conditioned under the influence of that supreme relationship to God which at once distinguishes His sons from nature, and yet makes them the means by which nature is brought back from its otherness and alienation and made to serve the supreme ends of the divine kingdom. Thus the element of truth contained in naturalism is safeguarded in the completely Christian view of the world. The universe is, for the first time, adequately conceived, when it is regarded and treated as being spiritual in its source, its ground, and its end. Completed union with God, alike the starting-point and the goal of Christian life, is brought about not by the suppression but by the perfecting of personal relationships, divine and human. The way to it lies in complete self-surrender to the divine love, and not in self-exaltation. It is a process of being clothed upon, with an ever-increasing fullness and range of affection, not of being successively stripped, as in the case of Brahmanism, till nothing is left but a naked self. Its watchword is 'Dying to live,' but its self-renunciation is not, as in Buddhism, the way to self-extinction, but to the perfect and intensest blessedness in God, in the confidence that blessedness is positive, personal, and eternal, because life is

love, and love is the cause of all things. The Christian consciousness, therefore, has complete confidence in the trustworthiness of all faculties, in the reality and worth, though with different grades of value, of all the interests of life. It has learned how to harmonize the ideal and pursuit of holiness with the sympathetic recognition of all natural powers and activities. It unifies and orders all these under the one regulative and inspiring principle of love to God and to man. Attainment to this religion is brought about by a complete union and interpenetration of revelation, redemption, and satisfaction, representing the threefold effect of Christ upon the consciousness of the believer.

Thus Christianity as a living experience presents the perfect synthesis of all the elements and aspirations which have been manifested in various forms and degrees throughout all the other religions of the world. It attains this result by means of four great principles. Firstly, the assumption of the supreme significance of personality. Secondly, the explanation of the world as due to the self-giving of a supreme and infinite personality. Thirdly, the conception of the method of that personality as being the setting up of finite centres of independent existence within the system of the world, in order to the development of mutually related personalities, receiving from and responding to the divine. Fourthly, the recognition of the underlying unity of the whole as a system included in and controlled by God; as being, therefore, immanently conditioned by the divine character, pursuing in and through all things a spiritual and eternal world-end. Such a religious experience gives, as nothing else can, a sufficient inspiration to life as an organized and evolving whole; can explain and order those aspirations of man which, while they have arisen out of his contact with the universe around, become so entirely out of touch with and superior to that universe as naturalistically conceived.

II. Hence, in the second place, power and satisfaction are the marks of this experience as everywhere described by its possessors. It is a creation and satisfaction of life, giving to it, in the words of the Fourth Gospel, 'abundance.' And this

power and satisfaction are bestowed on condition of realizing the true relationship to God ; are in proportion to the fullness and vigour of the consciousness by which that true relationship is apprehended. Thus, knowledge, illumination, divine wisdom, describe the sense of insight into reality which this consciousness produces. 'Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things,' says St. John.¹ Reconciliation, as the finding of true life in free and complete self-surrender to the ends of God, represents the bearing of the Christian consciousness upon the personality and will. Adjustment to life in spiritual mastery of its conditions, this is the relationship to the world which is described in St. Paul's term 'heirship'; including power to face all emergencies, the discipline and enrichment of character even through evils, which in this respect are recognized as being good. Above all, the ever-growing power and vision of hope is wrought out through the whole of life as a spiritual preparation, carrying its possessors forward with growing energy towards the full attainment of an infinite good. The satisfaction given is above and beyond the limiting conditions of finite life, yet it gives power for all the purposes of that life. Thus by means of the filial consciousness which is its most distinctive characteristic, it combines in perfect harmony the two ordinarily contrasted aspects of religion ; the one which finds in it the present satisfaction arising from union with an infinite and eternal good, the other which finds in it a call to pursue a far-distant spiritual goal.

Such is the characteristic consciousness of Christians. It rings out for the first time in its fullness under the very shadow of the cross, when the deserted Christ declares, 'Yet I am not alone, the Father is with Me.' It utters its triumphant anthem by St. Paul when he cries, 'All are yours ; and ye are Christ's ; and Christ is God's.' It expresses its absolute confidence and its infinite expectation in the language of St. John : 'Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God : and such we are. . . . Beloved, now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we

¹ 1 John v. 20.

shall be. We know that, if He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him ; for we shall see Him even as He is.'

III. This experience of sonship, with its attendant satisfaction and power, is direct and immediate in Christ, but it is mediated through Him for all others.

This is the universal testimony of the New Testament, and of all typical Christian experience ever since. Historically, men have come to apprehend the revelation of the Father, to enter into the conscious life of sonship, to receive the 'Spirit of adoption' only in and through their relationship to Christ by faith. This historical fact in itself gives to the Person of Christ a significance which does not belong to any other religious founder.

The only cases of personal influence in the foundation of religion which can for a moment be brought into comparison with Christ are those of Mohammed and of the Buddha. Yet Mohammed only claims to be a prophet, who has been divinely commissioned to proclaim and to enforce the supremely important dogma of the unity of God. He stands in no inner and vital relation to the truth which he proclaims and enforces. So again with the Buddha. The position as the object of popular worship into which he has been advanced by no means corresponds with that which he claimed for himself or which intrinsically belongs to him. This is made clear by the report which has been preserved to us of a remarkable discourse which he held with Ānanda, his beloved disciple. 'Therefore,' he says, 'O Ānanda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as a lamp. Hold fast to the truth as a refuge. Look not for refuge to any one besides yourselves. And how, Ānanda, is a brother to be a lamp unto himself, a refuge to himself, betaking himself to no external refuge, holding fast to the truth as a lamp, holding fast as a refuge to the truth, looking not for refuge to any one besides himself? . . .

'And whosoever, Ānanda, either now or after I am dead, shall be a lamp unto themselves, and a refuge unto themselves, shall betake themselves to no external refuge, but holding fast to the truth as their lamp, and holding fast as

their refuge to the truth, shall look not for refuge to any one besides themselves—it is they, Ānanda, among the Bhikkhus (the members of my society), who shall reach the very topmost height—but they must be willing to learn.’¹

Such a description of the way of salvation, it is obvious, is in the sharpest contrast with that which is presented both in the teaching of our Lord and in the experience and teaching of His apostles and of His followers. So complete is the revelation of God in Him, so full the self-bestowment of God through Him, so supreme is His personal importance as the realized end and the permanent vehicle of the Spirit, that He is seen by His followers to be the very principle of self-giving in God; the Son who eternally realizes the fellowship of love in the Godhead. He goes forth eternally from the Godhead into outer manifestation, and returns in the perfect fellowship of kindred life. In Him, therefore, the possibility, the nature, and the spiritual end of creation are all explained. In this relationship to God and to the universe is seen to be involved the possibility, the nature, and perhaps the necessity of the Incarnation. The abstract opposition between creator and creature, between spirit and flesh, between God, man, and the world, is overcome; transcended in Him whose manifestation reveals their essential union in the all-comprehending whole of the divine. Thus the Son, who is the bearer of the truth and grace of the Father, is seen to be the eternal ground both of humanity and of the universe, giving spiritual meaning and consistency to the whole. He is the representation and assurance of ideal unity between God and man, while, on the other hand, He is the perfect creaturely response made in and through the Godhead Himself to God. Christ, as the spiritual consummation of the human race, and as giving in and through that consummation the final revelation of God, stands for all this in the Christian interpretation of the world. He is for Christianity no accidental historical personage. His deification in the worship of His Church by no means consists in His being gradually invested with miraculous powers and super-human dignity, as the result of such myth-making processes

¹ Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lecture*, pp. 182, 183.

as have gone on elsewhere. Superficial resemblances there may be, but they are only superficial. The divinity of Christ, together with the consequent doctrine of His relation alike to God, to man, and to the world, is an essential part of the whole revelation of God and of His relation to man which is contained within the life, teaching, work, and influence of Christ. The revelation of God as eternal love, of the principle of His life as self-giving, of the world as not an external result of His activity, but as receiving its measure of independent existence in order that it may return to the purposes and fellowship of God, this is the essential revelation of Christianity, and it is bound up with the doctrine of the Triune nature of the Godhead and of the Incarnation of the Son in Jesus Christ.

IV. But if this realization of the perfect religion is mediated for mankind by the Person and work of Christ, that mediation consists not merely of revelation and of self-impartation, but also of reconciliation and redemption. The work of Christ in the first place brings home to the full the consciousness of sin. Wherever religious life of any kind is found, there is present the consciousness of evil, not merely as the accidental lot of man, but as ethically caused and explained. The beginnings of the sense of sin—as transgression, as failure, and as ruin—are, as has been seen, everywhere present, though the form is affected by the main principles of each particular religion, and though there are many degrees between the optimism of some religions and the almost unrelieved pessimism of others. Just as, however, the Christian consciousness of God transcends all other religions in its spirituality and comprehensiveness, so it determines a corresponding completeness and intensity in the experience and doctrine of sin. Indeed, it is only in the light of the perfect revelation of God and through the growing experience of His grace that either the meaning or the gravity of sin can be adequately realized. It is only as spiritual influences occasion an inward return to God that the misery and guilt of alienation from Him can be really felt. The consciousness of sin, therefore, so far from affirming a final separation from God, witnesses to the beginning of a real return to Him. It

reveals an underlying oneness which brings home the misery of apartness. The sense of sin brought home in proportion to the consciousness of God cannot be explained away. The only means of setting aside its testimony is to destroy by a far-reaching scepticism the trustworthiness of human consciousness as a whole. However possible it may be to treat man theoretically as an automaton, the theory cannot possibly be applied in practice. And only on the ground of its impracticable hypothesis can the reality of the consciousness of sin, which is given in and through all consciousness of God, be explained away.

As, therefore, the reality of sin is brought home by the revelation of God in Christ, so the meaning of sin is made clear. It is the contradiction to the law and spirit of the filial, which with all its marks is revealed in Christ as being the true principle of life. Hence, as has been said, the conveyance through Christ of the consciousness of sonship to His followers is by means of reconciliation and redemption. Men are brought to realize the new relationship by apprehending the divine forgiveness on the one hand, and by making an act of acceptance and self-surrender on the other. And this reconciliation comes to them through the atonement of Christ and the regeneration of His Spirit.

The apprehension and the doctrine of the Atonement of Christ are the result of five associated causes. In the first place, they are due to the sense of that representative relationship of Christ to God and to man in union which is set forth by the Incarnation. In the second place, to the consciousness of sin as being in itself the contradiction of and the bar to complete union between God and man, and as attended by those infinite consequences which result from the violation of the supreme spiritual and moral order of the universe. Thirdly, to the actual experience enjoyed by the disciples of Christ of a return to God, and of emancipation from the condemnation and power of sin, as brought about by the personal influence of Christ the Son of God. Fourthly, to the completion of the experience of return and emancipation by means of the death of Christ. Hence to this completed experience of salvation His death is seen to be not accidental,

but essential. Fifthly, to the interpretation of the death of Christ by means of those sacrificial and sacramental analogies which, present in all religions, had been developed with peculiar fullness of spiritual and moral meaning in the religious life of the Hebrew race. For the student of religion these analogies cannot be dismissed as idle superstitions, but must be treated as embodying spiritual truths and principles in equal degree with any of the other characteristic deliverances of the human consciousness. In Hebrew religion the process can be marked by which the essential meaning of these analogies is disentangled from that which is external and eventually degrading until the doctrine, or rather the fact, of the Atonement is presented to us with the wealth of spiritual meaning which is found in Isaiah liii. There the efficacy of vicarious suffering is based upon the spiritual qualities which are manifest in it, and upon that relation of spiritual solidarity between the suffering prophet and those whose sins he bears which cannot be set aside even though they be persecutors and he their victim. Hence a perfected doctrine of the Atonement was prepared as the last product of the spiritual training and discipline which made the people of Israel, and especially their representative, prophets the martyr witnesses of God to the human race. By means of that doctrine Christ Himself interpreted the purpose and meaning of His death. Experience of liberation through the death of Christ joined with the inheritance of this great spiritual result to create the doctrine of Atonement by which expression was given to the way in which men reached, through Christ, reconciliation with God, and by which the death of Christ was explained in its essential relation to that result.

V. Growing out of the influence of the Person of Christ and of His work is, finally, regeneration through the Spirit. While this is experienced as a direct act of God, yet the awakening of the filial spirit takes place by means of processes which have a clear psychological explanation. The truth and grace of the new relationship to God offered in Christ are for the first time realized, and therefore become dominant over thought, affection, and desire. The faith of a final cosmic transformation springs out of the experience of regeneration,

with the evidence of divine grace and of the world-ordering supremacy of spirit which it brings.

VI. Thus, through this experience of Christ is the consciousness of the new and all-comprehending relationship of sonship to God realized. In it is contained the material of that abstract doctrine of God as the Father which sets forth the intuition and experience that He is love, life, wisdom, power, the quickening Spirit, who manifests His glory in the ever fuller bestowment of His own life to a universe which is ordered that it may receive and reflect His fullness in attaining the ends of His righteousness and love.

But Christianity, while in a peculiar sense a new religion, stands connected with Hebrew religion in a way that is unique in the history of religion. Superficially, it is in contrast to Hebrew religion, at least in its later development as Judaism, and supersedes it; but on looking below the surface, it will be seen to supersede only because it fulfils. At first sight it is the contrast that is most remarkable. Judaism has a highly developed ritual, and its authoritative scriptures were interpreted and hedged about by traditions of the scribes and elders; whereas Christianity, in the simplicity of its early spirit, represents a spiritual reaction against these external and limiting influences. Judaism is a national religion, emphasizing at every point the peculiar privileges of the people of God; whereas Christianity is catholic and missionary. Judaism emphasizes the sovereignty of God, and His sovereignty as so conceived stands in the closest relationship both to the ceremonialism and to the nationalism of the religion; whereas Christianity emphasizes the Fatherhood of God, and this emphasis is intimately related both to its spirituality and its universalism.

Yet when we look below the surface the contrast is transcended; Christianity appears as the religion of fulfilment, Hebrew religion as the religion of preparation. Whatever may be said of Old Testament religion as elaborated by the priest, its highest and most distinctive mark is found, not in the work of the priest, but in the influence of the prophet. At every highest point of its teaching, one or other—in some respects all—of the prophets anticipate the New Testament.

Yet the peculiarity of their consciousness is that they feel that they are anticipating, that their vision of the truth is a vision of something which is not to be fully realized in human consciousness and experience till 'the latter days.' Hence the constant formula, 'It shall come to pass in that day,' or 'in those days.' In no respect is this mark of anticipation more remarkable than in the foreshadowing of complete catholicity which is found in the noblest teaching of the Old Testament; for example, in Isaiah's prophecy that Egypt, Assyria, and Israel shall eventually come into an equal fellowship with Jehovah.¹ Even when this vision is not vouchsafed the prophets discern a divine intention to bring a measure of blessing to all the world through the redemption and exaltation of Israel. Again, if the doctrine of the divine sovereignty be studied throughout the whole course of its development in Israel, it will be seen to represent an aspect of Fatherhood particularly congenial to the Hebrew mind, and to tend ever more definitely—as, for example, in Isaiah xl.-lxvi., and in the later Psalms—towards a fatherly relationship, embracing alike the nation and the faithful individual.

Thus Old Testament religion represents a unique attainment in religion, which is essentially a foreshadowing. It ends, as to every one of its interests, in a conscious foretelling of events that are outwardly to realize spiritual truths and influences already revealed and at work, but which have not yet received such complete expression as to bring them universal recognition and fulfilment.

Thus the relation of Old Testament prophetism, with its essential characteristic of anticipation, to New Testament fulfilment and transformation, forms a connexion absolutely unique in the history of religion. So dominant is the fact of this connexion that even the priestly ritual is involved in it, and lends itself to spiritualization in terms of fuller experience. Witness in this respect the transference of the doctrine of atoning sacrifice from the offerings of the temple to the person of the Servant of Jehovah in Isaiah liii., which prepares the way for the New Testament doctrine of the Atonement of Christ.

¹ Isa. xix. 24, 25.

This religion of anticipation is recognized to be the result of revelation, exhibits a unique process of advance by selection under the influence of that revelation, and expresses in its doctrine of God and of His relation to the world exactly this fact of a progressive revelation of God in the attainment of a world-purpose by means and for the sake of character and conduct spiritually conditioned.

(1) In the first place, Hebrew religion, like Christianity, is the religion of revelation. As has been seen in the review of non-Christian religions, the idea and experience of revelation is everywhere present, though varying greatly in form and adequacy. It is universal and most highly developed in the Old Testament; but in no respect is the superiority of the Old Testament more clearly marked than in this, that the experience of revelation and inspiration is accompanied by the lifting of its recipient into the highest and noblest activity of all his powers, so that there is complete unity between divine revelation and spiritual intuition. When the prophet sees with his own truest insight, and proclaims with the largest and most courageous manliness, he is conscious of seeing and uttering what he is receiving in fellowship with his God. Thus, there is the remarkable combination of spiritual uplifting with mental and moral stability, sanity, and practical sagacity and power. Alike in the content and in the consciousness of revelation there is a unique continuity between Judaism and Christianity. And the continuity is due to the consistency of a spiritual evolution.

(2) Secondly, the advance which takes place throughout the history of Old Testament religion is advance by selection. Old Testament religion can only be understood under its predominant conception of revelation, but that revelation goes to work by a sustained process of distinguishing, rejecting, antagonizing, and eventually suppressing, elements which are discovered to be alien from its true spirit. The spirit of the nation touches in the course of its history practically every tendency which the review of other religions has shown to be embodied here or there, and found wanting in final truth and serviceableness for mankind. Only one field is unexplored, namely, that rejection of the worth of conscious

life and of its objects which characterizes Brahmanism and Buddhism. Even that standpoint was approached by the author of Ecclesiastes. It will probably be for ever a matter of controversy how far the various alternatives were presented to the people *in* the unfolding religion of Jahvism, and how far they were presented *to* it. But whichever way the matter may be decided, each alternative was so presented to the race during its spiritual development as to try the spirit, become the source of a temptation, and thus call forth the inner power of the religion in attaining to the consciousness of its true meaning. There may possibly be traces of totem-worship in the Old Testament. There are certainly signs of Animism, Nature-worship in all its forms, and with that tendency to the sensual which marked the neighbouring nations, was a constant danger, at least till the time of the Babylonian captivity. Barbaric features were again and again present, even in the worship of Jehovah as generally practised. But all these were gradually criticized, condemned, and expelled.

And this process of selection was carried out under the twofold influence of truth and holiness. A growing aspiration after the attainment of truth, not merely of abstract statement but of corresponding relationship, and of holiness, as the supreme end of human endeavour and the supreme attribute of the divine character—these were the two influences under which the religion was developed. And the pressure which applied these two principles was found in the character of Jehovah Himself. He was conceived first as the jealous God, appropriating His people to an exclusive allegiance to Himself, which involved at once outward separation from fellowship with other nations, and, above all, from adulterous pollution with their worship. But eventually the conception of the jealous God was transformed and transcended by that of the Holy One of Israel, and ultimately even this latter conception was transfigured by such a realization of the graciousness of His holiness as is presented in Isaiah xl.-lxvi.

Under these influences Old Testament religion came to negate all forms of heathen religion by its positive content. It negated Polytheism in all its forms, by its realization of the unity of God; Dualism, by realizing His absolute

sovereignty. It set aside mere finite and external conceptions of Him as it came to recognize more fully His infinity. It rose above nature-worship as it discerned His spirituality; above the immoral or the non-moral in religion, as it came to understand the meaning of His holiness. It set aside the very possibility of a conception of blessedness which mutilates manhood and turns its back on normal development by its emphasis on personality, and on personality as conditioned by and expressed in the social relationships of life.

Hence, positively, Old Testament religion reached its doctrine of God as One, supreme and infinite. But His infinity is above all that of spiritual and moral perfection. All other attributes of God are perfect in and for this highest perfection, and in the service of its righteous ends. Hence the primary manifestation of God is spiritual and ethical. The putting forth of His power in nature is in and for the sake of securing spiritual and ethical ends. The Old Testament contains, therefore, an implicit philosophy of the relation of the spiritual to the natural, though its emphasis on activity, purpose, and personality keeps this relationship from being reflectively wrought out. God is for it predominantly, though by means exclusively, transcendent personality rather than immanent Spirit and life. Even in this respect, however, the religion from time to time becomes anticipatory of that final doctrine of God in Christianity, which knows how to interpret the transcendence of His personality in such wise that it carries with it the immanence of His Spirit and life.

(3) With this view of God, Hebrew religion sets forth a doctrine of His relationship to the world which reveals the efficient cause of this progressive revelation as consisting in the gradual attainment of a world-purpose by means of character and conduct spiritually conditioned. Emphasis is everywhere laid in the Old Testament on personality and character. Therefore the main stress is laid on holy purpose on the part of God and on holy conduct on the part of man. Religion is, above all, historic. History reveals and illustrates the nature and the mind of God—not as the object of abstract ideas, or even of mystic contemplation—but as the subject of righteous purposes progressively wrought out in the exercise

of a sovereignty both supreme and universal. The living God is revealed in action, creating, choosing, maintaining, and using a peculiar people, that they may enter into conscious and active fellowship with Himself, in pursuance of His spiritual purposes for mankind and for the world. The Hebrew race is moulded as the divine instrument of this world-end through the combined influence of the grace which elects it, of the wisdom which trains it, of the power which redeems it, and of the righteousness which disciplines and corrects it. By these influences, as apprehended by faith, it becomes in growing measure a conscious participator in the divine purposes; receiving the revelation, attaining to the character and obedience, which render such participation possible.

The whole process is governed by the determining factor of the Covenant into which Jehovah has entered with His people; free and gracious on His part, involving on theirs the duty of joyful response, of unswerving loyalty, and of complete obedience. This conception of the Covenant snaps the nature-tie, that it may emphasize the spiritual conditions, both on the divine and human side, upon which so ethical a relationship rests. The whole is not an abstract theory, but a description of the inner consciousness which accompanies an obvious position in the history of the world. To this day it is impossible for any one who ascribes supreme worth to religion in itself and as a factor in human development, to say other than that God chose this people, as He chose no other, for the realization of the highest religious life, and for the reception of the theological truths which underlie and are expressed in such a religion.

Thus at every step of the development, revelation and history, insight and experience, co-operate to bring about fuller realization of the character of God seen as active personality, realizing spiritual purposes in the sight of, on behalf of, and in His people, by means of His all-controlling power. By these means spiritual conditions are created, which, as has already been seen, anticipate, but cannot realize, their own full and complete consummation.

The theological revelation answers exactly to the religious

experience and to the historic position. A religion of steadily progressive, yet incomplete, experience and influence is seen to be the outcome of an eternal yet gradually unfolding divine purpose. Unless the experience growing through the ages be meaningless, the interpretation is not only natural but necessary. Hebrew religion, reduced to an abstract creed or a tribal bond, represents but the dry bones where once was a living spirit. Of that living spirit this was the characteristic, that it knew itself to be the continuous response to a divine overture which invited and even summoned this people to be the instruments of a purpose, as yet only partially revealed to them, and still more partially fulfilled; but which in the end was to unfold its full meaning and attain its world-influence together.

No doubt Hebrew religion is deficient in a sense of complete satisfaction, has imperfect grasp of the divine immanence, retains to the end marks of tribal limitation. Its synthesis of the world and man in God is incomplete, nor does it fully attain to the depth, breadth, and permanence of a complete reconciliation with God. Yet it is exactly this combination of performance with incompleteness, as expressed in the prophetic temper, which is essential to the religion. It is the existence of this prophetic temper, so vital and meaning so much more than mere isolated predictions of events and persons, though embracing both, which is so arresting a phenomenon to those who look upon the universe and upon religion from the point of view of evolution. What is presented here is not merely the fact of the most striking religious evolution, but, accompanying it, the distinctive and ever-present consciousness given to this people that its heart and its history are the centre in which this evolution is taking place. In this case the instruments are not blind and unconscious, but throughout the process have a unique vision of the end from the beginning. The fulfilment, now dimly and now more clearly descried, is supplied in Christianity, which assumes all the results of Hebrew religion, fulfils and transcends them. The whole constitutes a process of vital evolution in the highest and deepest realms of life, which, while manifesting a clear resemblance to evolutionary processes elsewhere, gives to

this history a central position and a revelation of purposiveness which are unique.

And just where this unique centrality and purposiveness are found, there the subjects of this great process become, at least in their typical representatives, conscious alike of the fact and of its interpretation. The nearer we go to the heart of the matter, the more wonderful the fact of prophetism becomes, seen as summing up the spiritual life of Israel, as anticipating and fulfilled in Christianity, and as bringing into the full consciousness of spiritual purpose an unfolding which resembles, yet surpasses, that which is universal in all other fields of life and being. Thus in the distinctive consciousness of Hebrew religion the means of connexion is found between Christianity as the absolute religion and the religious development of the race. Hebrew religion finds its fulfilment in Christianity, while by means of its processes of spiritual selection it stands in organic relation to every type of religion which it rejects.

But Christianity stands in relation, not only to the past, but also to the future. It is, above all, a missionary religion, because of its inherent sense of finality and catholicity. It proceeded in the early ages of its history to win and to dominate the then known world; though in dominating it, it was compelled largely to adapt itself to the world which it overcame. At the present time a new world has been opened to it, and its representatives are only slowly awaking either to the responsibilities which that fact entails, or to an interpretation of Christianity which is profound enough to meet the new spiritual facts which are being disclosed. Those who live in the generations immediately to come will witness events in the unfolding of catholic religion at least as remarkable as those which attended the spread of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire. Outsiders will stand and watch the event. For those who are not outsiders the clue to the future is to be found, not merely in external words of holy Scripture, but in the fact that exactly that same sense of immanent universality which was vouchsafed both to the prophets and to the apostles is equally active and prevalent to-day. The conception of the way in which the final result

is to be brought about cannot be more imperfect in some respects than was that of the Hebrew prophet. Yet the significance of the fact and the preparation for the task is not to be found in the power to realize by an adequate imagination what is involved in attaining the result. This will be made growingly clear by actual experience. What is significant from the standpoint of the evolution of religion is this, that in a period bewildered by the complexity of modern life, overwhelmed by the mass of new knowledge in every department of life, and realizing the demand for a far-reaching readjustment of thought, the sense of immanent catholicity, the determination to realize it, and the power to conform the conception and statement of Christianity to its enlarged task, remains unaltered. In short, the immanent prophetism of Christianity remains in the twentieth century what it was in the first. Hitherto, these prophetic indications have not failed to reveal the purposes of God, the results of evolution. Doubtless the missionary efforts of Christianity have involved, as has been said, an adaptation to the varying conditions of thought and life, which, though they have in some respects revealed the power of Christianity, have in others proved its danger. The whole development of historic Christianity, while the most moving of spectacles, rouses at once wonder in presence of the unfolding of new forms and applications of the Christian idea, and disappointment because of the limitations, the perversions, and the corruptions which have attended the process. Admixture with alien elements, inadequate realization of its own permanent content, the changing selection and consequent exaggeration of special principles involved in it, have all played their part here or there, now or then, in the history of Christianity. It is a mistake, however, to concentrate the mind entirely either upon the naturalness of the result or upon the contradiction of principles here or there involved. Perhaps there has been no embodiment of Christianity so unworthy as not to contain within itself a witness to some indispensable element of Christian truth or principle of Christian life. A large philosophy will fasten upon that which is positive in each one of these, and seek to correct by its means that which is negative or even corrupt.

In illustration of this position it may be permitted to the author to quote from what he has written elsewhere on the Fatherhood of God. 'The truth of the matter is, that the types of spiritual apprehension which have characterized stages of religious history or sections of the Christian community, do specially realize some real aspects of the Fatherhood of God, and do respond to them, although such apprehension and response in various degrees fall short of the breadth and length and depth and height, and therefore, by reason of incompleteness, tend to one-sided exaggerations. The one-sided limitations of men mean more than a defect which leaves all else unaffected. They involve the positive development into a specialized and peculiar individuality of that which is present and active. Such characteristic peculiarities of temperament, accentuated by historic epoch and spiritual environment, mean a special sensitization in some directions, and the lack of it in others. They involve, therefore, a peculiar power to apprehend and to respond to certain aspects included in the Fatherhood of God, and the inability to apprehend and respond to certain others equally present in the complete reality.

'But it is not sufficient to point out that human defects involve a positive and distinctive determination of human character and of its spiritual apprehension, and that that distinctive peculiarity makes men sensitive to particular aspects of the divine Fatherhood.' It must further be urged that God ordains that it should be so, and that His own manifestation of Himself is determined in order to satisfy the particular spiritual condition of those to whom it is made, in order to enable them to fill their place and discharge their office in the gradual evolution of the world's life. And it must further be admitted that general advance may, at least sometimes, only be purchased by particular retrogressions. This is involved in the vital process of the world, and the revelation of God to and in men conforms itself to this fact. The defects, for example, in Augustine's theology, from the standpoint of a complete rendering into thought and life of the truth, as truth is in Jesus, were the conditions under which alone could a living and effective message from

God go forth to Roman and mediaeval life, taking into account their inherent and inevitable imperfections. And substantially the doctrine set forth—despite exaggeration and shortcoming—does declare something which is permanently true of the divine Fatherhood and vitally part of it.

‘The same explanation holds good in the classic example of Puritanism, with its one-sided insistence on the sovereignty of God, accompanied by a virility of purpose and action which wrought out our modern liberties.

‘And what is true of stages in the world’s development is equally true of survivals and reactions. In the case of true and faithful men, limited by their own individuality, and not sinning against light, these represent a fatherly accommodation on the part of God in manifesting to men such aspects of His Fatherhood as they are capable of apprehending and responding to.’¹

Sufficient has been said of the relations of Christianity to other religions. The results of the discussion may be summed up as follows:—

1. Christianity consummates the central evolution of religion.

2. In doing so it raises religion itself to a higher plane.

3. It effects this by means of the consciousness of a filial relationship to God, which unifies alike in thought and conduct all the elements and interests of life in an organic whole.

4. While supplying standards of criticism, by which all other religions may be tried, it finds room in itself for that which is most deeply spiritual and most broadly human in each.

5. It inspires by an inner prophetic consciousness a continuous spiritual advance; this advance being secured in part by living criticism, in the light of its original, of occasional departures from its intrinsic meaning and end.

6. It touches and satisfies with a sense of divinity and infinity, unknown elsewhere, all the highest and noblest emotions, desires, purposes, and principles of life.

¹ *The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life*, p p. 324–6.

This is to say, that Christianity, judged from the standpoint of evolution, is the fittest to survive, the only religion which contains the possibility of becoming universal, and which exhibits its distinctive marks, not in bare contradiction of all other religions, but because it includes in a perfect whole all which is capable of becoming universal and permanent in each.

BOOK III

THE PROOF OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

CHAPTER I

THE PRIMARY VERIFICATION OF CHRISTIANITY

CHRISTIANITY, according to the view which has been taken in these pages, is above all a specific consciousness of certain relations to God, and of the means by which those relations are realized. It is propagated by tradition, involving both instruction and preaching; but so long as it remains merely, or even primarily, a theoretic creed, it does not in the true sense exist. It is as an experience, a temper and attitude of the spirit, that Christianity becomes real in any particular case; and it is by the reception of that experience, and by its effect in completing, unifying, explaining, and inspiring life, that it has its verification for those who accept it. The question of its proof becomes, therefore, the discovery of the immanent grounds of this subjective verification in each particular case, and of the extent to which and the way in which these grounds have universal validity.

It is important at the outset thoroughly to apprehend that Christianity is thus experimental, and to understand the relation of the Christian experience to the sum-total of the experience of conscious life. The New Testament everywhere takes the experimental view of that wherein Christianity consists. It is treated variously as a revelation to the spiritual faculties, as an illumination of those faculties, as a consequent intuition; as a birth into a higher world, which alone has reality, calls forth and satisfies the highest capacities of the spiritual nature. This experience, however, which appeals to and quickens the highest spiritual faculties, comes to take a working place, nay, the highest place, in the practical consciousness of life, and is developed to its

maturity by the manifold activities of ordinary life in the world. It is therefore represented as an uplifting of human nature to a higher level, and as an enlargement of its powers and aims; but as an uplifting and enlargement which is yet a fulfilment of all that human nature implicitly is. Thus the essential conception of Christianity is not that it is an alternative to the natural life, still less an artificial departure from it or opposition to it. It includes the natural life in all its normal interests, and is indeed so immanent in the whole of it, that entirely to destroy the Christian content implicit in all human life is to destroy the very possibility of natural life itself. The claim of the Christian consciousness is that whatever gives positive content to life in all its ranges is an essential part of it; that attempted escape from its essential principles and attitude involves self-mutilation and eventually self-destruction. The sense of wholeness is therefore characteristic of the Christian consciousness, wherever it is completely realized.

The man who receives it in its fullness is conscious of being brought to the wholeness of his manhood, to the satisfaction of his whole need, and to a complete interpretation of the whole of life. Wherever any true and positive principle, whether of thought or of practice, is found, he recognizes something which is inherent in the Christian consciousness. Broken off from that consciousness it becomes to him an abstraction; true, it may be, in itself, but needing for its full understanding to be seen as part of the all-embracing whole. As detached from that whole and made abstract, any such principle lends itself to exaggeration, tending to a distorted view of the nature of reality, and to the negation of some other principle, which may be at least equally real and important. The Christian consciousness, therefore, seeks to make explicit that which completes the content, meets the need, and promotes the harmonious fullness of human life.

The first and most vital questions are, what is the content of the Christian consciousness, whether it really is thus comprehensive, and how it works. The question of origin is secondary. Consciousness in general must be

treated in the first place as an entity, and not as a result. The main question about it should be as to what is contained in it. From this standpoint the Christian consciousness has a primary claim to be considered equally trustworthy as any other kind of consciousness. It has appeared in the highest sense natural to those who receive it, has been steadily persistent and mightily effective in human history; especially in its influence upon the character which lies at the back of actions. It is bound up with and becomes part of the whole activity by which its predecessors play their part in the world. At the lowest, it is the most remarkable result of the action of the universe on man and of man's reaction upon the universe. The fact that it has only gradually grown to its present position in no way discredits it in a world to which evolution is the key, especially if it can be shown that it is the complete development of potentialities implicit in all healthy human life. Its power of world-wide advance affords a presumption that this is the case. If it can be shown that it does indeed include, harmonize, and explain all the interests of such healthy and normal life, then its claim to general trustworthiness will take rank with that of the general trustworthiness of human consciousness as a whole; neither more nor less. Particular scepticism as to that which is essential in the Christian spirit will then be bound up with general scepticism as to the trustworthiness of human consciousness as a whole. Such general scepticism cannot, of course, be thorough-going. All scepticism has a subjective way of choosing some arbitrary standpoint of trustworthiness and of faith. The ordinary life of perception, that of practical interests, and that of scientific pursuits, all have their special standpoints in this regard. The critical question is how far the special standpoint of any one or of all these covers the whole ground or supplies a complete standard of reasonable certitude.

Our review of the relation of the Christian consciousness to other religions has demonstrated its serviceableness. How can the advance be made from its serviceableness to its truth? Four conditions must be fulfilled. First, it must be shown to be indispensable to the full realization of human life, to be

the end which so completely unfolds the immanent idea of the whole as to be its only explanation.

Secondly, as for this reason completing all other elements of human life, which implicitly assume it.

Thirdly, as offering the only complete and consistent explanation of the universe, and containing principles for the explanation of every part.

Fourthly, as able to look apparent contradictions in the face, either explaining them away or subordinating them.

The present chapter will deal with the first two of these conditions, and touch upon the third. The complete treatment of the third and fourth must be reserved for a later stage of the discussion.¹

I. The primary argument in support of Christianity is that it is true because it is indispensable to the full realization of the noblest human life. It is necessary to commence with some consideration of the formal nature and meaning of this argument. It may be premised that three things are involved in the general form of it. First of all, that that which is distinctive of the Christian consciousness—the filial relationship to God in Christ—is essential to the complete satisfaction of what man essentially is, and therefore seeks to become. Secondly, that because of this, Christianity alone gives rationality to the world, when man with all his characteristic aims and activities is included. Thirdly, that that which alone gives satisfaction to the highest aspirations of man, and rationality to the world in which man is included, is thereby evidenced as real.

1. Thus, the proof of the truth of Christianity, as it claims to be a revelation of divine truth to the spiritual faculties of man, manifested in and through religious experience, turns upon the nature of what have been of late termed ‘judgements of value,’ and their worth as evidence of reality. The term ‘judgements of value’ has been adopted from Lotze by the Ritschlian school of theology, and has now acquired currency in general theological thought. Broadly speaking, by a religious judgement of value is meant that some belief—whether it be a conception of the reality underlying spiritual

¹ See Book III., chaps. iii. and iv.

experience and manifest in it, or a standard or principle of action—is essential to the well-being and complete satisfaction of human nature; in short, that life, as man is constrained to seek to realize it, is not completely possible unless such conceptions and principles are assumed to be real.

In form, the insistence of Ritschl and his school upon the importance of such judgements of value in the proof of the Christian religion is a revolt against the primacy and sufficiency of all purely intellectual explanation of the nature and meaning of the universe. The form of the argument depends upon the contention that man is not merely or even primarily intellectual, but that the explanation of his nature is to be found in his will, in the immanent necessity that he should realize the meaning and possibilities of his nature by means of action in pursuit of satisfying ends. Ritschl, as has been seen, exaggerated the distinction between the theoretic and the practical faculties in man until they often appear to be in opposition, and as the result of this apparent opposition he drew an absolute contrast between religious explanation and world-explanation, though with considerable vacillation at different stages of his life and in different parts of his writings. What appears essential in the emphasis laid upon 'judgements of value,' as distinguished from what is called theoretic world-explanation, is, that no world-explanation can be satisfactory if the peculiar content of human consciousness as unfolded in the pursuit of satisfying ends, and, above all, of the Christian consciousness as the most remarkable case of this kind, has been left out of account. All world-explanation must fail in completeness which selects mechanic, biologic, or even abstractly ideal principles of explanation to the exclusion of the principles which are furnished in the concrete content of spiritual, above all of Christian, consciousness itself. Man manifests his nature in the fulfilment of relations and in the pursuit of ends. To understand him these relations and ends must be explored and set forth. To select principles of explanation which are found everywhere else, save in that which is distinctive of human consciousness as such, is to leave a great part of the world out of account, and that the most important, if not

because of its intrinsic value, at least, because it is the distinctive mark of the only being who either is competent or desires to inquire as to the meaning of the world. So relative to the inquirer is the world about which he inquires that he finds all the principles by which he explains it out of his own consciousness as standing in vital relationship to its complex system. All his explanations are essentially anthropomorphic, for he cannot get outside himself to contemplate the bare possibility of a world as it would exist if his real or possible consciousness were left out of account. Therefore all that is presented in consciousness as the result of man's contact with the world must be explored and have due weight given to it in order to any statement which can justly pretend to be a final or complete explanation of reality. To rule out anything which is distinctive of human consciousness and experience, above all, to rule out that which is most distinctive of both, is to prepare a result which falls short of complete rationality just in so far as it fails to represent complete human experience.

Such may, perhaps, be laid down as the legitimate claim of judgements of value as a primary guide to reality, and as entitled to weigh against any supposed explanation that is founded upon principles lower or more partial than those which are supplied by the complete content of spiritual consciousness. The enforcement of judgements of value as a guide to truth should mean, first, that the standards of value and the strivings of the noblest life contain within themselves an inner justification which can be made explicit, and has direct importance as revealing the meaning of the world. Spiritual life, as it has manifested itself in all its nobler forms, whether heroic or saintly, has become apparently independent of, and frequently even opposed to, mere biologic interest. Even if such interest should turn out to be unconsciously served over the whole range of human life by its being ignored or even sacrificed by the hero or saint, at least such men have pursued their life in complete independence and ignorance of such remote biologic considerations. Again, much that has become indispensable to the highest human life as ordinarily lived is the despair of the mere biologic

inquirer, as having no connexion whatever with efficiency in the mere struggle for animal existence. The man who is determined to find the whole explanation of human life in such biologic interests calmly dismisses large portions of the content, whether of noble or of refined human consciousness, as inoperative by-play. Such an attitude reveals a presumption which the scientific inquirer is the first to denounce when it is displayed by those who ignore physical elements of explanation in the supposed interests of religion or theology.

Life as manifested from its faintest beginnings to the highest forms of human consciousness exhibits distinct planes or stages, the highest of which has ideals and pursuits, which are not self-regarding, nor in the physical sense of the word life-regarding. To the man who regards the matter from the biologic standpoint, all such departures are, so far as the universe is concerned, irrational, while as present in the individual they are more or less insane. If this obvious conclusion is to be avoided, it can only be by juggling with facts and confusing phenomena in a way which the plain man feels to be entirely unconvincing. If the attempt to prolong life be the one rational motive, what of the heroic sacrifice of life? To bring this under biologic rule the only course open is to appeal to powers of altruistic imagination and sympathy, which by the very fact that they are thus called in, are shown to be, at least in select cases, mightier and more real than the biologic interests which they overrule. The contention of those who plead for the place of judgements of value in the explanation of the world, is that the principles and acts of the highest living must not be confused, reduced to inferior terms, or treated as unimportant for the discovery of truth, but that they carry an immanent justification in themselves which it is the business of the spiritual inquirer to make explicit, and to insist upon as essential to the explanation of human nature and of the world to which it belongs.

The affections of life demand similar treatment, revealing their spiritual basis and inspiration, and showing their justification. Ritschl opposed the will to the intellect; the kingdom of ends to the world of theoretic ideas. He practically ignored

what is still more vital to human life than either of these, the realm of affections which respond to the spiritual relationships of life. Here the same feature which has manifested itself in human action is again apparent. The more completely the human affections are developed, the more completely do they throw off the merely animal and utilitarian interests in which they had their first manifestation. Born and realized in the lower, they gain with every step of human progress an independence which gives to them a spirituality and infinity of their own. Life varies as relatedness, and the worth of relationships is eventually determined by the wealth of disinterested spiritual affection. The realization of love and of life come together; and in that realization the sense of relatedness within the finite, and that of relatedness to the infinite, act and react upon one another. The fullness of human love tends to expand until it leaves the finite behind, and seeks infinite and eternal satisfaction in the divine. Such religious satisfaction, on the other hand, brings its possessor back again into the finite relationships of human life with a wealth of spiritual and disinterested affection unknown before. The love which has thus found its satisfaction in God is felt to be permanent, and to carry with it the permanence of the life which is capable of such love. The significance of this fact also must be taken into account as one of the most characteristic judgements of value to be found in the life of mankind; essential, therefore, to any complete explanation of the nature of man.

Hence, finally, the enforcement of judgements of value as a guide to reality should mean the drawing out intellectually of the principles involved in spiritual life as it seeks the highest ends, and in love as realizing the full meaning of the relationships into which it enters, and finding its own full meaning in them. Before entering upon the general subject of world-explanation, in short, it is necessary to lay bare the principles contained in human nature in its highest and fullest development. The cogency of such a proof rests upon one initial assumption: the affirmation of the reality and worth of human consciousness in itself, and in its fullest range. It is in this relation that the assertion that the

Christian religion is incapable of proof has whatever force may legitimately be accorded to it. It applies not to the proof of this particular fact or the other connected with the Christian faith as historically revealed, but to the whole attitude of certitude as to the contents of spiritual experience. And in this respect the Christian faith only occupies the same position as that of any other deliverance of human consciousness, except in so far as its principles are more momentous, and its realization not so universal as is the case with the everyday content of ordinary consciousness. The latter fact needs accounting for, but if the difficulty involved in it be removed, then its affirmations come to rank side by side with any other affirmations which depend upon the trustworthiness of human consciousness. Hence it is necessary to seek a careful and comparative exposition of the contents of the Christian experience, and a proof of the catholicity of that experience, not merely in the sense that it is capable of reproduction universally, but also in that its essential features are present in all positive human life, and become manifest in proportion as that life attains the fullness of its immanent end.

To sum up, therefore, the principle involved in the use of judgements of value as a means of arriving at truth is, that that which alone satisfies and justifies the aspirations and affections of the highest human life, unifying, ordering, harmonizing, and inspiring all the ends of life in a complete whole, is thereby evidenced as the revelation in and through human consciousness of underlying reality.

2. If this be so, the contents of such spiritual experience contain the highest evidence of the existence and nature of God. The reason that these judgements of value are indispensable to man is that they have their ground in the eternal source of man's being. In his judgements of value man manifests, so to speak, the structure and ends of his spirit; that which he intuitively realizes as setting forth the meaning, and indispensable to the satisfaction of his personality. When men come to read their own lives in terms of an underlying and immanent purpose, to realize in a growingly spiritual way their dependence, and when under both influences there grows up within them an aspiration after the

spiritual, the infinite, and the eternal as the ground and end of their being, this state of consciousness is at once distinctive of the most highly developed manhood, and gives expression to what has been implicit in religious consciousness from the first. Furthermore, this state of consciousness becomes in the highest degree vital and influential. Only in its light can its possessor understand himself in his relation to the whole of life. Those who either are without the consciousness or doubt the validity of its testimony treat the problem as insoluble. It is contended that this most peculiar and influential testimony of the human spirit, which represents the satisfaction of the most urgent and lasting strivings of mankind, can be interpreted only as containing within itself the revelation of the divine reality in which men 'live and move and have their being.' The fact that such judgements are essential to the full and normal realization of man's personality in all its meaning is evidence that they unfold its inmost secret. Hence, they are the finite manifestations of the infinite source of human nature. The statement that 'man makes the gods in his own image' is true. That he does so is not a reason for considering the result valueless, but the very contrary. It is an assurance that the creation of his spiritual intuition and imagination contains the truth, provided that the presence and influence of the ideal and infinite has due effect, and that the result is in the line of the normal development of human consciousness as evidenced by historic progress. That which is normal is for this purpose determined by its being potentially universal, and in harmony with the complete conditions and needs of human well-being as they are evolved in the actual world. On consideration, it seems absurd to refuse to human personality—its faculties, aspirations, and relationships—a predominant share in the unfolding of divine reality. Yet that share cannot be accorded to it, when it, the highest and most distinctive reality in the world, is reduced to the lower terms of inferior existence by the elimination of that which is peculiar to itself.

To accord to human nature, as disclosed in the characteristic deliverances of spiritual consciousness, the highest

place in determining the nature of divine reality, is the only rational course, for the following reasons. First of all, because human nature exhibits powers and needs which, upon any supposition, issue from that reality. Secondly, because it contains within itself the only source alike of the need and the power of world-explanation, however limited that explanation may be. Everywhere it imposes its own forms or categories upon the world that is to be explained; except in the structure of human consciousness, there is no means either of the perception or of the explanation of a related world at all. And, thirdly, because human consciousness, occupying this position, has made the characteristic claim to have experienced a divine revelation to which it yields a spiritual response.

Of such essential importance is the content of human consciousness to the explanation of reality, that those who, theoretically, deny its validity, habitually slip into its use. The universal sceptic, for example, affirms the principle of certitude and the worth of human consciousness, at least, in the act of proclaiming and justifying his own scepticism; his faith at least in his own doubt, in the reality of himself as doubter, and in the rationality of his doubt. So again the bare naturalist is constrained to call in from his own consciousness not only the perception of connexion between phenomena, which he investigates, and beyond that the conception of effectiveness and of interaction, based upon his own consciousness of will-power, but also the concept of purpose, modelled upon his own deliberate action in securing ends. The words 'law,' 'selection,' 'agency,' 'end,' are all essential in his vocabulary, and can never be entirely stripped of their association with the purposive activity of man. However often they may be purged by the thought which revolts against anthropomorphism, the residuum to which the scientific inquirer limits himself never becomes free from its subjective source. Fully to realize this fact is to perceive how baseless is the assumption that the way to reach objective reality is to attempt the impossible course of getting clear of that subjectivity which is not only present in all that we say or do, but which, upon any rational

supposition, is equally a part of reality with that which it seeks to explain.

Man is the only creature within our knowledge to whom there is a nature, relative to his consciousness, and presented as a whole, ordered by reason. Man, therefore, cannot be dismissed by his own thought, as being either a by-product, or subordinate in the whole scheme of existence, or as undistinguished from the whole. And man adds to all else that distinguishes him the consciousness that a revelation of God is made to him, in him, and through him. The testimony of religion, which has been seen in our previous inquiry to be natural and necessary, and to advance by ordered growth to its perfection in Christianity, cannot be dismissed from consideration. Man, by the very fact that the whole of nature presents itself to him, is thereby shown to be at once part of nature and above it. He is distinguished from it exactly by the union within himself of the correlatives, self-consciousness and world-consciousness. He affirms, in addition, God-consciousness, as transcending and unifying the other two.

Herein is to be found the *rationale* of revelation. Monism affirms the identity of the whole world, including man and any other higher intelligences, with God. But in the whole, which is thus identified with God, a principle of distinction in unity appears in the fact of self-consciousness, and this principle of distinction cannot be explained away. To say barely that God is the whole of things when self-distinguishing consciousness has been practically negated or thrown into the background, is to unify by ignoring this primary fact in the situation as it is revealed to consciousness. Unity can only be secured and explained on the basis of this primary fact. On this basis it must do justice to three things. Firstly, to the sense of dependence on a kindred and superior, yet immanent source. Secondly, to the presence of a hierarchy of ends in the universe, the higher of which rightfully command the subordination of the lower. Thirdly, to the position given in consciousness that nature, as such, exists for spirit—for the human spirit, and therefore—since the human spirit proceeds from, and has its being

in God—for God as Spirit. Thus the immanence of God is manifest in human consciousness, firstly in the testimony of that consciousness to the fact and nature of its dependence; secondly, in the unfolding of rational principles, which, in proportion as they fulfil the meaning of human nature, are realized to have divine significance; and thirdly, in the consciousness of revelation, breaking down the apartness of man and making him the instrument of God, by unfolding within his consciousness his divine origin, meaning, and purpose.

Hence men carry the idea of God within them in varying degrees of fullness, according to their spiritual development. They naturally use that idea for the purpose of world-explanation, whether as philosophers or as men of common sense. They lose it in whole, or in part, when they make the unnatural attempt to look outside their own consciousness, or that of their fellows, for its full evidences in a world from which they themselves have been subtracted. They thus throw out the consciousness of God from the concept of humanity, and then contend that a miracle is necessary to bring it back. According as they believe or disbelieve in the possibility of that miracle, does the fact of revelation stand or fall with them. Admit the full significance of human personality in the world, and its historic consciousness of personal relations with the Divine, and then revelation becomes in the highest sense natural, being due to that interpenetration of the divine and of the human which is the direct consequence of the spiritual nature of man and of its grounding in a universe which, because man is spiritual, must be ultimately spiritual also.

The recognition of the universal spiritual conditions of revelation is not incompatible with the further recognition of varying degrees in revelation. A measure of truth may be conceded to the deliverances of the religious consciousness even in their lowliest forms without denying the unique glory and significance of Christianity, and of the spiritual preparation which made Christianity possible. Such differences of degree are determined by two factors. In the first place by the method by which the divine purpose is

carried out. The laws of revelation are similar to the laws of evolution elsewhere. However the matter may be explained, different measures of divine self-giving become manifest in different degrees of spiritual enlightenment and fulfilment. In the second place, these differences are accounted for by the measure and nature of the human response. The variations in this respect which are apparent in the higher spiritual history of mankind are again foreshadowed throughout all the lower ranges of life and progress. It is true that in such lower ranges, as might be expected, the peculiar spiritual and moral problems which are present in the case of revelation do not arise. Yet it is possible to find cases where, under the pressure of external influences, animals have so completely altered, and indeed degraded their modes of life, that the change has involved a desertion of the normal faculties with which hitherto they have been equipped until by disuse the very power of those faculties has been lost.¹ It would be a strange thing if such phenomena happened in the lower world, where character is present only in its most rudimentary and non-moral forms, and did not become still more strongly apparent in those higher realms of being where deliberate moral choice has constantly to be made, and where, in addition to all other stress of life, comes the still more searching temptation to be disobedient to a heavenly vision. The difficulty of differences in degree, however striking, between revelation and religion in their lowest and highest forms respectively, is simply an outstanding case of the difficulty of bringing together, in human imagination, the constantly exercised volition of a self-conscious Divine Being with ordered law and method in the world which owes its origin to Him. The further difficulty is involved of the combination of divine sovereignty both transcendent and immanent on the one hand, with the delegation to the creature of that measure of independence which is involved in individuality, whether in its lowest or in its highest forms. The difficulty of combining these various

¹ The mole, with its visual apparatus complete, yet atrophied by disuse, due to a change of habits, which was adopted probably in order to escape its enemies, is a case in point.

elements, however, does not entitle us to negate any one of them.

3. The next position which must be laid down is, that that which is authenticated to man as being true by reason of its being essential to his highest and most rational life, is thereby furnished as the key to the explanation of the world. The supposed opposition between the highest subjective truth for man and the truth in respect to nature, considered as such, does not exist. The cosmos can only be understood as an ordered system relative to, and having its unity in, consciousness. Empirically the world exists for the immediate consciousness of the individual, and for his memory of the various ways in which it has existed for him in direct consciousness throughout his past. Its objectivity is established for him when it is found to exist similarly for the consciousness of his fellow men, and to be the means by which he affects that consciousness. That natural discovery enables him, from the first, to add the results of consciousness in the history of his fellows to its results in his own. And thus the great body of knowledge of the world is built up. In addition, however, to the objectivity of the world, is man's perception, developing with every stage of its progress, of its unity and coherence. This discovery of its unity and coherence is made as man finds alike that the world becomes subservient to his purposes, and, on the other hand, by an equally real experience that it opposes them. It comes, eventually, to represent a consistent whole, now falling into line with what he desires, and again resisting him. Thus nature exhibits phenomena of ordered regularity. As regularity in his own life means will, expressed in law, so man comes to understand it in the case of nature as his mind becomes capable of the conception. Lastly, he perceives that the regularity outside him which prevails over him whenever he attempts to thwart it, is a regularity in pursuit of ends; whether on a cosmic scale, or in the limited forms which have supplied the material for the argument for design in nature. Just as he understood the regularity of nature in the light of his own law-giving, so man only understands the unfolding of ends in nature, either generally or in regard to

special phenomena, in the light of his own purposive activity. Thus, from first to last, nature is relative to man's thought. He knows it only as it is present to consciousness, and as it is interpreted by the forms of his own self-conscious life. To abandon these forms at any point, while it is a confession of his own incapacity, reduces nature also either to a meaningless enigma or to chaos. Moreover, though man learns the coherence of law in nature because, while it generally harmonizes with the fixed conditions of his own life, from time to time it proves too strong for his desires, yet in the larger education of which he is the subject, it is seen, even in the latter case, to be, on the whole, subservient to his interests. Its order, in a sense even its heedlessness of him and its opposition—sometimes effectually barring his way, and at others only yielding to his utmost efforts of will and of wisdom—all are seen in historical retrospect to be a friendly hostility. His higher life has only been developed under the continuous pressure of physical necessity. In addition, the opposition of nature and its unsatisfying materiality have been the means of developing the social instincts and relationships of mankind. They have driven men to find permanent satisfaction in a higher and ideal world, by means of which the world of natural existence has been reshaped, until it has become a more suitable home for the noble and enlarged life which they have come to live. Nature therefore has, by the very fact that it has opposed man, stimulated his social, ideal, and spiritual interests, and evoking these, while strengthening his character in the struggle of life, has made him the creative and transforming power which the history of civilization shows him to have been. Thus, the triumphant assurance, 'all things work together for good,' which is the highest faith attained by the saint, is the testimony borne by the history of civilization taken as a whole. So much is this the case, that within certain limits man has attained to a higher development where nature has presented to him the most difficult problems and tasks than where she has easily yielded to his slightest requests.

And not only is nature relative to man's consciousness

and subservient to his purposes, but throughout, as has been seen, it bears analogy to his own life. If it is treated as a whole—as an ordered system, presenting arrangements of infinite delicacy, and absolutely inexplicable, at least in the biological sphere, without the conception of ends—it is because in all these respects it presents resemblances to man's own consciousness and activity, though infinitely vaster in its scope and more delicate in its processes. Further, nature considered as evolved, is part of a continuous system which is completed in the consciousness of man. Breaks there are, and it may be for ever impossible to show that the higher is so implicitly contained in the lower as to be developed from it under favouring conditions without the entrance of some additional principle or factor from above. Yet, while this is the case, the lower is not only completed by the higher, but is actually assumed into the higher. Chemistry cannot be explained by physics, nor biology by chemistry, nor the phenomena of conscious life by biology. But in each case the lower is taken up into the higher and becomes one of the limiting conditions of the higher when it appears. Hence that which is essential to the satisfaction of man is essential to the explanation of the world, because the very fact that the world exists only in such relations to consciousness brings it within the sphere of the spiritual. Distinguished from the spiritual in the first emergence of self-consciousness, and maintained in its distinction from the spiritual by the growth of moral personality, yet the experience of the world proves that it is bound up with the spiritual purposes which are wrought out alike in harmony with it and in distinction from it. It is thus brought into necessary alliance with the spiritual, not only in its rudimentary but in its highest forms. And, further, the world is continuous with consciousness, so that, from the historical point of view, the highest manifestations of the spiritual consciousness have been prepared and introduced as the culmination of the natural process which has gone before. Hence, since the end of an evolution contains the explanation of the whole process of which it is the culmination, and of any part which is essential to it, so man, as alike transcending

and completing the development of nature, contains its explanation.

Speaking from a somewhat different point of view, man, as a self-conscious, spiritual, and ethical being, pursuing the most unworldly ends of holiness and goodness, comes to his maturity within, and as part of the natural universe. His life, in which these higher interests emerge and become predominant, is preserved in it and served by it. His very sense of distinction from it and superiority over it can only be realized in it and by means of it. The result of his ceaseless interaction with it is a spiritual and moral individuality, which sets up an elaborate system of standards of value which he treats as self-evidencing. By means of this system his various interests are ranged as higher and lower, as primary and supreme or merely instrumental, as healthy and normal or the reverse. This fact at once presents an alternative.

(1) It may be claimed that these higher interests are not subservient to the interests of physical life. In that case they cannot be physically explained. Yet they cannot be dismissed as a meaningless and ineffectual by-product, without doing violence to the primary deliverances of consciousness. If consciousness is untrustworthy in this respect, it is certainly in no wise better entitled to confidence when it reveals to us a supposed world by which it is itself reduced to nothingness.

The reality of these higher interests, in some sense at least, cannot be denied. Nor, since they are phenomena of consciousness, can they be reduced to the terms of the unconscious. Hence, on the supposition that they are not life-preserving, the world has been evolved in stages and in parts, which, while connected, have each a measure of independence, unfold each its own principles and interests. To deny or disparage the reality of any part as it is presented to the consciousness is, instead of untying the knot, to cut it in the most violent and unscientific way. Suppose that the conscious life with its aspirations is not explicable on physical grounds, and in that case the explanation of the world must be based upon a conception of reality, of which purely

physical phenomena are only a part. Human consciousness, including the whole of its characteristic content, must have its worth and place affirmed in the whole which is to be explained. To account for the world on this supposition, all aspects of reality must be included and shown to be the manifestation of a higher principle, to which they are all alike subservient.

(2) On the other hand, the hope may be entertained that eventually it will be possible to establish the fact that even the ideal and spiritual interests of human nature, which seem to be entirely independent of merely physical interests, are, in reality, promotive of them. In that case it will become all the more clearly manifest to those who ascribe supreme worth to the spiritual and ideal interests, and to the moral standards of life, that the physical world is implicated in, and subservient to, a spiritual purpose. For upon this supposition, the extent of what we call life is so enlarged, that all the higher spiritual and ideal interests are seen to be part of it, and inextricably bound up with it. But the whole, as thus revealed to consciousness, is spiritual and not merely physical. Its natural origination, and the fact that spiritual development serves physical well-being, cannot for a moment destroy the independent meaning of the so-called result produced by physical processes. What is in the effect, therefore, must be assumed to have been present in the cause; what is involved in the fruit to have been implicit in the seed. A spiritual result which can be naturalistically explained does not thereby, it must be contended, become purely naturalist. Rather the nature of the result forces us to revise our conception of the means which have produced it, so that the more pronounced the spiritual result the more essential is it to recognize a spiritual potentiality in that which, at first sight, seems most natural.

In short, finite self-consciousness, which, in spite of its finitude, ever seeks the infinite and touches with infinity every interest which it adopts, becomes a witness to a self-conscious, infinite Source, which is ever manifesting itself in the nature of the finite. The world exists for self-consciousness, and self-consciousness comes to its fullness in pursuit of

ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness which have no meaning except for self-consciousness. Thus man, in proportion as he becomes a man, feels himself drawn in two directions, each of which, taken in isolation, becomes false and self-destructive. He is drawn towards the infinite satisfaction which cannot be found in the world as finite and material. In such moods he cries—

From the best bliss that earth imparts
We turn unfilled to Thee again.

On the other hand, he returns from this mood of aspiration after the infinite, conceived as perfect love, to seek a secular progress, which realizes the possibilities of spirit as superior to, sovereign over, but therefore to be made manifest in, the external world. The story of his life is that of the interaction between these two tendencies; occasionally in collision, but in the long run in co-operation with one another. A momentary satisfaction in the one is generally followed by a new effort in respect of the other. It is in this fundamental fact—the relation between spiritual striving after the infinite and secular progress—that the assurance is given that judgements of value in the spiritual world contain also within themselves the key to the meaning of the natural world. Truth of spirit is truth for the universe, which belongs to the system of spirit, and is perfected in the perfecting of spirit. Once affirm the reality and worth of the spiritual life, whether in its individual or in its collective aspects, and that recognition involves a divine teleology which embraces the whole universe, and explains it upon principles which come to light only in the full development of the spiritual life.

II. Such, it must be claimed, is the general position of the spiritual consciousness in the world; and such, according to the measure of its development, is its importance for the explanation of the world. It must now be added that its highest expression is in the Christian consciousness, with its characteristic sense of a filial relationship to God. This form of consciousness is fixed in the authoritative types of Christian experience, and is constantly being produced in varying degrees of depth and completeness. According to the measure

of its fullness is the measure of its Christianity. The realization of this consciousness has been prepared for, as will be seen, in the deep, natural foundations in which human nature is laid. It is the flower of a long course of spiritual and moral development, as the preceding review of religions has shown. It has come to its perfection through the consciousness of sin and of redemption from sin. The characteristic note of this consciousness is that of abounding satisfaction and of spiritual power. The typical descriptions of it by St. Paul and St. John, or indeed by any of the saints who have entered into it, are a striking testimony to these two unfailing features of filial experience. It has been seen to complete and correlate all other experiences. Its realization in the dawn of Christianity inaugurated a new epoch, not only in religion, but also in secular progress. That era was made possible by the far-reaching conditions of the time in which Christianity appeared.

What, then, does this filial consciousness, so decisive for Christianity, and so influential in the history of the world, affirm?

1. In the first place it apprehends the Fatherhood of God. In so doing it affirms an infinite and eternal source and ground of human nature and of the world. It declares that source to be spiritual and personal. Further, it asserts that this spiritual Personality is all-perfect, completely realizing, and therefore ceaselessly inspiring the highest ideals. Again, it declares that the life of this all-perfect Personality is that of self-giving, and that it is by reason of this self-giving that creation exists, and advances stage by stage towards those ends which are dimly disclosed in the highest ideals, hopes, and efforts of conscious life. Further, it affirms the immanence of this divine Personality throughout the whole universe in which His purpose is becoming growingly manifest. It declares, furthermore, that this divine Personality is the sovereign principle of unity which unites self and not-self, man and the universe. Because of all this, meaning, law, and purpose are inherently sovereign in the universe as a whole, presiding over its development, and are so reflected in human consciousness that man finds

his own faculties the key to the world outside him, and that the world finds its realization in producing and ministering to his self-consciousness. Such, at least, is the contribution which the Christian consciousness makes to the doctrine of God and of His relations to the universe.

For the vast majority of Christians the recognition of this divine Fatherhood is accompanied by the recognition of the principle of filiation as an essential condition of the divine nature. The principle of self-giving, which is, above all, manifest in Christ, is apprehended as inherent in the divine perfection, and felt to be the source of all spiritual blessedness, is seen to depend upon the essential constitution of the divine nature. It is the filial in the Godhead which is necessary alike to the perfection of the divine life, and to divine revelation and self-communication. It is this fact which establishes the sovereignty of the divinely filial as the end and law of the whole universe, which has its being in and for God. Thus the Father subsists eternally in relationships of love, which are the explanation not only of the being of the Godhead, but of the divine relations to the universe, and especially of the fact that the universe attains to its highest consummation when the dependence which marks it, and the law which rules throughout, have final expression in the filial confidence and self-surrender of spiritual consciousness. Thus the individual is part of a divine and universal order, of which the filial is the immanent norm, and that general norm receives its individual expression through the self-impartation of the divine Spirit, which, proceeding from God in spiritual energy, returns to Him in creaturely fulfilment.

2. The testimony of the filial consciousness realized in Christianity is as important in its witness to the nature of man and his place in the universe, as it is in respect of the nature and relationship of God. In the first place, and most obviously, it proclaims man's worth, and in the form that his worth is worth to God. It is the testimony to the fact of the unique importance of his consciousness and of its possibilities; the explanation of its meaning as set forth by the spiritual relationship in which he stands to God

as the all-perfect source of his being. On closer examination it is obvious that the truth of any such consciousness of worth, with the standards which it sets up, must depend upon the worth which man possesses for the Author and Source of his being. The dignity of man becomes a mere declamatory phrase unless that which he asserts of himself, the greatness and possibilities of his nature, is grounded upon his position in the universe; upon his position as secured by its essential meaning, and ultimately by a divine purpose which assigns that meaning. Man's position in the universe, however unique it may appear to him when he judges it in the light of ordinary perception and of common sense, can only be made good as depending upon his assured place in the entire scheme of things. In the case, therefore, of a being whose primary consciousness is that he is spiritual, his worth as spiritual must depend upon the reality of the spiritual relations which inspire and satisfy his nature; in short, upon the ground that the universe is so spiritual, that by its essential nature it safeguards and promotes his spiritual well-being as a supreme object recognized in the purpose for which the world exists. This is the testimony of the filial consciousness. Man by it finds his satisfaction in a spiritual Source, which guarantees his preciousness, and thereby proclaims that the universe exists to safeguard and promote the highest ends of his being.

3. Again, the testimony of the filial consciousness bears witness to the reality and importance of individuality. Man, however close his relationship with the Source of his being, is not to be confused with that Source. Within the infinity of the divine nature his individual personality is set up, recognized, and maintained in its independence, although that independence is only perfected as his personality permits itself to be appropriated by God and brought into relations of trust and obedience by which it comes to know and to set forth the divine purposes to be realized by its individuality.

4. Further, the testimony of the filial consciousness is to kinship with the Father. Only in the light of such kinship can either the worth or the individuality of man be explained. The affirmation of spiritual subordination must not degenerate

into the undue self-depreciation which magnifies the contrast between man and God until the sense of affinity is almost destroyed. In the well-balanced temper of Christianity it is exactly the sense of kinship with the Father which supplies the point of view and the motive power for the removal of the evil—whether due to sin, to ignorance, or to avoidable frailty—which brings home the sense of a contradiction between the human and the divine. This sense of contradiction carries with it in the Christian consciousness, not a judgement as to a final and normal matter of fact, still less the abdication of despair, but, on the contrary, the sense of something which is to be removed as an impediment to full self-realization, because it is a contradiction not only of the mind of God, but of the full meaning of human nature itself. The starting-point for the explanation of human nature is the reality and supremacy of divine kinship, in spite of the contradictions which at present threaten its destruction.

5. Hence there is in the filial consciousness an identification of man's end with God's end. God's end includes that which unfolds the purpose and meaning of human life. Human life is perfected in discerning and accomplishing the spiritual end of God. The entrance of individuality, with its attendant moral responsibility, necessitates that this unity of end can only be wrought out on the part of man by means of the self-surrender and dependence of love. It is consummated only in that perfect realization of the spiritual which depends upon insight into the highest meaning of life and spiritual discipline in order to its fulfilment. Yet while the divine end is only thus to be recognized and fulfilled by a costly process of self-mastery, the sure testimony of the Christian consciousness is that by the path of self-renunciation and discipline comes the fulfilment, not only of the divine purpose, but of the eternal meaning of human nature itself.

6. Again, in the testimony borne by the filial consciousness to all this is involved the supremacy of love and spirit and life in the highest and most ideal significance. The mere naturalism of the conception of sonship has become impossible when its spiritual implications have dawned upon the mind and heart. Sonship means not descent from and nourishment

by the conditions and factors of mere physical life. A higher world of meaning and consciousness has been evolved, which the physical exists to serve. In the subordination of the physical to ends higher than those which are contained within itself is proclaimed the sovereignty in the universe of higher elements than the mere physical, namely, those spiritual interests of love which, by the very fact that they are evolved last, are shown to have existed first of all.

7. Hence, bound up with the filial consciousness is confidence alike in the constitution of the world and in the spiritual outlook of life. It is this confidence of the man brought into right relations with God which is set forth by the frequent use in the New Testament of the terms 'heirship' and 'inheritance,' as signifying the unity of present spiritual consciousness with the final anticipation of Christian hope. Undoubtedly the purposes of God may contemplate the realization of world-ends, to which mankind is subservient. Yet the filial consciousness, with its sense of heirship, affirms that these ends must be achieved by the fulfilment, and not by the sacrifice of the filial nature and destiny of man. And this confidence in the nature and ultimate issue of the universe has corresponding to it a spiritual consciousness, which unites inseparably the sense of present blessedness with the intuition of permanence and the assurance of infinitely progressive realization. These are held together in mutual interpenetration and dependence. The obscuration of any one of them is an injury to those which are left behind. Immortality derives its certainty from the meaning and worth of a present consciousness, containing within it the prospect of an eternal fulfilment, while this experience of real yet unfolding blessedness postulates as its condition the permanence of immortality.

8. Finally, the filial consciousness expresses for its possessors a nature fulfilled in and answering to the complex relationships of life. Divine in its source, spiritual in its nature, it is social in its manifestations. It draws from the Infinite the strength and inspiration to give a growing manifestation of the social possibilities inherent in the life and nature of man.

Thus, to sum up, the filial consciousness brings man into harmonious relations to the universe, enforcing alike his dependence and his freedom by reason of the spiritual relationships in which he subsists, and bringing him, as he discerns and serves a divine purpose immanent in the whole of life, into a mastery over the world only tempered by the nature of the divine purpose itself.

All this is the supreme expression of spiritual consciousness, giving utterance to its characteristic experience as manifest in history. This alone expresses its meaning, fulfils its characteristic needs, and affords the basis for its noblest endeavours. If any part of this testimony be blotted out, so far as it relates to the human side of it, a specific injury, which can easily be ascertained, is done to some essential quality of the highest human character. A loss of human power in some of its highest manifestations is inevitably sustained. The man who loudly proclaims his contradiction of any elements of this Christian consciousness is seen by his fellows to represent in the purely spiritual world an analogy to the man who, having no ear for harmony or eye for beauty, pours ridicule upon the highest creations of music or of art. The man of more spiritual temperament, who reluctantly abandons any element of this consciousness, betrays by his very regret that he has declined to accredit the inner witness of his own spiritual nature. If the testimony of the Christian consciousness be blotted out in regard to the divine source and ground, our Father which is in heaven, then the abandonment means that some element in man's nature, indispensable to his highest life, fails to find its sufficient stay and its necessary instrument in the universe outside his personal life. Hence a division is set up in human nature itself, between the conclusions of the investigating mind and the aspirations of the spiritual faculties. The highest in man's nature is presented to him as the unnatural; hence a hopeless lack of rationality, due to the fact that nature and consciousness cannot be bound together in a consistent whole, and that the noblest ends in spiritual life are deemed to pass into excess, or to diverge from the alien and inadequate ends of the universe as a whole. To represent

that in the world a process takes place which develops the infinite needs of the spiritual consciousness at the beginning in order to quench them at the close by an exposure of the emptiness of the universe, is to make reason in its final exercise hew out for itself 'broken cisterns which can hold no water,' in a way that, by reducing the universe to hopeless contradiction, equally involves reason in imbecility and suicide.

All human blessedness, as sought by the most various religions, is the realization of some aspect of the filial consciousness. Even when under the influence of degeneration fear has supplanted faith in the human heart, so that religion is concerned rather with driving away malign influences than with cultivating fellowship with benignant power, evil is warded off by religion in order that within the narrow limits of life remaining the spirit of trust may have play. The filial attitude is sought after with the drawbacks of early naïveté in all higher forms of nature-worship and of Animism. It is exemplified in the endeavours of Brahmanism and Buddhism to escape the negations of the creature, and to find blessedness by realizing that absolute oneness with the Infinite—however conceived—which is the inmost and eternal truth. It inspires the confidence of the Dualist that good will ultimately triumph in the agelong warfare with evil. It gives sublimity to the submission of the Moslem to the decrees of Allah—however bare and external they may appear to be—in the assurance that for such submission is reserved the reward of everlasting good.

Further, all human progress, with the hopes, ideals, confidence, and courage essential to it, is a manifestation of the filial spirit. Even if it be not reflective and complete, it is none the less real and implicit. The attitude with which progressive manhood faces the world is filial, and needs the essential content of the Christian consciousness to justify it. The temper which alone makes human life, and above all human progress possible, is that of trust, and trust is only justified by finding or assuming a trustworthy ground in the world to which man stands related. Each power, from the lowliest to the highest, as it is developed lives by trust. It relates itself

to the universe outside itself as being trustworthy; suited to inspire and to satisfy that which is essential to its full development. Each new power lives and flourishes in the universe upon this tenure. It exists and is developed by exploring the universe in the certainty that it will find there its foundation, encouragement, and satisfaction. The man who has attained the elevation of the hero and the saint regards the universe, for the purposes of his heroism and saintliness, upon exactly the same assumptions as govern the life of man when nearest to mere animal existence for the ends of merely physical well-being. No power of man is self-grounded, self-contained, or self-satisfied. Each relates him to a universe in which for its peculiar purposes he puts his trust. This act of trust asserts that the universe is for that particular purpose trustworthy; that is to say, that it is akin to man so far as the nature and satisfaction of that particular faculty are concerned. Thus each new stage of human development is a revelation to man not merely of what is possible in the universe so far as his own achievements are concerned, but of what is grounded in the essential nature of the universe as satisfying this essential relatedness, which is involved in the attitude of trust. Nature must be akin to man, in order that he may be a successful animal. The universe must be akin to man, in order that he may become a hero or a saint. That man may not give effect to the full significance of this in his philosophy, does not destroy the fact that this assumption is instinctive in the practical spirit of his life.

As has already been seen, this spirit of trust is nurtured in man by family relations, in which the life of nature culminates, and the life of spirit dawns. This mediating position of the family should be treated as all-important for the interpretation of the universe. It is the point at which physical necessity prepares the way for the opening of a higher existence to which mere physical well-being is subordinate. Its educative influence ensures that the temper developed in the family circle shall, just because it is congenital and natural, be extended to the universe which reaches the child through its family relations. To treat the spiritual effect of these relations as accidental is unphilosophic. Either all things are

accidental or nothing is accidental. To treat influences upon the human spirit and their effects upon consciousness as accidental, and as creating therefore a disqualification rather than a qualification for attaining to truth, while magnifying their necessity in the physical realm, is to set up a claim to reality and independence for the physical as out of and independent of consciousness, which is philosophically absurd.

From all this it follows that this attitude of trust is vital not only in the case of the supreme spiritual and moral interests of man, but in the natural exercise of all his faculties, and in the pursuit of all his practical ends. It is clearly manifest even in perception, and in the action based upon it. Trust is reposed at once in the perceptive faculty, in the reality of the world which is revealed to it, and in the power of the organs which respond to it and utilize it for the practical purposes of life. In the act of perception the subjective and the objective are brought together in an act which affirms the interdependence and trustworthiness of both.

The transition from the state of mind involved in ordinary perception and practical life to the scientific point of view reveals exactly the same temper. The spirit of science is for its own purpose always gnostic and never agnostic. Its characteristic courage, patience, and inventiveness of method are all due to the unwavering faith that the universe and the intellect of man are so essentially harmonious, that the putting forth of intellectual activity governed by its own laws will lead to ever-increasing knowledge of nature. Knowledge of nature by its very definition means the discovering in it of order, method, the natural unfolding of ends which can only be perceived or interpreted in terms of the intellectual and purposive activity of man. As man becomes rational he needs to find, and succeeds in finding, corresponding reason in nature. Only an invincible trust that this must be so assists him in the often disheartening delays and defeats of physical investigation.

The same practical temper of trust is equally apparent in the development of the works by which the results of scientific

inquiry are turned to the practical service of mankind. That nature will reward patient and intelligent activity, that she will be mastered by obeying her, is the implicit faith which has enabled men in all ages to transform the wilderness into the Garden of the Lord.

Perhaps the most important example, however, of this spirit is found in the case of the social reformer; the outstanding representative of a great cause, the importance of which has become evident to his own mind, and for which he seeks to gain practical acknowledgement and service among his fellow men. His strength lies in his implicit trust in the prophetic nature of his ideal, and in the practicability of the effort by which he seeks to translate his ideal into activity. Whatever may be his formal explanation of the universe, his strength practically consists in his belief that the good end which he adopts is part of the world-end, and therefore can be carried into effect. The ultimate which is the object of his hope is the immanent as the nerve of his power. It is but a step from this to recognize that what is immanent in him as the ideal spring of his effort is also transcendent, eternally existing as purpose in the universe before it became temporally manifest in him as receiving and witnessing to this ideal. If in despair he should come explicitly to deny this, his hope and power at once fail. If his hope and courage are maintained in spite of the coldness and hostility of his fellows, it is because there is in him an implicit faith *Deus vult*. It is this instinctive consciousness which lies at the very heart of the filial spirit as perfected in Christian consciousness.

The whole of history is a testimony to this truth. Its triumphs have been brought about as men in the spirit of trust have sought for higher well-being, by the exercise of reason and freedom, in the confidence that the world is so constituted as to enable them to realize their ideals of the good. They have treated evil as so subordinate in the scheme of the universe that its very presence provokes the effort to overcome it. Wherever this spirit has failed, not only has higher progress been made impossible, but the continuance even of physical existence has been endangered. All growth of character has meant increased power to realize both in

thought and effort the rationality and serviceableness of the world. Men have in the practical sphere, done what Plato did in the theoretic, identified the Idea of Being with the Idea of the Good. In short, it may be claimed that all the higher life of man consists in this identification, and that wherever he has failed in the act of trust, which counts upon the highest good as having the highest claim to existence and the final certainty of it, he has sunk beneath himself as man, and has become incapable of the noblest efforts of life. The idea of the Good has greatly varied in kind and in fullness, but beneath these variations, faith that the good is the practicable because the truly existent has been the power with which men have faced the problems and conflicts of their life. And this again is the filial spirit, acting upon the presumption that a purpose of good runs through all human life, as conditioned by the universe, so that hope and effort for the larger good are ever justified both in principle and in result.

The filial consciousness as perfected in Christianity completes therefore the spirit which is essential to the success of man in any of the interests of his life. It manifests this spirit in its highest exercise in regard to the highest interests of life. It exhibits in complete form the spiritual grounds upon which it is justified. It consecrates to the highest exercise this universal and vital principle of all successful life. Based upon the supreme spiritual experience of Christ, it yet gives complete and final expression to all the elements and relations which religious consciousness has been everywhere seeking to express. It is something which, while given in a direct religious experience, brings assurance, energy, and satisfaction to the whole of man's being—spiritual, affectional, moral, and rational. It makes good and completely manifests the grounds of that prevailing temper, the loss of which in any department of life reduces man to helplessness and confusion. Seen in this light, the *onus probandi* rests upon those who challenge Christianity, not on those who place trust in it. Its position in life and in the world may well give its possessors courage to look in the face alike seeming contradictions to its essential principles in the scheme of things, or philosophic difficulties in its theoretic exposition.

The metaphysical and moral difficulties involved in the testimony of the filial consciousness will be dealt with subsequently in this inquiry. Meanwhile it is necessary to observe that the truth and importance of the filial spirit have been so clearly perceived by many of those who, on account of metaphysical difficulties or naturalistic presuppositions, refuse to accept its theistic testimony, that they have made strenuous efforts to preserve many of its essential features on some other basis.

This has been done in various ways. In the first place, efforts have been made to stimulate what is called 'cosmic emotion,' and to utilize it for the practical purposes of religious life. The object of such emotion is the universe, of which man is conceived to be a natural product, as manifesting system and order. It is obvious at once that such an object of emotion can come to mean various things, according to differences in the metaphysical view of those who adopt it. It is possible that it should verge upon Theism; representing an attempt to express that sense of the incommensurateness of the Divine Being with the ordinary limitations of human personality, and that more intimate union of the Divine Being with the system of nature which philosophic Theism is itself anxious to recognize. At this point, however, of approximation to definite and philosophic Theism, there is a twofold hesitation: first of all to attribute personality as the source and ground of the order manifest in the universe; and secondly, to do justice to that differentiation of selfhood from the mere system of nature, which is so marked a condition of human consciousness and human progress. This twofold tendency is very clearly manifest in the ordinary forms of this endeavour. Human personality, and therewith its testimony to divine personality, is practically resolved away. Nature in its otherness from what is distinctive of consciousness is elevated into an unreal abstraction, and assigned a pre-eminence which does not belong to it in the ordinary deliverances of human consciousness. This depreciation of personality, and undue prominence given to the so-called natural and practically materialistic aspects of the universe, results in the setting up of an unspiritual and unethical object

of religious emotion. It involves an abandonment, so far as the object of worship is concerned, of the spiritual and ethical features of the universe, as made manifest in human consciousness. It therefore substitutes vague feeling for the whole conceived as infinite, ordered, but impersonal, for the Personality which is sought by the religious affections. It substitutes vastness and evolutionary order for the standards of value which have been attained by the spiritual and moral efforts of mankind. It is therefore an attempt to keep the emotions of religion without the presuppositions which alone can justify these emotions in the case of a spiritual and moral being who pursues holy and righteous ends. As such, man must find the object of worship in something which is kindred to the highest and best in himself, not in the mere process by which he has come to be what he is, especially when there is a determined effort to think away from the source and the process any similarity to the holiness and righteousness which have been reached as the finally satisfying end of human life. It is as the prolific and orderly source of all kinds of existence that the cosmos is to arouse emotion, instead of as 'the power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness.' Certain states of emotion are permitted by the absence of definition, and by the temporary negation of moral interests. As a momentary relief they may have a wholesome function to fulfil, but when systematized and made to represent that which is essential in religious life they sacrifice just what is indispensable to spiritual progress, namely, the growing prevalence of the moral values of life.

In the second place, the Religion of Humanity is offered as a substitute for the theistic basis of the filial consciousness. At first sight it might be supposed that this attempt repairs the injury done by the previous one, in that it centres the worship of man upon the human as contrasted with the non-human. But this first impression gives way on closer examination. In the first place, the significance of the human is done away by a purely naturalist explanation, which attempts to reduce to physical terms the peculiarities of spiritual and moral consciousness. In the second place, humanity is an abstraction and not a reality. It may include

the whole of mankind, past, present, and future, without any differentiation. In that case, a diffused sympathy, which vanishes at the touch of definition, is all that can result. Or a selection is made of some special type embodied in a particular personality, chosen as specially worthy to represent humanity. But such selection is either arbitrary, or must be justified by considerations which introduce the most important modifications into the very conception of humanity which has been set up as supreme. Spiritual and moral standards are adopted for the definition of humanity which cannot be justified logically as being involved in the abstract conception of it when presented as the innumerable company of mankind, past, present, and future, and which cannot be justified genetically by the consideration of man as a merely natural product existing under diverse conditions of religion, morality, and civilization. Such an object of worship therefore supplies no standard for consistent moral guidance. It contains no satisfactory source of moral obligation, for it is clear that no obligation can exist either towards an abstraction or towards the multitude of individuals, past, present, and future. And impracticable as the object is for the moral guidance of life, it remains finite. It is not the All, nor is it the source of its own life, nor is it infinite; whether the infinite be sought as the object of affection and worship or as the absolute perfection which kindles the faculties to the attainment of moral excellency hitherto unrealized. For such effort, not humanity as it exists, but the ideal as it never yet has existed in this temporal world, is the only adequate object of worship. The strength of the religion of humanity, therefore, would seem to lie in the implications which it introduces from spiritual and moral sources elsewhere, but which are without justification either in its logical concept, or in its narrowly naturalist outlook.

A third effort would substitute the Infinite and the Absolute as impersonal for the God of Christian Theism. The metaphysical questions involved must be reserved for discussion at a later stage. Passing over for the moment all question whether the idea of the Infinite and the Absolute can be made metaphysically satisfactory, it is clear that the

conclusion that the Infinite and the Absolute are incompatible with personality destroys in the object of worship exactly those qualities of trust and affection which are most marked in all higher religion, and have their complete manifestation in the filial consciousness of Christianity. The religion which adores the indefinableness of the Infinite and the Absolute is one which is emptied of all the distinctive qualities of faith, hope, and love. Moreover, such an object, while it may bring to men the refreshing which comes to them in the light of setting suns and in the sense of the sublime vastness of nature, fails essentially in giving moral inspiration to life. The very fact that the supreme Infinite and Absolute is impersonal involves that it is non-moral, and that therefore the moral effort which fills the content of the noblest human life is at every point of it a departure from the Infinite and the Absolute—or a more accentuated contrast to it. Indefiniteness is the nearest approach to absorption in it, and every step in the addition of distinctions, however holy and necessary the human conscience may pronounce them to be, only carries those who take it farther from the sympathy of the Infinite and the Absolute, if sympathy it can be supposed to have. Man is made by the perfecting of personality; the Source of his being is perfect in being impersonal. Thus the line of human advance is, impossible though it may seem, an advance ever further from the direction of its source. Such a conclusion of history would, at the best, be an anomaly inexplicable by reason. But to make that the object of worship which is the contradiction of what man is by nature, and of what, according to his worth, he is tending to become, is to introduce a contradiction into the inner life of the spirit itself. It is at one and the same moment to turn to the setting sun of indefiniteness in its worship while facing the new dawn of ever-growing personal distinction in its heroic and saintly effort. Such a solution, therefore, destroys the unity of the universe of which personality is the highest product; the unity also of the spiritual life itself.

One more such effort must be considered in some detail, that of Professor Höffding in his *Philosophy of Religion*.

According to his view, 'Religion is faith in the preservation of value, and ethics investigates the principles according to which the discovery and production of values takes place.'¹ By this is meant that the rational progress of mankind depends upon the continuous discovery of ends of action, objects of affection, and postulates of thought, by the maintenance of which alone can the well-being of humanity be secured. Ethics investigates the nature of these, and lays down the principles which govern their pursuit. But religion supplies the faith, including steadfastness, courage, and devotion, by which each value, when once ascertained, is pursued. This, however, is not enough. It is necessary to believe that the universe is so constituted as to have regard to the values which are essential to the well-being of man. Höffding calls 'the feeling which is determined by the relation between value and reality the *cosmical vital feeling*.'² The axiom of religion is the conservation of value, which corresponds in the spiritual realm to that of the conservation of energy in the physical. This axiom 'meets religious need, since this need consists in the desire to hold fast to the conservation of the highest values beyond the limits which experience exhibits, and in spite of all the transformations which experience reveals. Or, in other words, faith is fidelity, and the content of faith is that fidelity prevails throughout existence. Fidelity is conservation, continuity throughout all changes.'³

But this content of faith cannot be established on a completely rational basis. And for two reasons.

In the first place, man cannot have complete experience of existence. 'Since the criterion of reality can never be more than approximately applied, so too the concept of reality is itself really an ideal concept. We work with it, as with various other concepts, in spite of their inevitable incompleteness. Existence is not presented to us as completed, and who knows if indeed it really is completed? Perhaps it is for ever in the toils of becoming, so that the continual appearance of new empirical content is no mere accident.

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (English translation), p. 374.

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

If this be so, we understand why existence always remains incommensurable with our knowledge, however great the advances of the latter.'¹ Hence the manifold contradictions into which thought falls in its attempts to determine the nature of reality and the relations subsisting within it, as, for example, between God and the world; each of which is assumed to be infinite, while, despite this, each is limited by its relations to the other.

The second cause of uncertainty is that man is compelled to judge by his own standard, and cannot be sure that this represents the standard of the universe. 'All estimation of value—as all understanding and all explanation—is undertaken from the place occupied by humanity in existence, and is determined by the conditions of human life. But this standing-ground and these conditions of life are limited, and we cannot obtain a view of their connexion with the rest of existence. We only get over this difficulty by conceiving the human race and its planet as the centre of existence; but the Copernican conception of the world has enlarged our horizon, and thereby rendered the problem of the conservation of value far more complex than it was before. The fact that the history of our highest values is interwoven with a great whole of which we can never catch sight, not only makes it impossible to find an objective foundation for it, but also makes it impossible to give the faith in the conservation of value a definite and still more an intuitive form. Beyond the general notion that that which possesses real value stands in such close connexion with the forces moving in existence, that it must persist under one form or another, we cannot pass.'²

Hence this uncertainty, which involves both the meaning and, by consequence, the future of the universe, can never be cleared up. There is an additional difficulty in determining the question by personal immortality, for even if the values represented of human life be preserved by the universe, this may be done in other ways than by the survival of the particular individuals of whom mankind is composed. 'How a single personal life is bound up with the laws and values

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (English translation), p. 247. ² *Ibid.*, pp. 255-6.

of the whole of existence is an insoluble problem. But if there be an inner connexion between it and them, so that our noblest and highest striving contains something which cannot die (whatever may be the form under which it is preserved), this value only arises when we take this life, the life which is known to us, as an independent task and attribute to it independent value.'¹

The result of the whole investigation, therefore, is that 'to live eternal life in the midst of time, that is the true immortality, whether or not there is any other immortality. The distinction between end and means falls away in such moments and in such strivings, as indeed it always disappears whenever there is any true personal life; and with this vanishes also the distinction between religion and ethics, for the ethical includes the religious.'

With the general view of religion as concerned with the conservation of value, there is no need to quarrel. It represents a most important aspect of the matter. That which is involved in this demand must ever be for man, at least under earthly conditions, the most important subjective verification of revelation, the standard of criticism by which all religions must be judged. Substantially, this has been the standpoint taken in our previous inquiry.

But closer examination will justify us in raising upon this foundation a much more commanding edifice of rational faith than Professor Höfding allows. The positive content of the 'eternal life' which we are bidden to live 'in the midst of time' consists of such ethical ideals and conduct as are the outcome of 'our noblest and highest striving.' Such striving is for the fulfilment of a spiritual nature which in its self-affirmation, its religious consciousness, and its vast possibilities is, so far as our knowledge extends, unique. But this spiritual nature is something which, with its standards of value, is *given* to us. It issues from the heart of that mysterious Reality, the secret of which we are seeking to explore. The value, therefore, by which and for which the noblest human life is created cannot be arbitrary or even merely subjective. It is prescribed for us, not merely

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (English translation), p. 384.

by ourselves, not even by humanity—whether past, present, or future—but by the Source of all being. Is it not, therefore, most rational to assume that the ethical character, by which human nature is realized, has the same value for the Source which lays it down as for us who receive it as a possibility to be fulfilled?

Professor Höffding himself goes far to admit this. He says, 'Although our finite points of view and forms of thought are not able to afford us a definition, still less an exhaustive formulation of this principle [of being], yet they must stand in interconnexion with it, and we are not justified in declaring them to be without significance. Our thought, our knowledge itself forms part of existence, has arisen within it, and is itself one of the facts which must be taken into consideration before we bring our inquiry into the nature of being to a conclusion. The ideas which our experience prompts us to develop are probably, in comparison with the great related whole of which we form a part as individual members, both subordinate and derivative; devoid of all significance, however, we need not suppose them to be. Only we are not able to indicate the degree and nature of the metamorphosis our points of view will have to undergo before they can be assimilated into the highest and most all-embracing interconnexion that we are able to conceive.'¹

This statement not merely warrants, but necessitates the strengthening of the conclusion. Not only need we not treat the ideas which are vital to our well-being as 'devoid of all significance,' but, on the contrary, we are bound to assume that they have the most important significance. It matters little that they are 'subordinate and derivative,' or that they will undergo considerable metamorphosis when our experience is deepened and widened. That they are subordinate and derivative implies that they are part of a governing whole which is consistent with them and shares with them its validity. And such metamorphosis as is implied in fulfilment involves of necessity a perfecting which is the exact opposite of any belittling, still more of destruction.

And this is not all. The Christian religion, which has by

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (English translation), pp. 88, 89.

all confession been the most fruitful in creating ethical values, has affirmed their mundane value precisely on the ground of their supra-mundane significance. Its essential peculiarity has been that in this respect it has been the religion not merely of demand, but of affirmation; not merely of hope, but of inspired realization. This is the import of the filial consciousness; by this it at once perfects religion and guarantees ethics. Hence the characteristic deliverance of this consciousness is that it is inspired by the Source of all things, and that it gives intuitive assurance of what, on the facts shown, would be rationally inferred. Professor Höffding remarks that 'we get the deepest form of faith when the will asserts itself, unblunted and unexhausted, precisely at its own limit, in a lively wish that the highest value may be realized. The deepest religious word ever spoken is the prayer of Jesus: "Not My will, but Thine be done." The will is surrendered, but this surrender is itself a positive wish, or, at any rate, is but the negative side of a positive wish.'¹ But the strength — nay, the indispensable condition — of this surrender is not a mere wish, but a triumphant assurance that the will to which the surrender is made is at once so good and so mighty that the highest value will certainly be realized, in spite of all outward seeming which threatens the opposite. It is not the wish, so much as the assurance, which makes this not only 'the deepest,' but the most creative, 'religious word ever spoken.'

Moreover, although we cannot pass from the human to a more universal standpoint, or view existence in its completeness, whether present or future, we are not left without any verification of the conclusions of reason, or of the revelation contained in the highest inspiration of the filial consciousness. The history of evolution is spread out before us. This, so far as our world is concerned, culminates in man, supplies him with the materials and the conditions of his civilization, and incites him to pursue it. Within this great system is developed the religious consciousness, which appropriates and interprets the whole of this process. The cosmic and the human are thus bound together, and, as has been seen, man's

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (English translation), p. 127.

end is, so far, the world's end. It matters not that we have exchanged the Ptolemaic for the Copernican point of view. It is not necessary to assert that man's end is either the exclusive or even the highest end of the universe. Wherever other beings may be found of equal worth and possibilities, and wherever other cosmic systems may exist in organic relation to them, the same principles of explanation are applicable. Even supposing that the end of the universe is distinct from, and perhaps higher than, the ends that can be realized in man or in any other possible orders of finite existence, all that is contended for is that the universal end cannot be served by the contradiction, but only by the fulfilment of the particular ends revealed in the nature and history of mankind, and in those of similarly subordinate spiritual beings elsewhere.

This assurance is reached on the ground of the affirmations of value with which Reality supplies us, and by which it enables us to take our part in unfolding its meaning and realizing its progress. If veracity is to be attributed to all other instincts and intuitions by which life is served, at least equally must it be attributed to this upon which the whole depends.

Just here, then, the central presence of Christ and of the filial consciousness He inspires and illuminates becomes of decisive importance, as completely revealing and authenticating the principle upon which all rational, ethical, and religious interests alike depend.

The principle of the conservation of value involves the permanence—the personal immortality—of the individual in whom this value is inwrought. How can those values be preserved if alike the spiritual result and the process in which alone such value consists are brought to an end by death or by any other catastrophe? Even if such value can be transferred to successors, what avails this, if they also in their turn pass away, and if human life itself be but an episode in the history of the universe? The conservation of value everywhere certainly implies personal immortality somewhere. And those who pay heed to the characteristic sense of man that he is not merely a means, but an end, will draw from this fact—to say nothing of other considerations

that may be urged—the assurance that this immortality is the universal destiny of man, or, at least, in so far as he realizes the values which are to be conserved. If I count it immoral conduct towards my neighbour to treat him as a mere means to my own ends, must not the Ruler of the universe display a standard of conduct equally high? He will not consummate His work by an act so literally irrational and immoral—by whatever names it may be called—as is involved in the destruction of that which He has brought to the spiritual maturity which demands immortality by evoking trustful dependence on Himself.

Thus, finally, it is the meaning of God contained in the filial consciousness of Christianity which alone gives assurance of the conservation of value. According to Professor Höffding, 'From a purely theoretical (epistemological and metaphysical) standpoint, the concept of God can mean nothing other than the principle of the continuity, and hence of the comprehensibility, of existence. From the religious point of view, God, as the object of faith, means the principle of the conservation of value throughout all oscillations and all struggles, or, if we like to call it so, the principle of fidelity in existence.'¹ Again, we are told, 'Great religious personalities have called the object of their highest trust and love "God," and we can comprehend this if we understand by "God" the principle of the conservation of value in reality.'² The word 'principle' is a mere abstraction. It stands, or should stand, for a persistent course of action, actuated by the purpose of securing spiritual values. It may be said that to read such a meaning into it is only an example of the anthropomorphic imagination, and that it is unessential or misleading. But how can I credit the universe, or its Source, with a steadfast principle to maintain spiritual value, unless it, or He, be indeed spiritual? And how can the term 'spiritual' be understood, unless it connotes a perfect consciousness by which the worth of the spiritual is appreciated and its upholding is decreed? Such a principle can, therefore, only reside in and be enforced by a supreme Subject, and religious faith is reposed, not in the principle, but in the Subject whose character and conduct it

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (English translation), p. 134.

² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

expresses. The fundamental mistake of such a system of thought as that of Professor Höffding, in spite of its insight and ethical earnestness, is the turning aside to abstractions which in themselves can neither inspire nor explain religious faith, because of a fear to affirm the Personality which is essential both to the abstractions and to the faith, on account of the imperfection of any human endeavour adequately to represent the conditions of His transcendent life.

All such efforts, therefore, to preserve the filial consciousness without its theistic basis are a testimony alike to the necessity and naturalness of that consciousness, and to the impracticability of maintaining it with consistent thought upon any other than the theistic grounds upon which it rests in the life and revelation of Christ. The perfectly filial is the perfectly human, and the perfectly filial is only possible with the Christian content. This is the primary verification of the Christian religion.

CHAPTER II

THE CHRISTIAN EXPLANATION OF THE WORLD AND THE REJOINDER OF NATURALISM

THE investigation pursued in these pages up to this point has shown Christianity to be the perfect satisfaction of the demands of religion, fulfilling in itself the religious consciousness and infinitely transcending all its previous manifestations. It so fulfils it as to present to us a religion which, while it is the inspiration and completion of all the noblest forms of spiritual life, is also true to the essential spirit by which alone can success in any sphere or interest of human life be achieved. The essential of the Christian consciousness has been seen to be the filial spirit, which, original in our Lord, has been conveyed by Him to all His followers with a fullness proportionate to the faithfulness and completeness of their discipleship. It is in the filial consciousness that religion emerges in its highest spiritual and moral form, satisfying the intensest needs, harmonizing the various interests, and giving power to the many-sided efforts of human life. Within that consciousness, as has been seen, is contained an intuitive doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. That intuitive doctrine contains the following affirmations: that there is an infinite and eternal Source and Ground of the universe; that that Source is spiritual and personal; that He is all-perfect, completely realizing in Himself, and ceaselessly inspiring throughout creation, the highest ideals; that the essential spirit of His life is self-giving, and that it is by this that the fact of creation, and the steady advance of creation until it attains to the highest standards, hopes, and efforts of conscious life,

must be explained; that this divine Source is immanent throughout the universe, the principle and end of its unity, so that, because of this immanence, holy purpose, rational meaning, spiritual law, and the goodness of perfect love are inherently sovereign.

We are now to examine the meaning, consistency, and validity of this intuitive consciousness of the Christian religion, to define and to justify to thought its content, both as being the only satisfactory explanation of reality, and as capable of being embodied in a satisfactory doctrine of the being and nature of God. It is possible that some may question both the necessity and the possibility of such an undertaking. For example, Mr. Merz, in his remarkable work, *The History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, writing in a sympathetic spirit towards religion, says, 'The conviction is gradually gaining ground that scientific and religious thought emanate from two separate centres, that although they inevitably come into frequent contact, the study of their independent origin and history, and their different psychological method, is more valuable than a temporary and merely ephemeral compromise of their respective doctrines. Happily, this country has produced many great and a few thinkers of the first order, in whom the greatest that scientific thought has achieved was in harmony with a truly religious spirit. In contemplating these illustrious examples, and bowing before their greatness, the popular mind will probably find its conviction of the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation of both aspects, more strengthened than by leaning on the doubtful support of a voluminous apologetic literature, which proposes to give general proofs where only individual faith can decide.'¹

With all that is here said as to the separate sources, methods, and history of scientific and religious thought, the present writer, at least, is in general agreement. Yet, as has been urged throughout the present inquiry, scientific thought has been largely indebted to religious and theological sources for its initiation, and can easily be shown to be an abstract

¹ *The History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. ii. pp. 324, 325.

part of a larger rational whole, though it has abundantly justified on practical grounds its claim to an independent position and procedure. Again, nothing is less serviceable to the interests, either of science or religion, than 'a temporary and mere ephemeral compromise of their respective doctrines.' It is in the completion of all the testimony which either science or religion can bear to reality that the ultimate reconciliation must be found, and not either in truncating one or the other, or in attempting to set up a system whether of artificial arrangement or of insincere professions between them. At the same time, 'individual faith' is nothing, especially in scientific men, unless it seeks to be rational, and the spectacle of those who are at once great scientific thinkers and also religious men is likely to weaken instead of to strengthen the general belief in 'the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation of both aspects,' if they justify their individual faith on grounds that are at once open to intellectual challenge. Individual faith must justify itself as rational, and the most fervent expressions of it from the most distinguished men can only serve its interests if they can be expressed in terms of universal reason. In the same way, if, as has already been seen, Christianity is the supreme satisfaction of the needs of spiritual consciousness, this can only be the case because it is true. This involves that it should be consistent within itself, and, however independent, consistent with all other realms of discovered truth. Doubtless, the final synthesis which will harmonize all aspects and elements of truth is far in the future, and may never be completely attained, but each age must use all its resources, and put forth its highest endeavour to approximate to such a solution in the interests alike of reason and of religion.

Hence it is necessary now to consider the power of Christianity to explain the world and life in detail, and to furnish a rational and consistent doctrine of God. This inquiry must be made in the light of objections urged against it and of alternatives offered. It will be necessary to make good the following three contentions: firstly, that Christianity furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of the universe; secondly, that it gives the key to the nature, condition,

destiny, and salvation of mankind; thirdly, that it contains a consistent and reasonable doctrine of God. It is difficult completely to separate these three branches of inquiry. They are mutually implicated, yet they are in substance distinct. The first deals with the necessity of the idea of God furnished by the Christian religion for the explanation of the universe as it exists. The second deals especially with what has been made manifest of the divine dealings in the history of mankind. The third deals with the possibility of finding a satisfactory rational construction of what is intuitively given in religious experience, and confirmed by reflection upon the nature of the universe.

The present chapter is concerned with the explanation of the world.

Two questions must be asked at the outset—What is it to explain the world? and What is the world which is to be explained?

As to the former, the following elements are indispensable. Firstly, a complete descriptive account of things and their mutual relations. To secure this is the primary task of the whole of the special sciences.

Secondly, a complete unification of reality as described by the special sciences under a supreme constitutive principle. All efforts at world-explanation represent an attempt to unify the whole system of things, the ultimate subject of controversy being the sufficiency of the principle selected for such complete unification.

Hence, thirdly, a final explanation necessitates that the unifying principle shall be a sufficient reason; that is to say, it must be a principle which needs no further explanation, but can legitimately be treated as absolute as well as ultimate, containing within itself the source of all that proceeds from it.

As to the second question, the world to be explained is nothing less than the sum-total of all related existences. The attempt to explain this sum-total of related existences, which we call the universe, proceeds from a first impression derived from actual and common experience. That first impression is that the world of existences is stable, that it is ordered by

law, that it constitutes a system or systems thus ordered by law, and that therefore it is an intelligible whole. Until this first impression is produced no explanation is sought, and no attempt at explanation is made. But this impression of stability, law, and intelligible system grows steadily with the development of the human mind. The impression of order and the unfolding of mental power act and react upon one another. It is as man begins to create an order for himself that he seeks to find order in the world to which he belongs. The more he himself becomes delivered from the chaotic succession of impulses and desires, so that he creates, within however narrow limits, ordered means to secure steadfast ends, so much the more does he become conscious of an external order of things upon which he may depend. The discovery of such an external order forces him to study its nature, and systematically to adapt himself to it if he would secure the fulfilment of his own purposes. Thus, step by step, the impression and experience of an external order of things is matured, and as reflective processes are awakened in his mind, he makes that order of things the subject of investigation apart from any other practical results to himself save the pure satisfaction of comprehending the natural order to which he belongs.

Thus, man's ordering alike of his inward impulses and of the outward means which he creates to satisfy his desires is *in fulfilment of purpose*. It is as he becomes the subject of increasingly steadfast purposes, and grows in the power of selecting and using an ever-wider compass and an ever-extending succession of means for their fulfilment, that the full range and power of his own self-consciousness is unfolded. New realms of purposes gradually open to him as his spiritual development proceeds, and with these new realms such new powers of mental activity and such new interests in the world as almost to constitute for him a new relationship to it.

Rightly or wrongly, therefore, man, when he comes to explain the world, does so instinctively by the same principles which govern the development of his own spiritual life. Wherever he finds activity in the world, and especially where he finds that reliable activity which we call the uniformity

of nature, he attributes the activity to purpose, and its persistence to persistence of purpose. He sees within it all, therefore, the exercise of will. It may be impulsive. Many wills may appear to him to be acting in concert or in conflict with one another. Or he may attain to the belief in one sovereign will manifesting itself through all the operations of nature. But, however this may be, activity, and above all, regular activity, means to him a purpose to be realized, and therefore a will which selects and adheres to it. Nature, therefore—as he becomes capable of the conception—is understood by him to be *an order for securing ends*. It is only at a later stage that natural order becomes depersonalized, and then the apparent invasion of order by the extraordinary suggests purpose rather than that upon which expectation has learned to count. In the first stage of this conception man's inner sense of his own importance makes him treat these ends as directly and perhaps exclusively relative to himself. The sunshine and refreshing showers of the spring are signs of the divine favour which would do him good, while the storm or the eclipse are tokens of wrath which he must endeavour to propitiate. Yet the intended effect upon him of these various experiences of nature are seen by him to take place, not for his own sake ultimately, but for the sake of a divine and sovereign end, with which he is now at one, and now at enmity. Hence, as the world is conceived to subserve the divine end or ends, this subservience is seen to be the final cause of its creation and the key to its meaning.

Thus, the sufficient reason of the world is originally demanded and discovered, because the inquirer extends to the universe the analogy of his own self-consciousness. The sufficient reason of his own thoughts, desires, and purposes, together with that of the mechanism which he calls into existence to satisfy them, lies in his own personality as self-conscious will. Within the sphere of his own self-consciousness no other explanation is needed of his thoughts, affections, and purposes, than that he thinks them, feels them, and wills them. When he seeks a sufficient reason for the world outside him with its changes, and still more with its ordered

changes, he finds it in personality, akin though superior to his own, whose thoughts and purposes the world exists to carry out.

Such is the general history, about which there is little or no controversy. But in recent times, and under the influence of abstract scientific conceptions, the whole of this mental process has been treated as illusory, save the one part of it which finds order in nature. Nay more, every other element has been excluded as illegitimate for the sake of the one element of order which is recognized, and it is even contended that the conception of order is imperilled if it is attributed to personality and will as its source. The idea that nature serves man is dismissed as due to a conceited sense of self-importance which arises from a restricted experience. With the dethronement of man as the end of the operations of nature comes the dethronement of all that for which man stands in the constitution of the universe. Thus, will is conceived from the standpoint of its power to break in upon an order of things, rather than from that of its power to create and to sustain such an order.

Hence, the only common ground from which all alike can start in their endeavour to explain the world is that it is presented to us as an ordered whole. Yet, if this be so, the first question that must be asked is, What is the nature of the world, which is thus presented to us as ordered? As to this, the following outstanding facts must be borne in mind.

Firstly, the world as an ordered system manifests a regular development which embraces within it the fulfilment of many special ends.

To begin with, it is a system, the vastness, delicate minuteness, and universal inter-relation of which the progress of science is only just beginning adequately to reveal to us. If the telescope, assisted by photography, brings within our observation system upon system of constellations, and suggests the possibility of an infinite number which must for ever lie beyond the possibility of earthly perception, these are all seen to be included in the network of common relations, and subject to like physical laws. At the other end of the scale of existence observation reaches to the threshold

of the infinitesimal, and its indications suggest elaborated relations between all its parts at least as wonderful as those which rule in stellar spaces. In short, nothing is too vast and nothing is too minute to be brought within the range of a common system of organized relations which are equally illustrated by the infinite and by the infinitesimal.

Further, this vast whole exists in the ceaseless activity of ordered change. Its state to-day is not its state of yesterday, nor its state for to-morrow. And the changes which take place throughout the whole are co-ordinated. Moreover, as the doctrine of evolution proclaims, 'they tend in a definite direction.'¹ The systematic relation of the whole is not interrupted, but is maintained in and through unceasing and universal change.

Finally, this evolving system presents countless means for the attainment of ends. The interpretation of this fact is a subject of dispute, and will be the main object of the present investigation. Meanwhile, it must be noted that there are countless organs and arrangements, at least in animate nature, which can only be described and studied as involving at least immanent ends. It is clear, for example, that the eye is the organ of seeing. The opponents of the existence of final causes in nature, or at least of the use of the conception in scientific explanation, may seek to rest in the bare assertion, 'The eye sees,' without advancing to the further proposition, 'The eye is intended for seeing.' But, in practical usage, it is impossible to maintain the distinction. The comparative study of the development of the eye, whether within one order of animals or throughout the whole range of animals gifted with vision, must depend upon the assumption that the end of the eye is seeing, and upon investigation of the various ways and the varying degrees in which that end is fulfilled. In some cases the end sought is not merely immanent in one particular animal or vegetable, but involves complex inter-relation, as, for example, in certain instances of the fertilization of plants by insects. It is quite possible that the progress of natural science may lead to the extension of this conception of ends beyond the biological sphere into the

¹ *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. ii. p. 290.

physical. Above all, the conception of evolution involves, as will be seen later on, the extension of this conception to the order of things as a whole, including both the physical and the biological.

Secondly, the world is apprehended as being thus ordered and is utilized by reason. The growth of finite consciousness displays a steadily increasing distinction between the ego and the non-ego. In proportion as purposive action is developed the sense of that distinction is increased. Yet side by side with the development of the distinction comes the development of the reason by which the distinction made by activity is transcended. Each step of mental development presents two aspects, the distinguishing of the rational self from nature, and the discovery that the nature which is so distinguished is relative, and in the last resort akin, to the reason which apprehends it. Only for such a reason does the world, as an ordered whole, exist. The whole impulse to explain it depends upon the intuition that the world is reasonable, that is to say, that it is governed by laws, arrangements, and systematic order, which can be explored and found intelligible because they are akin to the mind which searches them out. Yet, while at every stage the reason which apprehends and explains nature does so upon its own principles, yet these principles are not imposed upon nature, but found in nature. The conception of law proceeds from the constitution of human nature itself. Only as contained in that constitution is it fully intelligible, at any rate to human imagination. But nature responds to the conception, and exemplifies it through all its provinces and processes. The extent to which the imaginative realization of what is involved corresponds to the reality of things is the subject of this discussion. But at least in one sense or other it is clear that man and nature are bound together by a common reason, and that no account of that common reason can be given except in terms of the self-consciousness to which the whole order of things appears or is relative.

Thirdly, the development of this ordered, and therefore reasonable, system of things is marked by the successive introduction of higher forms of existence, exemplifying a

more complex organization, and seeking higher ends. Roughly speaking, existence, as we see it, falls into three great provinces—the physical, the living, the self-conscious. It is possible that the advance of science may, in some respects, soften the sharpness of these distinctions. And in two ways. The influence of the physical upon the living and the self-conscious has been set forth by natural science and emphasized by materialism. But, on the other hand, if the importance of the physical conditions of higher existence has been maintained, there are many signs that the reverse process is taking place, and that dawning gleams which are prophetic both of life and of self-consciousness, may be found in physical phenomena, where in the past men were satisfied with a purely mechanical explanation. Yet, however this twofold interpretation may be established, the broad distinctions remain. Within the realm of the physical we are concerned with the constitution, infinitely varied and complex, of atoms, molecules, crystals, and the like, where the action of mechanical forces is all that can be clearly discerned. In the living there is the growing prominence of what may be called a subjective centre, which has power to receive and to react upon the stimuli received from without; and to do so not merely because of the presence of purely mechanical forces, but in fulfilment of ends contained within its own constitution. At the summit of the living appears the self-conscious, containing within itself as extensive a variety and as many degrees of development as are manifest in the lower forms of life. Each of these higher provinces subsumes and is served by the lower. Attraction and repulsion are the forms of relationship which are manifest in the lowest. The reception of, and response to, stimulus marks vegetable life, while sentience, appetite, and instinct make their appearance in animal life. When self-consciousness is reached, it is marked by deliberate choice; by the growth of memory as the indispensable means of physical survival and progress; and, above all, by power to overrule the senses and the appetites by ends which are deemed greater in their intrinsic value, and of higher authority to command the will.

Hence, fourthly, the world takes a new beginning with man.

He is animal, yet he drops the instinctive equipment which regulates and protects the lower animals, and substitutes for the most part the conscious pursuit of ends blindly fulfilled elsewhere. He becomes, judged from the animal standpoint, the most defenceless of the animals. But side by side with his animal helplessness there is found the growth of the intelligent will, by means of which all the antecedent probabilities of the struggle for existence are triumphantly reversed. He gains his animal safety by a process which leads him to transcend and to subdue the merely animal in the pursuit of higher ends. He creates civilization. In that process he comes to spiritualize that which is natural; to treat the natural as the means to the ideal pursuits of truth, beauty, and goodness. If there be any physical explanation of this he is unconscious of it. To become conscious of it would defeat instead of promoting the ends for which he lives; would drag him down to a realm of considerations which the wise man, the artist, the philanthropist, the hero, and the saint agree in declaring to be unworthy of consideration in comparison with their ideal ends. For these ends the higher man lives, and for their realization he gladly sacrifices, though often not without struggle and temptation, the lower promptings of merely physical existence.

Fifthly, man, attaining to this ideal existence of civilization, is religious.¹ He conceives that he is in fellowship with God, and has the sense of dependence upon, and of obligation to, God. He searches for the substantial as against the world of mere appearances, for the eternal as contrasted with the fleeting, for the ideal in opposition to the actual, and for the infinite as beyond the narrow limits and the inadequate satisfaction of even the sum-total of finite experience. He looks to the Divine as the power which must and will redeem him from the thralldom of the lower in order that he may enter into the fullness of this spiritual inheritance. He seeks so to become the son of the Divine as to be delivered from himself and to be made an heir of the spiritual and eternal. All

¹ It is not, of course, intended that every man is so, at least, in any adequate sense of the term, but that religion represents a characteristic attitude of mankind.

religions, according to the measure of their worth, as has already been seen, have expressed all these needs, and represented their satisfaction. This has been perfectly the case in the Christian religion, and in the characteristic consciousness which has attended it.

Sixthly, the whole system thus unfolded is fulfilled in and mediated by Christ. Our preceding conclusions as to the place and meaning of the Christian religion entitle us to affirm this. Christ is by all confession *the* personality of history. In fulfilling the idea of religion, and inspiring the new religious life in the world, He has immeasurably advanced all the other interests of mankind. The history of civilization shows, notwithstanding the drawbacks due to the stupidity and unfaithfulness of men, the quickening touch of the Christian consciousness upon all the interests of mankind, not only spiritual, but also moral, social, political, and even rational and aesthetic. All these elements are essential parts of the world that has to be explained. The omission of any one of them leaves a result which is less than the whole of the problem which is set. To ordinary consciousness each is entitled to equal consideration with the rest. Those who seek, under a philosophical or scientific impulse, to unify the whole by a rational interpretation must take the greatest care before reducing any one of these elements to terms of the others, and especially must determine, if any such reduction is possible, to which among them priority of worth, meaning, and explanatory power belongs.

Perhaps no serious challenge to this statement will be made from any quarter, except to the inclusion of religion, at least, in the form which has been suggested. As to this, it may be objected that its inclusion assumes the explanation which is sought. The essence of religion, it may be contended, lies in the endeavour to explain the world as an ordered result by reference to a personal and intelligent cause, conceived after the manner of a man. The answer to this objection is that the theoretic discovery of a cause, adequate to the creation of the world, or to the production of the changes which are manifest in its history, is but a subordinate part of religion. The essential feature of religion in its highest and

most representative forms is the—at least fancied—consciousness of immediate relations involving fellowship, dependence, and responsibility with a divine person or persons made manifest to the higher spiritual faculties. It may be further objected that such alleged consciousness has exhibited such varieties, contradictions, and irrational superstitions that it has dismissed itself from practical consideration as a phenomenon representing the ultimate truth of reality. The answer to this objection has again been supplied by our previous inquiry. In its course we have seen what are the common elements included in all religions, and what are the limiting conditions in the varying types of human consciousness, the different stages of development, and the different kinds of experience which have resulted in such varying types of articulated religion.

Above all, it has been seen how, in the case of the one religion—Christianity—which can claim to be final, and can hope to become universal, exactly the same principles of ordered development and of vitality have been made manifest in its growth and influence which are found in the case of those powers of the mind which are commonly assumed to be trustworthy. The development of religion as revealed to us in the Old Testament and in the New is not a chaos, but is as clearly governed by laws of rational development as is the case in any other department of being, life, or thought. If evolution be taken to be the watchword of a rational explanation of the world, then the Christian religion presents itself as the supreme and most influential example of such evolution. To dismiss the patient consideration of it in this light, because of the superstitions and varieties of religion elsewhere, is to be guilty of a carelessness as to facts and distinctions which is a flagrant contradiction to the true scientific spirit. There is the less excuse for this in the case of an evolutionist, because the very nature of his special studies has revealed to him the highly specialized conditions which are necessary to the production of any highly developed form of life, and the way in which a limited development in other directions is obtained by the exclusion of the peculiar excellence to be found only in the highest and most select forms of life. It is therefore

in the highest degree reasonable to insist that any complete explanation of the world must take sympathetic account of so noteworthy a phenomenon of history as that of religion, especially the unfolding of the spiritual consciousness in Hebrew religion, in Christ, and in historic Christianity, with its achievement and still further promise of world-wide expansion and supremacy.

When all these elements are taken into account, they lead naturally to a theistic explanation. The appearance of finite personality, its position in the world, its rich, many-sided, and ideal development, in apparent independence of merely material necessity or advantage, press home the supremacy of a divine and universal reason as its source. And the weight of this presumption is corroborated by the testimony of religious experience, together with its spiritual, moral, and secular results.

It only remains for those who feel the force of these spiritual factors to leave to philosophic theology the task of developing a satisfactory doctrine of the Godhead thus revealed in spiritual consciousness, of His relationship to the universe and to finite selves, and of the divine end which is being realized in man and in the world. Speaking broadly, it may be contended that there is a connected development between the spiritual intuition of God, the consciousness of the importance and worth in the world of human self-consciousness, the recognition of the legitimate authority of the ideal ends of life and that of the universal prevalence of natural order. So far from the first three of these elements being unfavourable to the last, they are, on the contrary, its highest support and its completest explanation; though, of course, it must be admitted that an uninstructed Theism has too often damaged its own case by seeking the evidence of the divine personality in the breach rather than in the upholding of the order which it lays down.

But another course may be pursued. The world presented to perception appears to common sense as external to, and independent of, the percipient. Especially is this the case because it appears as an object common to all who perceive it and therefore independent of any of them. This hardened

appearance of externality and materiality is necessary at a certain stage of mental development, and for the ordinary purposes of practical life. It is the condition of self-distinction and self-development. It promotes that instrumental use of nature out of which all the practical arts of life arise. Natural science in its origin and temper stands in the closest connexion with common sense, for common sense presents the world which science investigates, and pursues those practical concerns of life out of which scientific interest arose, and the satisfaction of which it at least incidentally serves. Moreover, the instruments of scientific advance, whether mathematical, covering all the operations of numbering and measuring, or experimental, interrogating outward things by isolating and adapting them, lend themselves to this standpoint of ordinary perception and emphasize it.

The primary sphere of scientific inquiry may, therefore, be defined as being things in their material objectivity and in their mutual relations. The problem only gradually disengages itself from the utilitarian ends of life and becomes purely theoretic. In this process science is driven from the easy-going assumptions of ordinary perception and common sense, and finds it increasingly difficult to answer the two questions, namely: What is a thing? and, What is the meaning of the relationships into which it enters? But while the course of its inquiries drives natural science farther and farther towards the realm of metaphysical discussion, its problem is always set to it by the appearance of phenomena as a multiplicity of things bound together in a complicated network of relations.

For natural science, therefore, man becomes the selfless observer of an apparently independent system of things which constitutes the world. His distinctive problem is to secure a finally satisfactory description of things, and an explanation by means of the category of causality of the co-ordinated changes through which they pass.

It is not intended to deny the legitimacy or usefulness of this point of view, or of the methods which are implied by it, so far as the purposes of physical inquiry are concerned. It is perfectly possible to combine them with Theism in one

of two ways. It may be done by reviewing the initial assumptions, the process, and the final results of scientific inquiry in the light of philosophy, with a view to establishing the legitimacy of a theistic explanation of the whole. Or, short of attaining to this philosophical point of view, a theological explanation may be introduced at some stage of the scientific inquiry. This latter is the usual resort of scientific inquirers, who are religious, but not metaphysical. Such inquirers usually either assert the conclusions of faith as subjective impressions borne in upon the mind, which are entitled to a hearing although they cannot produce strictly rational justification; or they select some special point, or points, in the evolution of the world at which it becomes necessary to call in the assistance of a divine Creator or Artificer. That point may be the initial production of matter, or the giving to it the first impulse which endowed it with motion. Or it may be held that such interference was necessary in order to arrange the collocations of the various elements of matter and their combinations. By some the introduction of life, and, above all, the production of man, are singled out as needing a direct and peculiar intervention of divine activity from without. Finally, the necessity of a miraculous revelation supplied for the guidance of self-conscious beings, produced by a purely natural order of development, may be insisted upon. At one, or all, of these points religion may modify the naturalist point of view, not by subjecting it to general metaphysical criticism, but by the use of the categories of physical explanation themselves, or by reference to the ordinary experience of the world, especially including the volitional activity of man presented to common sense.

Our immediate concern is not, however, with the scientific justification of such a procedure, or with the philosophic validity of the way in which it is carried out. It is with those scientific inquirers who contend that the final explanation of all things is contained in natural science, understood as dynamics; and that what cannot be so explained by measurement of size and weight and calculation of dynamic forces, is either incapable or unworthy of any further explanation. Such a temper leaves entirely out of account the

relativity of all things perceived, perceptible, or imaginable, to consciousness ; and depreciates, not merely for the purposes of scientific investigation, but absolutely, the importance of selfhood in the universe. It boldly challenges the sovereignty of the spiritual, and reduces reason, conscience, and religious aspiration, either to the result of material conditions, or to an inoperative shadow attending those conditions. For it, the testimony of religion, including Christianity, is that of a malevolent or benevolent superstition, according to particular circumstances—for example, the variety of the religion or the stage of human development—or, ignoring all these distinctions, according to the bias of the inquirer. Even here qualifications must be made. This attitude of thorough-going naturalism may be fitful. It is possible to maintain it throughout the whole course of scientific inquiry and exposition, and to brandish its assumptions in defence of the scientific position with the vigorous enjoyment of a savage clubman, and yet, at the end of it all, some frank confession may retrocede the whole ground so aggressively occupied in the scientific campaign.

Further, it must be borne in mind that the representative attitude of the most recent and representative men of science shows a remarkable growth in humility as compared with that occupied a generation ago. In evidence of this the address of Professor G. H. Darwin at the British Association of 1905 may be quoted. ‘We have seen,’ he says, ‘that it is possible to trace the solar system back to a primitive nebula with some degree of confidence, and that there is reason to believe that the stars in general have originated in the same manner. But such primitive nebulae stand in as much need of explanation as their stellar offspring. Thus, even if we grant the exact truth of these theories, the advance towards an explanation of the universe remains miserably slight. Man is but a microscopic being relatively to astronomical space, and he lives on a puny planet circling round a star of inferior rank. Does it not then seem as futile to imagine that he can discover the origin and tendency of the universe, as to expect a housefly to instruct us as to the motions of the planets? And yet, so long as he shall last, he shall

pursue the search, and will no doubt discover many wonderful things which are still hidden. We may, indeed, be amazed at all that man has been able to find out; but the immeasurable magnitude of the undiscovered will remain through all time to humble his pride. Our children's children will still be gazing and marvelling at the starry heavens, but the riddle will never be read.'

The growth of this more modest attitude is due in part to reaction after the self-confidence which attended the remarkable scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century; in part to the effect that has been produced by the criticism and modification even of those great discoveries by later scientific inquiry. Above all, it has been brought about by a deeper reflection, giving a more sympathetic hearing to criticisms which emanate from metaphysical and even from theological quarters.

At the same time, the purely naturalist point of view is still strong and confident. For those who hold it, the first concern is to secure the presentation of things in their bare objectivity and materiality, as the only sphere not only of scientific inquiry, but also of ultimate reality.

1. In order to this there comes first the expulsion of final causes from the world of reality. Final causes are almost universally held to imply purpose, will, and directive intelligence. If admitted, therefore, they indicate the existence and influence of divine personality. They are conceived by those who deny them to be external to nature, and therefore to be superimposed upon it from without. But the system of things is supposed to be a rounded whole complete in itself. Therefore, not only is such alleged outside influence excluded from the purview of science, which regards the world as a self-contained whole, but it is excluded from the possibility of knowledge which has no means of proving the existence of such influence. Hence final causes have probably no place in reality. The modern attack upon them was led by Spinoza, who based his opposition primarily upon quasi-theological grounds. His investigation of the nature of God in his *Ethics* left no possibility of purpose, for according to him, God, who exists and acts out of the sole

necessity of His own nature, predetermines all things, not out of freedom of choice, or of His good pleasure, not with understanding, or even with consciousness, but by reason of a natural necessity. This necessity results in the manifestation of the one self-existing Substance in the two parallel, but mutually independent, forms of extension and conscious intelligence.

The world of extension and that of finite self-consciousness proceeding necessarily from the divine Substance and being irreducible one to the other, there is no room for the attribution of purpose to the divine Substance, seeing that the consciousness of purpose belongs only to intelligence as a finite and phenomenal attribute. Moreover, even if it were theoretically possible to attribute purpose to the divine Substance, a spiritual reason would, according to Spinoza, forbid this being done. For to attribute purpose to God and the creation of means for its accomplishment is to suppose that there is a need in the nature of God which demands satisfaction, and this is contrary to the divine perfection.

Indeed, the very imagination of final causes, he contends, is due to an illusion. Men suppose themselves to be free, and always act with a view to some desired end. Hence they come to believe that the end of their desires is in itself the cause of their actions. Further, as they discover both within and outside themselves many means of benefit to themselves, as, for example, their bodily organs and the food which nourishes them, they conceive that these were divinely produced with a view to their well-being, and in order that the gods who produced them might receive the gratitude and worship of mankind. The principle, being thus accepted, is immediately extended, for if there are natural causes of benefit to men, there are also causes of injury, as, for example, storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c. It follows that these must be the result of divine displeasure. Hence the attribution of final causes becomes the refuge of ignorance. Wherever knowledge of efficient causes fails men assume the fulfilment of a supposed purpose as an explanation. Moreover, they naturally make their own organs and dispositions the standard

of existence, judging things to be good or bad according as they are agreeable or disagreeable to themselves.¹

All the objections thus urged by Spinoza have had a measure of weight with those who reject final causes as having no place in the universe. In the main, however, there have been two operative considerations which have led to this rejection. In the first place, it has been held that there is an opposition between the principle of Final Causes and that of Efficient Causation. The latter has been conceived as determinative within the facts themselves, while the former must, in the nature of the case, be outside the things themselves, and therefore be inoperative. As a matter of fact, they exist only in the imagination of men, and are projected thence into the world of nature by reason of a false analogy set up between man's acts as apparently purposive, and the events which happen in the world. Secondly, however this may be, the discovery of Final Causes is held to be outside the range of science, which is limited to the task of discovering, measuring, and describing the antecedents and consequents throughout the whole range of universal physical causation.

2. What is left when Final Causes have been expelled consists of Matter and Motion. These may, indeed, not be treated as self-explanatory. Such blank materialism has long been put out of court. Modern thought prefers to treat them as the manifestations to sense of an unknown Substance, which is revealed, not only in matter and motion, but also in the finite consciousness which attends matter in certain complex forms of organization. But while this is nominally the case, for all practical purposes, matter and motion are frequently treated as the only trustworthy materials for a scientific explanation of the world. Hence, practically, the attitude taken up by Professor Tyndall in his celebrated Belfast address remains unchanged. The final reservation of the naturalistic philosopher, however, gives him all the practical advantages of materialism without encountering its speculative inconvenience, or even absurdity.

What then is matter? As defined by the metaphysicians

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I., Appendix.

of the past it possessed two groups of qualities, the primary and the secondary. The primary qualities included extension in space, weight, and resistance to pressure. The secondary qualities included colour, scent, &c., which were speedily discovered to depend in a peculiar degree upon the faculties of the percipient as well as upon the qualities of the percept. These secondary qualities have since been resolved into effects produced upon the consciousness by modes of motion, emanating from objects and affecting the sensory apparatus of man. Thus certain of the qualities which common sense attributes to matter have been transferred by modern science to motion.

Matter, therefore, is what occupies space and resists pressure. It can be divided mechanically or disintegrated chemically. Hence, the problem of its ultimate constitution is raised. The progress of physical and chemical science, and the application to them of mathematics, have produced the atomic and molecular theories of the constitution of matter, the molecule being defined as the least possible particle of a composite body, whose parts are held together by chemical affinity, the atom being the infinitesimal and primary particle of each of the supposed distinct chemical elements entering into combination. But the speculations of science have not ended here. Within the atom the electron is now conceived to exist. The primary atom itself is supposed to be as highly organized a body as a planetary system, and the doctrine of the survival of the fittest has been extended from forms of life and systems of worlds, not only to molecules, but to atoms themselves. Indeed, the vista opened before us by the material universe is one of infinite extension throughout space, and of infinite subdivision into imperceptible parts, each kind being a special modification of the infinite and universally diffused ether.

Again, matter appears to ordinary observation in two states, at rest and in motion. As this motion is investigated it appears to be governed by systematic laws which express the working of natural forces. In the stellar systems attraction and gravitation are the names of forces by which the motions of heavenly bodies are regulated. In the world

of chemistry, affinity; in that of physics, attraction and repulsion represent the forces which have to be measured and described. While, therefore, motion as commonly perceptible has opened up immense fields of scientific inquiry, the pursuit of that inquiry has shown how untrustworthy is the ordinary supposition that bodies are at rest unless moved from without. Not merely may motion pass into apparent rest, but rest may pass into motion if the conditions, physical or mechanical, be suitable. Nay, more, the discoveries as to colour, sound, and heat—to say nothing of electricity—have shown that bodies supposed to be at rest are really in violent internal motion. The pressure of gases is explained as due to the combined motions of the minutest particles. In this way science has been led to the conclusion that while any particular body may be at rest in the sense of holding an unchanged relation to outside bodies, there is no such thing as a body at rest so far as the action of its constituent atoms is concerned. Every atom, indeed, is a composite system of matter in ordered and ceaseless motion. Until recently it was supposed that atoms were indestructible. The conclusion, however, that they are composite bodies has shifted the attribute of indestructibility from them to the elements of which they are composed.

What, then, is matter? It becomes increasingly difficult to decide. If the impressions of ordinary common sense are upheld, it is that ultimate inert body which resists motion, but is impelled to it by force. On this line of thought it becomes ultimately resolved away into a mere force-point, the centre to which and from which forces are directed. On the other hand, all that is effected by force may be transferred to matter as its ultimate cause, and when this is done matter contains, as Professor Tyndall said, 'the promise and potency' of all that is, because it has been definitely endowed with that promise and potency by the exercise of imagination. Ultimately regarded, in short, the distinction between matter and motion is an abstract one; it exists in thought, but can never be reached in reality. Inert matter can never be discovered, nor can motion be even conceived as distinct from some body that is in motion.

Motion in itself represents simply the variation of external spatial relations between different bodies. Such variations must be conceived as the result of causes. Such causes turn out to be capable of observation, description, and measurement. They are therefore called forces. But forces are not always apparently in activity. They may be latent, even for vast periods, awaiting suitable physical conditions for their activity. Moreover, as recent investigation has shown, one kind of force can be transmuted into another; indeed, all are under certain conditions interchangeable. For these reasons the conception of forces as the cause of motion has given place to that of energy as the universal, indestructible, now latent, now active, cause of the systems of motion which prevail throughout the material world and by which its organization is explained.

Within this world of matter in ceaseless and systematic motion there appears the phenomenon of life, with its organization, its power of receiving and responding to stimulus from without by something other than a mechanical resultant or a chemical reaction. Its essence has hitherto proved indefinable, its origin inexplicable. It is accompanied by, and is often treated as the result of, physical organization. In that physical organization, the laws of chemical combination and of dynamics are maintained. By many it has been supposed that a vital principle is necessary for the explanation of life. Those, however, who seek to interpret the universe in terms of matter in motion forecast the time when they will be able to demonstrate that life is the natural and necessary result of a peculiar collocation of matter, and that it originated from the non-living under highly favourable physical conditions, the possibility of which has now perhaps for ever passed away. The scientific explanation of the world in terms of matter and motion depends for its ultimate possibility upon the truth of this confident prediction.

But the forms of animal life are conscious, and the highest form of animal life known to us, namely man, is self-conscious. The gap between the conscious and the unconscious is even greater than that between the living and the non-living, although in the advance from the lower to the higher there is

apparent ■ steadily increasing complexity of physical organization corresponding to the advance in vital, and above all in conscious power. Hence this complexity of physical organization is treated as being in itself the explanation of the consciousness which accompanies it, and which varies according to the complexity and delicacy of the nervous organization. Yet, however this may be, consciousness is by all confession irreducible to physical terms. It is not convertible into terms of matter and motion in themselves, even if a particular condition of matter and motion is essential to its existence and determinative of its activity. Indeed, it is conceived to be equally impossible for ■ physiological state of matter in motion to be the cause of consciousness and for a conscious state in itself to break in upon the regular succession of physical causes and effects. The impression that our thoughts and purposes have this power is due to a human illusion. Hence the view of nature which explains it entirely in terms of matter and motion is completed in the doctrine of 'psycho-physical parallelism,' which treats the psychological or self-conscious side as an epiphenomenon, the inoperative subjective state which invariably accompanies certain determinative physical conditions.

With the denial of the practical power of consciousness—its thoughts, purposes, sense of freedom, religion, affection—the whole world created by the human mind is divorced from practical influence upon the course of the universe, becoming reducible to the mere concomitants of biological conditions, which again, as has been seen, are reducible to physics.

3. The universe of matter in motion has, however, not always possessed its present form. On the contrary, taken as a whole, it is passing through continuous change. The evidences of such change have always appealed to thoughtful observers from the time when Heraclitus uttered his famous dictum that 'all things are in a state of flux' (*πάντα ῥεῖ*). In modern times, however, every field of scientific observation, including physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, has multiplied evidences of this fact. Above all, biology and the sciences concerned with man have borne concurrent testimony to it. The advance of modern inquiry has steadily broken

down the hard-and-fast distinction of types which until recent times was accepted as evidence of distinct and separate creative acts. The process began with the biological discoveries which culminated in the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. It was extended by the advance of geology, with its explanation of the phenomena of stratification by the operation through prehistoric times of forces still actively at work. The hypothesis of La Place had already substantially assumed it in regard to the history of the planetary systems. By means of the Spectrum Analysis the great discovery was made that the same chemical elements which are found on the earth are present as constituents of the heavenly bodies, and that they are subject to the same general physical and chemical laws. In more recent times the independence of the supposed chemical elements has given way. So far as these still appear to be original, their differences are conceived to be simply due to differences in the complexity of their atomic constitution, not to any differences in the actual material of the atoms themselves. The whole present state of the material universe is conceived to be the result of special modifications of the underlying ether diffused throughout the whole of space.

Thus, the material of the universe is entirely homogeneous, and represents various stages and degrees of organization due to continuous changes in the disposition of its material particles brought about by changes of motion. These changes have been and are due to gradual processes which have operated through a practically unlimited past. They are also systematic, resulting from unchanging laws of activity, affecting universal matter in that correlation of its parts which naturally arises from the unity of the primary substance that underlies all change. The differentiations which have taken place in the organization of matter, and have resulted in the present constitution of the universe, are assumed, and not explained by the supposition of a primitive material substratum acted on by an all-pervading motion.

Again, this continuous and systematic change has been ever towards more complex forms of organization. To use Herbert Spencer's famous definition of evolution, the present

state of the universe is due to 'an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.'¹

In its highest processes, at least, this change represents a constant victory over apparent inertia. The springing up of a plant, for example, is the triumph of life over the force of gravitation which drags it downwards. The same is true of all forms of animal development and activity in which the tendency of matter to seek a state of equilibrium is constantly disturbed by the action of animal impulse; in the case of man, by conscious volition. To explain this continuous change brought about by a ceaseless activity, which results in an ever more complex physical organization, and is attained by this triumph over inertia, the doctrine of Evolution has been introduced.

The conception is biological in its origin. It is suggested by the examples of vegetable and animal growth, which to the ordinary observer appear as an ordered unfolding of initial potentialities of growth contained within the original organism. This principle is extended by analogy from the sphere of biology to that of physics, from special phenomena to the universe as a whole.

This general view of evolution presents various alternatives. Is it due to an inherent tendency eternally present within matter itself? Or is it, as the Greek atomists supposed, due to a chance hit by which the present universe, with its particular laws and its power to survive, came into existence from amid the infinite possibilities of other worlds, otherwise organized? Is the order which we know universal, or is it the realization of a cosmos within an outlying chaos? Are there many systems in different stages of evolution or decay, or is there only one? Is the universe finite, or is it infinite? So far as observation goes, decay is the inevitable sequel to evolution. The energy which has been available for the purposes of activity and organization gradually becomes exhausted, which means not that it

¹ *First Principles*, 3rd edit., p. 396.

is destroyed, but that it becomes unavailable for work—a victim, if the expression may be allowed, of that dissipation of energy which evolution successfully overcomes. Are then periods of evolution and decay cyclical, or has the whole universe started from one beginning, and is it tending to universal and final decay? If the former, what is the cause of the new start which periodically takes place? If the latter, had the universe a beginning in time? What set the process of evolution in motion? What, in short, are its original factors, and what, if any, their explanation?

All these are questions which have been answered in various ways, and which seem incapable of final settlement by any merely physical evidence. However they may be answered, care is taken by those whose view is now being presented to exclude any conception of prevision, design, and effective will-power in originating the whole system or guiding it to its appointed ends. In dispensing with any such conceptions, the discovery by Darwin of what is called the principle of 'Natural Selection' is supposed to be of the highest service. The term stands for the supposed accidental¹ appearance of variations in living forms, which enter into a struggle for existence, in which the victory goes to the fittest, namely, to those which are the most completely equipped to take advantage of their environment; the rest gradually perishing or surviving only under subordinate conditions of existence. This principle, applied in the first place only to the phenomena of life, has been gradually extended, as has been seen, to the domain of physics, reaching on the one hand to planetary systems, and descending on the other, not only to molecules, but even to atoms.

The limitations of the doctrine of evolution are immediately apparent. The principle of natural selection, however widely it may be applied, may explain the persistence of any form of organized matter when it has been produced, but does nothing to explain its original appearance. In the second place, while the principle may account for the issue of

¹ To the word 'accidental' various meanings may be attached. Generally, however, it will be understood as excluding conscious purpose in the appearance of particular variations.

the conflict between particular forms of physical organization and of living organisms, it provides no explanation of the universe as a whole. The survival of the fittest takes place after a competition between kinds with varying degrees of adaptation to their environment. But there is no environment to the universe as a whole, nor, whatever may be the possibilities open to abstract speculation, is there the slightest evidence of a competition between universes for existence.

Thus, the conception of evolution, while it may suggest an infinite number of experiments within the sphere of the universe, gives no explanation of that which led to the initiation of such experiments, of the material with which such experiments were made, and, above all, of the tendency prevailing throughout the universe to an ever more complex and highly elaborated system.

4. At this stage Agnosticism comes in to complete the point of view which is here being described. The original motive for such agnosticism is the fact that science, as such, is brought, as has been seen, to a dead stand when it approaches the ultimate problem of the origin and explanation of the universe. Evolution is simply an attempt to describe a process which has gone on in the world. Assuming that the whole world is the result of material organization; that matter exists, and that it is acted upon by those physical forces whose mode of working physical science investigates; assuming also that the highest consciousness is the result or the concomitant of material organization, the ultimate questions, What is matter? whence is it? and what is the explanation of its laws? are insoluble by science according to all confession. The only way out of the difficulty is to deny that they need solution, to treat them as self-explaining. This is done by the upholders of what may be called 'materialistic Monism.' But it does not represent the most widely current view of scientific men; witness, for example, the quotation given above from Professor G. H. Darwin. Sir Isaac Newton could measure and describe the force of gravitation, but what gravitation itself is, and, still more, why it is, neither he nor any one else has ventured to say. To lay down that it is an inherent property of matter is only

to tell us what we already know, but why it should be this rather than that it is impossible to say. Hence all such questions are excluded from the purview of science, now that it has frankly abandoned the cruder materialism of the eighteenth century. Its task is limited to describing things as they are, it being assumed that this task can be completed without any knowledge of what, whence, and why they are. Yet while this manifest inability of science to offer a complete explanation is admitted, and while the material universe is treated by most as not being self-explanatory, resort is made to metaphysics—a subject which for other purposes is decried—in order to shift the responsibility of this incapacity upon the constitution of the human mind itself.

It is true that the inability of science to explain the universe is not always treated as dependent upon the constitution of all finite mind in itself. In Professor G. H. Darwin's address, for example, it is implied that this inability arises from the fact that man is a microscopic creature in a practically infinite universe, and that he is placed upon a planet which is inconveniently situated for the purposes of observation. Such difficulties naturally suggest themselves to an astronomer, but it is impossible to conceive that man's chance of solving the real problem would be affected by an increase in his physical bulk or by any transportation through space to a better equipped observatory. Increased powers of observation he might have were his sensory organs more powerful, and his position in the universe more central. Even increased power of calculation might attend this enlarged perceptive power. But the difficulty of explaining the universe arises from altogether different causes, and would not be diminished if his perception of it in its material aspects were made complete.

A charge has been brought against man's sense-equipment by Mr. Balfour, in his Presidential Address to the British Association.¹ Having broadly traced the different conceptions which have succeeded one another as to the nature of matter and the constitution of the physical universe, down to the

¹ *Proceedings*, 1904, and separately published.

most recent speculation that the world, as we perceive it, is simply a modification of electricity, Mr. Balfour proceeded to turn the limitation of our sense-faculties into an indictment against them, and to use their apparent untrustworthiness as suggesting a doubt as to the adequacy and validity even of the highest faculties of the mind. He attributed this untrustworthiness to the fact that these faculties have been produced by natural selection. 'The blind forces of natural selection,' he said, 'which so admirably simulate design when they are providing for a present need, possess no power of prevision, and could never, except by accident, have endowed mankind while in the making with a physiological or mental outfit adapted to the higher physical investigations. So far as natural science can tell us, every quality of sense or intellect which does not help us to fight, to eat, and to bring up children, is but a by-product of the qualities which do. Our organs of sense-perception were not given us for purposes of research; nor was it to aid us in meting out the heavens or dividing the atom that our powers of calculation and analysis were evolved from the rudimentary instincts of the animal. It is presumably due to these circumstances that the beliefs of all mankind about the material surroundings in which it dwells are not only imperfect, but fundamentally wrong. It may seem singular that down to, say, five years ago, our race has, without exception, lived and died in a world of illusions; and that its illusions, or those with which we are here alone concerned, have not been about things remote or abstract, things transcendental or divine; but about what men see and handle, about those plain matters of fact among which common sense daily moves with its most confident step and most self-satisfied smile. Presumably, however, this is either because too direct a vision of physical reality was a hindrance, not a help, in the struggle for existence; because falsehood was more useful than truth; or else because with so imperfect material as living tissue no better results could be attained. But, if this conclusion be accepted, the consequences extend to other organs of knowledge besides those of perception. Not merely the senses, but the intellect, must be judged by it; and it is hard to see why evolution,

which has so lamentably failed to produce trustworthy instruments for obtaining the raw material of experience, should be credited with a larger measure of success in its provision of the physiological arrangements which condition reason in its endeavours to turn experience to account.'

The whole force of this indictment rests upon the adverb 'lamentably.' In the first place, it seems gratuitous to attack the faculties of man as inadequate, just when it is claimed that they have made a great discovery. Especially is it unsatisfactory to use the discovery of the intellect to discredit the senses, and when this has been done to use the discredit of the senses to throw back upon the intellect which has set them right.

But again, Mr. Balfour points out that the supposed deficiency of the senses was presumably brought about because too direct a vision of reality was a hindrance, not a help, in the struggle for existence. The purpose of nature was to fit man for practical living, though, according to the other part of the statement, nature did not deny to him faculties by which eventually, through his fitness for practical living, he might come to give a theoretic explanation of the practical conditions under which he lived. This very true account is vitiated by the alternative offered, that the slowness of the process is due to the fact that falsehood was more useful than truth, or else that it is accounted for because with so imperfect a material as living tissue, no better results could be obtained. First of all, there is no falsehood. The senses reveal to us, for the purposes of practical life, exactly what is in nature. There is no falsehood in a man's senses because as he sits in his room, in relation to its surrounding objects, his faculty of eyesight does not enable him to see the foundations. For the purposes of living in the room his perception is not false, but is true, although it is not exhaustive, like the knowledge of God. And in the next place, even supposing that with so imperfect a material as living tissue no better results could be obtained, the results which are obtained are exactly such as are sufficient for man to live the practical life by which his faculties are developed. The general question may always be asked, 'Why was not man God?' But the

asking of it, instead of marking the highest standard of philosophy, is merely irrational. Why, then, criticize our perceptions because they, like ourselves, have limits? Perception is conditioned by the world in relation to which it has to play its part. It is reinforced by faculties which enable us eventually, as has been seen, to transcend its immediate deliverances. But the practical plan upon which human faculties are laid out shows us that man is treated by the universe to which he belongs as, above all, a practical being, whose knowledge is to be gained as his powers of activity are evolved, and not as a mere instrument of abstract thought. The general limitations, therefore, arising out of man's dependence, are not unfriendly to, but in harmony with, the needs and purposes of that practical activity by which, above all, his nature is to be explained.

The general argument in support of Agnosticism, while it may be incidentally strengthened by such considerations as Professor Darwin and Mr. Balfour urge, rests upon a metaphysical foundation. It depends, as it is set forth by Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and others, upon a twofold inability. Firstly, upon the inability of the Source of all things to reveal Himself as He is to finite minds. Secondly, on the inability of the finite mind to pass beyond the phenomenal, and to apprehend underlying reality. The whole question whether the Source of all things is knowable hinges upon the twofold question whether what He is is such as can be brought within the sphere of knowledge; and secondly, whether the faculties of human knowledge are so constituted that they can possibly apprehend Him. The two are ultimately one, but the former approaches the matter from the standpoint of the nature of God, the latter from a criticism of the faculties of man. Roughly speaking, from the former standpoint the question is, Can God—supposing Him to exist—be conceived as He really is? From the latter standpoint the question becomes, Is such a God as can be conceived by human faculties the real Source and explanation of the universe? This was the issue presented by the late Dean Mansel in his celebrated Bampton Lecture on *The Limits of Religious Thought*. His argument supplied the material for that of Herbert Spencer

in his *First Principles*, and represents to the present time the philosophical position of Agnosticism. God, according to Mansel, must be conceived as First Cause, the explanation of all that is; as the Absolute, existing above all relations, and as the Infinite, exempt from any limitations of any kind. But to begin with, these characteristics are mutually contradictory. If God be First Cause, He is not absolute; for to be a cause is to enter into a definite relationship which is the contradiction of absoluteness. Moreover, the infinity of God implies that He contains within His nature in an infinite degree all possible qualities, including those which are contradictory to one another. To represent Him as First Cause is so to define His relation to the universe, for example, as to involve the limitation in that particular direction of His infinity.

The matter becomes worse still as we consider the essential nature of knowledge itself. Knowledge in general, and the knowledge of God in particular, has four essential features. It involves, firstly, a distinction between the subject and the object. Whether, therefore, God knows or is known, this involves a limitation. If He is known, He becomes distinguished as the object of knowledge from its subject, and this limitation is contrary to His infinity. A similar limitation is involved from the opposite side—if He be the knower. Secondly, knowledge involves a relation between the knower and the known; but the existence of this relationship is contrary to the absoluteness of God. Thirdly, all knowledge, so far as our consciousness goes, involves succession and duration in time. But directly any object becomes subject to succession in time it is shown to be finite, and this, again, is contrary to the nature of God. Fourthly, the knowledge of God involves that He should be conceived as a personality, for only a personality can be the subject of such attributes as religion must needs apply to Him. But personality involves both limitations which are contrary to the divine infinity, and relations which are contrary to the divine absoluteness.

Hence there is an inherent contradiction between the religious consciousness, its need and affirmations, and the real

nature of God. It is hopeless to attempt to lessen this contradiction, for any such attempt implies that we have the material of a real and adequate knowledge at hand by which we can correct the errors of the inadequate. But this is not even a matter for inquiry, for, as has been seen, the conditions of such an adequate knowledge are necessarily beyond our reach. It is therefore useless to attempt to correct crudities of religious thought in the hope of attaining a satisfactory knowledge of God, whether the attempt is made by dogmatic theology or by rationalism. The result of all such efforts is equally open to philosophical criticism with the crudest errors of superstition.

Yet, according to Mansel, the case of religion is by no means lost as the result of this incapacity ; on the contrary, it is assured. God has given to man a revelation, which, while useless for the purposes of exact thought and adequate comprehension, has regulative value ; that is, it is a guide to practical life. Revelation is accepted by the faculty of faith, which is totally distinct from that of reason, and because of its distinctness can never be the object of a successful attack by reason. Hence the revelation of the Scriptures, when its real office is understood, is secure from the assault of reason. In the first place, reason cannot get at it. In the second, any attempt to do so exposes reason to exactly the same objections which it has urged against revelation.

It is obvious that general thought, unconcerned with the special interests which Mansel was concerned to defend, could not rest in his conclusion. It is impossible to conceive a revelation, even for regulative purposes, when the very giving of it, however inadequate it may be judged from the speculative standpoint, is contrary to the absoluteness and infinity of God, which are held to be essential to His perfection. To suppose that God contradicts Himself, even for a regulative purpose, involves absurdity upon absurdity ; the absurdity of the contradictory act in itself, but the prior absurdity that the Absolute and the Infinite has set up conditions so inconsistent with itself that this contradiction becomes necessary. In the next place, it is impossible to maintain the authority of faith apart from reason. The faith which accepts the true

revelation is bound at least to distinguish it from all false claimants to the position. How is this to be done save by an appeal to reason in the last resort? Not only does faith need, therefore, to avail itself of reason in distinguishing the claims of the Christian religion from all others, but, whatever may be the right of the matter, it is liable to be ejected from the premises of human life if it cannot give an account of its presence upon them which is intelligible to reason. And its power to be intelligible to reason depends upon some community of nature between the two. Hence, Mansel's arguments in support of Christianity have long since crumbled away; while his argument proving that adequate knowledge of God is not only impossible, but involves radical contradictions in thought, has become the basis of the doctrine that God is unknown and unknowable, as this doctrine is presented by Spencer, Huxley, and the agnostics.

The whole contention rests upon the extension to real existence of the logical principle that '*Omnis determinatio est negatio*.' It is further implied that, as Kant laid down, there is an absolute distinction between things in themselves and phenomena; in short, that the essential quality of things in themselves is that they cannot be revealed in phenomena, for then would they not cease to be 'in themselves'? Yet to leave the matter thus would be hopeless, not merely for the adequate knowledge of God or of underlying reality, but even for the scientific explanation of the world. The most obvious necessity in order that the world may be explained within scientific limitations is the assumed reality of infinite Power. Therefore, in the celebrated reconciliation between the claims of science and religion offered by Herbert Spencer the following conclusion is reached: 'Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and must eventually be freed from its imperfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing. To this conclusion Science inevitably arrives as it reaches its confines; while to this conclusion

Religion is irresistibly driven by criticism. And satisfying as it does the demands of the most rigorous logic at the same time that it gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action, it is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve or qualification.'¹

Or, secondly, if underlying Reality be not defined as Power, it must be understood as Substance; Substance being held to be the sufficient reason of all that is, and the whole universe being the natural unfolding of its contents. This latter is the monistic explanation of Haeckel.² It sets aside Agnosticism, in form at least, by asserting that what appears to agnostics to be the problem is when rightly conceived the solution.

The Substance which manifests itself has two aspects, the material and the spiritual; each involving the other. There is no primacy of the spiritual. On the contrary, practically it is the other way. Finite consciousness only makes its appearance with the appearance of the living germ, and necessarily ceases at the moment of death. According to the development of the organism, and especially according to its nervous development, is the presence and range of consciousness. Just as the conception of an independent spiritual and immortal consciousness is disproved by biological science, so the conception of a supreme spiritual and purposive being who is Creator of the universe is due to an irrational extension of the illusions of human consciousness to explain the universe. All that really exists is Substance, unfolding itself in the two-fold form of matter in motion and of the consciousness which accompanies it. The former, however, is of chief importance from the scientific point of view, since the material aspects of life are alone suited for exhaustive scientific investigation, alone yield exact results and absolutely determine their accompaniments in consciousness. Thus the underlying Substance, so far from being the primary enigma, is the means of solving the riddle of the universe.

Our survey of the fundamental positions of what is called Naturalism is now complete.

¹ Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 108.

² Haeckel is himself indebted to Spinoza for the conception.

CHAPTER III

THE CRITICISM OF NATURALISM

IN criticizing Naturalism it will be well to proceed in the reverse order to that in which it has been expounded in the previous chapter.

I. We begin by considering the philosophical position assumed by Agnosticism.

1. At the outset it should be remarked that Agnosticism contradicts man's natural instinct of explanation. The history of human thought, not only religious but also philosophical, shows the habitual transgression of the limits which it is now attempted to impose upon it. In transgressing these limits men have had no consciousness whatever that they were falling into unreason. They have naïvely used the powers revealed in their own consciousness to explain the phenomena and the history of the world. In doing so their steps have been most certain just where, according to Agnosticism, they should have been most uncertain. That men have pursued this course habitually does not in itself prove that they ought to have done so. But at least it is remarkable that if the human mind is really as incompetent as is supposed it should be compelled instinctively to seek an explanation which is beyond its reach, to meet wants which are illegitimate, and to present answers to the world-problem which, even where they have failed to give intellectual satisfaction, have been both supported and opposed in total unconsciousness that alike the question asked and the answer offered were necessarily absurd. In all other realms of life the continuous putting forth of effort in a fixed direction reveals an immanent rationality, is inspired by the real needs

of life, and leads to the completer discovery of truth and the fuller adjustment of life to its environment. Are we to suppose that at the highest point of life, namely human self-consciousness, and in the intensest and most universal exercise of it in the attempt to explain the universe, that which is true everywhere else becomes false, and that the persistent effort to find a higher and larger environment above that of sense represents a total aberration of the human mind? The view thus taken is so contrary to all that we can observe elsewhere, as well as to the testimony of every other intuition and instinct of human nature itself, that it at least needs the most careful criticism before it can be accepted.

2. The agnostic position, when it is closely examined, appears to be a skilful attempt to secure the practical advantages of Materialism while evading its metaphysical difficulties. It starts with Power; it ends with man. But the inscrutable Power which it posits as the source of all things manifests itself in matter and motion with the ever more complex arrangements that matter in motion produces. Man is the last result of matter in motion. The spiritual and moral instincts of his nature, when they are not explained away as due to illusion, are explained as resulting from biological interests.¹ These biological interests result from the need of securing the stability of the most complex combinations of matter in motion, namely the organic.

Thus at every point the dominant factor in the explanation is materialist. Matter is the only manifest result of the underlying power; it is the key to the characteristic efforts of the finally resulting consciousness. Yet, even Professor Huxley admitted that the one thing of which we have immediate knowledge is not matter, but mind. The whole of our perceptions *appear to us*, and in order so to appear must become either direct presentations or representations to our own consciousness. Primarily, therefore, all perceptions are states of consciousness, whatever else they may be held to involve. To ignore the consciousness which is primary and co-extensive with the whole field of knowledge—for the

¹ See the fundamental positions of Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics*.

very term has no meaning except for consciousness—and to treat that which appears to consciousness as being the cause of consciousness itself, is to invert the order of things. It is to explain the better known by the less known, the immediate by the remote; to turn the result of consciousness into its cause. This has been generally recognized as the fundamental fault of Materialism, and has led to its abandonment by every school of competent thinkers. But Agnosticism, while it seeks to evade the unpleasant consequences, is guilty of the same fundamental fault. It indeed offers the adjective 'inscrutable' on the altar of religion and philosophy; but it claims the substantive 'Power' for a frankly materialistic explanation of being and life. Inscrutability makes no further appearance till the process is complete, and then is again made use of to propitiate those interests which have been ignored throughout the proceedings.

3. Agnosticism brings in covertly the very explanations it expressly excludes, just so far as it is inconvenient to dispense with them. It begins by fencing off the Source and explanation of all things as unknown and unknowable, because not amenable to any possible categories of human thought. But it needs unlimited and underlying power to make its scientific explanation of phenomena possible. Hence 'the unknown and unknowable' is immediately translated into 'power' to meet its convenience. If this translation be legitimate, ultimate reality is neither unknown nor unknowable. It is known to exist, it is recognized as underlying Substance, and it is treated as power manifest throughout phenomena. In the next place, this assumption that the so-called unknown and unknowable is infinite power, not only violates the epistemological principles that have been laid down, but is in flagrant contradiction with the metaphysical assumptions of Agnosticism. God cannot be known, we are told, because He is absolute. But underlying power is not absolute. It has become relative to that which it underlies. Any attempt to escape this conclusion is a mere subterfuge of thought. Again, it is supposed that underlying reality is beyond knowledge, simply because it is underlying, and therefore a 'thing in itself.' Such a thing in itself is inoperative unless

it is manifest in phenomena; but directly it is so manifest it ceases to be a thing in itself. Hence the 'inscrutable Power' of Agnosticism is either not a thing in itself, and therefore not the ultimate reality at all, or it is not a power, in which case it is of no use for the practical purpose in hand.

4. Once more, this conception does not in the slightest degree escape from the charge of anthropomorphism which is brought against theistic belief. Our conception of power is simply an abstraction from our own consciousness of will, and of its ability to secure results. We are conscious of will as the determined effecting of purpose in spite of obstacles without and of inertia within. This triumph of will, first of all over inertia, and then over outward obstacles, is what we mean by power. To explain the universe by power, therefore, is simply to utilize this experience of our own consciousness, and is as plainly anthropomorphic as the most pronounced Theism that exists.

Haeckel, as has been seen, substitutes the conception of substance for that of power, and escapes the difficulties which drive Agnosticism to make positive affirmations about that which is by hypothesis unknown and unknowable, by treating the conception of substance as self-explanatory, and every further question asked about it as due to the irrational exercise of human intellect. There are three difficulties in this view of the matter. It appears, to begin with, hazardous to assume that so much of the characteristic work of the human mind is entirely fallacious, and yet to maintain the absolute confidence which Haeckel cherishes in the scientific explanation provided by it. If the whole history of human thought is marked by fundamental illusion, how shall we be certain that any purging process has gone far enough, or even—to put the difficulty in an extreme form—avoid the fear that the very fact that the human mind thinks anything is a presumption that it is not true? This will appear clearer shortly, when the derivation of the conception of substance is examined.

In the next place, we are invited by Haeckel to surrender the worship of a personal God largely on the ground that the universe as it exists is not good enough to be His creation.

Yet we are to substitute for the worship of Theism that of Pantheism, which finds satisfaction in explaining all things by the so-called natural laws of physical science, without raising any of the questions hitherto suggested by the spiritual and moral intuitions and postulates of mankind. Such a worship has the most serious evils. In setting aside the higher intuitions and postulates it invites us to be satisfied with a poorer universe than they demand. We are to accept a universe as naturalistically perfect which, on spiritual grounds, is worthy of such condemnation as to render the conception of a Supreme Goodness impossible. Further, we dismiss the demands of the spiritual and moral nature as illusory, in flat contradiction to the general principle manifest everywhere else, that what has been naturally evolved has meaning and purpose, and, therefore, represents truth, although it may be with imperfect expression.

But the third fundamental objection is that the conception of substance, unfolding itself in its two aspects, cannot be primary. Postponing for a moment the question of its source, the universe, as has already been seen, is that which is manifest in and to consciousness. The universe stands in an organic relation to consciousness, but as a percept it is in a subordinate relation. The mind which distinguishes it, in so doing subjects it to its own forms of thought. In knowledge, therefore, the mental aspect, so far from being subordinate to the material, or even parallel with it, holds supremacy. To dethrone mind from that supremacy, when passing from the finite experience to the explanation of the world as a whole, is to reverse the order of things manifest in perception, without having any conceivable justification for so doing. At whatever stage of the evolution of the world we plant ourselves in imagination, that world has no meaning except as a presentation to consciousness. Could we stand in presence of the earliest manifestation of underlying substance in a nascent cosmos, it would be still something relative to the human mind, and only explicable in terms of it. There can be, therefore, no warrant for dispossessing the mind from the position which it holds in all actual or imaginable experience, when we come to consider the origin of the universe *in and by which* this

experience is brought about. Some conception of reason, indeed, is needed which may enable us ultimately to bridge the distinctions set up in finite consciousness between the mind which perceives and the world which is perceived. But the possibility of such a final solution depends upon its being consistent with, and not a reversal of, what the whole range of human experience unfolds. Hence, illogical and incoherent as it is, Agnosticism is a more satisfactory solution than any explanation that begins by ignoring or reversing the fundamental declaration of consciousness which, even if an imperfect instrument of world-explanation, is all that we possess.

It is perhaps unnecessary to deal at length with the metaphysical difficulties upon which Agnosticism relies, for they have been frequently discussed. When it is objected that God, as the Absolute and the Infinite, cannot reveal Himself without destroying both the one and the other of these essential attributes, it is necessary to be on our guard against perils of definition and abstraction which beset us on every hand. Is God the Absolute and the Infinite? If so, what exactly is meant by these terms? To what extent is it true, when these terms have been carefully defined, that He cannot reveal Himself, and that, therefore, His existence cannot be known? All these questions need to be carefully answered. As to the first, it is important to remember that the final abstractions of human thought are not the first realities in actual existence. The conceptions, the Absolute and the Infinite, whatever they may be worth, are conceptions of thought, representing its last and most abstract analysis. But to suppose that the Absolute and the Infinite exists *as such* is to make exactly the same confusion between logical conceptions and real existence as is made when it is supposed that pure undifferentenced being exists. What exists is not pure being, but being enriched with the endless attributes of the actual concrete world. In the same way, if Theism is true, what exists is not a spiritual abstraction called the Absolute and Infinite, but an actual divine Being, manifesting those qualities and standing in those relations which the careful study of the universe reveals.

Thought will therefore escape from the entanglements

involved in abstract conceptions to inquire whether such a being as theology postulates is made manifest as existent, and how far the conception of His being, attributes, and relationships entertained by theology is capable of being rationally expressed, so as to be compatible with the whole texture of conscious experience. Such an investigation disposes at once of the supreme dignity of the bare logical conceptions of absoluteness and infinity. If by the infinity of God is intended that God is absolutely without qualities, or is the all-receptive home of contradictories, common sense as well as religion refuses homage to so meaningless a conception. Such a being, if He were possible, could not be God, for if there be a God He manifests certain distinctive attributes in and through the world of which He is the source and explanation. Both religion and thought would prefer to have a real God manifest in determinate character, instead of a mere empty metaphysical abstraction. The same is true of the attribute of absoluteness. Manifold relatedness and capacity for relation make the dignity and power of human life. To treat God as incapable of such relations honours Him by the attribution to Him of what is in itself unintelligible, and which even if intelligible would reduce Him to complete ineffectiveness. What should be intended by this conception is, that God is not dependent upon the world for His existence; but that the world is dependent upon Him, and that in some sense the world is within His being, and not outside it. This, of course, is the ultimate difficulty of a completely satisfactory doctrine of God in His relation to the world. But it is in regard to the practical problem of the inclusiveness of the life of God and yet the independence of the life of the creature, that the solution must be wrought out, and not with the counters of mere logical abstraction. Upon the answer to this question, to be discussed later on, will depend in what sense we are to understand that God can reveal Himself.

It must not be supposed from the foregoing criticism that the postulates of substance and power are without serious metaphysical meaning. Indeed, the present contention is that they will be found to contain within them distinct theological

implications. It has been seen already that the conception of power is subjective in its source. The same thing is true of the conception of substance. At first sight it may seem easy to postulate the primary and absolute substance, which by a process of natural development results in the cosmos, as presented in perception, having its two parallel aspects of consciousness and extended matter.

But when we come to consider this conception more closely in reflection it becomes clear that it is a pure creation of our own thought. It is impossible to reach it by any perception which passes beyond its own universal conditions to an immediate apprehension of it. Not only is it a creation of our own thought, but it is clear whence the material of it is derived. In consciousness we have an intuitive sense of selfhood as lying at the base of all that is manifest in our various mental states, whether of thought, feeling, or volition. The deliverance of consciousness is, further, that this selfhood is relative equally, and perhaps co-extensively, to mental and bodily states. The procedure both of Spinoza and of Haeckel is to throw out from this primary fact of self-consciousness the conception of a similar underlying reality within the perceptible universe, and to treat it as the explanation of all that is relative to it, just as selfhood is the explanation of all the manifestations and experiences of our conscious life.

Thus the only material for the conception of substance, both as to its nature and as to its very existence, is to be found in our consciousness. The attempt to purge the conception of the selfhood which at first attaches to it, even if it be legitimate, by no means clears it of as purely subjective and, to use Haeckel's own expression, 'anthropic' an origin as the developed theistic conception against which he wages warfare. Man is as much the source of the concept of substance as he is of the idea of God. The use of this concept is an example, in fact, of the cosmological argument for the existence of God, to which such serious objection was taken by Kant. Roughly speaking, this argument is as follows. Every beginning has a cause; the world had a beginning, therefore the world had a First Cause. As

presented in the ordinary theological way, this argument offers the dilemma of either conceiving a process of phenomenal causation which has had no beginning, that is, has been going on from all eternity; or, on the other hand, of starting from an original Source which is the First Cause of all the effects subsequently manifest in the universe. It has been argued that the first of these two alternatives, involving an infinite regress, is unthinkable, and that therefore we are driven to the second alternative of a First Cause, which in order to be sufficient, is invested by subsequent argument with the attributes of divinity. The argument as thus presented is open to a variety of criticisms. In particular a twofold objection is taken by Kant against it. In the first place he objects that the category of causality holds good in the world of phenomena, but cannot be extended from the relations of particular phenomena to that which is the source of all. His second objection is to the attempt to posit a First Cause as being *necessary* to explain the world, which, because of its finitude, presents itself as an accidental effect. Further, it is argued that because a conception is unthinkable, in the sense that it cannot be realized by the imagination, it is not necessarily untrue; that an infinite regress cannot be presented to the mind is no sound argument against its reality.

Whatever may be the force of these objections, they do not invalidate the essential meaning of the cosmological argument. To admit them all is only to be brought face to face with that wherein its real significance consists. It is clear that the First Cause said to be established by this argument stands in a totally distinct relation to phenomena from that of the whole series of phenomenal causes. It does so, if for no other reason than that it is treated as the underlying explanation of the whole, instead of as a particular activity manifest in the parts. It is unnecessary to discuss the applicability of the attribute of necessity to such an explanation, provided that it is found to be real. In addition it may frankly be admitted that there is a fallacy in the form of the argument that because an infinite series is unimaginable therefore it cannot be existent. For it is impossible to stretch the power of the imagination to cover all the facts of the

universe. Moreover, it is perhaps not of the greatest importance to the theistic argument whether the phenomenal universe has existed from past eternity, or whether it had its origin in time. What, however, the cosmological argument attempts to satisfy, is the demand of the human mind for a sufficient reason of all that exists. It is not so much concerned to find the first term in a series of phenomenal causes, as to find the principle of unity which constitutes the whole series, the power which makes them effective, the wisdom which orders them. Such alone can be their sufficient reason. The nature of such a sufficient reason is involved in the structure of consciousness itself, and in the relation of consciousness to all its states. We are conscious of a twofold relationship within ourselves. The one is of the phenomenal succession of mental states—including thoughts, feelings, and desires, under the influence of perception, the association of ideas, and changes of bodily condition. We are, in addition, conscious of a Self to which all these changes in consciousness are relative, and which is manifest in them all.

The cosmological argument postulates a similar explanation of the universe as involving on the one hand a possibly infinite series of phenomenal changes in an ordered system, and underlying that series, constituting and explaining it, a reality which holds a similar relationship to the whole that selfhood holds to the manifold states of conscious life. The form of the cosmological argument is an attempt to give exact expression to this demand. Its force depends upon the legitimacy of the transference to the universe as a whole of the particular relations manifest in finite consciousness. The procedure of monistic philosophy, whether represented by Spinoza or by Haeckel, affirms the legitimacy, and even the necessity, of this assumption. It is dissatisfied with the so-called infinite regress of finite causes, and postulates an underlying Substance manifest throughout them as being their only possible explanation.

Exactly the same dissatisfaction accounts for Herbert Spencer's postulate, the inscrutable Power, possessing the causal effectiveness which, as has been seen, is suggested by the triumph of the human will over subjective inertia and

objective resistance. The substantial contention therefore of the cosmological argument is agreed to alike by theists, monists, and agnostics; and is agreed to by all simply because, despite the opposition of Haeckel, the human mind is forced to conceive the universe 'anthropically,' that is, to treat the fundamental features of human consciousness as containing a revelation of the fundamental features of the universe as a whole. Just as the individual is conscious of a greater measure of reality in himself than he attributes to his passing thoughts and feelings, so he searches for what has been termed the 'Ens realissimum' underlying the passing states of the universe as a whole.

The question then arises to what extent this principle should be applied. The monist, as has been seen, does not escape by his attenuated conception of Substance from the Anthropomorphism to which he objects. The agnostic thinks himself entitled to appeal to the inscrutable Power so far as that assumption is necessary to make him at home in the universe, for his practical purposes of phenomenal explanation. Why rob the fundamental Substance of those qualities of selfhood and character which are manifest in the only Substance of which we have immediate knowledge, namely, self-consciousness? And why, having claimed power for the underlying Substance, should objection be taken to its being further clothed with mind, heart, and will? At least, no objection can be raised against the latter extension which cannot be urged with equal force against the former. Yet such objections urged against either the complete or the incomplete expression of this underlying principle of the human mind fall to the ground before man's absolute inability to get out of himself, or to treat his fundamental deliverances as having no relation whatever to the conception and explanation of the universe.

It is said that knowledge is only of phenomena, the things that appear. Of what are they appearances? To whom do they appear? It is selfhood, as has been seen, that causes us to conceive the relation of Substance to phenomena. It is consciousness to which phenomena appear. Must not this fundamental fact of selfhood be used as the

one sufficient reason to explain the world? Is there not completer justification for the full use of it than for the attenuated use contained both in Monism and Agnosticism? Must not the sense of need of a world-explanation haunting all men, with the practical assumption that such an explanation can be found attending most men, be held to be of greater weight than abstract objections raised against both the need and its satisfaction, especially when such abstract objections fall to the ground through their inner inconsistency, and assume in a veiled or mutilated form precisely the principles it is their professed business to oppose.

II. The next subject for inquiry is as to what is involved in the hypothesis of evolution.

Understood as a mental conception, the doctrine of evolution asserts that the present state of the universe is due to a gradual and orderly unfolding, brought about throughout by the operation of natural causes.

Pervasive as the hypothesis has become, gaps still remain which the whole course of scientific investigation up to the present has failed to explain away. The first of such gaps is found at the introduction of life, the second at the appearance of consciousness, the third at the manifestation of those highest forms of consciousness which are exhibited in the rational, moral and religious activity of man. It cannot be said that either speculation or physical inquiry has in any way helped us to understand the transition from the non-living to the living, from the living to the conscious, or from the conscious to the fully rational and religious. As has been observed with regard to the first of these, 'the spectre of a vital principle still lurks behind all our terms.'¹ Various methods are adopted in order to overcome this difficulty. The attempt to reduce the phenomena of life, consciousness, and reason to terms of matter and motion will be considered shortly. A counter tendency to find the dim promise of life and consciousness in that which appears at first sight to be non-living and merely physical has already been noticed. The view that life naturally emerges

¹ Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. ii. p. 462.

from the non-living, when all the conditions are favourable, without the introduction of a special vital principle, raises the great problem how to account for these favourable conditions without a pre-arrangement which involves prevision and purpose. The difficulty of conceiving the evolution of the conscious from the unconscious, and of the highest forms of rational life from the lower, presents even greater difficulties.

It is needless here to particularize more special difficulties, as, for example, the fact that biology appears to require a much greater period of time for the evolutionary processes than physics is at present prepared to pronounce possible.

It may suffice to consider what is involved in either alternative, whichever may ultimately hold the field. Should the existence of gaps in the evolutionary process be ultimately confirmed by science, and the necessity of distinct principles of life and consciousness be conceded, the introduction of such distinct principles into the world at the precise moment when its general conditions enabled it to receive and foster them will ever remain one of the strongest evidences of a superintending mind, and a sovereign will, carrying out its purpose in a time-succession by a recurring creation of higher forms of being, to which all previous forms become subservient. It is possible, however, to conceive that the gaps may be bridged by a more complete investigation of the physical conditions, if to these be added the frank recognition of the promise of life and mentality clearly recognized as such in the most rudimentary forms of physical existence. In short, if the opposition between nature and spirit is transcended at the outset, it may be unnecessary to face it at the finish, provided the course of physical investigation shows that gaps were not really existent in the physical history of the world. Suppose that the imagined existence of these gaps be disproved, the emergence of the conscious out of the unconscious, of the living out of the non-living, will still remain unthinkable unless the potency and promise of life and consciousness be traced back to primordial existence itself.

Let it be assumed, however, that this result is reached.

What, then, does the conception of evolution demand and the investigation of the universe reveal? Surely if anything serious is meant by the conception, the three following elements are absolutely indispensable to it. Firstly, an immanent end, which is gradually attained by the universe in a way somewhat similar to the arrival at maturity by the living organism. Secondly, an organized system for realizing that end, or for attaining to that maturity. This involves the reality of an all-embracing process, which correlates and co-ordinates all parts and forces throughout the whole, so that order is preserved throughout change, and all change is in the direction of the final result. Thirdly, a persistent energy, pressing upward and onward, towards ever more highly elaborated results. This, at any rate, is the impression borne in upon us by the study of any province of the universe, and it is distinctly the conception of its history which is conveyed by those who offer evolution as the explanation of the world. If the conception be intended to be not merely satisfying to the imagination, but also theoretically strict, it presents a metaphysical problem at every point which it will be subsequently contended can only be solved by a theistic interpretation. If the main conception be not seriously intended, we are being played with as by conjurers, who divert us by means of by-play, while their tricks are being performed. In order to satisfy the imagination a large conception is presented, the essential meaning of which is cast aside in the particular hypothesis of physical explanation. In such case the real meaning of the conception is evacuated, and only chance remains as the true explanation of the world. On this supposition the original existence of matter is postulated, and infinite time is claimed with infinite possibilities of experimental combinations of primordial atoms. A subsequent warfare between these combinations takes place, in which the fittest survive and become aggregated in the correlated system of things which we understand by the universe. Such has been the explanation offered, with minor variations, by ancient and modern Materialism, from the time of Leucippus and Democritus to the present day.

As a mere conception, it presents the insoluble problem of transmuting chaos into cosmos without a principle of order involved. The very assumption that, from such a fortuitous concourse of atoms, the related world which we know could emerge, carries back to the first beginnings of things by an illicit process of the mind exactly those principles of relation with which our experience of the ordered world as it exists has made us familiar. The multiplicity of such phrases as 'accidental variation,' 'natural selection,' 'the survival of the fittest,' and the like, does nothing to assist the explanation of the world by chance. Each of these is open to the most serious criticism. In particular it is entirely unscientific to speak of variations as accidental. Completed knowledge would without doubt give a full explanation of the causes of such variations as of all other physical changes. But beyond all such criticism the appearance, the advantage, the survival and perpetuation of particular variations are only indications that the universe is constituted in a particular way. The real problem is then, given an entirely disorderly world with the present principles of order at work, to describe how everything which was incompatible with them passed out of existence in order that they might prevail throughout an ordered universe. The principle of order is clandestinely introduced from our existing knowledge of the world. When it is discovered it must be called to account for itself, and it will be found to imply principles which are from first to last the negation of chance.

Looked at from a more general standpoint, the human mind will never believe that the universe, which throughout its infinite vastness reveals such marvellous delicacy of organization, as universally in the infinitesimal as in the infinite, which throughout the whole range of nature shows the prevalence of common principles of inter-relation, and which throughout all changes maintains alike the minuteness and mastery of a perfect order, not imposed from without, but manifest within all the related elements of the cosmos, is due to a chance hit among infinite other possibilities. These possibilities are infinitely against the appearance of any one particular combination. When, instead of one single

combination, the existence of an infinite number of successive and co-ordinated combinations is involved, the possibility of such a result being fortuitous is represented by an infinite number of infinite improbabilities piled up upon one another. The passage in thought from the constitution of atoms of different types to molecules, from molecules to their collocations in the world; from these to the systems aggregated in the countless worlds known to or imagined by astronomy, then on to living organizations, and finally to the higher animals and man, shows how stupendously irrational this conception really is.

Moreover, this process of evolving order out of chaos was not a mere mental process, but one which took place on the field of material nature. Where, then, are the signs of this tremendous warfare between order and disorder, or between conflicting systems of order striving for ultimate possession of the whole field? Obviously there are none. There are indeed, to all appearance, heavenly and other bodies in every stage of growth or of decay. There may be planetary systems which are hastening to their final dissolution, while others are still in their earliest infancy. Yet all these stages of evolution are governed by exactly the same laws, and exhibit the working of the same relationships with which we are familiar in that portion of the universe which we are accustomed for ordinary purposes to regard as stable. Indeed, the order of the world never represents the stagnant identity of any being with its own immediate past; still less such an identity of the whole system of things, or of any province of it. 'All things are in a state of change,' is still the truest generalization from the facts presented to us in every part of the universe, whether of mind or of matter. But wherever we find such changes going on, they are subject to universal laws, and manifest common features. Change within the universe, therefore, offers not the slightest corroboration of the supposition that there may have been rival universes in germ, striving to oust one another from existence. Even variations within the known universe which lead to differing degrees of stability and permanence are variations within limits that are strictly marked out.

All have some measure of positive capacity for existence in the universe, else they could not enjoy even the small measure of permanence which belongs to them. All enjoy it because they are subject to the general laws which condition the whole, or rather are particular manifestations of the underlying reality which is manifest in all existence and through all changes. The detailed test of such an explanation of evolution by chance should be applied in the case of living bodies, whence the whole conception of evolution arose. To deal with speculative cases, which at best are almost infinitely remote, lends itself indeed to easy assumptions, but provides no basis of sound reasoning. In living bodies variation in one particular feature, if at all important, means a concomitant transformation of all features. Thus, the phenomena of all variations reveal a dominant and all-embracing order, persistent in and through all change. The whole system is a living and inter-related whole, and changes in the organism manifest—not strife, but complete co-ordination.

Above all, the impossibility of explaining change in the universe as due to accident or chance is brought home by the new discovery of the importance of the cell-structure in biology. The old hypothesis of growth, by what may be termed elastic expansion, has been superseded by the doctrine of epigenesis, or of growth by division. It is found that development takes place from the primitive and almost undifferentiated cell of protoplasm by a ceaseless process of growth by division, the organism advancing by each such division a stage forward towards its final form. At every stage there seem almost numberless possibilities of divergence from what is called the type; the very conception of a type being, it may be remarked, hard to reconcile with the supposition that the world is governed by chance. Can any one who traces the growth of any such organism, selecting its way as it were through so many chances of abortive variation, be content to attribute the result thus steadfastly attained to chance? Even if there be a heroic believer in the incredible, capable of making such an affirmation in the case of an individual organism, what can be said of the

unfailing persistence of the type through countless generations, involving the continuous and unfailing reproduction of similar forms? If the phenomena of development in any single life represent the orderly attainment of an immanent end through co-ordinated changes, which involve internal division and the steady assimilation of suitable nourishment from a congenial environment, what shall be said of this process steadily continued without failure throughout the millenniums of biological existence? Moreover, the more closely the general conditions of life are studied, the more it is borne home upon us that they have regard to the future quite as much as to the present, and appear to be devised with a view to the steady improvement of living forms. Thus the arrangements of nature are in accord with the progressive energy which is the moving power of its development. Is there any greater probability of evolution by chance elsewhere? Each stage of physical explanation wins some new conquest for the principles of order, discovers a harmonious process, completing its results with more than an artist's fastidious care, even in the most infinitesimal parts. The progress of science is, therefore, by means of the exclusion of the fortuitous. As Lotze has pointed out, what the material universe presents to us is not infinite possibilities, which can be contemplated by a thinker, but the actual existence of one such possibility.¹ The whole development of the cosmos has taken place from one actual primitive state, which contains the possibility of an infinite but correlated development. Variations are only possible within strictly definite limits, and therefore never break out from the system to which they belong, the nature of which becomes fully manifest in their complete development. The question involved, therefore, is, Why this ordered universe and not another? What is involved in this correlation through change and in the attainment through this correlated change of the finally developed system of the world? The mere use of the term 'natural selection' will not explain it. As has been observed, 'natural rejection' would be a more suitable term than 'natural selection,' for what is explained thereby

¹ *Microcosmos*, vol. i. p. 432 (English translation).

is not the persistence, still less the first appearance, of any positive forms of existence, but the rejection of those which do not sufficiently conform to the system of the world to insure continuance in it. What constitutes the system which so rigorously excludes ultimately these unsuccessful competitors in favour of superior forms? Is not their rejection due to their inability fully to conform to a marked-out end? Is not their exclusion, whatever other problems it may involve, the evidence of the progressive achievement of an end which supersedes the lower by the higher? To what is this persistent effort to supersede a lower by a higher state of things to be attributed? So far as we are familiar with such a process in ourselves—our only sphere of immediate observation—such effort reveals purpose. What can be the justification of casting aside this element so indispensable in the field of our own primary observation, when we come to examine apparently kindred phenomena upon the stupendous scale of the universe without?

Once more, chance is the negation of reason. To say that a change came by chance is to say that no reason can be given for it. Yet the whole investigation of the universe proceeds on the initial assumption that it is a rational whole, and that the reason of it can be discovered. The result of each stage of the investigation, in whatever department it is carried on, is to make the universe appear more rational than it was before. It is to encourage the hope that when the process of inquiry is completed, if ever, the last lurking appearance of unreason will have been expelled, and all things will appear naked and open, that is, comprehensible, to an all-embracing mind.

To sum up, we have the following results of the evolution of the universe. In the first place, its supreme product is mind. Mind unifies all its experiences, present and past, by reference to a self which underlies and is present to them all. By means of memory mind can revive the past as a personal experience in a way which is absolutely incomprehensible, unless the full spiritual significance of the self to which that past was relative be tacitly assumed. The self which thus unifies its own experience is characterized by reason, affection,

and will. It seeks to attain the purposes which satisfy reason and affection by deliberate choice issuing in volition. The appearance of such a reasoning, desiring, volitional being is the last outcome and the most remarkable product of evolution, which ever strives apparently to produce and to perpetuate the highest forms of being.

Secondly, when this rational self appears upon the scene as the result of evolution, it seeks and finds a corresponding reason in the universe outside itself. It comes to seek and to find that reason outside itself by realizing a reason within itself, which it did not create, but which was provided for it by means of this process of evolution. As this process of evolution completes itself in the mental development of the rational self, it discloses the larger reason of the world outside. The mind grows to its maturity in finding that the world without is intelligible by being apparently purposive. This evolution of rational faculty and discovery is on the hypothesis part of evolution itself. How, upon the principles of evolution, can the light which it sheds upon the whole processes which culminated in itself be dismissed as worthless for the purpose of world-explanation? Surely the fact that the highest product of evolution is rational, needs to find reason in the whole process which has culminated in itself, and successfully finds it there with every advance of its own thought and experience, is the evidence that uniting and underlying the rational self and the universe which it explains is an absolute self. That self awakens the need and gives the power to apprehend reason in the world, simply because its own underlying reason and purpose is unfolded alike in the laws of evolution and in the mind that comes to discover them.

To all this it is replied, as has been seen, that mind is a mere epi-phenomenon, arising whenever certain complicated conditions of physical organization are realized; but wholly inoperative as a cause determining physical conditions, and therefore useless to make any contribution towards their explanation.

To this general view two objections must be raised, which to ordinary minds will always seem conclusive. In the first

place, from the standpoint of ordinary consciousness this general conclusion is incredible. It is a contradiction of our own primary experience, and is totally impracticable for the ordinary concerns of life. So far as man is a percipient being he has a primary instinct that he possesses a measure of reality, which is not possessed by the successions of his sensations and perceptions. The self to which these are related in consciousness has a sense of continuous identity, a memory of the past, and an expectation of the future. Each man's present experience is what it is, because by means of self-consciousness it finds its place in the texture of events which form the life-history of the self. Reality, therefore, for him is determined so far as it concerns himself by the placing of each new experience in that time-succession, which has no meaning except for an enduring self present throughout the whole. If it should be suggested to him that some elements of this experience are merely subjective, he tests their objective reality by discovering whether they relate themselves to other selves as they do to him. The test of reality, therefore, applied by ordinary consciousness to perceptions, is their presentation to a world of selves as part of a common consciousness which implies not only immediate experience, but also memory and expectation. To throw out this self-reference in perception is to throw aside not only the basis, but also the meaning of knowledge. It is to deny the primary and to substitute for it a secondary, which is in all cases an inference from the primary, and an inference the very making of which depends upon the application to the secondary of principles which have been discovered in the primary. With the disappearance of the primary, therefore, the secondary vanishes also. And the mind, face to face with this result, is reduced to stupefaction.

In the second place, our primary consciousness has equally a sense of making choice. The alternatives of that choice are supplied to us by a state of things in the external world; as, for instance, when walking in the country I find myself brought to a stand by a dead wall, and have to decide whether I will make a detour to the right or to the left. For ordinary consciousness the hypothesis which denies that material

conditions can operate upon the mind, or be affected by it, will be negatived as absurd by such common experiences. But when this influence of external things upon the mind takes place, I am assured by the consciousness which accompanies all choice that it is within my own power to act one way or the other. When my progress is stopped by such an obstruction, I deliberate which is the best way out of the difficulty. My mind wavers between various considerations presented to it. It may be that I am unable clearly to decide which is the better course to take. Yet, as it is necessary to make progress, I at last throw the whole weight of myself upon the side of one of the alternatives, prepared to run the risk of having made a mistake. This consciousness also is primary. To attempt to explain it away is to explain away the better known by the less known, and by a less known which exactly contradicts the immediate consciousness by which alone life is possible. The very contradiction, moreover, is made by fetching up out of my own consciousness that sense of continuity and of causal relation, or it may be only of inseparable association or succession, which again in the last resort is supplied, not by things in themselves, but by things as presented in and affecting consciousness.

Hence, this treatment of mind is not only incredible from the standpoint of common consciousness, but reduces the very idea of explanation to an absurdity. Explanation, when carefully considered, can mean nothing but translation into terms of mind. That by which, and in terms of which, all knowledge exists must not at the end of the process be swept away in order that that which is only intelligible by and through it may be substituted for it. An explanation is only asked by mind; apart from mind there is nothing to be explained. The means of explanation are everywhere found in principles supplied by mental states themselves. When philosophically examined, the whole foundations and cogency, not only of philosophy but of science, are destroyed directly the mind is dethroned. Hence, in order to the explanation of nature, nay, even to the appearance of nature, the transcendence and immanence of self-consciousness are necessary. According to the development of that self-consciousness is the extent and fullness of the

world perceived and sought to be explained. The world appears as infinite to man in comparison of its limited significance to the lower animals, because a higher and larger self-consciousness has been given to man than is possessed by them. It is the full development of self-consciousness which relates man in thought to the universe, and gives him a growing apprehension of its vastness and its order. Upon this fundamental fact rests the ineradicable belief that mind has a reality and an efficiency of a higher degree than is possessed by nature abstractly, though wrongly, conceived as the antithesis of mind; and that to understand the relations in which mind and nature stand to one another it is necessary to assume a universal mind underlying and manifest in both. Hence, the most natural explanation of evolution as a persistent upward tendency of all things, culminating in finite mind, and unfolding to that mind a universal reason and, at least, the appearance of steadfast purpose, is to be found in the universal presence in all the parts and processes of the universe of a sovereign mind as the only known cause of persistent and of ordered effort, manifesting that attainment of satisfying ends by ordered means which we call reason.

III. It is necessary, in the next place, to examine what is involved in the supposed explanation of the world in terms of matter and motion. It is assumed, as has been seen, by those who offer a naturalistic explanation of the universe, that it can be explained by the action and interaction of these two factors. Assuming these as the ultimate realities of physical existence, the problem of science is to reach, examine, measure, and describe them. Such a process, if completed, would furnish a complete definition alike of their inmost nature and their mutual relations. Our present business is to consider what is the source of these two factors, whether they can possibly be treated as ultimate, or even as possessing independent existence, and how the conception of them stands related to our subjective experience.

As to the first question, the ordinary reply would be that matter and motion are supplied to us by sense-experience. Modern science, at least in England, assumed at the outset

Locke's doctrine of perception and Hume's doctrine of causation. The former treated the senses as supplying ready-made the complete objects of perception. These objects are subsequently dealt with by reflection, which examines the relations in which they stand one to another. Experience, therefore, is assumed to be sense-experience. Such sense-experience provides us with innumerable cases of invariable association of particular antecedents and consequents in change. A determined effort has been made, first of all by Hume, and then by the modern association school of philosophy, to represent that this invariable association is all that is implied in physical causation. Waiving all other criticism of it, it has become clear that such a conception of causation is insufficient to explain the phenomena of evolution as understood by recent science. Therefore, behind the conception of invariable association, that of energy has been introduced as the supposed explanation of all the phenomena of physical causation, and above all of that upward tendency involving the overcoming of resistance which evolution has recognized as active throughout the whole development of the world. Hence, the physical conception of the world is that of ultimate particles of matter as force-points, the centres upon which and from which forces are directed, and of energy, now latent and now active in the various forces which reveal their presence in particular modes of motion.

When, however, these conceptions are examined closely, it will be seen that they are based upon the ordinary view of common sense. As Mr. Merz has said, 'Common sense has never had any difficulty in knowing what matter and force are, or in defining them for the purposes of practical life.'¹ Roughly speaking, matter represents that outside ourselves which resists change; and force represents the power to effect change in spite of resistance. The fact, well known in experience, that we can divide matter to an indefinite extent by mechanical means, and that it is capable of vastly greater subdivision by chemical processes, has from the dawn of physical speculation led naturally to the supposition either that matter is infinitely divisible, or that the process of

¹ Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 334.

division, when carried to its ultimate limit, will reach primitive particles of matter, called atoms simply because they are incapable of further division. This conception was reached by the Greeks in a pre-scientific age. The contribution of modern science consists of the application of calculation and measurement as the combined result of abstract mathematics and of physical observation by means of experiments and the construction of models. The primary elements of matter, whether atoms or the electric ions out of which the most recent science believes atoms to be compounded, however they may be treated by mathematical calculation, must for ever remain beyond the reach of direct perception. They are creatures of the imagination, whose existence is treated as verified by the practical results of assuming them. The question is as to what is involved in that assumption, and whether, if legitimate, it provides an adequate and final explanation of the system of the world.

1. In the first place, then, it must be observed that the discovery of atoms, even if they could be made direct objects of the senses, would leave the problem exactly where it was before. To reach the ultimate elements of matter by a direct act of perception would leave unsolved the question, What is matter, and how does it stand related to the mind which perceives it? The ultimate atom is only imaginable as revealed in a state of consciousness. An infinite and perfect consciousness, instead of seeing matter merely as an indeterminate whole, would on the hypothesis perceive it as an infinitely complex organization of infinitesimal particles. This clearer perception, however, would not do away with the fact that it is still a percept. We have, therefore, not got past the great problem of metaphysics, How does the matter perceived stand related to the mind which perceives it? The mind is as influential in regard to the atom as it is in regard to the universe which is built up by means of countless atoms. The consciousness, therefore, which perceives, whether directly or by means of the imagination, cannot be dispossessed from its prerogative position by breaking up the matter perceived into its original elements.

2. Secondly, it is an unproved and perhaps unwarranted

assumption that the energy which is the condition of physical explanation is a fixed and unchanging quantity. It is constantly assumed that in dealing with the conception of energy its quantity can be treated as definitely fixed, and that its availableness for use is exhaustible. Such an assumption is highly convenient to our limited intelligence, just as it is convenient for the purposes of a game to play it with a fixed number of counters and to assign a particular numerical value to each one of the counters. But supposing the conception of energy to be substantiated by purely scientific reasons, it must be confessed that we are face to face with the initial mystery of physical existence. Confident assertions are probably illegitimate, whether on the one side or the other; yet there appears equal ground for the supposition that the supply of energy in the universe is infinite as for that which treats it, no doubt with much convenience to science, as a fixed and exhaustible quantity. The recent discoveries of radium, and the speculations which have destroyed the presumed simplicity of chemical atoms, have shown how exceedingly precarious are all absolute conclusions upon these matters. The aphorism 'Omnia exeunt in mysterium' seems peculiarly applicable to such a primitive factor, if indeed it be primitive, as physical energy.

3. In the third place, do atoms and energy really exist? In the case of atoms there is no agreement upon the subject. As Mr. Merz points out, in reviewing the course of atomic science during the last century, 'Although, therefore, chemical research was governed all through the century by the atomic view of matter, it does not appear that philosophers considered the existence and usefulness of chemical formulae as a proof of the physical existence of atoms, or of smallest indivisible particles of matter, in the older sense of the theory. Hand in hand with this purely formal and experimental treatment of chemical phenomena went the almost absolute neglect with which questions referring to chemical affinity were treated. The word was little more than a name for an unknown something.'¹ In recent years, however, researches, due in their origin rather to physics than

¹ Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. pp. 419-420.

to chemistry, have developed the atomic view of matter until Lord Kelvin says that 'the Newtonian theory of gravitation is not surer to us now than is the atomic or molecular theory in chemistry and physics, so far, at all events, as its assertion of heterogeneousness in the minute structure of matter, apparently homogeneous to our senses, and to our most delicate direct instrumental tests.'¹

The change in the mental attitude on this subject has been due to the development of what is known as the Kinetic Theory of Gases. In this development the influence of Clerk-Maxwell has been powerfully felt. Under the influence of these great physical inquirers the absolute distinction in the popular mind between the solid, liquid, and gaseous states of matter has been broken down, and, to quote Mr. Merz again, it has been shown that the supposed static properties of matter 'could be explained by different modes of motion, translational, periodic, and rotational.'² Thus, for example, Lord Kelvin has advanced his celebrated 'vortex theory of matter,' though this conception has raised apparently as many difficulties as it has solved; it being, at any rate at present, impossible to explain how whirling matter acquires weight and increased inertia.³ In recent thought the phenomena of electricity have acquired importance in the doctrine and constitution of matter, but no physical explanation has yet been found of what is meant by an electrically charged body. Hence, we may take it that the atomic view of matter in its various forms represents not a finally ascertained fact, but a convenient description for the purposes of scientific speculation. Its simplicity is being attacked by various hypotheses of systems of motion involved in the action of particles. The supposed simplicity of the ultimate elements known to chemistry has already given way, and the existence of constituents hitherto unsuspected is now insisted upon. In fact, all forms of matter are now treated as electrified modifications of the universally diffused ether, which represents matter in its most primitive form.

¹ Lord Kelvin on 'Capillary Attraction,' 1886. See *Popular Lectures and Addresses*, vol. i. p. 4. Quoted by Merz, vol. i. pp. 424, 425.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 56.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 64.

Yet if the conceptions of the constitution of matter have passed through many revolutionary changes in recent years, and are still left in a state of the highest uncertainty, the exactitude of mathematical dynamics is in contrast to such uncertainty. The most elaborate and exact calculations are made as to the behaviour of matter, although its nature and constitution is open to the greatest difference of opinion. Such mathematical dynamics reach rigidly certain conclusions just because they simplify the real problem by artificial abstraction. They are a system of 'conceptual shorthand,' as Professor Karl Pearson has called them. The more careful physical investigators have clearly recognized this limitation. Professor Clerk-Maxwell, for example, says, 'By referring everything to the purely geometrical idea of the motion of an imaginary fluid, I hope to attain generality and precision, and to avoid the dangers arising from a premature theory professing to explain the cause of the phenomena. If the results of mere speculation which I have collected are found to be of any use to experimental philosophers in arranging and interpreting their results, they will have served their purpose, and a mature theory, in which physical facts will be physically explained, will be formed by those who by interrogating Nature herself can obtain the only true solution of the questions which the mathematical theory suggests.'¹

In other words, mathematics offers a conceptual solution, which is exact in proportion as it is abstract. It does not attempt a real solution, which must be left to the methods of experimental inquiry. All that it does is to show that the behaviour of matter in motion is as if certain ideal conceptions of it were true. In short, the science of dynamics, although its use of mathematics gives it absolute exactness, partakes of both the advantage and the disadvantage of every other abstract field of human thought. Abstractions are never adequate to represent facts of nature, but are artificial simplifications of them for the purposes of human thought and imagination.

If radical defects are inherent in all mathematical explanations of the constitution and behaviour of nature, the

¹ Clerk-Maxwell, *Quoted Scientific Papers*, vol. i. p. 157. Merz, vol. ii. p. 81.

inadequacy of such explanations is, above all, manifest when advance is made from mere physical problems to those which have to do with the appearance and organization of life. Try as men will to dispense with the conception of a vital principle which physical inquiries have endeavoured to drive out into the limbo of irrational metaphysics, yet there remains an inherent and permanent difficulty in explaining life, and above all, consciousness, in terms of matter and motion. Consciousness, to whatever cause it is due, certainly cannot be confused with matter in motion or described in terms of it. Nor is it possible to understand by this means how a physical organism which represents, from the standpoint of the physicist, the most unstable form of matter in motion, should yet have power to overcome physical inertia and to achieve development along the lines of biological evolution. When life appears, it is a new thing, exhibiting a nature and behaviour of its own, which, however they may be affected by the laws of matter in motion, are not resolvable into them. Thus, however men may try to dispense with such conceptions, and to criticize them on physical grounds, the conception of a vital principle, or of the *nisus formativus* involved in the growth of living organizations, is as necessary to the imagination in dealing with biological phenomena as are the abstract conceptions of the nature of matter and of motion in the sphere of physics.

4. In the next place, atoms and energy, matter and motion, even if they be actually existent, are all of them artificial abstractions from a concrete whole, given in human experience. It is impossible to find in nature matter without motion, or motion without matter; just as it is impossible to isolate any individual particle of matter from the whole texture of material relations in which it exists. The real whole of experience consists of things in an infinite network of relationships. To attempt to reach a thing apart from its relations is, from the first, foredoomed to failure, for a thing can only be defined in terms of the sum of its relations. Thus interdependent relations form the system of the universe. They are the manifestations of that coherently articulated Power which even Agnosticism is forced to posit

as the ultimate basis of all things. Hence, to whatever depth our thought may penetrate, it is impossible to arrive at the bare, unrelated thing simply because it is nothing at all. The very attempt to reach it in thought involves a world of abstractions, in which the widest differences are equally legitimate.

The attempt to separate matter from motion, and to treat motion as the result of energy, is simply an instance of this abstraction, which, while it may be legitimate for the purpose of science, cannot possibly be treated as adequate to the realities of the world. The plan of including all activity under the conception of force or energy, and of treating matter as in itself essentially passive, which exists merely to be acted upon or to resist action, is simply a product of human imagination. When we are dealing with such products, it is open to us to vary them indefinitely, and none can deny us the right. Of only one thing are we immediately conscious: of a world exhibiting infinite variety of relationships, presented within our consciousness, and naturally interpreted by us as manifesting not only order in change, but power. The question is not merely what is involved in order, which within the range of our experience is associated exclusively with purpose, but what is involved in power, and whether any conception of power which does not involve personality is not a mere abstraction for working purposes, which reveals its inadequacy directly it is closely examined.¹ When this abstract description of nature in terms of atoms, motion, force, and energy is complete, it becomes clear that every one of these terms is a mere symbol. We are as far from knowing what they are in themselves as we were at the beginning. In short, it remains open to us practically to make them mean exactly what we please, so long as we neither violate the laws of mathematics in calculating by means of them, nor contradict the facts of nature itself as they are presented to us in consciousness.

5. To what is this combination of practical usefulness with the lack of finality and determinateness really due? To this: that our whole conception of what is involved in the primary

¹ See previous discussion, pp. 333-41.

qualities of matter and in the existence of energy, is the projection into the world outside ourselves of certain of our own conscious states.

We are conscious, on the one hand, of passivity, and on the other of activity. Our passivity is bound up with our sensational nature, and with that resistance to unpleasant change which is involved in it. On the other hand, we are possessors of a fund of active power, by which we deliberately attempt to change certain states, which, for one reason or another, are unsatisfactory to us. This opposition experienced in our own consciousness is used by us as the interpretation of what is involved in the static and dynamic condition of nature. Matter is endowed with an inherent power of resistance, the conception of which is derived from our own mental states. Energy, now latent and now active, is conceived by means of the now slumbering and now vigorous activity of which we are conscious. Thus, the ultimate conceptions of the most purely physical science are, when analysed, as anthropomorphic as those of the most elaborate Theism. That they are highly convenient, in fact indispensable, may be a strong argument in favour, not merely of their legitimacy, but of their substantial truth. Yet, when their subjectivity is clearly recognized, and it is seen that the conception of energy is simply a working abstraction from the fuller reality of human will, the question is raised whether energy in nature can have any other ultimate explanation than that, throughout the universe, it is due to will-power proceeding on the ordered lines of purpose, just as is the case in human nature, from which the conception is derived. Thus we see that at every point the science which strives to be purely material is steeped in mentality, and that all its conceptions involve an abstraction, from the spiritual which, even in its utmost abstraction cannot throw aside the spirituality involved in its very nature and origin. All that the Theist asks is that while these conceptions may be used for their limited scientific purposes, the ultimate interpretation reached shall be held not in abstract apartness, in which sense it cannot represent ultimate truth, but should be brought back again into the wholeness of its origin. In

short, while energy may for the purposes of science be taken as an entity, and the laws of its working be investigated upon that basis, yet when the process is completed it should be remembered that the very conception is simply derived from the effectiveness of human will, and that when the concept of effectiveness in Nature is ultimately examined, it is meaningless, save as a working symbol, to the human mind, unless it is treated as manifesting the decisions of a Supreme Will.

IV. It is necessary, in the last place, to inquire as to the reality of final causes in nature, and as to the interpretation of them if real.

As has been seen, that which has suggested to the mind the conception of energy is the effectiveness of will, while the ordered march of evolution, and the special forms of evolution manifest in vegetable and animal (to say nothing of rational) life can only be construed after the analogy of purposiveness as revealed in the deliberate volitions of men. Should these analogies, which are indispensable to the most restricted scientific explanation of the world, be treated as having validity for thought? If so, do they involve a creative consciousness, will, and therefore personality, as the explanation of the world? What guarantee have we that an indispensable principle of human thought is a guide to reality, and that the distinctive spiritual qualities of man are a revelation of the nature of God? This last is in reality the ultimate problem involved in the question as to final causes. As has already been seen in regard to Agnosticism, the mere positing of power or energy at the heart of all things leaves the problem unsolved. The conception is as subjective as any other, and the power which is assumed cannot, as set forth, be accepted by thought as a sufficient reason for the world. The mind cannot fail still to ask, What is this power? Whence is it? How can it be the explanation in particular of the spiritual consciousness which cannot be reduced to the bare terms of matter and motion?

In form Spinoza, the great opponent of final causes, avoided this difficulty. The infinite Substance by which he explained all things was *causa sui*, was manifested, so far as

men are concerned, in the two parallel attributes of extension and thought, which have equal claims to be regarded as forms of reality, and find their unity only in the eternal Substance from which they proceed. In short, so far as Spinoza is concerned, to quote the words of Pollock, 'the point of his heterodoxy is that he will not call God exclusively or eminently a thinking Being. To say that God is a spirit is in Spinoza's view just as inadequate and misleading as to say that man is a spirit. Man is a thinking being, but he is also a corporeal or extended being; and thought is only one of the infinite attributes of God.'¹

This statement may be treated as adequate, provided that it is borne in mind that it leaves open the important question whether, when Spinoza spoke of thought as one of the attributes of God, he meant to attribute consciousness to God as God, or whether, as is probable, he considered that the thinking attribute of God exists only in innumerable finite minds.

Minor metaphysical criticisms of this view may be waived. It is also needless to discuss in detail how far it meets the religious and moral needs of men. For Spinoza, as we have seen, the conception of human freedom and of the effectiveness of will is the mere illusion of the mind. Moreover, the peculiar religious fervour with which Spinoza contemplated geometry enabled him to become 'God-intoxicated' upon the bare conception of order as found in extension and in the regular sequences of nature.

1. Passing over all this, however, it is clear that what enables Spinoza to dismiss the whole conception of final causes, not merely in its cruder, but in its more careful statement, is his doctrine of dualism, so far as extended matter and conscious thought are concerned. Because these two run parallel with one another, neither has any claim to the pre-eminence. The fact that he carries both back to one source in the infinite Substance must not blind us to this fact of their supposed practical independence. For the infinite Substance is in itself entirely uncharacterized, and is simply understood as the *tertium quid* from which the two attributes

¹ Pollock, *Spinoza*, p. 353.

of extension and thought, with any others that may conceivably be found in the divine nature, naturally and eternally emanate. Can, then, this unmediated dualism between extended matter and thought be recognized as a true description of the facts? Spinoza only succeeds in treating it as such by curtly dismissing the deliverances of human consciousness which testify to the meaning and effectiveness of self-conscious thought and purpose as illusory. Yet, as has again and again been urged, it is only of these that we have primary knowledge; and the extended world, so far from existing in independence of thought, can only be presented in consciousness and understood by means of those categories of personal consciousness which have been dismissed as illusory.

The external world cannot be explained by mere recourse to geometrical forms, nor conceived by the bare experience of succession. The category of causality is essential, and the whole meaning of that category, as we have seen, is derived from the consciousness of our own effective power which Spinoza has pronounced deceptive. It has been the fashion to treat the uniformity of nature, not only as an assumption absolutely necessary for the purposes of scientific explanation, but as the most assured fact of physical existence. It has been conceived as absolutely independent of mental association. Yet this fact of uniformity has never been the subject of scientific induction. Rather it is the assumption of the human mind upon which alone scientific investigation becomes possible or even desirable. It is because inquirers assume that there are uniformities in nature that they proceed to investigate what those uniformities are. As Dr. Ward has said, 'We do not obtain the conceptions of natural law and natural uniformity by an ant-like accumulation of particulars, nor are they mere cobwebs of the brain. Impressions do not generate these conceptions for us, but we apply the conceptions to them, thereby converting and transforming these crude experiences into the one "Objective Experience" we call science.'¹

The destructive scepticism of Hume long ago discovered

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 225.

this, and treated the conceptions of natural law and of cause as due simply to invariable association, and valid, not theoretically, but only for the practical purposes of life. Yet the mere association of ideas is powerless to generate these conceptions. We do not find practically that their strength depends upon the range or duration of experience. Our conviction of them is a primary condition of all mature thought and action in the world. It is, in short, the practical venture of a faith which only by this means can give to the world rationality for thought and stability for action. It is the postulate with which we set out, not the conclusion which we eventually reach. Hence at every point the primacy of the consciousness which Spinoza dismisses is brought home to us. Yet the fact that we discover the indispensable outfit even of purely scientific inquiry to be at bottom subjective, and to involve not merely intellectual but also practical elements, does not entitle us to disparage the reality of scientific discovery, any more than it enables us to dispense with the assumptions simply because their origin is subjective. It is our contact with the world, as both *of* it and *above* it, that awakens all these categories and postulates into activity, and forces us to apply them to the task of world-explanation. As we are brought face to face with the world, we are bound to treat it as a stable and uniform order, and to make progressive verification of this assumption. As we watch the phenomena of ordered change, we are bound to call in from our own consciousness the concept of causality to explain them. As we watch the process of evolution, whether in living forms or in the system of the universe as a whole, we find the conception of a goal to be reached by immanent activity to be essential. This conception is supplied to us from our own consciousness of willing ends and selecting means, and from the still more intimate processes of spiritual growth and achievement. These great principles of human explanation, aroused within consciousness as the external world is presented to it, find themselves in nature. Without them nature as an intelligible whole does not exist.

The discovery of this relation between consciousness and nature destroys the possibility of treating the apparently

material as ultimately unspiritual, or of withholding primacy from the spiritual attributes by which nature is intellectually organized and practically used. It may be impossible, in our philosophy, to go behind the ultimate fact of ■ material world distinguished from consciousness. Yet this inability does not entitle us to deny the relativity of nature to mind, or the primacy of the spiritual principles which the whole of our experience manifests. Even if the hypothesis of philosophical dualism be adopted, mind and matter, spirit and nature, are capable of entering into mutual relations. The material world can be *cognized*, i.e. it can become significant to mind, because mind is able to find a community between its own principles and those of nature. Thus the distinction, though not superseded, is transcended, and by the growing supremacy of reason. If it be asked whether principles of knowledge are a guide to realities of being, the answer must surely be 'Yes,' when it is remembered that being supplies us with the faculties of knowing, and as the means not only of knowing but of life. What, then, is our natural course? Surely to treat these principles as being in themselves a key to reality; frankly to accept them as the indispensable means of the rationality which is sought, and to treat the demand for that rationality, not as illusive, but as a trustworthy clue to existence.

But if this be so, what right have we to dismiss anything contained in these principles as they become active within us as having no place in the system of the world which is explained by them? These indispensable concepts of uniformity, causality, and end are only known to us as manifestations of self-consciousness and of deliberate purpose. When these two elements are dismissed from them they become abstractions which, while they may be used with advantage in deciphering nature, fail to give any account of themselves when speculatively examined. The theistic position is that these concepts must be taken as a whole, and that, when taken as a whole, they are valid not only for scientific inquiry but also for speculative thought.

In short, the manifestation of uniformity, causality, and ends in nature reveals the working of ■ self-conscious Mind

and Will, whose ways are sought out and discovered by the human mind in the exercise of its natural faculties in their essential interaction with the world. These faculties are the finite manifestation of the infinite source of nature and man. The rationality of the result involves the rationality of the source, and the personal implications of the rational in man involve the spirituality and personality of the rational within the whole of which man is part.

2. The same conclusion is reached when man is regarded not as the means by which the world is explained, but as in himself the summit, so far as human experience goes, of the whole system of the world. Wherever else the existence of ends in nature may be questioned, at least it is beyond doubt that the choice and pursuit of ends is a vital feature of human consciousness, and becomes more marked with every advance in human civilization. The nature of man is developed in absolute union with and to his own consciousness in pursuit of, purposes which are essential to his satisfaction. He is equally conscious in his own experience of moral freedom and of limitations involved in it. He is free to develop the meaning and possibilities inherent in his own consciousness; yet the nature whose meaning and possibilities he realizes is something which he did not create, but which was given to him at the start. The purposiveness of human life is equally manifest when the phenomena of social evolution are studied, and when the whole course of historic development is traced. The meaning of the organized social life of mankind is only to be found in this deliberate choice and pursuit of ends. This is made clear in every field of human activity, industrial, commercial, intellectual, or political. The mark of advancement in civilization is capacity to select and to hold fast a policy, and a policy is simply a purpose chosen from among alternatives to which the life of the nation, party, or class is made subordinate. Directly we pass from the natural to the social we come clearly into a realm which is only intelligible so far as we can explain it teleologically. This supremacy of the teleological in civilized society depends for its possibility upon the teleological constitution of all individual human life so far as it is conscious.

And finally this teleology of individual conscious life exists in close parallelism with the teleology of biological development. These three are ultimately one.

The two-fold bearing of this all-important fact is of the greatest significance. Man, as the most highly developed teleological being, at once completes and transcends a natural evolution. If the former of these two aspects be regarded it will be seen at once that the mere biological task of his appearance and survival is stupendous. If the wonder involved in direct creation is great, that which is involved in evolution by means of natural selection is even greater. It demands the co-operation of a practically unlimited past, and of a practically infinite system of natural conditions. Yet man not only completes, but also transcends nature. While he never entirely escapes from the physical conditions of his life, yet these become subordinate when he begins to pursue the ideal ends of civilization. The climax of his natural evolution is the starting-point of his spiritual history. If man may be defined with Aristotle as a rational animal, the emphasis at the outset is on the animal, and at the conclusion on the rational. As rational, man comes to conceive and to generalize in thought, to subdue the animal impulses to rational purpose in action. He creates literature, art, religion, to say nothing of the material products of civilization. All these products are marked by the subservience to purpose which becomes dominant in the producer.

To the whole of the process by which the predominantly natural passes into the predominantly spiritual, there are two instruments which are absolutely indispensable. The first is Language. Rational thought and human society, with all the ends of civilization, are impossible without language. The development of language takes place side by side with that of civilization. It is alike the result and the condition of all spiritual progress. Here, again, nature supplies the basis, not only in the evolution of the vocal apparatus, but also in the instinctive cry and the primitive articulation of the mere animal. Yet immediately the inherent and dominant purposiveness of man takes possession of and moulds to its use these rude and primitive instruments by deliberate effort.

Nowhere are the relations of the natural and spiritual more clearly manifest than in the development of a great spoken language from the few distinct sounds of which its alphabet is composed, and the few primitive cries of its infancy.

If spoken language is essential, the written language is equally so for the higher purposes of the spirit. Without it history would exist only in the form of vague tradition, centring in a few outstanding events and personalities. The vast accumulations of scientific knowledge would be impossible, and the higher poetry could hardly exist. The primitive impulse to pictorial representation, of which remains are to be found in pre-historic periods, is made to serve first of all the practical needs of life, and finally its more strictly rational and its ideal interests.

Yet, language spoken and written, essential as it is, could neither exist nor be utilized were it not for memory. It is upon memory that the whole possibility of civilization or even of the lowest form of human existence depends. Memory involves two features, the reference of present events to a permanent self, which is conscious of having existed in the past, and the power of treating present mental states as representations of the experiences of that self in the past. The essential witness of memory, therefore, is to the permanence through all change of a self to which all such change is relative, and which retains within itself a record of such changes. The existence of such a self is absolutely inexplicable on purely physical grounds. Even J. S. Mill found the Association philosophy absolutely helpless here. 'If, therefore,' he says, 'we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as a past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.'¹ As a matter of fact, the existence of a permanent self is the original datum of faith upon which the whole possibility of perception, thought, and

¹ *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 4th edition, p. 248.

purpose is based. It is the initial postulate of all human life, and cannot be explained in terms of anything to the explanation of which it is itself essential.

Here, then, is the fact and problem of man as a teleologic system. His life is the consummation of the natural order, and the dawn of a spiritual order. Alike his natural equipment and his spiritual advance involve the infinite processes of natural evolution. They are made possible by his own selection, half conscious at first, deliberate afterwards. All rudimentary instruments of expression are supplied to him by primitive instinct, but are developed by growing purposiveness. The whole of the vast structure which he creates depends for its possibility upon memory, and memory is absolutely inexplicable except as the natural function of a selfhood which is above, yet relative to, all the experiences and changes of its history. Can this marvellous product be casual? Reason repels the imbecility of such a suggestion. Can it be of secondary value or meaning in the history of the universe? On the contrary, the intuitive judgement alike of healthy manhood and of mature reason is that what is involved in civilization alone has highest value, and that, therefore, because it stands for what is paramount in value, it stands for what is primary in purpose in the universe. It cannot be disengaged, as has been seen, from any part of the universe. Its highest instruments have been presented to it in their potentiality by biological development. The Agnostic, if he be an engineer like Herbert Spencer, demands unlimited power for the universe as a product. But quantity of power is not sufficient. For all the reasons which entitle man to assume quantity, we are entitled also to assume quality. Can the last product of an all-embracing system of evolution be of a higher quality than its source? If the end of the process be ideal and spiritual, how much more its source? If selfhood be the indispensable pre-requisite of all human experience, must not this all-important fact of human consciousness be treated as evidence that, *a fortiori*, selfhood is essential to the spirituality and purposiveness of the divine? Humanity comes to its own by the development within the cosmos of rational purposiveness. This rational purposiveness is the

characteristic manifestation of a growingly influential selfhood. It assimilates and subdues external things to its thoughts and purposes in proportion as it subdues internal impulses and appetites to the service of the higher life. Does not this whole process of spiritual education mean the manifestation of the Creator in the created, the return of the creature to the likeness of its Source, the acquirement in time of a sovereignty by the spiritual over the natural, which expresses the sovereignty of Spirit in the eternal ?

3. The world as evolved, finding its highest stage in self-consciousness and in the manifold spiritual life of which self-consciousness is the condition, appears in grades, and unfolds a system of spiritual values. The spiritual life—understanding that term in the widest sense—is based upon intuitive assumptions, without which it cannot possibly exist. They are essential to the justification of its distinctive aims. Once let them fail, and human life is reduced to imbecility. Yet from first to last, they partake of the nature of faith. They carry their justification within themselves. This justification is that they are indispensable to human life, fashioned as a coherent and rational whole, and are the aims by which its progressive development is brought about. They are, therefore, the words of God, by which alone man lives. That is to say, they are as much the laws of spiritual life as the laws which physiology investigates are the laws of bodily life. To deny them theoretically or practically is to invalidate the testimony of the spiritual consciousness by processes of thought which, if they sometimes seem to be scientific, are none the less ultimately irrational. The object, therefore, of all the judgements which man passes as a spiritual and moral being is to maintain the integrity of this system of values in human life. The purpose of the moral consciousness, whether in the individual, or as partially reflected in the legal and social sanctions of the community, is to keep the first things first. The standards of life which are necessary to man as a spiritual and moral being are upheld inwardly by his moral consciousness, and reinforced outwardly by the moral sentiment of society. The object of that sentiment as it develops its full and characteristic strength is to protect man from

sinking below the spiritual to the animal, whether his animality be that of the tiger or of the ape. Undoubtedly the effectiveness of this moral sentiment fails from time to time. Its vision may be clouded in the individual or in the community, and its executive force may be too feeble to resist the incursions of the flesh. When this happens, however, humanity itself decays. No amount of science, with its prudential considerations and restraints, can arrest the downfall which follows upon a perversion or weakening of the moral sense. The only method of self-preservation for man is that he should become ever more fully man. And man becomes man only through the power by which he gives expression to the principles and standards of his own distinctive spiritual and moral life. The maintenance, therefore, of these intuitions and standards necessitates what Dr. Martineau has well called a 'reverential estimate of human nature.'

Further, in order to maintain reverence towards human nature it is necessary to maintain reverence towards the universe itself. The reverence for sanctities within can only be completed and sustained by reverence for sanctities without. The sense of the holy is to all time the guardian of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Except so far as the spirit of worship enters into all these their glory is dim and the pursuit of them goes astray. That which brought about the speedy eclipse of the glory of Athens at its zenith, and which destroyed the promise of the Italian Renaissance, was the failure of the sense of the holy. It was the decay of the spirit of reverence for the meaning of the universe, and with it came the destruction of that self-reverence which is the salt of human life.

Hence the supreme gift of spiritual evolution is this sense of the holy. It maintains the ideal in every one of the highest pursuits of life. It saves the pursuit of truth from becoming a mere accumulation of knowledge, and fills it with the large and deep spirit of wisdom. It delivers the pursuit of beauty from the enthrallment of the purely physical and sensuous and from the taint of lurking animality. It fills the pursuit of goodness with the sense of the infinite and

eternal, and prevents it from sinking to a mere self-regarding morality.

Thus the sense of the holy conserves that which is indispensable to the integrity of human life by inspiring the spirit of worship, reverence, and humility throughout the whole. The perception and pursuit of holiness, therefore, is the highest and most indispensable quality of man. It is essential alike to the lowly and to the lofty; to primitive and to modern man. In it every other spiritual quality of his being finds its highest and ultimate expression. The evangelical graces, faith, hope, and love, need it as their atmosphere. The cardinal virtues, wisdom, courage, justice, temperance, are sustained only in so far as they are nourished from this source.

Yet, the sense of the holy is like other faculties of man, not abstract or introspective. Men do not find the holy by retiring within from an alien world; but, above all, by looking out and looking up. The sense of holiness fastens upon the holy as supreme and universal. The holy is a mystic presence, which inspires awe when man is alone with nature. Wordsworth has given classic expression to this influence—

And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains, and of all that we behold
From this green earth; of all the mighty world
Of eye and ear, both what they half create,
And what perceive; well pleased to recognize
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being.¹

¹ Wordsworth, *Tintern Abbey*.

This sense carries with it the constraining authority of moral obligation within. The assumption, at least of the filial consciousness, is that what is universally indispensable to well-being is true. That which is essential, therefore, to the maintenance of the highest human life, either individual or collective, is none other than the assurance that a holy character, imposing upon man the spirit and aims of holy life, is present throughout the universe which moulds the life of men. The existence of the All-holy is the root and justification of holiness in men, and the All-holy can only subsist in a character which eternally fulfils and upholds the standards and values of the highest spiritual nature which it produces and vindicates in the history of the world.

4. Hence by all these ways the Sufficient Reason of the universe is reached. Its quality as well as its quantity and force must be taken into account. As the source of causal power producing stupendous effects, the possession of unlimited energy is required. Herbert Spencer asks that this may be reserved to him from the outlying Agnosticism as the indispensable minimum necessary to explain the world. Those who look upon the universe rather as the home of an indwelling and all-pervading rationality, realizing ends and maintaining order, are driven to maintain, on exactly the same grounds upon which the conclusion of Spencer is based, that the Supreme Power is rational. Finally, those who listen to the highest intuitions of the spiritual life and perceive how indispensable those intuitions are to perfecting and maintaining the civilized order of the world, which is the highest product of evolution, demand on exactly similar grounds that the Rational Power by which the world is explained should have the holiness of character which alone is adequate to the spiritual and moral results produced; above all, to that sense of infinite perfection as the goal of human life which is inseparable from the highest saintliness. Such infinite power, reason, character, mean a divine Personality, whose highest attribute is love. The whole cogency of this argument, whether it establish a Power or a Personality as the Sufficient Reason of the world, is that the Source of the universe cannot be less than that which is

manifested in and to its highest product. Yet, unless the power by which all things are explained is personal, the final product possesses attributes which we are intuitively compelled to rank as of higher dignity and worth than mere power, however vast its quantity and immeasurable its effects. It is upon this principle that Theism depends for its conclusiveness.

CHAPTER IV

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN AND THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL

IT is in the light of the considerations advanced in the preceding chapter that the cogency of the Argument from Design must be estimated. Although some of the ground has been covered by the preceding discussion, the case of the argument as generally presented must be examined, and the examination will raise definitely many important points which have not yet been treated.

The general objections which have been urged against that argument will be considered shortly. Minor objections need not occupy attention now, because the whole tendency of modern thought has so modified the form in which the argument is presented by its more thoughtful upholders, that these objections rarely lie against it as at present used. Such minor objections relate to the exaggerated attention paid to particular instances of contrivance in nature ; to the explanation of these by the representation of the Divine Being rather as an external artificer than as the internal source of life and order, and incidentally to the frequent overstraining of considerations arising from the utility of particular objects to the well-being of man. The doctrine of evolution, in whatever form it may be exhibited, has taught us to regard the adaptations of vegetable and animal life not as particular cases of design inserted in the universe by a special divine volition, but as involving the whole process of development throughout the universe from first to last. The marks of design are now sought not so much in the particular cases of adaptation taken by themselves, as in those aspects of the

whole process of evolution which show that the world is a system which involves alike, in the whole and in its parts, the ordered attainment of ends. In the same way, evolution has taught those who lay greatest stress upon the argument from design to find the analogies by which it is conceived and explained, not in the mechanical contrivances and efforts of man, but in the vital processes of nature. These are held to reveal an indwelling principle of purposive and ordered action, not the activity from outside of a Designer fashioning independent material to his will by the mere exercise of power. This transformation of our way of regarding the matter is a corrective of the exaggerated tendency to regard all useful objects as having their existence simply that they may satisfy the desires or even the needs of man. This tendency erred not so much in what it affirmed as because it ignored other elements equally real, if not equally important. To say that certain products or phenomena of nature are useful and even indispensable in the service of man, while it may be true, and may afford a partial explanation of their meaning, must not lead us to overlook the fact that they have a reason for existence in themselves, and that they are relative to other parts of the universe as well as to man. A wider teleology should seek to explore the meaning of all these other relationships as well as of the one which obtrudes itself upon human attention because of its simple and direct relativity to man.

What is most important to perceive in regard to the argument from design when embodied in such forms as are in harmony with the general lines of modern thought and science, is that it can only be presented in a completely satisfying form to one who is already and on other grounds a believer in God. It must necessarily have greater weight in confirming faith than in creating it. The way in which it is presented to one who has no belief in God must of necessity tacitly suppress many of the vital considerations which are operative in the mind of a Theist.

In the case of such a one, at least three factors are present. In the first place, there is the religious consciousness of fellowship with a personal God, which, as has been seen,

takes the form in fully developed Christianity of consciousness of the divine Fatherhood. This consciousness certainly does not and cannot result from the study of the evidences of design in nature. Its source and religious explanation lie deeper than any such external considerations. At the same time this consciousness is itself the mature result of a spiritual history. In the case of the individual, it involves the bringing to maturity of great processes of inward spiritual life. The man who attains to it has a consciousness of an ordered spiritual growth within himself as real as is to be found in the case of any other spiritual faculties and experiences. When he passes from his own interior experience to regard the historic development of the Christian consciousness, he finds the same marks of ordered development pervading it as are present in his own personal consciousness. To take only the great spiritual development revealed in the ordered advance of the Old Testament and its consummation by the New, he becomes aware of a continuous process of spiritual preparation and fulfilment. Looking, therefore, both within and without in the light of his own religious experience, he is face to face with what bears, from beginning to end, all the marks of purposiveness. Perhaps, in course of time, an inversion of the order in which the design argument is generally presented may take place. It has been customary to seek for the clear marks of intention in nature, and to proceed thence to the consideration of similar aspects in the spiritual life. It may well be that in the time to come the evidences of design will be sought primarily in the spiritual history of mankind, and that the conclusion surely based upon these will be extended to solve the problem of the physical universe. If this change takes place, it will simply make explicit what has been implicit throughout. Just as we have seen that every physical explanation is primarily subjective in its source, and is powerless to strip itself of subjective characteristics, so in the case of the argument from design. The eye that scans nature to find the marks of a designing intelligence cannot look out upon the world apart from the spiritual consciousness, or without being affected by the evidence found therein of a divine

influence and purpose which, in regard both to the individual and to the race, are providential.

In the next place, in this experienced fellowship with God there takes place the development of a selfhood which seeks with enlarged power and success all the ends of an advancing spiritual, moral, and practical life. The characteristic of the highest human life is its steadfast purposiveness, and the way in which it uses a steadily growing intelligence in pursuit of its purposes. Purposiveness is the measure of the development of human life. Yet, while the possession of this great quality separates man by an ever-growing distinction from the inanimate world, it enables him, with clearer consciousness and more certain effect, to realize the ends which are immanent in nature. All the powers by which he secures his purposes have been supplied to him by nature. The very facts of his survival and of his equipment reveal the co-operation—if the expression may be allowed—of the whole universe with the nature and the ends of man. His purposiveness springs out of the dimmer life of instinct, while instinct itself is connected with the processes of reaction upon stimulus which prevail in nature before instinct appears. Purposiveness emerges from something inferior to itself, and carries to a completion processes of improvement which have prepared the way and led up to the conscious efforts of intention. The man who is conscious of God, and is in the full possession of human purposiveness, must, in the light of his own consciousness of what is most marked in himself, and of his relations to God and nature, invest the Divine Being with the purposiveness which he finds in himself.

Finally, under these influences he finds himself in presence of an outward universe which presents all the features of a connected system and of an ordered development. In the clear light of his own inward consciousness he explains this universal system, with its orderly development, to higher forms of being and relationship by means of the spiritual personality and the dominant purposiveness which he finds within himself.

The weakness of the argument from design, as itⁿ is

presented in ordinary theistic controversy, is that it necessarily suppresses the testimony drawn from the spiritual and rational consciousness in their mutual connexion, and attempts to investigate the natural phenomena of the universe from a position of complete spiritual detachment. Thus many of the considerations which are really operative upon the mind of a believer are ruled out from the discussion as it is ordinarily carried on. It cannot, therefore, be matter for wonder if, as thus circumscribed, the power of the argument to produce conviction is less than the ardent believer imagined would be the case. That, notwithstanding this, it has great cogency must still be contended, though undoubtedly its force as applied in an abstract way to special cases of adaptation has been lessened as the result of the physical inquiries of Darwin. Its authority, however, cannot be reasserted merely by detailed criticism of the arguments and conclusions of Darwinism, but by vindication of the place which the religious consciousness and its accompanying human purposiveness take in the whole order of things, and as the necessary key to the complete explanation of that order. The double principle of the necessary subjectivity of all objective explanation, and of the necessary objectivity of all that is truly subjective, is the principle upon which the universe can be explained. It has been needful to force this consideration upon those who supply mere physical explanations of the world, and therefore inevitably end in Agnosticism. It is equally needful to press it upon those Theists whose presentation of the argument from design has become inadequate to our latest knowledge, and whose use of it fails to make the frankest and fullest use of the spiritual consciousness. Such use should be the more readily welcomed by the latter because the whole weight of the design argument rests upon the inference from the essential activity of man to that of God.

Serious objections are urged against the cogency of the argument from design in respect, not merely of accidental drawbacks, but of its essential contention. The more philosophic of these have been urged by Spinoza and Kant; the more scientific by such physical inquirers as Helmholtz.

These objections may be summarized as follows :

In the first place, it is urged that the argument at its best can only prove the existence of an Artificer shaping given materials to His purposes, and not that of an absolute Creator.

Hence, in the second place, the Divine Artificer, it is argued, must be conceived as limited by the inadequate or even refractory nature of the material He uses.

In the third place, the analogy of human design suggests that the Designer makes choice between alternatives, both as to the ends He pursues, and the means He adopts for their realization. This is held to be contrary to the divine perfection.

Fourthly, the very fact that the Divine Being is conceived as pursuing ends by ordered means is held by Spinoza to involve the attribution to Him of needs which He is moved to supply. This, again, is held to be contrary to the eternal and unchanging satisfaction which is necessary to the conception of God.

Fifthly, even if these metaphysical difficulties could be set aside, it is urged that the argument from design treats things as means to ulterior and external ends, and that this is contrary alike to their nature and to their scientific explanation, which make it impossible to conceive them as means to something external to themselves.

Finally, the force of the alleged facts themselves is, it is objected, exaggerated. Moreover, so far as their evidence goes, they are contradictory, pointing to opposite conclusions as to the character of the Divine Being. This objection has three parts. (*a*) The phenomena instanced as the clearest examples of purposive adaptation are faulty. In illustration of this the celebrated criticism of Helmholtz that any optician would be ashamed to turn out so imperfect an instrument as the human eye may be cited. (*b*) Even supposing that examples of the apparently purposive can be found in nature, these are not its predominant features. The purposeless also exists, and has to be accounted for. (*c*) And, lastly, the presence of evil must be recognized. This shows either that the Designer of the world is not omnipotent, or that He is

not beneficent. This conclusion is the more necessary when it is borne in mind that the power of adaptation is equally manifest in fitting organisms for destructive as for beneficent purposes.

It is necessary to offer some observations upon each one of these objections.

1. As to the first, it is admitted by the more thoughtful upholders of the argument from design that it is inadequate in itself to offer any philosophy of creation itself. To isolate the argument from all other considerations upon which a theistic conclusion is built is as unjust on the part of its opponents as it would be unwise on the part of its upholders. As Dr. Martineau has pointed out, the force of the argument from design is to direct attention to marks of purposive action actually present in nature, and to trace them to a rational source, not to explain the history which placed them there.¹

The argument from design taken by itself and in its narrowest form is not adequate to support the whole weight of Theism. The discussion of the elements found in the religious consciousness given in Book II., Chapter ii., is sufficient to show that no such view can be held by those who regard belief in God as due, not to intellectual inquiry as to the scientific explanation of particular phenomena, but to the spontaneous and united action of manifold factors in the spiritual history by which man attains mature development. The very power to see the marks of the divine mind active throughout nature depends upon the influence of these permanent factors of spiritual life. The argument, therefore, can only be complementary. However great may be its force, it only contains within itself a small part of the reasons which justify faith in God, and is in itself inadequate to set forth either the fullness of the nature of God, or the mode of His relationship to the universe, which finds its explanation in Him. It is a confirmatory and not a creative argument, and its power to confirm the belief in God does not extend to the whole content of that belief, but only to particular elements of it. Theists, therefore, will be quite content to

¹ See Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 327, 328.

use it for this purpose, and to accept philosophic criticism which restrains them from pressing it beyond the due limits both of its place among the arguments for Theism, and of its possible testimony to the nature and action of God.

2. As to the objection that the conception of design of necessity suggests the inadequate or even refractory nature of the material used by the Designer, several considerations must be borne in mind. It must be conceded that the imaginative representation of the human mind is inadequate to set forth completely the divine reality. Descriptive statements of the way in which God attains His creative ends must necessarily be coloured by the familiar analogies of human action. Only thus can they be presented to a mind which, while familiar with its own relationship to objects, is necessarily unable to conceive, except with the greatest imperfection, the relationship in which God stands to His works. Nowhere, therefore, is there greater need to beware of crude anthropomorphism than in the way in which this argument is presented. Man, because he is finite and exists in a network of relations with objects external to himself, is obliged to secure his ends by mechanical means. The material which he uses has a nature of its own, independent of his will or of his desires. So far, therefore, as he shapes it to his own purposes, it must be, roughly speaking, by a process of give and take. It is obvious that the relationship of God to the world in which He realizes His ends is of a totally different character. He is not external to the world in the sense that man is external to its material objects, nor is matter something originally given to God from outside, the adaptation of which constitutes for Him a problem and a task.

Even if creation be explained as involving the setting up of a hard-and-fast material world, outside the divine nature, and to some extent in independence of it, yet that setting up must have been, on the hypothesis, by the direct act of God Himself as the first step to the realization of the ends upon which His will was set. The setting up of the material therefore, was the preparation of something essential and subservient to the divine purpose, and not of something

refractory to it. It is true that the limitations of particular objects or realms of nature may disqualify them from direct participation in some part of the divine purpose which transcends their inherent limitations. Yet this is not to say they have not a divine purpose of their own, or that in the fulfilment of it they are not entirely adequate to that which the divine will demands of them.

In short, the divine mind, the divine power, and the divine ends are within the universe, both as a whole and in all its parts, not merely external to it. Hence the fulfilment of God's purposes exhibits His sovereignty, not over, but within the universe. The attainment of His ends is a manifestation of His glory within it by the fulfilment of its own nature, and not a triumph over it by the transformation of its nature. The securing of the immanent ends of the universe and of its several parts does undoubtedly involve the reality of a time-process, which must in some way be treated as equally real and divine as the changeless eternity of God. The relation between the eternal and the temporal, the changeless and the progressive, in the reality of the universe is perhaps the most difficult problem of philosophy. Yet, while the explanation is hard, the facts must not be suppressed. Given that the time-process is in its way as real as the eternity of God, then the fulfilment of ends in time contains no evidence at all that the material used is intractable to the divine hand which accomplishes its purposes by an ordered history, and not merely by an eternal act.

3. The third objection is that the argument from design involves that God makes choice between alternatives, both as to the ends which He purposes, and as to the means adopted for their realization, and that such choice is contrary to the divine perfection. Here, there seems to be a serious confusion of thought. To conceive the divine action as proceeding without the deliberate exercise of will, or even the possibility of such exercise, is to degrade the divine nature from spiritual and moral perfection to the level of merely natural necessity. This effect may be carefully disguised by the forms of speech employed. We are concerned, however, not with the forms of speech but with the realities of

existence. To conceive of God as without the power of free decision reduces the divine will below the human level. Equally to suppose that the infinite possibilities of alternative action are hidden from the divine mind is to reduce the intelligence of God below that of the human level. Can it be conceived that the finite mind is able to imagine all manner of worlds differing from the actual, and that such power is to be withheld from the divine mind in virtue of its perfection? Such a restriction cannot be seriously maintained by any one who attaches real significance to the spirituality of the divine nature. Yet this does not involve, either that the alternatives of possible action are presented to God as laid down for Him by conditions independent of Himself, or that there is any hesitation or uncertainty in His unfailing and eternal choice of that which is best. As to the former of these, namely, the presentation of alternatives to the mind of God, it is impossible for us to represent to ourselves the fundamental difference between the divine consciousness and our own. To be able to realize the difference in imagination would mean that we had transcended the difference between ourselves and God, and had entered into the experience of the divine mind. This is absolutely impossible unless we could ourselves become God. It is clear that there is the greatest distinction between alternatives offered to us by a world that already exists and is external to ourselves, and alternatives that exist before a world is called into being, and that are governed, not by the nature of an external material, but by the character of Him who calls it into being. Yet, while the divine mind works under conditions totally dissimilar from our own, this is no reason for denying to God the vision of unrealized possibilities, although the bar to their realization lies, not in any external difficulty, but in the divine character itself. Different as are the conditions of our own thought, circumscribed by the limiting experience of the actual world, we can sometimes approach to similar conditions, at least in regard to the creations of our own fancy.

In the same way, while our moral frailty and our temporal conditions make it impossible for us adequately to realize the nature of the divine perfection, the building up of consistent

character within us does enable us distinctly to conceive the conditions under which the divine freedom is exercised. As human character is developed, a particular alternative of choice and conduct may be so consistently realized in consciousness as practically to exclude the adoption of any other alternative that is presented to us. Such consistency of choice and action determined by character itself is not the negation but the perfection of freedom. Formally, freedom involves the unrestricted possibility of choice. That formal possibility does not become restricted in the course of moral progress. Yet he is the freest man whose character exercises unfailing command of the motives and resolutions of the will. In this highest sense that man is most free whose actions can be most surely calculated as unfailingly governed by the laws of goodness. What is thus faintly foreshadowed in examples of human excellence must be ideally fulfilled in the eternal perfection of God.

4. Just as human nature is an inadequate guide to the nature of God, alike in its intellectual and in its moral perfection, so is it also as to the inmost reason which explains the divine activity. Spinoza urges that the pursuit of final causes involves a need of satisfaction which is contrary to the eternal blessedness of God. Again, this would seem to press a human analogy in exactly the same way that on other occasions Spinoza himself so vigorously condemns. The action of man in pursuit of ends is determined by his relatedness to the whole world of which he is a finite part. His needs and their supply are the effective means by which he is brought into the network of those relationships by which his life is fulfilled. His action, therefore, is governed by that essential relativity. A creature within the cosmos that had no needs would be incapable of entering into any relations. His needs are for objects outside himself. Yet the very fact that he needs these objects, and is able to acquire them, shows that both he and they belong to one inclusive system of things which prescribes, not only their apartness, but their inseparable relation. Such conditions, obviously, cannot explain the relationship of God to the world which He created. That world is the expression of His fullness, not the satisfaction

of His need. Its existence is, in a sense which we cannot apprehend, within His own nature, and not merely external to it. The action by which it is called into being and sustained is an immanent act in the divine life, and not the going forth of that life beyond its limits to find or to set up something as the object of its satisfaction. Human analogies, therefore, entirely fail at this point.

5. The argument from design by no means necessarily involves the treatment of any concrete element of reality as a mere means to ulterior and external ends. To say that a thing is a means to ends beyond itself is not to say that it is a mere means to such ends. The familiar illustration of the fertilization of orchids by insects, so often adduced, brings this out clearly. It is impossible not to treat the insect as a means for producing the required effect upon the plant. At the same time it is clear that in producing it the insect is not a mere means to an end beyond itself, but is satisfying its own need by its characteristic action. Here, as in regard to other aspects of the argument, the naïve application of human analogies needs to be corrected by careful reflection.

The relation of things in nature as means to ends outside themselves is determined by two general conditions which characterize the universe as a whole. The first is that it is the result of a process gradually evolved in time. The succession of the time-process is equally real as the unchanging 'now' of eternity. Change is the concrete content of time. Ordered change reveals the presence of purpose so dominating change that it becomes evolution. The second is that the things which thus come into being in time by an ordered process are inter-related as parts of the universal system of reality. It is out of these inter-relations of all parts of the world's system throughout the process of its temporal evolution, that it comes about that one thing may act as a means to the ends involved in another. Yet this fact by no means entitles us to overlook the truth that each thing is primarily fulfilling the ends involved in its own being, and is not intended merely to bring about the ends of other beings. This fact must be borne in mind when we are brought face

to face with the problem that certain living creatures in the world seem purely destructive of other and higher forms of life. Of some of these it can be clearly shown, that notwithstanding their apparent hurtfulness, they have a beneficent office to fulfil in the economy of things. Of some it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to affirm this. Yet they must be judged not merely by their effect on other beings outside themselves, but by their power to fulfil the ends which explain their own being. *A priori*, they have as much right to exist and to exercise their distinctive form of activity as has any other kind of being, though undoubtedly the fact that they interfere apparently with the self-realization of other beings higher than themselves does constitute a grave problem in explaining the nature of the world as a whole.

Thus the fact that the universe is an inter-related system evolved in time, necessitates the conception that each element in it has alike its own ends to fulfil, and its influence upon the ends of others, and upon the world-end as a whole. To God no kind of being and no state of being is a mere means; each has its own place and meaning in the complete system of things. None has a place of its own in such wise as to be free from the necessity of acting upon other things and being acted upon by them, as each and all fulfil the appointed ends of their being.

6. Finally, we pass to the objection that the significance of the apparent instances of design is exaggerated, and that their testimony to the being, and still more to the character of God, is inconclusive.

In the first place, the imperfection of even the most conspicuous cases of adaptation in nature is insisted upon, to wit, the imperfection of the lenses of the eye as a refracting medium, to say nothing of its frailty and liability to disease. As to this, two governing considerations must be borne in mind. In the first place, if there is to be a system of things at all, the nature of the whole must govern the possibilities of the parts. Without going beyond the case of the living organisms endowed with power of vision, it is clear that the possibilities of the organ of sight must be determined by the

possibilities and needs of the living tissues as a whole. The optician can produce a better lens than that of the eye, because his lens has not to conform to the conditions of life, but simply to the laws of physics. The problem of the human eye is to secure the best organ for the practical needs of life which is compatible with that organ being alive, and alive as part of the human body as a whole. It represents, therefore, the most complex case of those limiting conditions which are often present in the works of a human inventor. For example, the designing of an ironclad represents a whole series of compromises with a view to the maximum efficiency of the vessel as a fighting force. The maximum speed, the greatest gun-power, the strongest armour, the comfort of accommodation, and many other elements have to be adjusted and reduced in order to produce a satisfactory whole. To any complaint that one or other of these elements shows a reduced efficiency the designer replies, correctly or incorrectly, that the reduction has been necessary in order to secure a greater serviceableness on the whole. The same considerations apply in an increased measure to the productions of life. Of course the question may always be, Why should they apply? Yet when clearly considered, such an inquiry is irrational. It demands that there should be no finitude and no systematic relations in the order of things. It is always possible to ask why was not this or that finite creature equal to the infinite Creator? Why should there be a system of things at all? Yet such questions are in reality meaningless. Even if it were not so, they emphasize the one attribute of power at the expense of all those other attributes of the Divine Being which play their part in the constitution and order of the world. The very imperfections inherent in a physical constitution, for example, have manifold bearings upon the possibilities of the world from the spiritual and moral standpoint. Just as in the case of an organism the interests of life limit in some directions the abstract possibilities of physics, so the spiritual and moral interests which in our conception are the supreme motive of God, limit the conditions of purely physical life. The world as a whole must be judged, so far as we are capable of judging it, by

its adaptation to the highest end revealed in it, and not by its fulfilment of lower ends, which if pressed to the utmost of their abstract possibilities, might be unfriendly to, or even effectually shut out, the higher. Such a principle of explanation is laid down for us by the combined influence of the spiritual interests and of the finite limitations of the universe as we know it.

Again, it is objected that if there are outstanding causes of the apparently purposive, there is an even vaster range of the apparently purposeless. What has been said about means and ends in nature must certainly be applied to this consideration. The objection, if well taken, may minimize the force and range of the design argument, but need not imply the disparagement of Theism. Each object of the world, as has been seen, has its own place in, and right to, existence, even if that existence point to no purpose beyond itself either in time or space. Waiving this point, however, the universe must be treated as a whole. The question must be asked of it, therefore, whether or not there are signs within it of great ends being carried out for which spiritual character in its Source is indispensable. If that be so, the apparently purposeless may be explained on two grounds, apart from its own inherent power to exist. It may be the basis of the more obviously purposeful; standing out in apparent contrast to it, but in reality constituting the indispensable conditions of its existence. Again, even within such a system, it may be impossible to avoid the presence of the purposeless here and there as a sort of by-product of the universe in fulfilling its divine end. Here and there throughout the universe there may be some residual existences which cannot be explained as desirable either in themselves or in the interests of others. The presence of such accidental existences may, for all we know, be inseparable from the possibility of there being a world at all. If this be so, the fact would indeed be contrary to our abstract conceptions of the omnipotence of God. It by no means follows, however, that it need be derogatory to any true conception of the divine perfection, which, in carrying out the designs of supreme spiritual goodness and wisdom, takes upon itself

the incidental disadvantages to mere power which such spiritual purposes involve.

It is, however, contended that, even supposing the case as presented from the argument from design be true, yet the presence of evil throughout the world proves that its Designer is either not beneficent or not omnipotent. The force of this dilemma must be considered subsequently. Meanwhile, it is necessary to consider what is meant by the presence of evil in the world, and what is its force as reducing or destroying the essential goodness of the universe.

Evil is of two kinds, moral and physical. From the point of view of the argument from design it is unnecessary to deal at length with the problem of moral evil, and for a simple reason. If such evil be truly moral and not the merely automatic result of physical conditions, then it proceeds from the fact and from the abuse of personal freedom. If personal freedom be non-existent, then evil is conditioned by as purely natural a necessity as is the fall of the apple to the earth. In that case the same general conditions that explain physical evil must apply to what, by a human illusion, has been supposed to be the result of free and responsible choice. If, on the other hand, the universal instinct of mankind, which apportions praise or blame to individuals alike through the deliverances of their own consciousness and through the judgement of their fellow men, be valid, then this fact points to the existence of an unconditioned power of free choice between good and evil. If this be true, the gift of moral freedom, with its attendant risks and actual ill consequences, must be justified by totally different considerations from those which are involved in the question of design. The problem has to do, not with the inefficiency of a machine, but with the deliberate introduction into the system of things of beings who are not machines.

Several considerations, however, must be borne in mind in qualification and explanation of the existence of this personal moral freedom. To begin with, the individual has his place in an historic development. The working out in the world of this historic process depends for its possibility

upon two forces—heredity and influence. Unless both of these are present, history is impossible. Therefore the existence of moral freedom in the individual is limited by the inheritance which he receives as part of his nature, and by the influence which is exerted upon him by means of the whole social environment, and especially by that of the family. Hence, it is inevitable that the influences that make for good and for evil should impartially affect alike the nature and conditions of each free moral personality.

Again, man considered as a free individual not only has his place in an historic process, but exercises his freedom under the limitations of bodily life. Moral and physical conditions apparently act and react upon one another. The causes which predispose to moral evil may often be sought in physical degeneracy, just as on the other hand moral evil has manifold effect in deteriorating physical conditions, which then in their turn react unfavourably upon the moral disposition.

Again, moral personality is something which at best has not come into complete being, but is struggling for existence. The emergence from the predominantly animal to the predominantly human may be witnessed in the growth of every healthy infant. It is witnessed in the gradual advance made by the human race in its infancy. It is a process which shows steady but slow advance throughout the history of civilization. The whole course of that history is summed up in the great principle of St. Paul that first is that which is natural and afterward that which is spiritual. If potential freedom is a distinctive human endowment, actual freedom is a costly achievement. The course of history represents the effort to secure that freedom and to provide such conditions for its exercise as will influence its decisions on the side of well-being and not the reverse.

Finally, the consideration of this subject is peculiarly liable to exaggeration caused by a false abstraction. The evil of certain epochs of history and of certain human characters is so outstanding as to blot out all impressions of the underlying and the surrounding good. Good men are troubled with the evil of their own heart, with the

consciousness of sin. It becomes natural under such two-fold influences to speak not only of universal depravity, but of total depravity. Yet such language represents a false abstraction. The very consciousness of sin implies that the depravity is not total, or the sense of sin would be destroyed. The Christian penitent will reply that he owes this consciousness of sin and the power of turning from it to divine grace. Yet such grace must operate upon and within human nature itself. The very fact that it does so is clear proof that something exists within human nature which is akin to the grace that transforms it. And, from the broader point of view, not of the spiritual experience of the individual but of human life generally, the bare power to exist depends upon certain possibilities of good which, if they are destroyed, lead to immediate decay and prompt extinction. The race is maintained not by its wickedness but by its potentialities of goodness. The pessimism which accompanied the decay of the Roman Empire evolved the great doctrine of Augustine, and in some respects touched the whole of Western theology with an excessive gloom which obscured many of the most real and important elements of the case. The very sense of moral evil, in fact, betokens underlying spiritual good, and is the witness to a great force of spiritual and moral progress inherent in the very life of mankind. It is the divine spur and inspiration to the highest efforts of moral freedom.

All these considerations must be borne in mind in dealing with the problem of moral evil and its bearing upon Christian Theism. Freedom with its risks is essential to personality. Freedom is exerted under the conditions of a time-process. Freedom, while in one sense the starting-point, is in another the highest goal of human development. To that development man is urged forward, not only by the ideals and incentives of good, but by the pressure of the sense of evil. Hence, the presence of this sense, while at first sight it seems to be evidence of the downfall of a divine purpose, is equally a sign of the persistence of that purpose, wrought out by means of the spiritual evolution which utilizes the forces of moral freedom to supersede the flesh by the spirit.

As to the existence of evil which is other than moral,

the following general remarks must be made. It is necessary to admit its existence, and further to admit that it is at present, in some respects, at least, inexplicable. To attempt to deny the reality of evil by assuming that it only appears to men to be evil owing to the finitude of their nature, is to disparage the significance of their practical experience. The integrity of this necessitates the sense of the reality of evil, which it is the business of all true progress to overcome. The idealism which considers itself entitled to set aside this characteristic consciousness would similarly feel at liberty to invalidate any other deliverance of human experience according to its will.

Yet, while insisting that the reality of evil in the universe must not be explained away, it must further be contended that its influence is not predominant; but, on the contrary, that it is so subordinate as not to set aside the general results reached by the Christian consciousness. The fact, after all, is that in this world, beset by evil, the revelation of the fatherly love of God has been made, that it has been accepted by faith and verified by the spiritual and moral results of a life built up upon that faith. Moreover, we owe to the sufferers of the human race in a peculiar degree the fact that this faith has become so influential in human consciousness, and has received so profound a verification in spiritual experience. Those who have done most to exemplify the faith in the Fatherhood of God have been those whose hearts were most oppressed by the fact of evil, and whose lives were most fully exposed to its influence. Out of the depths of their own experience they have discovered a power in the divine love, which they have apprehended, to transmute the experience of evil into a means of spiritual and moral advancement, so that suffering has enlarged, instead of narrowing, the sphere of their spiritual inheritance. An altered spiritual relationship to evil has revealed what is inmost in it as a power subordinating to the ends of holiness and love.

The following considerations must also be borne in mind. To a great extent even physical evil is consequent upon misconduct, or upon the mistakes which follow upon ignorance

or carelessness. It acts as a spur to knowledge, and a preventive of carelessness. In the next place, such suffering as is not due to the misconduct or ignorance of the individual is frequently consequent upon the conditions which we have seen to be absolutely essential if there is to be a world at all. And, finally, much of the evil which exists in the world is distinctly bound up with the principle and the possibility of good. For example, the evil of bodily pain is constantly cited as disproving either the beneficence or the omnipotence of God. Yet, when more carefully considered, very important considerations become apparent, which set aside this inference. To begin with, the existence of pain is essential in our finite experience to the possibility of pleasure. A nature exempt from the liability to pain would similarly be insensible to pleasure. The experience of each is enhanced by contrast with the other. Moreover, the great bulk of suffering in the world is prophylactic, the necessary warning against encountering danger or the judgement upon unnatural conditions which is necessary if those conditions are to be remedied. That the incidence of the suffering often falls upon those who are guiltless in respect of the infraction of natural law which entails it, does not create an insuperable difficulty when the essential conditions of heredity and influence to which reference has just been made are borne in mind. Moreover, the existence of evil has acted as a powerful stimulant to that redemptive activity for the race and for the individual which has been the very nerve of progress. It has operated further to discipline character. From the spiritual standpoint, many of the greatest and noblest of the human race have found a beneficent purpose more clearly manifested in suffering than anywhere else. With St. Paul they have 'gloried in tribulations,' not only as offering to them the opportunity of that vicarious suffering which deepens the sense of human fellowship, but also for the spiritual benefit which tribulation has brought. In short, suffering has been condemned chiefly from the standpoint of the animal, and not from that of the spiritual, nature. So far as we can realize, the dismissal of suffering from the economy of human life would, under its present conditions,

extinguish the possibilities of saintliness and heroism in favour of the establishment of man as a successful rational animal, so called. Man's peculiar liability to suffering is largely due to spiritual causes, and exists for spiritual ends.

Hence the problem of suffering is greatly reduced on both the human and the animal side. In respect to man, it is entailed by, and essential to, the higher possibilities of his nature. Add to this that the intensity of his suffering is largely due, not to physical, but to mental causes, to imagination, to apprehension of consequences of all kinds, and to anticipation. Destroy all these elements, and suffering is reduced to a mere physical spasm. It is as this that it exists for the most part among the lower animals. No doubt there are graver cases even among them which call for special consideration; but, speaking generally, and omitting the liability to special diseases, the fact of suffering is as essential to animal efficiency as it is to the higher possibilities of human character. There is from the merely animal standpoint a ministry of suffering which conduces not only to the development, but even to the happiness of the animal creation. In short, the more carefully we pursue an unprejudiced inquiry the more it becomes apparent that it would be impossible to have a painless world without so entirely destroying all the characteristics of the world we know that we have no means of realizing what such a world would be like, let alone of estimating whether it would be desirable or whether it would be possible. In respect of this aspect of existence, Butler's great principle that this world represents a scheme imperfectly comprehended by man, is particularly in point. Not that it should cause us to acquiesce in a difficulty without seeking to explore it, but it should at least deter us from raising objections which assume a total overthrow of all the conditions of a spiritual and moral life, and make the irrational claim that man and the animal world are to be delivered from all the conditions of finitude, involving as they do the possibility of history, of society, and, therefore, even of vicarious suffering.

There are, however, four cases in regard to evil which call

for special examination. They are as follows: (1) Cases where apparent purpose appears to be either abortive or only incompletely fulfilled. (2) Cases where the purpose fulfilled in nature appears to be one of deliberately causing pain. (3) Cases where the purposes involved in different forms of existence appear to be mutually destructive. (4) Cases where the apparently purposeless in nature, or what is at least inferior in the worth of its purposefulness, interferes with the fulfilment of the purpose involved in the existence of what is higher than itself.

It is impossible to deal exhaustively here with the problems which are involved. The reader may be referred to Martineau's *Study of Religion* for a very full treatment of many of the questions raised. Some comment, however, must be made on each of the four objections which have been raised.

1. The first is that of the cases where apparent purpose appears to be either abortive or only incompletely fulfilled. There are many instances of this apparent failure. Only a small proportion of seeds, for example, comes to maturity. The promise of fruit in the spring is only incompletely realized in the summer. In the higher region of animal life there are many kinds of deformity; and individuals depart in all manner of ways from the standards of ideal excellency. Even the type changes; and while this, on the whole, represents a tendency to improvement, made possible by a large measure of stability, yet a considerable measure of instability remains. The highest forms of excellence are often the most delicate, and nature seems to have set herself against the speedy attainment of too high an ideal by the peculiar tendency to lapse into unfruitfulness which attends all her rarer products. In addition, there is the impossibility of complete adjustment to an environment which, owing to the unceasing changes of the world, constantly varies, and hence suffering results. It is clear, however, that the objections raised on moral or rational grounds against these apparent drawbacks are largely founded on an abstract and arbitrary principle. The better is throughout treated as the enemy of the good. It is claimed that the nearest approach to absolute perfection should be a

law universal, by which all are condemned who do not attain to it. Such a principle would, indeed, if adopted, condemn the whole process of evolution by which the world has been built up. It is not, perhaps, possible to rule out such a universal objection; but, at least, we who are entirely conditioned by the evolutionary process have no means of estimating the possibility or judging the merits of any imaginary world to which the principles of this world are altogether inapplicable. We can condemn the dull child by comparison with the genius, yet to do so involves two mistakes. In the first place, it judges him solely by what is above, and not, also, by what is beneath him. In the next place, it generally overlooks the value of those common and homely characteristics to which nature and, perhaps, true insight, attach greater worth than to the rare eminence of genius. In another way our judgements are often faulty. So far as can be observed, certain types of physical infirmity seem closely bound up with certain forms of spiritual or intellectual superiority. We do not know why this is the case, but before we condemn the system of the world on the score of physical frailty in these cases, we must put to its credit the spiritual and intellectual excellence which compensates.

At every point of human endowment it is possible for us to ask the question, Why not more? But, at least, the process exemplified in nature seems to show that what is sought is a gradual improvement of the common level, and that the rarer qualities are flashed upon the world rather as a transient illumination to guide the general body in its advance than as a permanent endowment given to a few select individuals for their own benefit or for that of a caste. And if all cannot be infinitely perfect, surely this method has more to justify it, especially on the ground of universal beneficence, than any other.

In addition, moreover, to the manifold compensations which abound, the very risks to which human life is exposed in the attainment of its ends are providentially used to increase the care which is taken for its conditions, and to widen the range of that care, till it embraces the community

as a whole. They constitute also a commanding summons to the energy by which evil is overcome. It may be answered that if the evil did not exist, the energy would not be required. Yet this is to set aside all our standards of human value, for it is by putting forth this energy, combined with rational and sympathetic care, that man emerges from the animal to the spiritual. When all this has been said, however, there remains the fact that life, according to the measure of its development, and especially human life, is liable to peculiar dangers. When the infinite complexity of the conditions which determine it are taken into account, it will not seem remarkable that in a proportion of cases the result seems to miscarry. It is impossible to deny the existence of this very real and sometimes perplexing evil. All that can be done, probably, at the present is to affirm that the moral conditions of human freedom are often accountable for the worst cases, that their possibility is an incidental disadvantage, and that it is bound up with a liability to variation, which, on the whole, results in the improvement of the species. Finally, however painful some of the cases may be when looked at in isolation, they are so subordinate in the whole system of things that they cannot set aside the impression created by its prevailing tendencies and results.

The prodigality of nature raises considerations of a different kind. The seed, for example, which never fructifies, fulfils ends of a different kind in the whole order of things. In short, the judgement based upon each thing in the world must include the careful estimate of its place in the whole order of things, including not only the fulfilment of its own immanent end, but the assistance which it affords to the fulfilment of the ends of others.

2. The second case is that where the purpose fulfilled in nature appears to be one of deliberately causing pain. The instances of this are rare, but they are real. There are animals in nature which not merely kill their victims, but kill them with excruciating tortures. Even allowing that no objection can be taken to the killing, what is to be said of the attendant torture, which is not apparently

essential to the killing? Probably this problem is at present insoluble, for the answer to it involves a completer understanding of the process of evolution, and what is involved in it, than we at present possess. At least the difficulty is relieved by the admission of the principle of evolution. On the supposition of a direct and special creation of such instruments of torture, the difficulty would be increased. The feature in question is bound up with the presence in the universe of that principle of individuality which is prophesied in the lower forms of existence, and which not only binds the individual up with a universal order, but makes his very individuality, real as it is, part of that universal system. Thus the possibility of a creature equipped to torture its victims appears to be bound up with the possibility of all those higher forms of specialized existence, upon the appearance of which in the world alike its manifoldness and its improvement depend. Of course a heightened impression as to such rare cases of adaptation to cause suffering is produced by the vividness of human imagination, and by the modern exaggeration of the evil of mere physical pain. The difficulty is, however, real, though the increase of knowledge may largely explain it away, unless utter pessimism prevails, and principles be adopted which would make the existence of any animate world at all absolutely impossible.

3. The third case raised is that of mutual interference so that the ends contemplated in one particular form of life are interfered with by those sought by others. Almost all the predatory phenomena of animal life are included under this head. While once more it may be impossible with our present knowledge completely to explain or justify this aspect of the world, the following general considerations must be borne in mind. The strife in nature is non-moral; it no more involves moral considerations than does a disturbance of the elements. Further, it is clearly productive of the highest efficiency. That life should be endangered is necessary if life is to be progressive. Moreover, the purpose involved in competing forms of animal life, while it renders them in a minor sense mutually destructive, in a much more

important sense makes them mutually helpful. If the strength and fierceness of the tiger threatens the weakness of the deer, it tends to develop its swiftness, circumspection, and elusiveness. The qualities which make the perfection of the deer are thus due in a large measure to the presence of the tiger, and the animal finds pleasure in the possession and exercise of its own distinctive characteristics. The penalty may eventually be paid, but the enjoyment has been lifelong, and if death is to occur at all, it may, probably, from the animal point of view, be as desirable from the tiger as from any other cause.

It may be added, as Dr. Martineau has elaborately shown, that animal life with its prolific increase and its mortality, would be impossible on a limited planet unless these predatory habits prevailed.

4. The last case is that of the interference of what is seemingly purposeless, or at best, inferior in the worth of the purpose it fulfils with purposes of higher value.

As examples of this, the destruction of a young or influential life by the bacillus of a deadly disease, the destruction of a city by an earthquake, or the deterioration of a race by an enervating climate, may be cited. It is impossible to deny the reality of the evil in any one of these cases. Yet before the evil of such effects is used as an argument against Christian belief, careful investigation should be made as to whether in each case the evil is not bound up with attendant good. From the individual standpoint there is, in the light of Christian consciousness, comparatively little difficulty; for an essential feature of that consciousness is the permanence of the spiritual self, and the conviction that this world, with its changes and chances, is but the threshold of a higher and eternal form of existence. The whole appearance of catastrophes, whether to the individual life or to the life of multitudes, wears a different look according as it is judged in the light of belief in immortality or the reverse.

Looked at, however, simply from the standpoint of earthly life, it is clear that important considerations must be borne in mind before the poignancy of human tragedy

is allowed to affect our judgement of the world. The general conditions of our transitory life and of its exposure to danger are undoubtedly essential to the moral training of the race as a whole. The incidence of the penalty of ignorance or carelessness here or there is undoubtedly a mystery, only to be resolved by remembering that human life is that of a community, and is not to be judged by an exclusively individual standard. From this broader standpoint it is clear that the uncertainty of human life acts as a motive to strenuousness, that the dangers to which it is exposed conduce to circumspection and courage, while in cases where exposure to such danger is habitual it ceases to have any noticeable effect in diminishing the happiness of life.

All the finer characteristics of the race would remain undeveloped were it not for the pressure of earthly imperfection upon the spiritual life. Indeed, it may not be pressing the matter too far if we regard the liability to such catastrophes as confirmatory evidence of the truth of immortality. What seems contrary to a mundane conception of divine beneficence may be seen to be in reality part of that beneficence, if on general grounds we are allowed to assume that God has a higher career in store for man than that of being a successful and contented animal. In that case He deliberately prepares the spirit to seek after immortality, considered not merely as a survival after death, but as the fruition of spiritual promise. The counterpart of that desire is that man should find himself a stranger and pilgrim on the earth, and this consciousness could not be developed were his environment so satisfying and stable as to leave no room for the desire of a higher and more abiding blessedness.

As to race deterioration, several important qualifications must be borne in mind. Certain races are condemned, not by an absolute standard, but in comparison with those progressive peoples to whom it would appear that the future of the world has been committed. It must be remembered, however, that we are on very doubtful ground when we assume that any such absolute election has been given to any particular race. The emergence of Japan, for example, from barbarism to many of the highest standards of human efficiency, shows

how uncertain such forecasts are. Moreover, there is place in the world for lower as for higher races, if all the manifold possibilities of human life are to be realized. Distinct excellences which tend to be sacrificed in the more successful often flash out among the less successful. And, further, the effect of the interaction of races in the world's history may in the end largely explain what is now incomprehensible simply because it is incomplete. Movements are at the present time taking place throughout the world by which the spiritual and moral gains of the superior races are gradually being shared with the inferior. Sometimes the inferior cannot bear this improvement, and pass away; as is the case, for example, with many of the Red Indian tribes in North America. Yet there is really no more mystery, so far as the righteousness of the world-order is concerned, in the disappearance of a race than in the disappearance of an individual, while the disappearance of an inferior type is of practically small account so far as the case of human progress as a whole is concerned.

All these considerations mitigate, though they do not fully explain, these apparent drawbacks of human life. Above all, for the Christian, such drawbacks are judged by the help of that characteristic consciousness which transmutes evil by an inner experience into good. That which when externally presented in anticipation, or in the life of another, seems wholly bad, is constantly found as inwardly experienced to work for good. This testimony of the filial consciousness cannot be dismissed as illusory by any one who has really felt it. To him it is an assurance that the Fatherhood of God, in the consciousness of which his own life becomes complete, will in the end provide the interpretation of those elements of life which seem evil chiefly when they are separated in thought from the whole texture of experience, individual and collective, and judged in the false abstraction which results.

Finally, it is by help of this consideration that the foreboding of death is relieved of its terror. From the standpoint of nature, it is the correlative of birth, and man, being what he is, is indispensable to the whole economy of life as we know it. Judged from the higher spiritual standpoint,

it cannot be purposeless. Christian faith apprehends this, and prepares to meet it, fortified by the experience which has discovered, stage by stage, that all things work together for good to them that love God.

From a general survey of the whole difficulty, it would appear, therefore, that the dilemma that God is either not beneficent or not omnipotent is entirely inconclusive. It is the existence of pain, and of all that centres in pain, that is held to force upon us this alternative. Yet it is clear that, taken on the whole, pain is advantageous, especially judged from the standpoint of the higher interests of the world. In so far as this may be presumed, the existence of pain cannot be used either as an argument against either the beneficence of God or His omnipotence. As to the former, it is probably ordained because He is beneficent. As to the latter, mere power is not the divinest of attributes, but only power which so ordains the conditions of existence that they attain at the necessary cost the highest ends. On the whole, it must be urged that we see enough to give us the promise that this is the case with our world, though not sufficient to enable us to clear up mysteries which are due to the finitude of our comprehension, to our inability to foresee the complete life-history of any individual, and to the incompleteness of a tale which is at present not half told. All this, however, is not adequate to the Christian consciousness in its most characteristic expressions. In presence of the mystery of evil, three influences shape the attitude of those who most completely reflect that consciousness. In the first place, the recognition of the wisdom and love which are clearly to be seen working within, and utilizing much that appears on the surface to be evil. In the second place, a deep sense of the way in which spiritual and moral evil is bound up with the whole physical conditions of life and determines them. The explanation of the connexion is sought through the spiritual, and not through the merely natural. Hence, finally, the confidence of the Christian consciousness points to the certainty of the passing away of evil when the work of redemption and of spiritual evolution is perfected. Thus the deep sensitiveness to the poignancy of evil, which, after the example of Christ Himself, has been the

mark of the most typical representatives of the Christian life, gives rise to a stronger assurance of the completeness with which redemption will be wrought out, and of the consequent explanation why evil has been permitted.

It is now possible to sum up the results of this whole discussion. It has proceeded throughout upon the following fundamental principles: (1) That man, with his characteristic spiritual faculties, cannot be isolated from the whole texture of the universe to which he belongs; (2) that it is of his spiritual faculties alone that he has immediate knowledge; (3) that of these faculties the religious consciousness and the pursuit of ends are the most influential; (4) that in consequence of his organic relation to the world, he of necessity interprets it by means of these two distinctive faculties; (5) that however narrowly he may confine the power of human reason to explain the world, some measure of explanation is admitted as valid because it is necessary to the scientific and practical interests of life; (6) that such limited explanations are as distinctively subjective as those which are criticized and rejected, and in especial are of necessity marked by exactly those anthropomorphic features from which Agnosticism seeks to escape; (7) that, therefore, there is at least equal authority for the application of these principles in their fullest as in their narrower range, provided that they are purged by reflection from these elements which are clearly incidental to man's finitude and dependence; (8) that, therefore, since nature exists as relative and subordinate to the spiritual purposes which are growingly manifest in history, the spiritual consciousness which comes to its maturity in the experience of divine sonship contains the key to the meaning and constitution of the world—all the postulates, axioms, and principles which are essential to any explanation of the world implying relations between God, man, and nature, of which the filial consciousness is the supreme expression and experience; (9) that the existence of evil, while to some extent an inexplicable mystery, is in many respects seen to subserve the highest spiritual purposes which are being wrought out in the world, and that that which remains unexplained is insufficient to set aside the testimony borne by the spiritual, moral, and

rational consciousness to the personality, spirituality, and love of God.

From all these principles it follows that the characteristic life of men, including religious aspirations and experience, purposiveness, reason, and affection, proceeds from, and is the manifestation of, the infinite and eternal perfection of God, which unites nature and man in the organic whole of the universe. This whole receives its laws out of the fullness of the divine life, which goes forth in the creative and ordering activity by which alone can the world be explained. The personality of man, in its characteristic relations to God and to the world, is the witness to the personality of God.

A few concluding remarks are all that is necessary to add upon this part of the subject.

In the first place, these principles and the conclusions resulting from them supply the presumptions with which the evidence for the existence of the miraculous must be explained. Those who make any approach to the adequate realization of the immanence of God will not find the evidence of His activity predominantly in the exceptional. To do so would be to disparage the weight of the testimony to the being and nature of God, which is found in the essential facts of spiritual life in its relations to the universe as a whole. At the same time, miracles cannot be pronounced to be impossible by a convinced Theist, to whom the whole natural order of the world appears to be subordinate to supreme spiritual purpose. Such a man will rightly be careful to criticize the evidence adduced to prove the reality of such exceptional events. He will not fail to use the powers of reflection to discover how far such events are due to the operation of spiritual forces, securing their supremacy by operating in accordance with, and not in contravention of, the order of the world. But he will approach the evidence with a subjective view as to the probability of such occurrences largely determined by the belief which he entertains—

(1) As to the spirituality of the universe, its infinity, and the indwelling of God throughout the whole.

(2) As to the importance of the alleged miracle in relation

to the spiritual purposes which the history presents to him as being wrought out in the world.

(3) As to the meaning and power of human personality in its possible mastery over the merely natural. Such considerations are of peculiar weight, for example, in judging the evidence which is offered of the resurrection of Christ from the dead, since in Him is found the unique manifestation both of the spiritual purpose of the world and of a transcendent spiritual personality.

The conclusions which have been reached in this inquiry are corrective of that sense of the vastness of nature and of the insignificance of man which paralyses faith and the confident pursuit of knowledge. It has been apparent that nature is presented to man as an ordered and intelligible whole only in virtue of his rational and practical faculties. These at once transcend nature, and are one with it. Hence all world-interpretation, however limited, must needs be in terms of human reason. Yet that reason is not self-explanatory, but in the process of evolution emerges within the universe, and has the sense of dependence upon its Source. We have therefore been driven to the conclusion that the place of reason in nature can be explained only on the ground that an infinite and absolute Mind and Will constitutes and sustains the whole.

The vaster the universe, the vaster is the Mind which thus creatively organizes it. Yet it is equally certain that the Supreme Mind which thus organizes it and the finite mind, which explores its meaning and utilizes it when organized, are one, although the testimony of the spiritual nature in man affirms, as we have seen, personal distinction within the unity. Hence the position of finite reason in the universe cannot be as precarious as modern pessimism fears, or as materialism supposes. The contrast between the vast extent of the universe and the minute physical organism of man offers in itself no ground for any conclusion favourable or unfavourable to the worth or permanence of personal existence. These matters must be tried by altogether different standards. Above all, they must be judged by the place of reason in the whole.

The result of our inquiry has been to vindicate the

supremacy of Reason alike as the Source and meaning of all things, and as the highest result of the creative process. The kinship, therefore, of human personality with the absolute Reason which explains the world, is the measure of its importance; and the appreciation of this fact enables the intellect to take its part in repelling those doubts and fears which are the sign of human weakness and not of strength.

The apparent impersonality of the methods of the universe is indeed urged against this conclusion. To this it must be replied that all systematic arrangement, even in the activities of men, tends to become impersonal in exactly the same sense as is alleged against nature. In short, such impersonality in fixed order and general arrangement is necessary to the highest triumph of personality itself in shaping human progress. In the same way the inner development of human character is only possible by the formation of habits. Habit tends to become an automatic law; though the action of personality within it is never for a moment suppressed. Such analogies are of course imperfect, yet they are not altogether without worth as showing in the limited field of individual human life how reasonable and indeed essential to its highest ends is the method which appears to be that of God in nature. The analogy stretches farther, indeed, than might at first appear; for just as man's ordered systems of automatic habits are the conditions of his effort in realizing new and higher ends, so in the universe the establishment of a lower order has been the precondition to the appearance within it of higher manifestations of purpose. Thus after the natural come the spiritual, exhibiting an ordered and comprehensive progress towards ever nobler and more universal forms of being.

The difficulty, then, is inherent in all systems, and especially in such organic systems as the phenomena of life display. In addition to all this, the testimony of the spiritual consciousness to personal intercourse with and to special assistance by God cannot be dismissed lightly. Within the system which ever more clearly manifests its spiritual aim and meaning, those who stand in line with this divine intention have been conscious in all ages and under all conditions of assistance

which they have unfailingly attributed to divine succour. Were the whole interpretation of the world such as to invalidate the general belief in the existence of God, such impressions of spiritual persons might easily be dismissed as purely subjective fancies. But in proportion as the evidence is the other way, such impressions acquire a high degree of trustworthiness, and become an invaluable means for filling out the doctrine of God and of His relationship to the spiritual world, individual and collective, which a general survey of the facts supplies. Any view, therefore, of the impersonality of the progress of the world must, when a generally spiritual interpretation of its meaning has been arrived at, be corrected by the typical religious consciousness of those who are most susceptible to the highest spiritual influence, and therefore most dependent upon its help.

Finally, all these considerations tend to relieve doubt as to the competence of human powers so far as this is due, not to a critical philosophy, but to a kind of moral stupefaction or vertigo. So far as such doubt is critical, it has been dealt with in our inquiry. So far as it represents a mere sense of overweighted helplessness, it is well to reflect that all human powers stand on the same level before the bar of philosophy, which impartially examines the claims not only of the highest speculative thought and of religious consciousness, but even of ordinary common sense and of scientific explanation.

After all, knowing is one indispensable activity of personal being. Personal being depends upon the comprehensive faith of self-affirmation. That act of self-affirmation is present in all the activities of human consciousness, and prevents any one of them from existing in abstraction from the rest. Spiritual, moral, and affectional elements are therefore involved in knowledge itself. The spirit of man in its fullest activity and completest and most harmonious development, affirms the world-meaning which is necessary to its own existence, satisfaction, and justification. In the practical sphere it is forced to overrule mere critical doubts. Alike in the lower and in the higher interests of life, it does this by an act of faith which is inseparable from, and in reality an aspect of, reason. In the fullest measure of self-affirmation

it includes the affirmation of God. Faith is the victory which affirms God in self, and self in God against the pressure which would destroy both; save that it is intended to evoke this triumphant faith in opposition to itself. In this sense the theistic explanation of the world is the victory of faith; but with that victory is bound up the victory of reason, the justification of spiritual consciousness, the rationality of the world, and the permanence of those ideals of spiritual worth by which alone is progress sought after and made possible. Such a victory, in all its many-sided completeness, is impossible without Christ. He has revealed the glory of God which unfolds the meaning of the world, and has inspired the filial consciousness which responds to and manifests it. This twofold gift not only provides the only explanation of the universe, but shows how all principles of successful thought and action in regard to it are, just in proportion to their truthfulness and success, fragments of the complete Truth and Life revealed to man in the incarnate Son of God.

CHAPTER V

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF MAN AND OF REDEMPTION

CHRISTIANITY contains, as has been seen, the principles which are essential to the explanation of the world. In it alone has the full meaning of Theism been perfectly manifested. In this respect the only alternative to it is Agnosticism, with its abstract assumptions and inherent contradictions, leading eventually to pessimism with its despair. It cannot, of course, be expected that such an explanation can, for the present, be scientifically developed in detail. The fact that Christian Theism alone contains the truths and principles by which the world becomes intelligible does not dispense men from the labours of philosophic thought or scientific investigation. Until these labours are complete, and, further, until the history of the world is fulfilled, there will be gaps remaining and mysteries awaiting solution. It may, for example, be safely affirmed that spirit has a constitutive primacy in the world over matter without our being able completely to answer the questions, What is matter? In what way does spirit act upon it? and, How can it play the twofold part of being in one aspect the limit of spirit, while in another it is intelligible to spirit? Such questions, which represent the ultimate problems of philosophy, are not in themselves sufficient to set aside the claim of Christianity to furnish by its revelation of God the only possible explanation of the universe.

Yet, this theistic explanation is given, not in theoretic form, or with a view to what may be called with strictness a cosmic philosophy, but in and through the spiritual life of men. It is as God's end is fulfilled in man's spiritual life

that the meaning of the world which is organically related to man appears. What is theoretic in the Christian revelation is the formal expression or description of realities which are practically operative in bringing men to realize the ends involved in the spiritual constitution of their nature. And while this purpose involves revelation, illumination, the activities of faith, and other factors, yet the whole is summed up in the Christian religion as a work of redemption. The divine end in man which reveals alike the nature of God and the meaning of the world is attained by way of redemption. It is by this means that man attains to the end of his being. Hence it is as redemption reaches its spiritual results that the exact character of man's need is set forth, and with it the revelation of his nature, condition, and destiny.

It is in the realized relationship of sonship to God, which is found in the Christian religion, that human nature, its ground and end, stand revealed. The filial consciousness, in making good the true relationship to God, completes human nature and stands in organic connexion with all the other interests and relationships of human life. The verification of this spiritual experience is found in the fact that it, and it alone, brings that complete fulfilment of life, the promise of which lies everywhere in filial assumptions that are satisfied in Christian experience. The verification of Christianity as doctrine lies in its power to describe and to explain this spiritual experience. But here the way is as important as the end—the process as the result. Christ is not only the Truth and the Life; He is also the Way. The result which, in bringing satisfaction to man, unfolds the meaning of the world, has been attained by a work of redemption, inwardly experienced by man, of which the Christian revelation furnishes an account. The complete proof of Christianity therefore depends upon the living relation of this work to the whole of reality, so that it cannot be dismissed as the result of a merely subjective imagination, and upon the truthfulness with which its essential features are set forth. Despite the fact that the filial consciousness is such a fulfilment of human nature that it represents that which is in the highest sense normal in man, yet it is clear that this consciousness is

not possessed by all men, that it is deliberately renounced by some, and that in so far as it is realized it represents the triumphant issue of a conflict more or less intense and continuous with opposing spiritual tendencies.

Thus, its fulfilment is brought about by a direct activity of God, which in respect to its various aspects is described by various terms. In respect of its motive it is grace. Its method is revelation. As it brings about altered relationships between God and man, it is reconciliation. As it achieves a spiritual triumph in man, it is apprehended as a manifestation of the divine power. On the side of man, the entrance into the filial life comes as a deliverance from sin and guilt by the activity of faith and the experience of regeneration. The redemptive activity of God, which thus results in the salvation of men, is brought about in and through Christ by His Incarnation and Atonement issuing in the forgiveness of sins and the bestowal of His Spirit.

Hence the Fatherhood of God is manifested in putting away the sin of those whom His eternal purpose of love has destined to sonship. Again, the filial relation to God constitutes a vital ideal in man, which according as it becomes active brings into relief the contradiction of sin, and comes into the full possession of its rights and power only as men make the response of faith to the grace of God. Of this saving action Christ is the Mediator, bringing by His divine-human work in life and death the grace of God, our Father, to men, and the response of sinful but penitent men to God their Father. Whatever difference there may be in the detailed statement of this great process, its essential outlines are held as true by Christians of all churches and schools.

Such is the revelation which is contained in the consciousness, the activity, and the influence of Jesus Christ the Son of God. Such is the experience of God, of Christ, of sin and of salvation, which is characteristic of the Christian faith.

The New Testament doctrine of Redemption adopts, as has been already seen, in their most spiritual form, many principles elaborated in the Old Testament. By that adoption it stands in vital relationship, not merely to the Old Testament, but through the Old Testament to the other religions

of the world. Yet, in its total meaning and effect it is absolutely unique.

1. Christianity stands thus distinguished, in the first place, by its revelation of divine grace; the nature, energy, and manifestation of which are equally unique. The attitude of God towards man is one of an unchanging favour which does not depend upon the present worth of man himself, but on the eternal purpose for his uplifting, which determines the whole of God's dealings with the race. So supreme is this motive that it may be said to subordinate to itself and to its supreme purpose all other affections towards mankind which are attributed to God. For example, His wrath becomes, not the angry outburst of a Sovereign against a rebellious subject, but the expression of a fatherly concern, which will not tolerate that the divine ideal, which is the very life of man, should be set aside by him. The intensity of this steadfast purpose is therefore not merely marked by the wrath, which is stirred by the contradiction of sin, but above all, by the merciful succour which makes God Himself to bear and bear away the sin which frustrates His purpose and rouses His wrath.

This act of God towards men, made manifest in the Incarnation and Sacrifice of Christ, stands by itself. Many other religions set forth in various forms the effort of sinful man to approach, and to render himself acceptable to, God. The New Testament alone sets forth the reconciliation and restoration of man, not as the result of a successful human effort, but as proceeding from a divine act of self-giving and atonement. It may be objected that Indian religion has its myths or legends of divine Avâtars. Such myths are twofold. Some of them are philosophical and are concerned with the explanation of the world as a manifestation of God. They have a measure of affinity with the Logos-doctrine of later Hellenic philosophy, if not with its Christian embodiment in the Gospel of St. John. But what the popular religion of Hinduism has affirmed, its stricter religious philosophy has denied. When the whole universe, including the self-consciousness of man, has been resolved into an illusion from which it is the function of salvation to deliver man,

then the whole conception of the divine nature, as containing a principle of self-giving and self-manifestation, is destroyed.

Under other influences some of the countless Avâtars of the divine, that of Vishnu, for example, represent the incarnation of the principles of compassion and service at work for the deliverance of man from particular evils or from his misery as a whole. Yet such supposed manifestations, deeply important as they are for the general philosophy of religion, and even of Christianity, are—so far as Indian religion is concerned—imperfectly grounded in the divine nature, and not made the one key to the character and purpose of God. They are neither comprehensive in setting forth the attitude of God towards the world, nor universal in the scope of their compassion, nor consistent with other Avâtars of a totally different kind. Thus, while there are elements here and in the myths of other religions which represent the gracious activity of this or that finite divinity, yet these do but serve to bring into higher relief the transcendence of the Christian doctrine of divine grace, while showing the close relationship in which it stands to those nobler conceptions of general religion, which apart from Christ remain incomplete, and hold but a precarious tenure of the human heart and mind.

2. Again, the redemptive act of the Christian religion is throughout a divine-human fulfilment. The grace of God is not external and merely miraculous in its action, nor is the saving deed of Christ a successful intervention on man's behalf from outside, any more than it is a discovery by man of the way to placate God. The manifestation of divine grace is made in and through a perfect human life, and that life rests upon and expresses the divine act of which it is the manifestation and result. It is all divine and all human; all supernatural and all natural. It is the act of God, yet the activity of man. Christ thus conceived as Redeemer brings the highest evidence of divine Fatherhood in its relation to a world, which, while it springs from God, is afflicted with the mysterious and deadly evil of sin. The Incarnation, which manifests the grace of God, and is the indispensable means of atonement and redemption, witnesses to the fundamental unity, and not the separateness of God and man.

3. Hence, further, while salvation is, according to the Christian religion, a divine operation, it is also a vital spiritual process. Its deliverance is not external, but is wrought out because an inner experience of reconciliation brings men to enjoy a spiritual relationship to God, which sets human nature on the way to the blessedness of a complete spiritual consummation.

The view taken throughout these pages has been, not that the Christian religion, even as the religion of redemption, is a bare contradiction of other religions, but that it represents the complete realization of the idea and end of religion, partially and in different aspects suggested elsewhere. This is manifestly the case, so far as the doctrine of the Incarnation is concerned. It is equally so in respect of its doctrine of atoning sacrifice. It is impossible and needless to deal in detail here with the history and practice of sacrifice in religion, its different forms, or with the principles which lie at the root of it. In different ways, and in different degrees of emphasis, the various practices of sacrifice include the recognition by man of a divine claim, and the fulfilment of its demand. They contain the recognition of divine fellowship and its attainment by means of the sacrificial offering and feast. They frequently involve the propitiation of a divinity angry with the worshipper, either on account of some particular transgression, or because of the general worthlessness of his life. And, finally, they represent religion as realized only at a personal cost paid through the sacrifice or offering, and also the principle of representative substitution of the victim for its offerer.

Such are the general conceptions manifest here and there in all sacrificial practices without taking account of those baser conceptions of the Divine Being, which look upon Him as so vengeful or envious, that He must constantly be satisfied or bribed with a share of the good fortune which comes to His worshipper.

All the higher and more general conceptions are found in the Old Testament, and are presented to us in the most spiritual and humanized form in Isaiah liii., where the atoning sacrifice is made through the passion of a prophet

whose suffering is entailed upon him by his fidelity to the calling and truth of God. Yet while Isaiah liii. supplies the material for the New Testament doctrine of the Atonement, it is not always perceived how far it falls short of its New Testament fulfilment. The vicarious suffering which falls upon the prophet is an infliction by God. The prophet, so far as his passion is concerned, is seen to be separate from God, as is the case with ordinary men. Hence, while there is a penal infliction upon him, there is no divine self-giving in that infliction. The victim is neither given by God nor one with Him. Thus the chastisement, as it is conceived, falls outside the divine nature, and can in no sense be said to be borne by God Himself.

The New Testament doctrine of sacrifice, on the other hand, represents the victim as standing in such relation to God that the very gift of the victim is a mark of the divine reconciliation in principle, that the fulfilment of the sacrifice is an offering by God Himself, and that the atoning suffering, while completely human in its incidence, is a suffering borne by God Himself in the Person of His Son. All this, which so fulfils the idea of sacrifice as to transform it, is not even suggested in Isaiah liii.

The general principles contained in the practice of sacrifice are by their very prevalence shown to be deeply rooted in human nature itself. Hence, they cannot be dismissed as being untrue, simply because they are human and imperfect. Rather, those who believe that human faculties and needs contain within themselves a true, even if imperfect, witness to reality, will study what is involved in order to appreciate its essential meaning, and to find the place of that meaning in the whole world of truth. Points of contact between all these doctrines and practices on the one hand, and Christianity on the other, should be explored; yet, on the principle that religion can only be examined and judged in its highest and perfect form, the doctrine of Atonement can only be satisfactorily examined in its unique Christian embodiment.

The following salient features of the Christian doctrine of redemption are to be observed in general :—

(1) Christianity never by its view of man's need of redemption throws humanity out of God. The advent and work of Christ are the fulfilment of a long course of spiritual preparation. That preparation is as much the unfolding of capacity as the development of a sense of need. The spirit which characterizes alike the religion and theology of the Old Testament, and above all the teaching and spirit of Christ, is as far removed as possible from the unnatural abstractions in which formal theologians have frequently delighted, and from the morbid sentiments which have often disfigured an imperfect Christian piety. The history of mankind appears as the providential training of God for the consummation of 'the fullness of the times.' It is true that the immediate object and the means of this training is found in the Old Testament in the peculiar people of God, and in the New in the community of those who are quickened by the Spirit of Christ. The illumination enjoyed by these undoubtedly leaves in deep shadow those who do not possess it. Yet the opposition is not made absolute. If the distinction is real, it is, nevertheless, transcended by points of contact to be found alike in the universal purpose of divine grace, and in the spiritual constitution and capacity of human nature itself.

Thus the hold of God upon the human race is never treated as having been set aside by sin. The conception of redemption is relieved from this exaggeration, because though its operation culminates in the manifestation of Jesus Christ, its processes are coeval with the existence of mankind; nay, are traced back to the eternal purpose of God, and explained as the unceasing outcome of His essential love. Further, redemption involves a revelation, the very possibility of which assumes the presence of an undestroyed spiritual faculty in man. And the end of redemption is found in a consummation, the mark of which is the satisfaction of a spiritual capacity without which the gospel could gain no response from the heart of man. Sin, therefore, however universal its existence, and however grave its nature and consequences, is not allowed to obscure these underlying and positive relations between God and man, nor to suspend for a moment His gracious manifestation in history.

(2) Secondly, the union of the divine and the human which has been noted as characteristic of redemption marks it in every part and every stage. The Incarnation, for example, can only be properly apprehended as being equally, at once and throughout, the complete manifestation of God and the attainment of the spiritual ideal by man. It is each of these two because it is the other. Abstract theology has often set up the divine and the human as in antithetic relation. It has been afraid to admit the complete reality of the human lest it should eclipse the divine, or, on the other hand, has supposed that the frankly historic treatment of Jesus superseded the doctrine of His divinity. No such antithesis appears in the New Testament. The familiarity of the disciples with the Son of Man does not for a moment prevent them from investing Him with the unique attributes of the Son of God; nor, on the other hand, does the doctrine of His divinity as it is presented to us in the Fourth Gospel lead the author for a moment to refrain from bringing into the highest relief convincing marks of His humanity. The abstract doctrine of the separateness and even the intrinsic opposition between the divine nature and the human is overcome by a personal contact with Jesus which has revealed what in a true sense may be called the humanity of God and the divinity of man.

The same union is manifest in the doctrine of the Atonement. The death of Christ is at once the bearing of sin by God, and the offering of man to God. It may be construed alternatively from either side, but it is throughout and indivisibly both the one and the other.

So, also, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in redemption may be exhibited equally as the gift of a Divine Power and as the attainment of self-realization by man. And this because of the original relationship between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man.

(3) Hence, thirdly, the Christian doctrine of redemption contemplates a complete interpenetration of man by God; and in such wise that spiritual influence has its natural result in ethical transformation. The influence of God does not overbear human nature or invade it, dividing it in twain.

The result and the manifestation of the spiritual is the ethical.

(4) In conformity with these underlying principles the redemptive facts themselves, unique though they are, find their place in a rational spiritual development. The transcendence of Christ and the unique events which marked His history are not incompatible with His appearance at what St. Paul calls 'the fullness of the times.' If His appearance marks the sovereign power of God, it reveals equally His sovereign wisdom.

(5) And lastly, even the consciousness of sin is developed within and by means of this great spiritual process. If Christ came to save men from their sin, it remains true that they only know their sin in any completeness in and by their knowledge of Christ, who redeems them from it. The knowledge of sin in its entirety is part of the work of redemption, and proceeds side by side with it.

All these considerations are necessary if we are to escape from an artificial presentment of the doctrine of redemption, which, while it often facilitates human analogies, departs alike from the teaching of the New Testament and from the essential features of spiritual experience, to say nothing of the difficulties which it needlessly presents to reason.

The doctrine of redemption, however, assumes and sets forth three fundamental facts :—(1) That man is possessed of spiritual freedom. (2) That mankind is involved in sin. (3) That his redemption is due to a transcendent dealing with him by God. Further, the fact that this dealing transcends nature as ordinarily understood leads many to suppose that it involves an external and accidental remedy for sin, and that the salvation which it brings is equally accidental in the sense that it stands in no organic connexion with the constitution of human nature itself. Alike its heaven and its hell are held to be unverifiable, external, and excessive so far as their conception is concerned. They can be explained, it is held, as the product of human superstition. And this whether individual immortality, a perfected spiritual community based upon immortality, or a reconstituted world as its result, is

considered. Lastly, the difficulty is found that redemption is a gradual and partial process instead of an actual and immediate bestowment upon mankind.

On all these points it is held that the doctrine of redemption, quite apart from any particular objections, stands condemned by the principles of modern thought. To spiritual freedom the universal reign of natural law is opposed; to the doctrine of sin and of the spiritual ruin of the race the doctrine of evolution. A transcendent dealing of God with man is held to be inconsistent with the cosmic processes of His government. And lastly, the doctrines of grace and of vicarious atonement are held to be incompatible with an ethical view of life.

It is necessary to offer some general considerations as to each of these objections.

I. The primary condition of the Christian doctrine of man and of redemption is that man is a free moral personality. What is involved in his freedom will become clearer when the objections raised against it have been considered. Meanwhile it is implied that men are in such wise the creators of their own character and conduct that they are justly open to praise or blame on account of it. The freedom of the will properly understood is essential to the fact of moral responsibility. In meting out praise and reward on account of good conduct, blame and punishment on account of evil, considerations of justice are as essential as those of utility to society. The assumption upon which society has proceeded from first to last is not merely that its sanctions are convenient, but that they are righteous. By such sanctions undoubtedly new motives are supplied to the will, and these motives may have great deterrent value. But the principle upon which men award approval or disapproval and their consequences is that the actions which are thus visited were governed by no external necessity, but resulted from the responsible choice of the agent.

So far as external necessity is concerned all are agreed, if by external necessity is meant the exercise of irresistible force. Yet the sharp distinction between external and internal necessity has been done away by the modern point of view.

The operation of necessity is no longer conceived as exercised purely from without in the sense of its being independent of the organism of the individual. Hence, three objections may be urged against the doctrine of moral freedom. In the first place, from the point of view of physical science it may be urged that man is governed by physical necessity. In the second place, from the psychological standpoint it may be contended that his action is always the resultant of the various pressures of motives operating upon his will. And, in the third place, it may be objected from the theological standpoint that his moral freedom is incompatible with the sovereignty of God.

The doctrine of moral freedom must therefore be examined in the light of all these objections. Speaking generally, the only satisfactory starting-point must be from the investigation of self-consciousness itself. Any theories which begin by pronouncing the characteristic deliverances of self-consciousness to be illusory, or the general development of self-consciousness to be erroneous, put themselves at once out of court. Whatever truth we can either know or imagine is presented to us in and through our self-consciousness. We can never escape from self-consciousness in order to take a dispassionate view of truth from outside ourselves. It is impossible for us to possess any standard of truth, or any body of truths which are thus derived from outside ourselves. Self-consciousness can only be corrected by self-consciousness; by the appeal, that is to say, from superficial appearances presented to it to that which underlies them, and is the means of gathering up apparently discordant phenomena into a consistent whole. In perception and the acquisition of knowledge generally the self is given in distinction from and in union with the world which it perceives and knows. But the world is perceived and known by man as an active and not merely as an intelligent being. As an active being man pursues ends, and has the consciousness that, within certain limits, the choice of ends is subject to his own control. So far as he is free from constraint by his fellows he selects his ends because he either desires or approves them. He acts in a particular way because he wills to do so. The decision of his will may be

arrived at with difficulty, may be steadfast or fluctuating, impulsive or deliberate. But whichever it may be, he has the consciousness that the result is something within his own power. This is the indispensable form of volitional consciousness. The vacillations through which the decision of the will is arrived at must indeed be accounted for in our doctrine of the freedom of the will; but however they may be accounted for they are insufficient to set aside the primary deliverance which is included within the exercise of will itself.

And, still more, the exercise of the will is attended by self-approval or by self-disapproval. The standards upon which its verdicts are based are influenced from many sources. The state of the law, public opinion, the training of the home, religious influence—all have their bearing upon the moral consciousness of the individual. Yet, in so far as he becomes a moral being at all, the influence which all these exercise upon him is not that of external constraint, but goes to shape a moral ideal which is internally set up within the moral consciousness itself as the standard by which conduct is judged, and to which even motives should conform.

Thus the ideal, however formed, is, according to the consciousness of the individual, freely adopted and made the instrument of responsible choice. It is by this internal ideal thus appropriated that man praises or blames himself so far as he passes moral judgement upon his own conduct. In so far as he offends against standards which have not thus become part of his own internal freedom, and suffers for the offence, he may blame himself for unwisdom; but he does not condemn himself for moral wrong. The internality of the standard is essential to its moral character. And directly it becomes internal it becomes the instrument of moral freedom. The first requisite, therefore, is to allow this fact of moral consciousness to speak for itself. The indispensable condition of any adequate doctrine of the will is accurate and complete description of the phenomena presented to consciousness in its decisions. Here, above all, care must be taken that we should not explain it by explaining it away.

1. If this attitude be maintained it will be manifest that the judgement of consciousness is that while man is conditioned

by the material, he is not subject to its necessity. Whatever may be the truth of the alleged complete parallelism between nervous states on the one hand and conscious states on the other, man has no complete consciousness of, or even power to observe, his nervous states. That which alone is made manifest to him is a series of states of consciousness relative to self as being his own, and apparently modified from time to time by the direct volition of the self to which they are relative. It is conceivable that the physical side of all this may be explored, and that even the most direct and decisive volition may have an inseparable union with a particular nervous condition, whether as cause, concomitant, or effect. Yet, such a condition will to the end be a matter presented to the researches of physical science, while immediate consciousness will proceed as though no such physical correspondence existed.

Unquestionably it is in some sense through the mediation of the nervous system that the material world is presented to consciousness, whether as a percept or as a force operating upon the feeling and influencing the will. It is equally clear that the mediation of the body is not merely external, that it is in some sense, at present impossible to explain, more than a mere connecting link between the spiritual and the material. The opposition between mind and matter must indeed be transcended before any connecting link can be found between them. If the nervous system be the indispensable means by which an external world is perceived and acted upon by the subject, it must be because a more intimate connexion exists between the two sides of the relation than scientific inquiry can either explore or imagine.

Speaking generally, it is clear that the external world conditions moral freedom by presenting the data upon which freedom is exercised. The nature of the material objects and laws by which human life is environed, the society of men whose presence and influence is only revealed to us through the senses, present to us the particular realities which, by forming the world of consciousness, condition the tasks and problems of the will. And, further, the pleasurable or painful sensations by which particular experiences are accompanied appear to be dependent upon the nature and condition of the

physical organism. The external conditions are the cause of subjective feelings, while the decisions of the will are obviously succeeded by states of feeling which reveal the heightened or depressed vitality of the bodily organism. Again, the material world imposes its conditions upon our very reaction upon it by means of our activity. However sovereign may be the decisions of our will, its effect is in various ways limited by our physical energy. Moreover, our physical energy must manifest itself in accordance with and by means of the mechanical and other laws which prevail in the physical world.

Yet, when all this has been said, the fact remains that we have throughout an immediate consciousness of the autonomy of the will, and that the whole of our moral, social, and judicial standards are a witness to that autonomy. Within the realm of consciousness, nothing is more familiar than our power, if we will, to override the promptings of our merely physical nature. The state of 'giving way' to these is as clearly recognized by us as is the corresponding state of overcoming them. Moreover, between these two extremes, we have frequent experience of being able, by a direct act of will, to moderate them. To secure a sufficient end, we may either modify to a large extent the physical influences which threaten to over-master us, or we may produce a similar result from the other side by calling in to the assistance of our will a large number of balancing considerations which eventually counteract our physical conditions. Thus, the man who is sunk in depression may arrest the progress of what unfits him for the moral tasks of life, either by so changing his environment as to select and bring to bear upon himself new and inspiring influences from without, or, still more, he may elect to call forth within himself considerations which dissipate his gloom, and by an act of the will may constitute these considerations fixed ideas, until, by their means, the physical and mental stress has passed away. Throughout this process, whether he yield, overcome, or moderate, he is conscious of moral responsibility for his choice; and of his duty and power, not merely to be the receiving-house of manifold physical impressions, but to order

and modify them for the fulfilment of the supreme ends of his life.

Suppose, then, that it were possible to establish the complete parallelism between nervous and mental states, and that we could have a direct and complete power of observing that parallelism, then one or other of two conclusions would be drawn. Either the nervous states would appear to be the material presentation of the spiritual, its physical embodiment; or a relation of cause and effect might be held to exist between the one and the other. If the former alternative were selected, this would not provide even a faint suggestion that the primary consciousness of volitional power and responsibility should be denied. The testimony of self-consciousness would be left in complete possession of the field, even although the decisions of the will were, so to speak, ensphered in physical conditions.

Supposing, however, that the other alternative be taken, and that it be assumed that either the nervous conditions are the cause of spiritual consciousness, or that spiritual consciousness is the cause of the nervous conditions. It is needless to discuss at the present moment the psychological question. Yet upon the facts disclosed in consciousness, if interaction is admitted between the nervous and the conscious states, the primary consciousness of man that he is able, by a direct decision of the will, to invade the physical conditions, cannot be set aside. No possible perfection of our observation of the successive states of nervous consciousness would entitle us to convert that into the cause which is equally capable, *a priori*, of being treated as the effect. The question, then, which is cause and which is effect, must be decided not by any consideration of the completeness and orderly succession of the physical series, but by general metaphysical principles which cannot be settled by mere reference to physical facts. The working out of the complete connexion between the physical and the mental would no more entitle us to dismiss our consciousness of effective will-power as a mere chimera than it would entitle us to deny the importance of the mind and its laws in constituting the perceptive experience of mankind. The concomitance would be in itself equally compatible

with the view that the material phenomena constitute the instrument of consciousness as with the view that they are the creator of consciousness. In that state of divided possibility, the decisive judgement would be given by the testimony of the moral consciousness, by which alone can the life of man be made good.

This, however, would not be to disparage the importance under our present conditions of existence of the material instruments of consciousness. The will, in its freest exercise, cannot be conceived to be external (if such a word be in place) to the physical organism. It is in command of the reservoir of energy which it uses. The occasion for its use of that energy in part is created according to the hypothesis by the antecedent physical conditions. Whether the decision takes this form or that, therefore, it would appear to the scientific investigator to take its place in the regular physical series. Apart from knowledge of the subjective side, it would appear to be completely explained by physical antecedents. Yet that which on its physical side appears and is purely natural, not affecting therefore the laws of physical energy in any respect, will be found on the subjective side to be explained by the free intervention of the will.

2. Man is influenced by motives, but the self-realizing potentiality of spiritual and moral personality is present throughout. The analogy of mechanical forces has frequently been applied to the motives of the will. Diverse motives have been compared to the different forces which meet at one centre, and it is supposed that the result in action is determined by the resultant pressure of these various motives. In short, it is urged that the so-called parallelogram of forces is as applicable to the facts of moral life as it is to machinery. It may be admitted that man never acts except under certain influences. Indeed, an uninfluenced man cannot exist. Not for one moment can we escape from the environment which acts upon us through our senses, and which stimulates the inner life to appropriate and respond to it. It does not, however, follow that activity succeeds influence. Still less that it succeeds after an interval of time, however infinitesimal. Man is from the first as active as he is receptive.

The two are co-extensive throughout his life. His action therefore depends upon an individuality, in which openness to certain impressions and a peculiar activity by which he at once acts and reacts upon them are combined. That individuality is influenced by all the forces of heredity. In this way, each individual assumes the history of the race as operative upon him through his progenitors. Thus, the self constituted by each man's individuality cannot be separated either from the inheritance of the past or from the environment of the present. The appetites, instincts, impulses, desires, intuitions which affect him are all modified by these two limiting conditions. Moral freedom is not *in abstracto* or absolutely creative; it can only exercise itself upon the data which are thus inwardly presented to it. There is no question, therefore, as is sometimes alleged by determinists, of a mere miracle in the sense that anything may happen through free choice apart from all the antecedents which led up to its exercise.

Two other admissions should be made. In the first place, there is much human action in which the exercise of moral freedom is suppressed. Wide ranges of action tend to become automatic; either moral decisions have never been taken in regard to them, or the principles by which action is guided have been settled long since, and the consequential course of conduct tends to become part of the unconsidered mechanism of life. Such must be the case if man is to have the energy and leisure to respond to the new calls of a progressive life. Thus, both the imperfect and the perfect moralization of life in different ways tend to remove whole tracts of conduct from the critical exercise of moral freedom. Secondly, the parallelogram of forces may fairly serve as an analogy in the case of impulsive or impassioned action. There are those who are largely the servants of impulse; this is prevailingly the case in childhood. There are others who give way from time to time to outbursts of passion and appetite. In the former, self-command has never been attained. In the latter it may have been lost. In a sense, it would be true to say that both the one and the other are explained by the fact that self-hood is as yet incomplete. When a man surrenders

himself to impulse, he sinks below the distinctive level of manhood towards that which is merely animal. In proportion, as self-hood becomes perfectly developed, he criticizes his impulses and desires, discriminates between them and controls them. Much of the highest and noblest action which he performs is under stress of the severest conflict with natural impulses. If it be said that the very fact that he resists them shows that there is a greater volume of pressure against them than in them, this is merely to beg the question. So far as intensity of emotional effect is concerned, it is simply untrue to say that the resultant action is more powerful than that which it overrides. That it prevails over the will is true, but its prevalence is due to considerations of reason and not to the pressure of mere force. In short, when self-hood is developed, man judges his impulses, emotions, and desires by a permanent standard of values, set up and enforced by his personality. That standard of values is less and less determined by mere emotional intensity, although, undoubtedly, it brings with it a satisfaction of its own. Thus the more thoughtful of those who have contended that the decisions of the will are determined by the resultant of the pleasures and pains produced by any course of action in prospect have introduced, as in the case of J. S. Mill, distinctions between kinds of pleasures, which, when closely examined, seem to set aside the whole hypothesis that conduct is determined by the mere pressure of pleasure and pain and of the desires connected with them upon the will. In the case of a higher and more delicate pleasure, such for example as the sense of having done one's duty, either the weakness of a motive considered as a force has been counterbalanced by a sense of worth which brings it into a more influential relation to the personality, or the personality itself has operated to select between one kind of pleasure or another.

The force of this consideration is increased when it is borne in mind that pleasures and pains chiefly act upon the will as motives by anticipation. It is true that we often take action or refuse to take action in order to prolong pleasurable sensations or emotions. It is equally true that pain already experienced prompts to decisive action of a simple kind, or

even of one involving elaborate contrivance in order to escape from it. A case of the former is when a child withdraws his hand from the fire; of the latter when an adult has recourse to various kinds of treatment to overcome a disease. Yet such instances, where pleasure or pain already experienced operate upon the will, belong to the lower ranges of voluntary action. The higher forms of action depend upon deliberate choice in order to gain an end conceived by the imagination.

In all such cases the question arises, What is it that acts upon the will? Is it the attainment of the end that is set before us, or is it the enjoyment of some pleasure or the avoidance of some pain which the attainment of that end is expected to bring with it? It would seem as though a decision either way involves an undue abstraction. It is impossible to contemplate the realization of an end without some conception of pleasurable consequences accompanying it; especially that sense of satisfaction which attends the attainment of a purpose or the supply of a need. On the other hand, it is clear that in action the direct object of the mind is not an emotional anticipation of pleasure, but the attainment of a deliberately chosen end. For the agent to transport himself by an artificial effort of imagination into the pleasurable emotions which he anticipates, unfits him for the efforts which he is called upon to make, and would frequently act rather as a deterrent than as an incentive by destroying his illusions before the time. This latter effect would take place because the presence of emotional pleasure after a time evokes the criticism of the reason. And especially as the emotion loses its freshness and begins to weary with a sense of monotony. Hence the attempt to seize by anticipation upon the emotional concomitants of the attainment of an end would certainly tend to destroy whatever power there is in them to awaken the activity. An end sought means a need satisfied. A need satisfied carries with it a pleasurable heightened consciousness. All these elements cohere in the motive which presents itself to the will. But all these elements are coloured throughout by the individuality of the actor. The need he feels, the peculiar way in which he contemplates its satisfaction, creating in

imagination an anticipated pleasure, which may or may not be eventually enjoyed, no less than the peculiar means by which he satisfies his need—all these, even in a simple act of choice, bear the stamp of his own individuality.

But the case is rarely simple. Various needs present themselves; the satisfaction of some of them being incompatible with that of the rest. Different ideals present themselves, and the selective process takes place. The anticipated pleasure or relief from pain which is projected into the future attainment, while undoubtedly suggested in part by the experience of the past, is largely created by the sense of the value of the end proposed to the governing purposes of life. To forecast action is for the most part to rise superior to merely emotional inducements. The man in whom such inducements habitually prevail manifestly falls below the realization of any steadfast moral personality. On the other hand, the man who attains to such personality is the man who is able to resist the pressure of the emotional anticipation, and to select among competing possibilities of action such courses as are consistent with his previous lines of action. And he is not content with outward consistency. He selects anew and reaffirms the motives by which these lines of action were determined, in spite of all incitements to the contrary. The governing factor in his choice, therefore, is his will to select that which maintains the consistency of his life, which develops and secures the expression of his personality by upholding the moral standard of values which he has set up.

Hence in all such complicated acts of choice the man who acquires moral personality brings to bear a norm by which he criticizes and selects the motives which are to govern his character. The standard which he preserves presents itself to him as an ideal to be fulfilled in the ever new unfolding of his life. At every point there is a possibility of his departing from it either by impulse, or by the invasion of emotion, or by mistaken judgement. Yet if such a consequence take place under pressure of anticipated pleasure or pain, although he may have obeyed the strongest motive dynamically considered, he has so far missed the mark. And this not merely so far as the general human ideal is concerned. He has not merely

diverged from the path by which alone can the general well-being of the human race be secured. He has not merely become an exception to the general law or tendency of human averages, but he has been inconsistent with his own individual ideal. In following the strongest, that is to say the prevailing motive, he has so far ceased to be a moral personality. He has admitted a course of action which cannot be made consistent with those ends of life which have been selected by him as maintaining and satisfying the highest values of life.

Hence to represent man as helplessly subject to the pressure brought to bear upon him, seems a total misconception of all moral decision.

The view which we have set aside has commonly been selected on the ground that human actions, both in general and in particular, can be predicted with a high degree of certainty, and that only by this means can a science of human conduct be set up. Neither of these contentions in any way bears out the doctrine of determinism. That a man's action can be predicted may be as much due to his hitherto unfailing exercise of moral discrimination in order to secure a permanent ideal of life as to any consideration of the emotional effect of motives upon him. Nor is this latter view necessary in order to a scientific knowledge of human conduct. This is to be obtained by the study of what is involved in the ends which approve themselves to the moral sense of men as fulfilling the end of their being, by investigating the nature and grounds of divergency as to such standards, and by discovering the causes by which their higher standards of action are from time to time modified or set aside.

The greatest alternative presented to the human will is that which is involved in religious choice. It is in regard to man's dealings with God that the greatest crisis takes place. He is related to God and to the universe in God. The meaning of that relationship is unfolded within his consciousness by the sense of dependence, the needs of spiritual aspiration, the dictates of conscience; in a word, by that combination of love and reason through which man realizes his place in the universal order of being. On the other hand, man is a distinct individual, possessing his own individual instincts,

impulses, and desires. The alternative so presented must be more carefully examined in dealing with the nature of sin. Meanwhile it is sufficient to say that the most far-reaching act of freedom is the decision either to emphasize and give effect to the relations which make man's individuality the free servant of the universal, or which turn that individuality into a means and justification of ignoring such claims in order to the pursuit of what appears to promote his own particular advantage.

The matter upon which his choice is in this respect exercised differs widely in the mode and content of its immediate presentation to him. It ranges, according to circumstances, from any ordinary contrast between altruism and selfishness, in regard to particular actions, up to the clearly recognized choice between God and the world presented to a Christian Theist. Yet the full content of the choice of the divine embraces all these particular acts of choice throughout the whole realm of human life. Every decision for the higher as against the lower is in its inmost nature religious, and would be seen, if its whole meaning were understood, to be the choice of God, by giving effect to those higher spiritual and moral intuitions which reveal and respond to the relation of God to men, and are indeed the immanent manifestation of His Spirit. The ultimate significance of the act is therefore the same, however great may be the differences in the apprehension of its full meaning and of its spiritual significance. The alternative may be presented in the spiritual crisis known to religious men as that of conversion, or in the daily recurring issues presented to the will from the dawn of moral responsibility. The former must needs determine the latter. The latter, if they be steadfastly persisted in, imply and lead up to the former. Thus the phenomena of spiritual decision known to the Christian religion are not isolated, but represent with the fullest determination of content and the highest intensity of spirit the alternative which is presented throughout the whole of human life, and which in substance is experienced either as one all-determining act of choice or intermittently in regard to particular decisions by all human beings whose life attains to moralization. In no acts of will are the fact and nature of

moral freedom more clearly disclosed than in these, in which the selection is felt to be between right and wrong, the higher and the lower, the social and the anti-social.

3. Lastly, the sovereignty of God is such as is compatible with moral personality, as it has now been described. Obviously, moral personality in man is both the basis and the outcome of a relationship to God which transcends the natural as ordinarily understood. Moreover, it is from this consciousness of personality in all its implications, religious, moral, and rational, that the conception of God as perfect Personality arises. The personality of God can only be made known to and in human personality. In the nature of this religious consciousness of divine personality are combined the sense of union, of distinction, and of a divine sovereignty which, acting on the basis of union and maintaining distinction, gains its ends by spiritual and moral means.

While, however, the mode of divine relation and influence in regard to finite personalities can only become manifest when such personalities make their appearance in the universe, yet the foundation has been laid long before moral personality appears. The relations of God to man, considered as those of the perfect and supreme spiritual personality to the finite, are the highest and the most complex fulfilment of a promise which is made throughout the lower creation. God's relation to the natural universe is not the annulling but the maintenance of distinction. It involves the attaining of a divine purpose by the setting up of the so-called material with a measure of independence, with steadfast properties, and established order, which, if on the one hand they are the means by which nature serves God, are on the other hand the divinely-given protection against any arbitrary interference.

The general form of relationship, therefore, which gives promise of ultimate moral freedom is found within the constitution of nature itself. Its fullness and range varies directly as the complexity of the organism. Living forms in this respect are the connecting-link between the domain of physics on the one hand, and of moral freedom on the other.

Again, looking at the matter from the other side, the possession of moral freedom does not throw man into a merely

external relationship to God any more than to nature. The spatial conceptions of within and without, however natural and necessary, are apt to become misleading. It is equally true to say that moral freedom, like man himself, is within nature, as to say that it is without. The fact that man operates upon nature does not exclude him from nature; indeed, he must be a part of nature in order that he may operate upon it. In the same way humanity is only possible because God is the ground, the means, the law, and the end of man's being, alike in its individual and in its social aspects. Yet, as personal, God and man, despite this inmost unity, are brought face to face with one another. But the fact that human nature is grounded and constituted in God makes every faculty of man an avenue to God. Not, however, a bridge across a chasm. Every human faculty is immanent in God, and God is immanent in it. Spiritual and ideal aspiration, reason, conscience, faith, are equally the testimony to God's indwelling in man, and to man's indwelling in God. If in one respect they bear witness to the distinction between the two, they equally bear witness on the other to the union out of which the distinction springs, and by which it is ultimately reconciled.

Hence the divine is not introduced into human nature at one particular point, either of time, of faculty, or of experience. The human and the divine in man are in essence co-extensive; the divine being the source and explanation of the possibility, order, and meaning of the human.

It may be that investigation of what is called subliminal consciousness may eventually throw much light upon the means of this relationship. Subliminal consciousness may be regarded as the secret repository of the past, whether that past be within the limits of the individual life or extends to his ancestral inheritance. It reveals from time to time that it is the storehouse of potentialities not yet developed, or, it may be, superseded by subsequent conscious selection. It represents a whole of personality, only an infinitesimal part of which is revealed at any moment of consciousness, or, perhaps, at all moments of consciousness added together. Is it not here that we should find, if we could explore it, the point of contact, if

such an inadequate phrase be allowed, between God and man, the seat of the divine sovereignty and influence over human life?

However this may be, the difficulty raised by the conception of consciousness of a personal relationship between God and man, considered in their distinction from one another, differs in form, but not in substance, from that which is involved in the relationship of man with nature. A naturalistic interpretation of the world cannot, as has been argued, invalidate the governing facts of human consciousness. Hence the problem how to combine unity with distinction would be equally real even if the hypothesis were adopted that the universe is a natural and self-explaining whole, without a divine ground.

If there be no divine Father, how does our mother nature gain her way in and through human freedom? To substitute a dogma of automatism for the experience of freedom is to beg the question in a way that would be considered shameful in a theologian. Hence, the problem of unity and distinction is as great for the naturalist philosopher as for the Theist, though the relations involved in the distinction between impersonal nature and personal man are not as profound and many-sided as those between a personal God and a personal man. Alike in the one case and in the other, facts must be accepted, not explained away; and no single fact can be explained in its fullness till all is known.

Yet, God's sovereignty, while it must be not only compatible with human freedom, but even fulfilled by means of human freedom, has ample conditions and safeguards in human nature itself.

In the first place, God, as the creative ground of human nature, determines that nature, giving to it its permanent possibilities, its limiting conditions, and the governing ends which determine its permanent direction.

In the second place, human nature thus considered is not merely an individual, but a social organism. Hence, the very activities which, considered as selfish and sinful, tend to defeat the divine purpose, provoke within the organism those social reactions by which harmony is restored, and the

purpose of God saved through conflict from defeat. The fact of lawlessness must therefore not be judged in isolation, but in its tendency to evoke the permanent and universal law-abiding elements and influences of human life. Human history is far more truly the sphere of law than of lawlessness, and the victories of law in the highest and deepest sense of the term have been produced by the emergencies of lawlessness.

In the third place, the sovereignty of God is secured by the permanent spiritual influence which He exercises upon human nature, individual and social, as grounded in Him. Slow and painful as has been the story of higher progress, that progress is real, presents growing signs of reason, and is due to the maintenance, expansion, and deepening of the spiritual inspiration of the race.

And, lastly, the sovereignty of God is maintained by the influence along all these lines of supreme personalities. Representing in their character and aims at once the highest dominance of the divine and the most typical fulfilment of the human, they have exercised a spiritual dynamic upon their fellows which has permanently moulded the direction of human affairs and the ideals of human character, conduct, and relations.

II. The second objection raised to the truth of the Christian religion viewed as Redemption is to its doctrine of sin. With the establishment of the existence of God and of moral freedom comes the recognition of spiritual and moral evil in the world. Such evil is in itself the sternest of all facts and the most universally admitted. On its objective side it represents a divergence from the ideal of humanity, or at least a failing to realize its ends. It is an exaggeration and perversion of some elements of human nature, a failure to keep pace with its progress, and a relapse to standards and habits that have been superseded. It is thus a contradiction of humanity in the individual, anti-social conduct in a social organism, reversion in a progressive community, maniacal excess in opposition to reason, animalism and inertia disfiguring and clogging the development of a spiritual character. These are the salient features which moral evil assumes on its

objective side. So far there is no dispute. But such objective departures from that which, because it is ideal, is normal for human nature, are attended by the moral consciousness of wrong. The action of conscience imputing responsibility and guilt is one of the most distinctive marks of human nature, and causes the most poignant suffering. The adverse judgement of conscience refuses to be explained away. Its characteristic testimony is that the act condemned was not inevitable and that it is not to be explained away as a mere mistake. It is not a mere miscalculation of the intellectual judgement, but springs from a deeper source. It is a setting aside, momentary or habitual, in the interests of some particular desire, of an ideal which reveals itself in consciousness as the rightful law of the individual life. That ideal may be coloured and its authority enforced by the influence of the social environment, but these are in themselves powerless to explain its inwardness and constraining nature. No doctrine of social pressure has yet been able to account for the conversion of the 'I must' into the 'I ought.' Social tyranny has never been felt to be so oppressive and has never been so strenuously resisted as when it has assailed this sense of duty. Undoubtedly this sense, like every other, exists in various degrees of acuteness, and is indefinitely capable either of education or of the reverse. It is awakened in primitive stages by humble and natural influences which at a later stage of human development cease to possess any moral significance.

But when all abatements have been made, the objective fact of evil is accompanied by the subjective side of moral condemnation. And both are completed in the religious consciousness of sin. Sin is the violation of the law conceived as expressing the divine will. It marks the action, and still more the motive which prompted it, as an infraction of the relations between God and the man who is guilty of it. It extends to the consciousness of sinfulness, as expressing not merely a habit of disobedience, but a spiritual state on the part of the sinful man which contradicts the mind and will of God. It represents a state of alienation from Him, the falling out from the normal relations with Him which are felt to correspond to nature and to be essential to blessedness. It

is clear, therefore, that the sense of sin depends upon the idea of God, and the consciousness of relation to Him. An unworthy or an unstable idea of God or a weak sense of relationship to Him must necessarily affect the consciousness of sin—alike as to its reality and as to the precise temper, motives, and conduct in which it consists. According, therefore, to the spirituality, ethical nobility, and comprehensiveness of the doctrine of God is the consciousness of sin. Its peculiarity, however, is always that it is not abstract, or concerned like morality with the abstract qualities of particular actions. It is grounded in a consciousness of relations to God; it represents the breach of those relations; it brings home to the sinner the responsibility of having broken these relations. It is not limited by the individual. As he is conscious of being a member of the community, so he extends his own consciousness of sin to the community, whose moral solidarity with himself he intuitively recognizes. Thus, in proportion to his sense of individual sinfulness, is his sense of the sinfulness of the race to which he belongs.

1. Such are the facts, so far as they need be stated for our immediate purpose. The only way to deal with them from the naturalistic point of view is, so to speak, to naturalize the facts and to denaturalize the attendant consciousness. That is to say, the facts of evil are treated as being naturally bound up with the history and development of mankind, while the judgement upon the facts passed by the religious and moral consciousness is held to be mistaken.

Such procedure simply eliminates disagreeable facts because they are inconsistent with an easy interpretation. Moreover, it is not alone the consciousness of sin which is to be eliminated, but the consciousness of God and of moral freedom. All these together form a coherent whole; but each has its peculiar justification, and all together stand, as has been seen throughout this inquiry, upon a solid ground, which enables them to resist successfully all such question-begging attempts to dislodge them. All that is most distinctive of man and all that is most immediate in consciousness must be set aside in order that by the reduction of man to mere animality, an animal interpretation of his nature

may suffice. Such an attempt, it must be repeated, is not to explain, but to explain away.

And, for the same reason, sin cannot be rationalized. That is to say, it is impossible to offer a reason for its existence which can neutralize the testimony of conscience that it 'ought not to be.' It is, indeed, urged that sin is involved in the finitude of human nature, and that, as so involved, it is a necessary factor in spiritual progress. It has even been contended that moral evil is not only essential to the development of goodness, but that it is necessary to secure complete expression of the infinite variety which is implicit in human nature, considered as a whole. From this latter standpoint, therefore, it is held to have substantially the same justification as any ordinary differences of intellectual endowment or of temperament.

Such a view not only overlooks what is distinctive of moral consciousness, but it involves a confusion of thought. It is doubtless essential to the development of finite personality, that there should be a sense of 'otherness' from God. The very fact that man emerges from nature and becomes growingly conscious of individuality involves not only that he distinguishes himself from nature, but also that he distinguishes himself from God. The attempt to sublimate that distinction, even if it is made under the influence of religious mysticism, is destructive of human personality, and as such, carries with it eventually a relapse into nature. Hence it is that certain forms of mystic exaltation which have sought to transcend the limitations of finite personality have always been unmoral in their nature, and frequently immoral in their tendency. The primary condition of the free self-surrender to God in which religion finds its blessedness is that there should be a self to be surrendered, and that the distinction of that self should be throughout not only maintained, but even emphasized by religion.

We are dealing with something far deeper and more far-reaching than mere differences of temperament. So far as these are concerned, moral judgement discriminates between peculiarities of disposition and differences of moral conduct. The former are treated as inevitable, whether they act to the

advantage or disadvantage of particular individuals. The latter are always the subject of praise or blame on the ground that the individual is himself responsible for them; and this independently of the judgement which the community may take of them. For while undoubtedly the judgement of the community has much influence in shaping the standards of morality, there comes a stage when the primary moral duty impressed upon the consciences of individuals is to create a new morality. When this task is laid upon them the acutest condemnation would be felt by them if they should falter on account of the adverse judgement of society, although that judgement might be practically unanimous.

The sense of otherness from God is in itself an indispensable stage of spiritual and moral development. It is equally necessary in the interests of religion and theology. But for this it would be absolutely impossible to conceive God as being personal, as possessing spiritual and moral attributes, and as exercising influence not merely by physical but by spiritual means. Thus, all the interests of religion, reason, and morality are bound up with the emphasis upon the personal distinction or otherness of man from God.

But otherness is one thing, alienation is another. The fact of sin on its religious side, as apart from the moral quality of any particular action, may be expressed by saying that the otherness, which is essential to human personality in all its interests, has passed into alienation as a state, not only of distinction, but of opposition, and therefore as a fixed state to be maintained instead of being a stage to be transcended. In other words, sin perverts the distinction of individuality into isolation. This isolation is negatively a recoil from God, but positively this recoil is attended by the particular aims, desires, and ideals which we call selfish. Thus, sin looked upon as alienation from God means the breaking off, so far as this is humanly possible, of spiritual relations with Him. Its result is the substitution of the particular self, which follows upon the dethronement of God. The particular consequence, therefore, of sin as a principle of alienation and selfishness is the setting up of self over against the community. The otherness which is essential to personal relations to God is

equally essential to personal relations with our fellow men. In regard to them also otherness may pass into alienation, and alienation has as its positive principle the selfishness which results in an anti-social disposition and conduct.

But when this state of alienation is reached it is naturally conditioned by the unwillingness of man to become a spiritual and moral personality. Personal distinction may be welcome, but the legitimate use of that distinction as a means of entering into spiritual and moral relations with God and with mankind is unwelcome. Hence, the drag of mere nature is felt at the moment when man emerges from nature. Hence, human sin as alienation from God and selfishness is not so much due to pride and ambition, as in Milton's conception of Satan, as to animalism with its peculiar instincts, appetites, and passions, whether of self-indulgence or of self-assertion. Thus, alienation from God is attended by a falling back into nature, which is in the highest sense unnatural. The sense of sin stigmatizes it as such. It might perhaps be supposed that man placed midway between the spiritual and the animal would but bewail his misfortune when, owing to the weight which clogs him, he sinks below his ideal as a spiritual being. But he refuses to make this allowance for himself, or if he makes it, it is at an advanced stage of moral degeneration. By doing what upon any theory that either naturalizes or rationalizes evil, he is not only entitled but compelled to do, he unfits himself for his position and task in the moral world which is the indispensable correlate of human life. Hence, the man who so uses his individuality as to exclude the law of God from his will, the satisfaction of God from his desires, and the ideal of God from his endeavours, stands self-condemned. The ground of his condemnation is that he has abused the nature of finite personality, holding it back from its complete expression in relationship to God and to the world in God, and thereby destroying alike its meaning and worth. The complete facts of human finitude in its relation to God and to the world intensify instead of annulling the consciousness of sin.

2. It is urged that the doctrine of sin is contrary to the idea and to the fact of evolution. To the doctrine of the Fall

of man it is objected that mankind is a risen and not a fallen race. It is necessary to examine this contention carefully, not simply by way of criticism, but also in order to perceive more clearly what is really involved in the Christian doctrine upon this subject. So far as the idea of evolution is concerned, it is, or ought to be, governed by the facts. It is true that it is not entirely suggested by the facts of merely objective nature. If objectively the conception has been derived from biology, yet it has been strengthened and enriched from the subjective side by the consciousness of ordered and gradual development within personal life. The whole conception, therefore, rests upon the impression produced by the facts of inner and outer life taken in union with one another. In this sense it is the fact that must govern the conception, and not the other way about. Doubtless as the conception is confirmed and enlarged by an ever-growing body of facts, the burden of the proof will rest more heavily upon those who allege that exceptions are anywhere to be found. Perhaps such seeming exceptions may ultimately be found to fall within the general conception, though it is equally likely that that general conception itself will need to be in some respects modified in order to include them.

So far as the facts themselves are concerned, it is clear that progress has not been universal in the case either of races or of individuals. There are at least many cases where the life-history of a particular people or a particular individual can only be described as a 'Fall,' however the fact may be explained. Moreover, human progress is not in spite of moral freedom, but by means of it. Progress is the ideal task set before freedom, and it is clearly manifest that the ideal may be renounced and may gradually fade away in any particular case.

Yet more, apart from particular cases, careful examination may enable us to combine the doctrine of the Fall, spiritually understood, with the fact that humanity as a whole is a risen race, showing marks of steady progress, even if slow, uncertain, and only partial. To begin with, much of the progress which is commonly called secular is compatible with spiritual and even moral decline. Increased command over the material

resources of life in the interests of physical efficiency and well-being is sometimes purchased at the cost of the highest and noblest ideals of life. There may be a secular use of God instead of a spiritual service of God. Such are the limitations of man that many an era of marked material progress is haunted by the sense of the betrayal of still higher and more commanding ends of life. The Christian doctrine, therefore, could not be rebutted by reference to the feats of engineering, the progress of sanitation, the increased complexity of economic organization, or even the development of scientific interests and aptitudes.

Yet, confining our contention to the real problem which is concerned with the spiritual and moral condition of mankind, it may be confidently affirmed that mankind, regarded as a whole, is a risen race, if particular exceptions, collective and individual, are admitted. The question is whether this excludes the reality of the spiritual experience which suggests and verifies the doctrine of the 'Fall.' It may be argued that it does not.

Three main factors are operative upon and within human life. There is the immanent activity of the divine Spirit. There is the steadfast environment of the physical universe. There is also the normal constitution of human nature itself. These together form an indissoluble unity. Human free will, however perversely exercised, can only operate within the limits marked out and guarded by this threefold combination. Throughout the whole the governing factor is not man's freedom, but God's encompassing presence and activity. It is due to this that progress to a spiritual goal is the governing law of the world's history and the task set to moral freedom. Not only are limits set to the Fall of man, so that to exceed these limits is either impossible or would involve self-destruction, but there is a spiritual energy unceasingly operative to realize within him the ideal which is the vital purpose of his being. Sin represents simply the resistance to this spiritual energy; whether the resistance of rebellion, or of inertia and indifference.

Thus, it is certainly possible that the consciousness of sin, with its attendant sense of failure and of fall, should be

held within the governing fact of spiritual progress. That spiritual progress is the governing fact is owing to the immanent activity and inspiration of God, conditioned by His pressure upon man through the environment which is constituted by God as His instrument in securing His spiritual ends. If the doctrine of the Fall be so held as to involve that man has ever fallen out of relation to God and been able entirely and universally to defeat the divine purpose and to overthrow the divine power, then it is equally untrue to facts and inconsistent with reason. If, on the other hand, it be understood that the limited autonomy of man does not give him complete sovereignty, even over himself, still more that it does not exclude the sovereign activity of God within mankind, then it is possible to include as one of the factors in the whole that conversion of otherness into alienation which consists in resistance to the will of God and the sense of guilt which attends it. Thus, spiritual progress has from the individual standpoint its exceptions, and from the universal standpoint its inertia, caused not by the resistance of dead matter, but by the divergent desires of responsible agents whose resistance brings to them the sense that they have fallen by means of it from that union with God which constitutes the blessedness of man.

3. It is in the light of these considerations that we must regard the present condition of the world. The frequent phrase that this is 'a ruined world,' is overstrained, in the same way as the doctrine of sin is overstrained when it is represented that total depravity means that human nature, as we know it, has become completely worthless through sin. In any strict sense of the term, a ruined world would be no world at all. In order to be a world, there must be an immanent order, law, and purpose binding all things together. Were these absolutely to fail, there would be no world at all. While spiritual order persists and manifests itself in human progress, it is clear that the world can only be ruined in a modified sense.

The extremer statements upon this subject find their biblical support by over-emphasizing certain passages of St. Paul's writings in separation from their context and from the

whole of his thought. The depth of his own experience of sin and of his natural helplessness to resist it is set in connexion with such appalling evidences of human depravity as are furnished in the first three chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. The result is to universalize his own experience; 'I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing.' This is the characteristic utterance of the most spiritual religion. But this is not to affirm that the Apostle ever completely identifies all that is involved in his own personality with his flesh. It is true that two alternatives of life are presented by him, the one that of being 'in the flesh,' the other that of being 'in the spirit.' These two represent the determining and pervading conditions of life. Yet the very fact that a man is sold under sin and becomes its slave reveals the still persisting capacity for freedom. A beast of burden cannot be a slave in any real sense, because it has no capacity for freedom in the true sense of the word. A man can be enslaved because he has this capacity, and slavery is the express contradiction of it. Hence the very fact that sin is always a slavery, shows that other factors in human nature besides sinfulness must be taken into account. And this becomes abundantly clear when St. Paul's writings are taken as a whole. When he is dealing with the sharp antithesis between sin and grace, between the flesh and the spirit, it is natural and necessary that he should identify the former with man and the latter with God. But grace and the Spirit must have a spiritual point of connexion with the man who is redeemed by them. Overwhelmed with sinfulness as he may be, there must be a point of contact between the sinner and God which makes redemption a spiritual possibility. But for this, man could never become conscious of sin. It is the living ideal of holiness within him which condemns his sin. Thus, his overwhelming consciousness of sin is in itself the testimony to the presence within him of spiritual life with all its possibilities.

Such is a necessary inference from the facts. But St. Paul does not leave it to be inferred. His doctrine that the second Adam is a 'quickening spirit' for mankind, still more his doctrine that all things are made through and unto the Son of

God, so that they have their coherence in Him, supplies a clear doctrinal account of universal relations between the Son of God and the human race, which supply the basis and the means of His redemptive work. This God-ward relationship, although its spiritual and moral possibilities have never been realized, or have even been largely set aside, is a vital part of St. Paul's doctrine of human nature, and must have equal significance assigned to it with his doctrine of human depravity. The Son of God represents, it may be said, the divine universal of humanity stamping a filial constitution upon the world, according to the measure of its capacity, and pre-eminently upon man. Thus the divine is inmost; regenerating, constituting, and moulding human nature. Conversion and regeneration would be impossible were this not the case. Sin stands for the alienation of the sinful individual from the divine universal in which his own being is constituted. Hence sin is unnatural and corrupt. But the inner constitution remains a divine possibility. There is the inmost conflict between divine grace and the human will. But the will, however rebellious, cannot altogether destroy the presence of the divine. Thus, in concrete reality, the worthlessness of the flesh does not exclude the underlying presence of the Spirit, not merely along the frontiers of human life, but actually invading its territory. Hence the fundamental idea of all religion is that of a return to a union with God which has been lost. The basis, possibility, and attraction of such a return is always present in different degrees of revelation and influence. The Christian doctrine never sees man as totally apart from God except for such abstract purposes as are illustrated by the writings of St. Paul. Sin is universal, but it has never become naturalized. Had this been the case, the knowledge of sin would have passed away as completely as sensation from a mortified limb. The consciousness of sin, therefore, is evidence that sin is not supreme. History is the story of redemption from sin, and involves the predominance of the spiritual conditions without which redemption is impossible.

III. The Christian doctrine of redemption sets forth a transcendent dealing of God with mankind.

It has already been seen that moral personality involves a new relationship to God, though the form of that relationship is foreshadowed in the measure of independence which is conferred upon nature, in so far as that which is moral can be foreshadowed by that which is not. The result of the spiritual relationship between God and mankind is made manifest in the ordered process of history. This process involves not merely outward events, but still more the spiritual influences which underlie those events. Human history, therefore, is accounted for, above all, by these influences, and not merely by biological forces. Without such a conception of the reality and supremacy of spiritual influence in human history the Christian belief must necessarily fall to the ground.

The reason for that conception is twofold. It has an objective side; that is to say, history appears as an unfolding of a spiritual order of things, the fulfilment of a spiritual purpose. It has also a subjective side. The consciousness of spiritual influence has been felt most strongly by those who have exercised the most decisive influence upon the spiritual history of the race. They have been supremely conscious of a divinely-appointed task, and of a divinely-given inspiration. Yet in this consciousness they do not stand alone; the spiritual experience of great multitudes of humbler men has verified their testimony. 'Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me,' is the witness not only of every apostolic life, but also of innumerable other lives which have risen to the vision of a divine meaning in the world and to a sense of duty to take part in giving effect to it. And the experience of this larger circle is not without a yet wider verification. At least momentary gleams of such a vision, and occasional attractions to such a spiritual response have been felt by countless others whose lives have not been altogether guided and governed by them.

But to this conception objection is taken.

First of all from the standpoint of natural science. What is the need, it is urged, of such spiritual dealings of God with men? Is not biological evolution sufficient for all purposes? Nay, is it not the real cause of all these supposed higher

manifestations? What, further, is the possibility of such spiritual dealings in an ordered system where law prevails to the exclusion of arbitrary interference? Even supposing these difficulties to be surmounted, at what point does such an intervention take place? How is it possible to separate between the natural order of things and the supernatural intervention, either in the wide sphere of human history, or within the narrow confines of personal experience?

Such objections, while they may in part be excused by the crude statements not seldom made by Christian advocates and apologists, betray a complete misconception and rest upon a totally inadequate philosophy of evolution. The general dealings of God with mankind, and even the work of redemption, cannot be an intervention in that strictest sense of the term which involves conflict with scientific truth. The influence of God upon the spiritual life of man, whether individual or collective, can at its highest be only a complete manifestation in fullest activity of that which has been present in potentiality throughout. Moments of special manifestation there may be, yet these reveal a presence already there, and fulfil a promise previously existent and rationally prepared. Revelation, redemption, inspiration do not bring God to the succour of men from outside, but make manifest His abiding presence within human nature. This is true even of such an event as the Incarnation, however unique may have been the means by which it was brought about. That event, whatever may be the explanation of it, stands out by all confession with a prominence which belongs to no other event in human history. Yet it is not an unrelated miracle. It represents a realization of personality and influence which, unparalleled though it is, has many lesser, yet not the less true, illustrations in other great providential personalities of history. It finds its place in a continuous process of spiritual development. Its very effect shows that it is correlated in the most intimate way with spiritual conditions and forces operating in and throughout human nature to its widest extent.

On the other hand, the whole course of this inquiry has been in vain if it has not made good the necessity that the

idea of evolution as applied to man must recognize and do justice to both sides of that which is revealed in the spiritual, and, above all, in the Christian consciousness, namely the divine and human. The union yet distinction of these two in the religious consciousness is, it has been contended throughout, the starting-point without which human nature and the world become unintelligible. Hence, no doctrine of mere biological evolution can be stretched to cover all the facts. Even if man, considered as such, could be biologically explained, yet man can only for abstract purposes be separated from the Divine Ground in whom he lives and moves and has his being. Hence the ultimate explanation of all that concerns man must be found in God. Above all, God is the governing principle and factor of human evolution. From the religious standpoint, the general veracity of which this inquiry has upheld, God stands in permanent and immanent relation to man and to the world, which have their unity in Him. His life conditions, and His self-manifestation keeps pace with, human development, and yet is not to be confused with it. Hence, this primary fact of the inter-relation between divine and human personality involved in the very existence of man gives both the possibility and the certainty of a transcendent manifestation of God in human consciousness. It also fixes the general characteristics of that manifestation, although its method is beyond our present comprehension. For while we may, and indeed, owing to our limitations, must illustrate the influence of God upon man, whether in inward experience, or, in the events of history, by the influence of man upon his fellow men, yet it is clear that all such illustrations must in the nature of the case be so inadequate that if they are pressed too far they become misleading. The most intimate personal relations between man and man may serve as an image, but can never set forth the full meaning of the relations between God and man, since the presence of the divine personality is within and not merely without the human which is influenced by it.

The second objection arises from a limited philosophic standpoint. It is the fault of one-sided intellectualism in philosophy that it seeks to find in God merely the Idea, by

means of which the conception of the world is unified. He, therefore, becomes rather the last generalization of abstract thought than the active source of purposes finding progressive realization in the history of the world. It is not sufficient to place God at the heart of things in idea, unless we remember that the universe can only be explained in terms, not merely of concepts for the mind, but of ends for the will of God. Anything short of this will ultimately prove to be an insufficient means of unifying the world for thought. The defect of pure intellectualism in philosophy is that it has never been able to do justice to the experiences of ordered change. The idealism of Plato broke down in its attempt to connect the ideal world of reason with the changing phenomena of time and sense. The philosophy of Hinduism failed through the same inability. And much European philosophy has become hopelessly inconsistent because its sharp separation between the intellectual and the practical has led to the establishment of separate doctrines for the one and for the other, which not only refuse to unite in a consistent whole, but, therefore, prove insufficient for the half which they undertake to explain. An abstract generalization does not convey an historic explanation. For the latter, power, purpose and personality are all-important.

Directly we study the world from the historic as distinguished from conceptual point of view, we find that its whole course blends transcendence with continuity; that higher principles and factors become growingly manifest in it, though they work in and through all that which has gone before. The most difficult problem for thought is to do justice alike to the transcendence and to the continuity. The transcendence of man is revealed in all that is involved in his personality. Yet that personality is not self-contained and complete. Man is at least dimly conscious of relationship to the infinite Ground which underlies his being, seeks to articulate the relations in which he stands to that divine Ground, and experiences a need of spiritual satisfaction which, instead of withering into vain regret, blossoms into confident expectation. It is at this point that men must seek and find,

or rather be found by, a God who satisfies spiritual expectation. The highest in man—his faith, hope, and love—must correspond to and reveal a Source infinitely richer and more glorious than himself. It is as irrational as it is unsatisfying to present the God who is revealed in stellar systems and chemical molecules to the saint, the hero, or even to the ordinary man who is possessed by the affections and aspirations which make up what is noblest and yet most natural in mankind. If a sufficient cause must be found for physical nature, at least equally must a sufficient cause be found for the spiritual nature of man. If every appetite and instinct of the animal is a means by which Nature brings it to respond to its environment, so must it be with the aspirations of the human heart. Unless this be so, all that is highest and most influential in man is proved to be irrational. The impossible paradox is presented to us that the forces by which rational progress has been brought about are themselves irrational. The fact that every power of man, rational, moral, affectional, and religious, goes out to seek and actually posits a transcendent divine object is a sure sign, if the world be rational, that that object exists; that it must exceed and not fall short of the spiritual perfection attributed to it by the conceptions of man; and that the reality of the personal relations which exist between God and man is as clearly and convincingly revealed in spiritual consciousness as the reality of energy is revealed in the phenomena of physical nature. The spiritual consciousness is at least as much entitled to hold its ground as the facts and forces of the physical world. If it is right to attribute to the source of the universe that which is sufficient to explain its physical characteristics, it is equally right to attribute to that source the spiritual qualities which are manifest to and in the spiritual life itself. Nay, we have a stronger justification for so doing. The knowledge of the spiritual consciousness is more immediate than that of the external world. Hence the belief that God deals with the personality of man in ways transcending His dealings with impersonal nature is made good to us by the highest reason; indeed, on the same grounds which give assurance that He who calls into existence and

deals with free personalities is Himself supreme and sovereign Personality.

IV. It is objected that the Christian doctrine of Redemption sets forth an external and incidental remedy for sin. That such a remedy should be external and accidental implies in the circumstances that it is unspiritual. The unspiritual is equivalent to the irrational. If, therefore, the work of Christ be really external and accidental, it can be no remedy at all in the real sense of the word.

It must at once be admitted that for many of the misconceptions held upon this subject crude and misleading statements by Christians themselves are largely responsible. It is unnecessary here to do more than note the fact that theories of redemption have frequently introduced into their account of the matter analogies, commercial, forensic, and political, which, while corresponding to passing phases of thought, have been without warrant in Scripture, and are altogether inadequate and misleading when applied to the dealings of God with mankind.

It is of the greatest importance at the outset to realize that while the Scriptures set forth, as has been seen, a transcendent dealing of God with mankind, their account is in no respect open to the general objection which is now stated. So far from redemption being in any way represented as due to an accidental intervention, the greatest care is taken to combine the doctrine of the active grace of God with the spiritual life and the normal historic development of mankind.

This may be illustrated, in the first place, from the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. These prophecies include the appearance of the Messianic King, the atonement of the prophetic Servant of Jehovah, the ideal priesthood predicted by Zechariah, together with the whole series of predictions which contemplate the perfecting of mankind and the renovation of the world as consequent upon the completion of spiritual redemption. There is one universal feature about all these. They represent an ideal fulfilment, a consummate expression, of influences already at work. In the case alike of the Messianic King, the prophetic Victim, and the ideal Priest, the grace of God raises a typically human factor to

the highest conceivable standard of spiritual efficacy. In each case the office is idealized and its intrinsic functions are fulfilled by a human personality in whom the presence of God is made perfectly manifest.

If in the person of the Redeemer the Divine is perfectly manifested in and through the human, so His work, whether of government, atonement, or mediation, is successful because it is the complete, and therefore unique, spiritual embodiment of the grace by which and for which all these offices naturally subsist in the providence of God. Thus the divinity of the source in no wise destroys the naturalness of the fulfilment. It is in its complete realization of the type that its unique nature consists, the difference in degree being so great that it constitutes a difference in kind.

So the whole work of God in the renovation and consummation of creation appears as the larger and more generous bestowal of life-giving influences which are already, if only partially, at work. Thus the work of redemption, as it is set before us in the writings of Isaiah for example, is simply the final and perfect manifestation of the continuous dealings of God with man. It is transcendent indeed, yet only as all fulfilment is transcendent. The final work of God is not the intervention of an outsider who has been inactive hitherto, but is the culminating revelation of an activity ceaselessly sovereign in all the affairs of men and throughout all the realms of nature. Thus in the Old Testament prophecies there is no such contrast as we have become accustomed to between the natural and the supernatural, or between the creative and the redemptive dispensations of God. Both elements are blended, the result being that the total effect represents a unique combination of the divine and the human, of the spiritually effective and the naturally conditioned.

The same impression is conveyed when we turn to the portraiture of our Lord in the Gospels. His Redemership appears to be based upon, to grow out of, His complete natural expression of the ideal, and therefore eternally real meaning of human nature itself. As Son of Man He reveals humanity to itself. In this lies His capacity to become the Redeemer

of mankind. His saving work is the natural result of this spiritual fulfilment. The divine presence in Him is not occasionally flashed out as distinct from His human nature, but is manifested throughout it. The view of human nature set forth by Him, while grave and solemn, is not sombre, but even genial. If He is Redeemer it is because He is Consummator and Fulfiller. If He pities and saves the sinful it is because He recognizes and calls out the potentially spiritual and divine. Judged by all ordinary standards, His influence is throughout supernatural. Yet it is not therefore external. His presence and influence within human history shows that He belongs to it, and belongs to it because of His essential relationship to mankind. Further, this essential relationship is not obscured, but is brought out and emphasized by the apostolic writers. The Pauline experience of sin and of redemption by grace, the Johannine contrast between light and darkness, life and death, do not set aside the essential relation between the Redeemer and His work on the one hand and those whom He redeems on the other. On the contrary, St. Paul and St. John give dogmatic expression to the underlying spiritual unity between Christ and man which impresses us in the Gospel stories. As the matter is presented to us in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, in the first Epistle of St. John, and in Col. i. 15-18, there is so close a relationship between Christ, the Son of God, and human nature, that He eternally constitutes its meaning and redeems it because of His creative and consummating presence throughout it. Hence it may be confidently asserted that Redemption, according to the New Testament doctrine, so far from being external, rests upon the internal relation of the Redeemer to mankind; that, in short, its spiritual efficacy is bound up with this inherent and essential relationship.

Hence the redemptive action of divine grace as set forth in the Christian religion does not involve the introduction into the system of the world of any external agency or the activity of any principle of divine conduct which is not involved in the creation, upholding, and perfecting of the world. The redemptive work of Christ is the complete manifestation of the realities which originally constituted the spiritual world,

gave to it its meaning, and are the means by which its end is fulfilled. The mode of their manifestation, and the way in which they operate, is profoundly influenced by the fact of sin. Yet sin, terrible as is its significance, simply calls into special redemptive activity spiritual energies of love and grace, without which the very existence of the world cannot be explained. Thus the work of Christ stands not only in line, but in vital connexion with the creative activity of God. It at once manifests all that is implicit in creation, and gives to it a new glory in its redemptive grace.

This may be seen clearly, in the first instance, by examination of what is involved in the general conception of grace. As represented in the Christian religion it is the complete manifestation of all that is contained in the original relationship of the Godhead to mankind. It is the supreme revelation of the Fatherhood of God dealing with the guilt and need of man. Yet without that Fatherhood and the wealth of compassion which is inherent in it, the very existence of the world cannot be explained. Grace is the divine succour brought by the Son of God. Yet the possibility and efficacy of that succour depends upon a primal spiritual relationship between the Son of God and mankind which makes Him from the beginning alike the stay and the goal of the humanity to whose rescue He comes. And the same is true of the gift and activity of the Holy Spirit. Thus, according to the Christian view, the work of redemption does not create an accidental relationship between God and man, but fulfils the meaning and reveals the possibilities contained in the original relationship.

Again, the whole work of redemption is a progressive manifestation of the energy of the divine self-giving *to* and *in* humanity. God gives Himself to man and in man in the fullness of His grace. This self-giving of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the consummate expression of the eternal love of God, without which no such world, as we see slowly unfolding its meaning, could have come to be. The very embodiment of grace in a supreme human personality, and the exertion of its energy within the spiritual life of men, is the highest example of the way in which all God's gifts to men are conveyed.

Thus the transcendent action of God in redemption depends upon an immanent potentiality which it fulfils. The gracious activity of God is internal, although the fact that sin hardens men into alienation from God makes redemption inevitably appear to them as external, as the breaking down of barriers from without, the bringing of help from above. So indeed it is; but by the triumphant operation of gracious influence implicit throughout, but antagonized by sin.

In this light the Incarnation, Atonement, and the gift of the Spirit, in particular, must be regarded.

1. The Incarnation is the transcendent fulfilment of the possibilities contained in the divine immanence in mankind. From the divine side it is the complete revelation of the divine glory and presence in human nature. On the human side it is the supreme expression of the spiritual meaning contained in human nature itself. This combination of the complete manifestation of God with the highest perfection of man is fulfilled in an individual life which brings about the complete union of the divine and human factors. The Incarnation is, therefore, at once the fulfilment of the divine presence in human nature, and the fulfilment of human nature in its divine relations. Each is co-extensive with the other, and there is no opposition between the two. The divine glory does not shine out independently, or in spite of the humanity, but in it and because of it. The divinity of Christ has been manifested in His ideal fulfilment of the spiritual meaning of humanity as constituted in Him; not in any necessary contrast between the two. The creaturely relation of man to the eternal Son of God is such that man has essential affinity with the divine nature, although the spiritual and moral effects of that affinity are set aside by sin. The Incarnation is the supreme consequence and revelation of that affinity, and of its spiritual and moral significance, unclouded by sin, and therefore revealing the divine purpose in mankind.

The verification of the reality of the Incarnation, the original belief in which rests upon the testimony of the self-consciousness of Christ Himself, lies in the following features.

(1) In the transcendent spiritual greatness of the personality of Jesus Christ. The doctrine of the Incarnation itself,

when all the circumstances are taken into account, is a supreme testimony to the unique impression produced by His perfection upon His followers and upon all men possessing spiritual susceptibility from the apostolic age until now. In the majesty of His glory Christ stands alone, and His lonely supremacy is the more impressive from the fact that it triumphs over, and in a sense obliterates, the homeliness and humiliation of His earthly lot.

(2) In the divine and harmonious naturalness of His appearance. Wide and deep as is the separation between Him and the humanity of His own time and of all time, yet His appearance blends the supernatural with the natural in a way that brings home the conviction of a special presence of God. The Incarnation is not an arbitrary miracle, but stands in closest relation to the divine activity throughout the universe in all its history.

(3) In the fact that the appearance of Christ marks at once a great spiritual fulfilment, and constitutes a new beginning in the history of mankind.

(4) In its illuminating power. To reject the truth that God was manifest in Christ is to reject, as has been seen throughout these pages, all possibility of explaining God, man, and the world in their nature and mutual relations.

(5) And, lastly, in its redemptive efficacy. The history of the world ever since bears ever-growing testimony to the unique and all-sufficient power of Christ, and of Christ alone, to illuminate, renew, and satisfy men, at once reclaiming the worst, and bringing to the best an ideal satisfaction of mind, heart, and character which can be found only in Him.

That the Incarnation finds its place in a consistent spiritual history, and operates by means of the general laws of human life, does not set aside, but rather emphasizes its divinely unique nature, while rescuing the conception of it from all such abstract distinctions as would bring it into contradiction with the ordered wisdom of God, made manifest in the history of the world.

2. The doctrine of the Atonement has, perhaps, suffered more seriously than any other from the influence of mere externalism. If the divine influence manifest in it from

above be represented as an intervention altogether from without, there are added to the metaphysical difficulty of such a conception spiritual and moral objections of the gravest kind. The commercial, forensic, and political analogies by which its reason and meaning have often been set forth, even if any of them can illustrate it, cannot explain it. They are destitute of scriptural warrant. Moreover, they lead to mechanical views concerning the death of Christ as a historic event. But the most far-reaching objection to them is that they are only in accordance with conceptions of the relationship of God to men which are altogether inadequate to set forth the reality. No human analogies can be in themselves adequate to express the relationship of God to men, which is clearly *sui generis*. Yet, as will subsequently appear, the relationship of Fatherhood not only dominates the New Testament, but offers the nearest approach which the conditions of creaturely life can furnish to the relationship of God to man. Whatever force, therefore, there may be in views which represent God as the Creator, the Judge, or the Sovereign of mankind, all these conceptions must be subordinated to the fatherly, and the relations and functions signified by them must be moulded and inspired throughout by principles and motives which are applicable to that highest relationship. Even when all this has been realized in thought, it is necessary to enlarge the conception of the Fatherhood of God, in order to admit the fact of His immanence, before the reasoning which is based even upon that relationship can afford completely trustworthy guidance to the meaning of the Atonement.

All explanations, therefore, of the nature of the Atonement must be based upon and seen to be the direct outcome of the relationship in which God stands to men. Again, regarding the matter from the standpoint of the Incarnation, the death of Christ is the complete fulfilment of that which is involved in His entrance into human life. It completes the union of the Son of God with the lot of men. The death must, therefore, be interpreted in the light of the Incarnation which led up to it; and the Incarnation is the witness to an underlying unity between God and man which contains

within itself the means of reconciliation, despite the fact and influence of sin. The atoning Christ brings to bear, if the expression may be allowed, the full force of this unity, in order to destroy the discord of sin with all that is involved in it. The very possibility of the Atonement, therefore, depends upon such a complete spiritual solidarity between Christ and mankind as constitutes Him, not merely in name but in inmost spiritual reality the representative of mankind. Finally, therefore, the death of Christ is, in the ordinary sense of the term, a natural, historic event. It is not artificially arranged either by Christ Himself or by the providence of God. It is as completely explained as the result of spiritual and natural causes as any other great tragedy of history.

The Christian doctrine of Atonement, taking account of these governing conditions, is concerned with the meaning, the value, and the influence of the death of Christ as manifest in the spiritual experience of believers. As to this, four propositions may be laid down.

(1) In the first place, the Offerer possesses, reveals, and fulfils the spiritual nature, grounded in God, which represents the spiritual potentiality of mankind, and is the underlying bond which unites mankind as a spiritual organism. The unity of mankind can only be fulfilled in and by that which was divinely manifest in Christ. This meaning is contained in St. Paul's great declaration, 'All things have been created through Him, and unto Him; and He is before all things, and in Him all things consist' (Col. i. 16, 17).

(2) His death is the ideally perfect act of self-surrender to the Father's will as wrought out under the conditions of His earthly life. In that act the Son of God completed in perfect righteousness and self-devotion His fulfilment of the relations in which He stood alike to God and man. The self-realization of Christ as the Son of God is consummated by the Cross.

(3) This consummation is realized under conditions which cause it to be the fulfilment of a task and the winning of a spiritual victory. The besetting conditions which try the faith, baffle the reason, trouble the conscience and shatter the hopes of men gather in a unique combination, and make an

unparalleled onset upon Christ by means of His Cross. It is at the first sight a startling contradiction of the message and the ruthless violation of the spirit of His life. Under such conditions He makes the final and triumphant oblation of trustful and self-surrendering love, affirming for Himself and for mankind the righteousness of God.

His dying cry 'Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit' proclaims the complete victory of the faith and love by which alone His death can be in the true sense a sacrifice to God.

(4) This offering is made under such spiritual conditions as lay upon Him the burden of human sin. The two-fold fact of His union with mankind in nature and in sympathy and of His distinction from mankind in His sinlessness make His death at once the assumption and the putting away of the sin of the world. He bears it in repudiating it. He receives upon His head its consequences, while declaring the eternal antagonism of God to it, and the true life of man as overcoming it. All this seems to be involved in the act itself when closely studied.

Hence follows of necessity the unique and eternal significance of His atoning act. The self-oblation of Christ is in very deed a sacrifice on behalf of mankind made once for all. It cannot be repeated, nor can it be added to. All that remains possible is that men should so identify themselves by faith with it, that its spiritual and moral principles should be reproduced in them. This is what is meant by the saying of St. Paul, 'I have been crucified with Christ.' The spirit of His sacrifice was the negation of sin—of its alienation from God, and its selfishness, its unbelief and worldliness, its sense-bound limitations. It was the affirmation of righteousness and of the divine law by active submission to them. That act of submission marked the final realization, in and through suffering, of blessedness in God. Only by the death of Christ could this supreme result be attained. The New Testament everywhere lays peculiar emphasis upon the death of Christ as the consummation of His work. Yet whenever any of the writers explain what constituted the worth of His sacrifice they find it in the completed obedience by which

in and through death Christ offered Himself without spot to God.

Hence the perfect sacrifice is the complete satisfaction offered to God for the sin of the world. This does not involve any of the crude interpretations which have sometimes been given to it. It was not a mechanical arrangement rendering necessary a human crime in order to its accomplishment. Nor did it bring about any change in the mind of God towards the human race, taking place at the moment of its completion. To attribute such a change of mind to God involves an irrational extension to Him of human analogies, and is in addition contrary to the whole spirit of the New Testament, which represents Christ as the gift of God to men, and His death as the final manifestation of the mercy and grace of God.

The source of all God's dealings with mankind is in His love. When other attributes or affections are ascribed to Him, such, for instance, as righteousness, justice, wrath against sin, these cannot be treated either as being independent of His love, or as a succession of separate and in themselves discordant affections and attitudes of spirit arising in a time-series. The total effect of the Scripture representation is to show that the love of God is the one underlying and determinative principle of His action towards men. They are the objects of that love as destined to realize the ends of holiness which sin sets aside. God's anger is therefore towards sin, and towards them as sinners, while His love is unchanging towards them as being, despite their sin, the ends of His purposes of grace and righteousness.

Thus so far as human thought is adequate to set forth this reality, there is a double attitude of God towards men, according as their relation to the eternal purpose of God is regarded. Hence the attitude of God towards the sacrifice of Christ. His sacrifice is the complete fulfilment of all righteousness, and is the setting aside by one supreme act of the sin which is the object of the wrath of God. In this twofold aspect the death of Christ is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and is the indispensable means by which the redemptive grace of God goes forth for ever to mankind.

These general conclusions result from consideration of what is essentially involved in the spiritual and moral meaning of the death of Christ, and are not artificially brought to the subject by *a priori* conceptions or abstract doctrines of the relationship of God to men. Many of the mistakes into which doctrines of the Atonement have fallen have been due to the fact that men have spent their ingenuity in answering why His death must take place, rather than in patient investigation of what His death immediately and really involves. The relations of God to men have been conceived, under the influence of governmental and judicial associations, as purely external. The death of Christ then became a mere expedient to satisfy the need of these relationships. The theory of its effect that resulted separated it from the spiritual experience and processes of human life. Thereby there was set up an explanation of its meaning which, while presenting grave intellectual and moral difficulties, failed adequately to explain its vital relations to the continuous spiritual life of humanity. All such unsatisfactory and arbitrary explanations are done away when the death of Christ is seen in its relation to His life and spirit, and when His work as a whole is seen in the light of the relations to God as His Father, and to mankind as His brethren, though sinners, from which it proceeded. Hence, the death of Christ, which, in its spiritual meaning, is the supreme satisfaction offered to the fatherly heart of God for, and in a sense by, mankind, is also the supreme gift of God Himself to men. It is a redemptive act in which the vicarious obedience and suffering exemplified in all the noblest service of men for mankind are immeasurably transcended.

From whatever point of view, therefore, the death of Christ is contemplated, its unique significance stands out. It is the consummation of His life, its highest act, its complete expression to God, and, by the very fact of the spiritual relationship of Christ to mankind, it is a unique offering on behalf of mankind represented by Him. Hence, its atoning worth is due to its spiritual meaning. While it transcends human life, it fulfils its meaning and represents its return to God from the alienation of sin. Thus, the historical act

passes into the spiritual experience of mankind as the means of a perfectly reconciling and sanctifying influence. The whole office of the Spirit in man is to take of the things of Christ and show them to believers.

3. The redemptive work of Christ issues in the life of the Spirit, with its quickening energy and its moral power. This energy and power, however, cannot be detached from the complex whole, in and through which they become manifest. The life of the Spirit, as presented to us in the New Testament, means the steady realization of personal relationship to God in Christ. It is the apprehension by the spiritual vision and by trustful faith of 'the truth as truth is in Jesus.' It uses the whole of His historic work as the instrument and vehicle of its influence. It represents, indeed, the transference of Christ to the spiritual life of men. His mind is reproduced in His followers as the result of their spiritual fellowship with Him. Hence, the life of the Spirit is variously described as the indwelling of Christ, as the coming to the knowledge of the truth, as a victory over the flesh, or as the entrance into the full enjoyment of the filial life. It is only as the power of the Spirit is seen in its connexion with all these sources of influence upon the human mind and heart that it becomes intelligible to us. As thus conditioned it becomes, not an arbitrary miracle, even though it be of grace, taking place at a particular moment of human history and in regard to a few chosen individuals, but it is seen to be an ordered stage in the dealing of God with men, a part of the texture woven of all the influences of revelation, inspiration, and fulfilment, by which the spiritual ends of God are realized in man.

Yet while the life of the Spirit cannot be understood apart from its connexion with the historic Christ and with the truth and grace revealed in Him, while it takes its place in the ordered fulfilment of the spiritual ends of God, yet it represents a characteristic dynamic. The experience of the Spirit is above all that of a power coming to and manifest in human life. Yet even here, unique as the experience is, it is not so unrelated to the general phenomena of spiritual life as to involve a breach with or a contradiction of laws and forces

which operate throughout the inner experience of men. Its transforming power is due to the fulfilment of the hitherto latent ideal in man. That ideal, hitherto neglected, contradicted, or but fitfully pursued, becomes under the influence of Christ the object of supreme desire, the possession realized by a trustful affirmation. In proportion as that affirmation is instant and decisive the phenomena which accompany it are those of sudden conversion, due to the spiritual energies breaking forth from regions far below the sphere of ordinary consciousness. It is in the power of Christ to unlock the chambers of the spirit in which those forces are confined, and to remove the manifold obstructions which the selfishness and secularity of sin oppose to their working, that the personal application of His redemptive work consists. This result is brought about by the conviction of sin—the awaking of the conscience to its presence, the acknowledgement of responsibility for its existence, and a sense of the unutterable burden of its persistence. The consciousness of sin, therefore, is a vital factor of redemption from it. On the other hand, there is revealed the mercy of God which forgives sin, sets it aside, and treats us as though it had not been. Each of these is brought home to us by Christ, His work, and His Spirit.

And within these are contained the power of a joyful emancipation, the entrance into living fellowship with God as His son, a new spiritual energy manifesting itself in the growing ease with which the moral tasks of life are discharged. Thus, throughout, the Christian consciousness stands in the closest relationship to the laws by which the spiritual nature of man is governed. It is transcendent, yet it gives full effect to that which is immanent in human nature as such. It can come to this fulfilment only so far as the perfect revelation of divine truth in Christ is presented to the spirit and is appropriated by faith. Every transformation, therefore, wrought by the new apprehension of truth or by the influence of goodness everywhere is an illustration of the means by which Christ's work of reconciliation and redemption is wrought out, and exhibits effects which are analogous to it. It, however, surpasses all these and stands out apart because

it brings to bear the influence of the supreme truth and goodness in such wise as to secure the entire renewal and transformation of the spiritual life by restoring the divine relationship as the source and end of all besides.

Thus, throughout, the Christian life is the spiritual life raised to its highest power and manifested in its completest expression. This is effected under the influence of the transcendent, yet human, personality of Christ. The redemptive power of Christ and of His work is due to the unique relation in which He stands to God, and to the spiritual life and history of mankind. Carefully considered the one carries with it the other as its consequence. The unique relation in which Christ stands to God does not withdraw Him from relations of vital intimacy with the life of man. On the contrary, His divinity involves and becomes manifest in those relations. To show that ultimately His life will be transferred to and reproduced in mankind is neither to reduce Him to the level of mankind nor to exalt mankind to His unique position. On the contrary, the fact that He has the power by means of His personality, His sufferings, and His influence to affect the universal life of man in so unique a way, and to bring about such complete spiritual redemption from the power of evil, is the sign that He represents in history not merely the immanence, but also the transcendence of God. If the immanence be suggested by the response which the spiritual nature of man makes to His truth and grace, not less is the transcendence suggested by His unique power to evoke that response. Thus considered, the naturalness of our Lord's influence, understood in the sense that it exhibits the highest working of universal spiritual laws, is not the negation of His unique relationship to God but its affirmation. He is, in His human manifestation—if the illustration may be allowed—the force-point of all the spiritual energy of God in a way which, while it identifies Him with the life of man, distinguishes Him from it.

If the foregoing account of the relation of Christ's influence to that of truth and goodness generally be correct, it is not remarkable that we should find in Him and in His work the fulfilment of truths and principles which are shadowed forth

throughout the whole sphere of religion. The history of religion is full of stories of incarnation, of the practices of sacrifice and expiation, and of conceptions of sacramental nourishment and incorporation. From the theological as well as from the anthropological standpoint, it is of the greatest importance to trace the ideals and principles which underlie these conceptions and practices. Many of them reveal a groping after, and a partially successful endeavour to express, truths and principles which have their final manifestation in the life and death of Christ, and in the relationship of believers to Him. This again should heighten instead of lowering our estimate of the unique character of His person and work. Christ could have no redemptive influence upon the life of men if His work did not possess this spiritual affinity with the noblest spiritual intuitions and endeavours of mankind. Part of the doctrine of the unique glory of His person is that He stands in such inward relations to the whole spiritual life of man, that its history—so far as it is one of progress—is that of preparation for Him, due to His own secret inspiration.

But a fatal mistake is made when this fact is interpreted to mean that what is found by us in the work of Christ is merely projected into it by our imagination, instead of subsisting in it as an abiding fact. On the contrary, it is there in order that it may be found by us. If this were not so, the supreme manifestation of truth and grace would be in the apostolic interpreters of Christ and not in Christ Himself. The active and formative forces of religion would be exerted in and through them in order to impose upon His doings and sufferings a meaning that is not really there. The Apostles and not Christ would be the creators of Christianity. There are those who do not shrink from this position, but it is repudiated by every one of these supposed creators. Doubtless the fact of Christ and the vision of its meaning are inseparably related. Only minds steeped in the influence and associations of religion could interpret the meaning of the supreme religious Personality of history. On the other hand, their work is but to offer a description and explanation, not merely of the outward events of a particular life, but of the spiritual effect

of these events as transmuted by Christ, till they become charged with His own spiritual power for those who come under their influence. The ultimate choice must be made between reducing Christ to a lay figure or symbol, which is intrinsically absurd, or beholding in Him with John the 'glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.'

V. It is further objected in many quarters that the ultimate prospects held out by the Christian religion are not only unverifiable, but that they are on physical grounds at least highly improbable, and judged by higher standards, excessive and artificial. The prospects of final blessedness, which are associated with the conception of heaven, are represented as standing in no vital relationship to the spiritual life of men, and as brought about, according to the Christian doctrine, by purely external and miraculous agency. The growth of the conception of heaven, it is contended, can be naturalistically explained by the study of animism. The whole expectation of a future life is based upon the excessive estimate of the importance of man in the universe from which it is the office of science gradually to emancipate the human race. The same arguments are of course applied in opposition to any doctrine of future punishment, with the addition of the two-fold objection that, if there be a God, such punishment is contrary to His benevolence, and that the nature of sin, even if its existence be admitted, is not so serious as to call for such punishment. This general point of view calls for consideration, although within our space it is impossible to deal fully with the questions involved in the future life.

It is necessary to begin with the admission that however clear may be the revelation or strong the expectation of a future life, it is impossible for men adequately to realize beforehand its nature. To realize it is to experience it, and not even revelation can work such a miracle as to enable us to experience the future life while belonging to this. Hence all forecasts of heaven must be poetic in their character, understanding that term in its highest sense. They must visualize a picture to the imagination which, even if it be true, must be inadequate, and the truth of which must be

measured not by its literal accuracy but by the satisfaction and explanation which that which is essential in its ideal affords to the spiritual powers and needs of human nature as we know it in this world.

Before judging the doctrine, therefore, it is necessary clearly to realize what is contained in the poetic presentation of it, and to look beyond the comparatively accidental forms in which it is necessarily portrayed to its underlying spiritual significance. Popular religion has increased the difficulty of carrying out this requirement by the naïve way in which it has improved upon the more authoritative descriptions of heaven, and frankly appealed to men's hopes and fears by representations of a future state which carry over into it without any criticism the ordinary conditions of the present, subject to such improvement as men would desire, in order to remove the various shortcomings and hindrances which the present world presents to the highest blessedness or even to the ordinary enjoyment of existence. Yet even in regard to these crudest representations, it were well worth investigation whether the confident assurances with which they are set forth and accepted by great multitudes, does not suggest an inner reasonableness about them which should prevent them from being lightly dismissed. The question, in short, is whether the faith which attends their imaginative presentment does not verify what is essential to them. How is it that, though we dismiss our ordinary dreams of blessedness on awaking, this one great dream, absolutely unverifiable, it is contended, and in the ordinary sense of the term obviously unverifiable, has fastened itself upon the spiritual life of the human race as one of the most essential of its convictions?

Excluding for the moment all reference to future punishment, the New Testament doctrine of the completion of salvation in Christ involves three things. Firstly, individual immortality; secondly, a perfected community; and thirdly, a reconstructed world. The first of these may be treated as the governing assumption, the second as the ideal presented to hope, and the third as the essential concomitant of that ideal. The basis of the whole doctrine lies in the belief in individual immortality. As to this, it may be confidently

laid down that if the conditions governing our present life are to be maintained, this belief must be in the main a deliverance of faith; the real question being whether such a deliverance does not contain within itself an immanent reason which makes it truly prophetic of its fulfilment. It is admitted on all hands by careful thinkers that natural science can neither prove nor disprove the doctrine of immortality. Despite the efforts of the Psychical Research Society, it is difficult to see how it ever can, even supposing that the investigation into alleged apparitions were to yield more satisfactory results than has hitherto been the case. Supposing that verifiable apparitions were greatly multiplied, and that the efforts to establish communication with the unseen world were more clearly and generally successful than has hitherto been the case, all this would leave the matter substantially where it stands at present. It is hard to see how it would be possible so convincingly to establish the desired explanation of all these phenomena that they would be incapable of another interpretation according to the bias of the inquirer. They would be relied upon rather as supports to a faith already existent or as strengthening a hope previously active, than as sufficient evidence, apart from what is involved in such an antecedent attitude of mind.

Just as science is here almost helpless, so the old metaphysical arguments in favour of a future life are now entirely discredited. No one would now argue for immortality on the ground that the soul is a simple, indivisible, and therefore indestructible entity. It is clear that all such arguments represent an unjustifiable transference to the spiritual realm of conditions which possibly—but only possibly—govern the physical.

Any fruitful consideration of the subject must start from the standpoint of human expectation which has hitherto been practically universal. That expectation must be judged in its bearings upon the spiritual evolution of mankind, as a factor in producing it and as indispensable, taking humanity as a whole, to maintaining it. It must be estimated on the assumption, freely made in regard to material phenomena, that the world is rational, and that the factors which are

vital not merely to its physical production, but to its spiritual progress, are thereby shown to partake of the rationality, and, therefore, of the truth of the universe as a whole.

The spiritual and moral implicates of the belief must therefore be the principal justification of its existence and the verification of its truth. Speaking broadly, it may be contended that the demand of a future life varies according to the moral worth of men. It is true that some men of noble character, having convinced themselves on physical grounds that the hope is untenable, have found themselves able to renounce it, and have even represented such renunciation as a nobler temper than that which seeks for continued personal existence. But they have substituted for the belief in their own personal immortality the conception of an idealized humanity, towards the production of which their hopes and efforts are going, and in which they reach an ideal immortality from which all selfish elements have been purged. The social affinities in man's constitution so qualify that which is merely individual that such a conception of consummated humanity involves half of the doctrine of immortality. A selfish individualism in such belief misrepresents its true spiritual import. On the other hand, the conception of a consummated humanity must needs undergo a further criticism. It is useless to substitute a faith in its possibility for the belief in personal immortality, if it should be found on closer investigation that the only hope of a consummated humanity, in a sense which would make the universe reasonable, depends upon the personal immortality of those who compose humanity as a whole. To reach the ideal consummation of mankind only for it to be swept away in one ruthless moment by an unconscious and remorseless universe would not establish, but, on the contrary, absolutely contradict, the rationality of the hope which laboured for its accomplishment. Here, again, the fatal division between the spiritual life and reality, which is what we mean, or ought to mean, by the irrational, would be clearly marked, as is the case in regard to all deviations from the Christian interpretation of the world. Death as extinction reduces the universe to imbecility. To suppose it involves utter

contradiction between the estimates of value which are the formative influences of spiritual life and therefore in the highest sense natural, on the one hand, and the historic event both in regard to individuals and to humanity, on the other. The end of life would contradict the whole meaning of the process. If we could evade this conclusion in regard to individual life we should be driven to it by contemplating the future of humanity. The latter contradiction would be indefinitely delayed, but according to all physical forecasts it would be none the less sure. The spiritual life which proclaims itself to have unique worth, and which can only develop its possibilities by the affirmation of permanence for itself, or at least for its endeavours, would be but an episode in the life of the universe. Thus spiritual and moral treasures would be surrendered at the demand of the mere brute forces of the universe. To endow ether with immortality, and to doom man, individual or collective, to extinction, in consequence of the physical limitations of ether and its combinations, would be indeed to treat the scaffolding as of more importance than the building, and to reduce the whole story of the universe to a meaningless and cruel absurdity.

If these considerations have force, they point to a still more important conclusion. Whatever forecast we can arrive at as to the nature of a future life must be based upon the testimony of personality. If the worth of personality, and its place in the universe as we know it, makes it impossible for us to acquiesce in its annihilation, the same reason forbids us to accept any conception of future existence which annuls its essential characteristics. The possession of personality is the distinctive characteristic of human life. It is not perfectly attained while the process of development and education is incomplete. The moral task of life is to secure a morally-ordered advance to its complete fulfilment. According as personality becomes more distinctively marked and more completely fulfilled, is it possible for its possessor to enter into fellowship with God and with his fellow men. Communion with God varies directly as the strength and many-sidedness of personality. Such is the history of the spiritual progress of individual men as we know it in the present life. Such

also is its importance for that spiritual fellowship in which the highest blessedness consists. No clue to the future can be found except within human nature itself. Hence no forecast can be deemed trustworthy which contradicts either the inherent conditions or the course of development which are distinctive of personal life as we know it. There are those who bid us look forward to immortality as offering an escape from our finitude and an entrance into the infinity of God. Such teaching is only a modern variant of the mystic dreams of eternal absorption in the divine nature. Such a future, if it involve the loss of personal consciousness, cannot, so far as men themselves are concerned, be distinguished from annihilation. It is true that according to the conception the superseding of individual existence by an infinite mode of being may, in some way passing our understanding, add the attainments of earthly life to the infinite riches of the Divine Being. In a similar way, when a meteorite falls back into the sun, it restores to the central body the heat which it has possessed. Yet while the sun may be infinitesimally enriched, the meteorite itself has ceased to exist. If this be so, the ultimate perfection which involves the extinction of personal consciousness would be the fulfilment of the divine at the expense of the human. Yet, even this is a concession which cannot finally be made. The spiritual perfection of God would not be enriched by any such transformation of spiritual beings as secured their infinitude at the cost of their personality. Such a process would indeed mean that God is the One and All of the universe. But all that which constitutes the spiritual and moral perfection of His being would pass away. His love, His righteousness, and all the other attributes which men have regarded as being worshipful in Him, would be transformed out of existence. For these depend upon the existence of a world of personalities standing in relationships to God, which are set up and maintained by Him owing to the spiritual and moral qualities of His nature. With the passing of such personalities the manifestation of those spiritual and moral qualities will all pass away. Moreover, that this process should represent the law of the universe would prove that these divine qualities were no essential and eternal part of the divine perfection.

Thus just as such a consummation would destroy the perfection of man, so with this destruction would pass away the perfection of God. The whole history of His dealings with the universe and with mankind would be reduced to mere natural necessity, under whatever terms that necessity may be glorified. The God who ceases to be the object of an eternal fellowship ceases to be thereby the object of worship in the best sense which has hitherto been attached to that term.

No doubt the finitude of man as a growing personality stands in vital connexion with the sense of infinity lying around and beyond. The fact that he seeks spiritual development emphasizes alike the fact of limitation and the necessity of passing beyond it. All growth involves both of these. Further, the expansiveness of human nature and the weariness which is often involved in the present conditions of earthly life make it pleasant in some moods to contemplate the entire surrender of the individuality which involves finitude even at the cost of personal consciousness itself.

Yet all this represents but a phase of thought or a mood of spirit. Neither the one nor the other entitles us to think ourselves away, or to suppose that blessedness consists in so doing. We are the less entitled to do so when we reflect that the whole spiritual constitution of the universe depends upon the maintenance within it alike of the personality of God and of the personality of man. To remain a personal object of the divine love brings greater glory to God than to become an eternal mode of the divine Being. All such interpretations of the doctrine of immortality, therefore, whether they spring from abstract speculation or from mystic yearning, involve contradictions directly they are closely examined. They contemplate the perfection of personality as consisting in its loss. They confuse communion with an absorption which, in destroying the ultimate possibility of communion, is an effective denial of the present reality of it. They set up an abstract spiritual end, which for its fulfilment depends upon the perfecting of personality, as a substitute for that perfecting.

It is a mistake to regard the distinction of personality as involving exclusiveness. Personality is the condition of

fellowship. From beginning to end there is a parallel growth of personality and fellowship. Selfishness is the contradiction of true personality. The expectation of the future, therefore, must look, not to the suppression of human personality, which is essential to the highest glory alike of God and man, but to the purging of it from that selfishness which hardens individuality into exclusiveness, and thereby makes it in very deed the foe of personality.

What is all this but to say once more that the filial consciousness is the supreme guide to the meaning of life not merely in the present, but also throughout the future? The sonship of man means above all that he exists as a true, and it may now be added as an eternal, end to God. This was the central affirmation from which the whole revelation of the Father given by Christ proceeded. This was the truth which the spiritual perfection of Christ enabled Him so completely to realize that it became the determining principle of all His thoughts, purposes, and actions. And that which secured Him in the consciousness of eternal blessedness He extends to His followers. 'God is not the God of the dead, but of the living: for unto Him all live.' This was the decisive utterance of the truth upon which the whole fabric of Christian hope is reared. It is a living assurance, not a mere speculation. But round it gather all other intimations of immortality. Self-affirmation, reason, love, ideal hopes and efforts, the abiding yearning after fellowship with God,—all these grow out of the filial consciousness, and all make human life a reality which transcends the limiting conditions of this world. The assurance given to this consciousness in its fullness lies in the Fatherhood of God. This revelation of His relationship to men is of all things most misleading, unless the hope of the future life is conveyed by it. And of the truth of all this the Resurrection of Christ stands as the proclamation.

Directly the true emphasis in regard to immortality is laid on personality, the moral implicates of the expectation assume due prominence. The old view which represented this as a state of probation, and a future state as one of rewards and punishments, receives substantial justification. And in so far

as the conception is transformed by recent thought, it is because we no longer look upon such rewards and punishments as being due to merely external action, but regard them as the complete working out of moral distinctions in a universe where the holiness of God is supreme, and where, at the same time, the personality of man remains free. To pursue this line of thought, however, would carry us beyond the limits of our present inquiry into the detailed discussion of eschatology.

The assumption of individual immortality, and the expectation of that future blessedness which on every ground is postulated by the filial consciousness, involves the realization of a perfect community. The perfect blessedness of the individual is unthinkable, except as being realized in and through a perfect community. If fellowship be essential to personal wellbeing in this world, *a fortiori* it must be essential to final blessedness in a future state. The two elements, the personal and the collective, stand or fall together. So far as the New Testament is concerned, it would be truer to say that the collective overshadows the individual in its doctrine of heaven than the other way. That is to say, the ultimate prospect set before us is that of a city, with its ideal fellowship, into which every individual believer hopes and strives to enter. In this respect also the doctrine of heaven projects into the future the complete realization of all that is involved in the present filial consciousness.

Finally, the perfection either of the community or of the individual in a future state is unthinkable without the essential accompaniment of a reconstructed world. Both the Old and the New Testament, therefore, give abundant expression to this ultimate promise and expectation. Neither, however, reveals to us the means or processes by which this transformation will take place. It is the act of God, but the conditions under which this act will be accomplished, and the energies of which it will make use, are not revealed. Nor could it be otherwise. They can only be revealed as they are experienced, and to experience them would involve passage by means of them into the perfect world which they are to bring about. Yet the filial consciousness becomes the vehicle of such revelation as is at present possible. The transformation to be

effected must be that of this present order of things, for continuity of experience is essential if personality is to be maintained. The breach between the present and the future brought about by death and by any subsequent event cannot be so absolute as to obliterate memory, or to destroy spiritual aptitudes which have been disciplined in the present life. This were to destroy personality altogether. Hence, however strongly marked may be the transitions of experience, or even catastrophic the objective changes brought about, the principle of continuity must prevail. This is the Christian doctrine, and again it will be seen to rest upon the fundamental intuitions of the filial consciousness. The 'how' of this change remains at present inexplicable. We may be sure, however, that the conditions of it are spiritual. Can we be sure, for example, at the present moment, that the imperfections of the present world are really due to its materiality? May it not equally be that powers in us lie dormant or are blighted, which, if they could be called into full exercise, would so transform our relationship to the existing world that what is now experienced as evil would be transformed into good? We have limited experience of such transformations owing to the growth of spiritual, moral, or intellectual power, even at present.

Much of the evil which prevails is due to the inadequate development of personality. With the growth of personality many influences of environment which are hostile to it in its weakness become favourable to it in its strength. In short, the world is within certain limits reconstructed by spiritual growth or transformation. Nor is it easy to set limits to this process, especially when the Gospel narratives reveal to us, prevaillingly in the case of our Lord, and sometimes in the case of His followers, a triumphant power to rise superior to limiting conditions and even to transform them for the purposes of spiritual life or in the service of humanity. Thus the transformation of the universe requisite to the complete fulfilment of the ideal contained in the Christian consciousness may be brought about by an enlarged range or an increased intensity of the spiritual nature which brings us into relationship with the world as it now is. If this be the case, the

sense of dissatisfaction with the present order of things rising to the condemnation of it is indeed the incipient manifestation of the spiritual power by which its imperfection will be transcended or done away. It is quite impossible in conformity with any spiritual principles of interpretation to imagine a future and perfect order of things externally fitted on to a perfected community, even by divine power. Such mechanical notions, while they may pass muster for popular purposes, will not bear reasoned criticism. The power to pierce beneath such external conceptions is the only means by which justice can be done to the essential truth which is contained in them. When this is done the promise of new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness becomes not only thinkable, but is clearly foreshadowed and guaranteed in the new relationship to the world which is brought about by every uplifting and enlargement of consciousness, and especially when such progress is completely dominated and inspired by the filial life of those who enter into the complete emancipation of the sons of God. It is impossible and needless here to discuss all that is involved in the Christian doctrine of the future life. Sufficient has, however, been said to show how its various elements stand related to the filial consciousness, and how the filial consciousness itself is the guarantee of their essential truth.

VI. Finally, the objection has been raised that the Christian faith is not universal. It has only become known partially and gradually. Its complete conquest of the world appears at present to be problematic. Even where it has become established as the dominant faith there is much opposition to it, and there are many differing interpretations of it. These difficulties pressed more heavily upon the mind in the old days, when the processes both of creation and of revelation were represented under more mechanical conceptions than is the case in the present day. We are so accustomed to consider the most precious treasures of life as the result of a long and costly, and even of a precarious, development, that it does not appear strange that the greatest spiritual treasure of all should be conferred as the result of a similar process. Moreover, the old view of revelation, which treated it as presented above

all to the intellectual faculties, has been superseded by a view which does fuller justice to the spiritual and moral elements involved. Even in respect of the intellect we have reached a new point of view. Intellectual development conditions on every hand intellectual receptivity. The capacity, therefore, to receive truth, although it is divinely conveyed, is dependent upon the human as well as upon the divine factor in the process. But directly the spiritual and moral aspects of the matter are taken into account this becomes even clearer. If the revelation of God be on the one side a gracious act of God, it involves also a spiritual and moral victory on the part of man. The history of the higher progress of mankind is that of a march towards an ideal goal, which can only be reached as the result of inward fidelity and strenuous effort. Moreover, the ideal satisfaction of the spirit in God is so comprehensive as to require for its complete realization the play of the many-sided but limited individualities by whose action the attainment of a comprehensive vision and a completely realized ethical life is gradually brought about. Hence it is not remarkable, under the conditions laid down, that the knowledge of the Christian faith and, still more, the adequate realization of its meaning, should be, not the lightly accomplished result of miraculous influence, but the consummation of the divinely ordered aspiration and effort of mankind. Unless this be so, the knowledge of Christ would cease to be spiritual in any real sense of the term.

There are, of course, two assumptions involved in this conclusion. In the first place, that all knowledge of God must result from an historic process. But, as has been pointed out, this is the only assumption which we are entitled to make. It is involved in the very nature of spiritual and moral personality as we know it in mankind. It is absolutely universal. Revelation and religion must, if they enter into the life and reality of the present order of things, conform to its governing conditions. If they did not, two clashing orders would unite in man, reducing him and all things with him to confusion. The transcendence of revelation must not be incompatible with a universal order. Redemption must be by way of the spiritual and moral laws which govern individual

and collective progress, and not despite them. Of course, the question may always be asked why a history at all, and especially, why a history which means not merely a succession of events or an ordered development, but a process which involves struggle, delay, and contingent defeat here or there. To that question we are not qualified to give an absolute answer. We are in large measure the creatures of this process. We can, however, perceive the infinite possibilities of moral growth by conflict. Any other alternative which we can present to the imagination will be pronounced by rational criticism to be less worthy than that which has been actually set up.

In the next place it must be assumed, if our contention is to hold good, that some measure of truth and worth is present in all religious life. Inadequate and contradictory as it may be, degraded as it may have become, there are to be detected beneath its surface the workings of higher influence, though in many cases on the most restricted scale. Hence, when the ultimate spiritual end is reached, all peoples will in some measure, however humble, contribute to its perfection. Unless this be so, no way can be found of justifying the dealings of God with men as consistent alike with righteousness and love.

Finally, such justification can only be made good if the process which is taking place in this world be treated as only the initial stage of a spiritual history to be carried on in realms beyond the present world. This, however, is a truth essential alike to revelation and religion. Christianity reveals the meaning of the world. It does so by being the consummation of, and at the same time in consonance with, the spiritual and moral order of the world. It postulates not only time, but eternity, for its perfect work; not only things present, but things to come. When all this is recognized, it does not, indeed, remove all difficulties. It is hard to conceive how this can ever be the case; but it immeasurably relieves them, and it relieves them just at the decisive point, namely, by showing that on no other plan could the knowledge and service of God be the reward of a victory by which the spiritual stature of the sons of God is attained. Thus the Christian doctrine of Man and Redemption is throughout explained by the fatherly-filial relation.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

THE previous inquiry has revealed the spiritual factors which are involved in the making of theology, and the ideal satisfaction given to all these factors by Christianity. It has become clear that if the world is to be explained at all, it can only be by means of Christian Theism. It is also clear that Christian Theism has resulted from the consciousness of a spiritual dealing of God with mankind, which, while transcendent and including revelation, redemption, and satisfaction, stands in the most vital relations to the whole development of the universe and of mankind. It remains to examine the belief in God upon its intellectual side, in order to discover the way in which its substance is arrived at, the nature and consistency of its content, and its validity for reason.

The history of religion has shown us that all its forms have represented to those who have accepted them the result of revelation, understanding that term in its widest sense. In proportion as they have been truly religious and not the philosophies of religion which follow upon its intuitive stages, they have represented influences which have been conceived as coming from without and from above by means of a direct presentation to the spiritual consciousness. Above all, has this been the case in regard to the great historic religion which culminated in Christ, and in the dawn through His influence of the Christian consciousness. Its distinguishing feature is the immediacy of spiritual intuition with the attribution of that intuition to God as its source.

At the same time, this revelation has been given within and by means of human consciousness. It has varied in its extent and richness directly as the development of spiritual consciousness. That consciousness has been related to the whole experience of life, and conditioned by the world and history. Above all, revelation has come as the result of the intuitive experience of the unique personality of Jesus Christ. Hence religion presents to us the consciousness of a divine communication, which is at the same time served and conditioned by the nature and spiritual maturity of human self-consciousness as situated in the world, enriched by the lessons and influence of its history and by the discipline of its events.

Both these elements, namely, the consciousness of divine illumination and the processes of human self-realization, must be held together if any satisfactory account is to be given of the making and meaning, the worth and validity of the doctrine of God. In the first place, that doctrine is the reflective product of revelation. Unfolded as it may be by definition and argument, its source lies deeper than such logical processes of intelligence. It springs from a source of spiritual apprehension which, while it distinctly and markedly includes the intelligence, at least equally involves many elements which are not strictly speaking intellectual. The doctrine of God, therefore, is primarily not a deduction but a description—the attempt to set forth the nature and relationships of the Divine Being whose presence and character is presented to and within spiritual consciousness. From all this it results that the so-called proofs of the existence of God are gradually accumulated, and are long subsequent to the belief in Him and even to the doctrine of Him. In any purely intellectual form they can only do partial justice to the variety and richness of the material from which the belief is drawn. Above all, they fall short of the manifold content of the Christian doctrine of God.

It is this fact of the spiritual sources of theistic belief which accounts for the apparently unsatisfactory character of many of the so-called evidences of the existence of God, and notably of what is perhaps the greatest and most vitally

important—the ontological argument; the argument, namely, that the thought of God as the Perfect Being involves His existence. As presented in its purely intellectual forms, it seems to depend upon arbitrary assumptions, or upon an abstract logic which resembles the superficial subtlety of a skilfully constructed puzzle. The reason of the union of this apparent weakness with real strength is that the argument in its purely logical form throws out of consideration those living intuitions of spiritual consciousness upon which its real force depends. So far as we can apprehend the Perfect Being of which the ontological argument speaks, we do so by a spiritual intuition which is deeper and broader than any supposed logical necessity. To throw out, therefore, history and experience for the sake of logic is to produce an argument which has convincing power rather in spite of than because of its logical cleverness, and which derives its cogency precisely from those elements which have been studiously left out of account. Hence all true Christian theology, whether apologetic or dogmatic, should, if it is to be securely based, start with the primary facts and experience of spiritual consciousness as its datum. Its business is frankly to hold to, explicate, and justify these primary facts of spiritual consciousness, and not to dispense with them. Theology has to show that the revelation given in these facts illuminates the world and is verified by its history. It has further to make good that the reflective doctrine which is drawn from this consciousness is logically coherent, stands in no contradiction to other ascertained truth, and is so derived as to possess rational validity. Careful examination will show how faulty, and, indeed, misleading, is the attempt to build up by mere argumentative processes an abstract doctrine of God in isolation from all those influences by which the belief in Him has been created and is sustained.

The revelation of God which is thus given is not purely transcendent and external to the man who receives it. The very fact that in it and through it man comes to himself and to the position of heirship over, and harmony with, the world to which he belongs, shows that that which, on the one hand, must be conceived as a revelation from above, is, on the other,

the intuitive deliverance of spiritual maturity. In this respect it is as truly natural as in the former it is supernatural. The union of these two aspects, while in ■ measure common to all supposed knowledge of God, is, above all, true in the case of Christ, where there is complete unity between the substance of the revelation given and the human Revealer of it. In Him the substance and the authoritative witness of the revelation are absolutely one. This is His unique position. His consciousness is that of constant reception from, and dependence upon, the Father, accompanied by complete spiritual lordship over truth, the world, and man.

How are we to understand and hold together these two aspects of the case? To understand the revelation of the transcendent Personality of God, who is not only transcendent but immanent throughout the whole range and the entire process of reality, and, above all, in the spiritual consciousness which apprehends Him?

The abstract metaphysical objections to the possibility of revelation have to a large extent been already dealt with in the previous discussion concerning Agnosticism. It must above all be borne in mind that we are everywhere faced by the fact and the prevalence of the religious consciousness. That consciousness combines the sense of oneness with, and the sense of dependence upon, a Divine Source. The Infinite and the finite are thus locked together in a relationship which at once emphasizes and overcomes the distinction between the two. Both the distinction and the sublation of it are equally vital to the fully developed religious consciousness. They represent not successive but simultaneous, not incoherent but harmonious, factors of that consciousness. Both are alike present in the case of every distinctive activity of human personality. Under religious influence, reason, while conscious of its own worth and power, realizes that it is the expression of the universal Reason which explains the world. Moral consciousness, with its sharp distinctions between right and wrong, finds the source of those distinctions, and the authority which enforces the obligation to respect them, in the moral sovereignty of God. Spiritual aspiration finds in the perfection of God alike its source and its goal.

Thus, for religion, the finite and the infinite represent the two poles everywhere held together by the distinctive energy of the spiritual consciousness. Further, spiritual experience finds not merely that the divine is given as the correlative of the human, but that the influence of the divine is throughout active and sovereign. The spiritual and moral condition of the religious man is constantly influenced and transformed from the depths of subliminal consciousness. It is in the sphere of that subliminal consciousness, when it is aroused, that men feel themselves under the immediate influence of the divine. It is from that which is thus given that the whole content of revelation, including the doctrine of God which is deduced from it, is derived.

Is there any inner contradiction or inherent irrationality in this experience disallowing its claim to be heard? At first sight we should suppose that while it is impossible for finite beings to comprehend absolute perfection, it is not impossible for them to apprehend it. The possibility of such apprehension is often obscured by treating the perfection of God as though it were quantitative instead of qualitative. Directly it is understood that the glory of God consists not in unlimited quantity, but in supreme perfection of quality, there would seem to be a power to apprehend Him like to that possessed by every inferior when brought into contact with the vastly superior, provided that the superior be of the same kind as the inferior.

It may, however, be objected that in religious experience all that is given to us is a state of our own thoughts and feelings and desires, and that these carry no legitimate reference to any cause beyond themselves. Yet that objection would equally apply to all our perceptions, and, above all, to all our intercourse with human persons. Our percepts are all, in themselves, states of our own consciousness; though states which carry with them a natural and necessary testimony to a cause beyond ourselves. It is contended that exactly the same thing, neither more nor less, is the case with the most vital experiences of the spiritual consciousness. The only difference is that in the case of ordinary perception the cause is affirmed to be a particular object external to ourselves,

while in the case of the religious consciousness the cause is attributed to a divine source which is all-inclusive and in some sense immanent within ourselves.

Yet this, when we come to reflect, is exactly what God must be, and we can therefore only invalidate the testimony of the spiritual consciousness on the assumption that only one form of approach to human consciousness is possible, and only one kind of relationship open to it, which must of necessity exclude the Divine. But such a presumption is entirely without rational grounds, and depends not upon maturity of wisdom, but on barrenness of imagination. Hence the doctrine of God cannot be invalidated by any legitimate criticism of its sources. Its rationality must be determined by the examination of its content, and of the process by which it is attained.

It has already been seen that God is presented to us in the Christian revelation as our Father. The following elements are included in this conception of Him and of His relation to the world: His personality and spiritual perfection; His transcendence above the universe and immanence within it; His sovereignty for the sake of the highest ends of His own perfection, the supremacy in His character of love, and, owing to all this, the union within Himself of eternal self-realization and of the principle of external self-communication. All these elements are implicitly contained within the conception of God's Fatherhood. Each one can be made the subject of rational investigation, the result of which will, in confirming their validity for thought, reveal that the conception of Fatherhood not only ministers to the highest spiritual life, but is the most adequate symbol for the expression of that which is essential in the divine nature, and in the relationship of God to the world.

I. *The personality of God.*—The revelation of God in spiritual consciousness is apprehended as a condescending self-manifestation, as the unfolding of character in the holy fellowship of religion, and as the fulfilment of a divine purpose which embraces alike the spiritual life of the individual and the course of the world as a whole. All these involve the personality of God. Reflection with a view to the explanation of the world yields in the first instance, as has been seen,

the same result as is involved in the experience of redemption and in the spiritual consciousness of religion. The explanation of the world is only possible on the assumption of the priority of the spiritual. The spiritual embraces the governing thought and underlying purpose that constitute the world a rational whole in which the unfolding reason of man finds itself at home. Yet the spiritual, as the subject of creative thought and purpose, is only conceivable as conscious, and consciousness involves consciousness of self or personality.

If the Source of the universe must be held to will and to compass ends, the character of which is fixed by His own nature, it must further be held that those ends are presented to Him in their entirety, and afford to Him satisfaction in their attainment. The only centre to which such presentation and satisfaction are possible is personality.

It has already been argued that personality is the highest reality in the created world, that, therefore, its creative source must possess in perfect degree that which He confers, and that every mark of purpose in the world is a sign that He actually possesses it. It may be added that the whole blessedness of religious experience consists in the apprehension of the divine personality, and in referring the gifts and experiences of life to God as consciously purposing and bestowing them. According, therefore, to the estimate held of the worth and effectiveness of human personality is the belief in the reality of the Divine.

But it is sometimes contended on philosophical grounds that the attribution of personality to God is illegitimate, and indeed irrational. It is held that the possession of personality arises in consequence of a twofold distinction, each part of which is essentially the mark of finitude, and therefore inapplicable to God. In the first place the self-distinguishing activity which is the mark of personality is bound up with the differentiation of the individual from the fellow individuals by whom he is surrounded and limited in the world. In the next place personality is the result of the distinction between the individual and the material world to which he belongs. Indeed, personality is not an original and unchanging possession, but a growth, and its growth is conditioned

by conflict with the world which it distinguishes from itself. It is held, therefore, that personality is a principle of exclusion, bound up with finite existence as limited by other finite existences throughout the whole system of the universe, and for this cause inapplicable to the Divine Source of the universe who embraces all things in His own all-comprehending life.

In opposition to this contention it must be held that even in man personality is a principle of inclusion rather than of exclusion. The power and range of personality is measured by the extent to which it appropriates the world by means of manifold relationships and extended experience. The life of the imbecile is exclusive, lacking the power to enter into the relationships by which a full human experience becomes possible. This exclusiveness, however, marks a fatal lack of personality and not its possession. Reflection on this obvious fact suggests that it is possible to disentangle the conception of personality from that which is incidental to the limitations of finite personalities. After all, self-reference is the one essential of personal consciousness, as such. What is vital to it is the intuitive conviction that the various states of consciousness are *mine*. The peculiarity that they are not another's holds a much lower rank than this. The same thing must be said of the fact given in experience that such states are supplied to the consciousness of the Ego by a world which we pronounce to be the Non-ego, because its successive presentations are not under the control of our own will. Undoubtedly these two subordinate features are present in self-consciousness, as it is realized in the particular experience of an imperfectly developed and limited personality. Yet, even here, they seem to be accidental to personality and not of its essence. Even supposing that in some sense these features must attach to the self-consciousness of God, all that it would be legitimate to hold in this respect would be that the fact of His personality involves a creative act by which He sets up the universe over against Himself, and that this act involves self-distinction from it on the part of God, and His gift to it of a quasi-independence of Him. In short, so far as distinction and exclusiveness attach to

personality, they are imposed upon us by the laws of the universe to which we are subject, while in God they are self-imposed by His creative activity.

Further, it may be held that the personality of God involves the manifoldness of the divine nature and not its essential simplicity. If, therefore, there be any measure of validity in the objections taken to the attribution of personality to God, they apply to an abstract conception of that personality, and lose their force as objections to that Christian Theism which attributes not only unity but the eternal fellowship of the Trinity to the divine nature, and holds God to be distinct from the universe while spiritually immanent throughout it.

Under pressure of such considerations those who deny personality to God, are driven to contend that they are doing this in the hope of attaining to a worthier conception of His glory. Thus Herbert Spencer remarks 'the choice is between personality and something higher.' And he suggests that to the divine source of all things may belong 'a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion.'¹ The illustration used by Spencer suggests an error of thought. Mechanical motion does not include intelligence and will; but intelligence and will, as we know them in man, include the power of mechanical motion. Supposing, therefore, that the Divine Being is naturally exalted above the mere creaturely conditions of intelligence and will, this upon the analogy would indeed subordinate intelligence and will to something higher within His own nature, but would not exclude them from it. That which is essential to any worthy doctrine of the nature of God is the inclusion within it of that which is highest in the universe which it creates, together with that measure of transcendence which its essential superiority claims for it. What God may be beyond what is known and knowable by us it is impossible for us to say, for our conceptions are limited by our powers and experience. But that He must include in Himself all that is highest and inmost in the world which He creates, and in the relative order and pre-eminence which He reveals in us as

¹ Spencer, quoted by Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 268.

being true—this is the first principle which even Herbert Spencer admits by the very form of his attempt to find in God a higher than the highest we know. To deny, however, personality, including intelligence and will, to God for the sake of that higher is not only, as has been seen, unnecessary, and contrary to our own experience, but leads practically to the displacement of the higher by the lower. The deliberate superseding of intelligence and will, the highest faculties revealed to us in our own life, leaves in the result only the Inscrutable Power suggested to us by the experience of the material universe. Moreover, whatever may be the case with the form of intelligence and will, as we know them, it is impossible to conceive that any power can be higher than them which withdraws from its possessor the ability to say ‘This is mine.’ To imagine that power to be absent from God is, whatever may be said in words, to reduce Him below the level of His highest creatures, not to exalt Him above them. Hence the conclusion is that while we can have no adequate conception of a personality free from the limitations which are inherent in our own finitude, yet the very principle that the Divine Being must be higher than the highest of His own works involves a selfhood which, simply because it transcends theirs, can in no wise fail of the attribute of personality as connoting the conscious appropriation of all that He is and does. In addition, the ceaseless striving of finite personality to transcend its limitations, and to appropriate the whole reality from which it distinguishes itself, is a prophetic witness to a personality in which this perfection is realized.

II. *The Spiritual Perfection of God.*—The Christian doctrine of God includes not only His personality, but His spiritual perfection. That which is revealed in human consciousness as having the highest worth is eternally realized in Him. It is the fact that it is so realized in Him which makes it an ideal binding on man. The character of God constitutes the nature of moral distinctions as they are progressively realized in the consciousness of man. It is due further to His character that spiritual and moral excellence takes precedence of all other ends which can be conceived and

pursued by man. The spiritual constitution of human nature is grounded in the character and not merely in the will of God. To suppose that moral distinctions are prescribed by God by a mere exercise of His will apart from the spiritual characteristics of His own eternal life, is to set up merely external relations between Him and the universe which He creates. Such a conception was possible, perhaps, in the days when abstract Deism reigned in the philosophy of religion, but it becomes incredible when due regard is had to the divine immanence, as is the case with all recent thought. God so constitutes all reality that His character is the immanent law of all life. This conception is brought home to us throughout the Holy Scriptures, which unfailingly connect divine law with divine wisdom and love on the one hand, and with human well-being on the other. In this essential and intimate relationship between God and the world the doctrine of Scripture is in agreement with the most modern thought. The real issue, so far as His perfection is concerned, between Christian Theism and naturalism depends upon the relative worth which is ascribed to moral and to merely natural life. Once grant the supreme worth and authoritativeness of the moral over the physical, and there is exactly the same reason for ascribing to God supreme moral excellence, on the ground of the moral phenomena of the universe, as exists for ascribing to Him infinite power on account of the physical.

The underlying principle, therefore, of the Christian doctrine of the divine perfection is that what becomes manifest as the end of the evolution of the world is grounded in the character of its source, and that what God imposes as the immanent law of spiritual life and well-being He must eternally realize in Himself. The justification of this conclusion rests upon two main supports. In the first place we are guided to it by the analogy of our own life and of our quasi-creative relationship to the works which we produce. Man's handiwork bears the stamp of his own individuality. It is in very deed the uttering of himself. This is strikingly manifest in the highest creations of the poet, the artist, or the musician. It is equally true in regard to the humbler

achievements of life, and to the sum-total of those social purposes which constitute a man's life-work.

Undoubtedly such self-revelation is in the case of men more or less incomplete. So far as it is imperfect, however, this failure is due to causes which are clearly ascertainable. Feebleness of executive power, the interference of other wills, limitation of place and opportunity, and, not least, the necessary use of an external and independent, though related, material—all these in various degrees limit the expression of man's inmost nature through his works. Moreover, as has been pointed out, man is at present an imperfectly developed personality. He attains maturity by means of a growing purpose, which struggles to express itself in action. He becomes what he ultimately is in the process of creating what expresses himself. The potentiality is real from the first. The main lines, or at all events the promise, of his distinctive individuality are already there. It is due to the conditions imposed upon him as the subject of growth in time that his individuality does not stand forth complete at the first. Hence analogy extends to God the main principle that His character is manifest with growing clearness in His works without the limitations which are due to externally imposed conditions, to foreign material, or to the process of becoming in time.

Doubtless the divine method of creation does manifest something in the conditions of the divine life which is akin to the limitations imposed upon man by an external world. The very process of creation involves the grant to the creatures of that limited independence which is most strikingly manifest in human individuality. But the essential distinction between this and the limitation of the creature is that the first is the free act of God, whereas the second is an involuntary limitation of the creature, imposed upon him by the Creator.

A similar distinction must be drawn when it is sought to extend the analogy of temporal development to God. It is sometimes argued that as man finds self-realization only by means of the completed activities of his life, so the self-realization of God can only be complete at the end of the

process by which His purposes are fulfilled in the world. The consummation of all things is conceived to be necessary not merely to the accomplishment of the purposes of God, but in order to the complete attainment of His own perfection. Here, again, it would seem that the limitations of finite beings entering and leaving the world as subject to the time-order of human history and realizing themselves only in the gradual achievement of purpose are illegitimately extended to the one Being, who is exalted above the time-order, since He constitutes it, and above all other conditions of human finitude. Hence the main analogy suggests that what God eternally is, is manifest in what His creative and controlling Providence seeks to produce.

The second argument is still more important than the first. It is contained in the essential testimony of the spiritual and moral consciousness. Mankind attains the goal of development through the gradual unfolding and enforcement of great ethical ideals. These have an individual and also collective application and influence. The ethical ideal belongs to individuals, and is in a measure accepted by communities. Yet it is more than mine, ours, the nation's, or even than mankind's. Its source lies beyond the individual or even the collective will. The testimony within it is that it springs from the Supreme Being who conditions our life, correlating it with nature, and co-ordinating it with the progress of the world. Its persistence, directive influence, social range and power over the world are due to this fact of transcendent origin.

The peculiarity of the ethical ideal is that it carries with it the sense of obligation to obey it. In this it differs radically from the aesthetic and other ideals of life. It expresses a command which is supreme over the individual will, over even the positive laws which are made and enforced by the community. It makes no abatement on account of my weakness or predilections; it contains within itself what Kant called 'the categorical imperative' of duty. Moreover, speaking broadly, the ethical ideal is revealed under religious influences; it grows out of, and is accompanied by, the consciousness of the divine. Hence, the religious man apprehends

the moral ideal as having been given by God. It is laid down for us as His law ; it is the law and goal of our life, because of His character. This consciousness that the character of God is the goal of our being is due to the fact that our life is immanent in His ; that our inmost individuality has its spring in God. Hence, the moral ideal as thus presented in spiritual consciousness carries us back to the perfection of God as its source. Its authority, meaning, and certainty of fulfilment are found in Him. Its essential testimony is to its own supreme worth, so that the moral task of my life is to subdue all other motives, interests, and forces to its demands.

It is in this fundamental fact of the spiritual and moral consciousness as it declares itself not merely in isolated individuals, but in the great prophetic interpreters of the race, that the key to the revelation of the attributes of God is found. It is as manifest in His relations to human consciousness that God becomes known. His approach to man can only be along the avenues marked out in human nature itself. Speaking broadly, those avenues correspond to the main divisions into which human nature may for practical purposes be divided, namely : mind, character—with its affections and aspirations—and effective will. In relation to each of these God is revealed as infinite perfection. This involves that His nature is manifest in that which constitutes the worth of human nature, but that His perfection is such that it is free from the limitations involved in human finitude and evil. Thus, for example, the functions of the human mind are knowledge and wisdom ; hence, correspondingly, the doctrine that God is omniscient and all-wise. The attribution of these two qualities to God carries with it the twofold affirmation that the human quality is a revelation of the divine, but that God possesses the qualities revealed in human nature in the perfection which belongs to His freedom from creaturely limitations, and necessarily involved in His sovereign relationship to the world.

Again, so far as character is concerned, such attributes as love, holiness, righteousness, truth, faithfulness are ascribed to God. They are the excellences manifest in the highest human character with the removal of their earthly limitations,

and with the recognition of their divine supremacy in the world.

So, finally, when we speak of the self-sufficiency, the immutability, the freedom, the omnipotence or the omnipresence of God, we are giving by means of all these attributes our definition of what is essential to the sovereignty of God as manifest in the world. In all these respects His nature represents the perfection which is faintly shadowed in ours. The intuition of His glory is given to the spiritual consciousness in the fellowship of religion. Its speculative justification is found by reflection on what is manifested in the relations of God to the world which He creates, constitutes, and maintains.

From these attributes it is possible and even necessary to deduce still further qualities by a process of abstraction; for example, the unity and the spirituality of God. All these, however, represent the last results of our analysis, and depend ultimately for their evidence upon that which God is revealed as being within our spiritual experience of Him.

Hence, it becomes easy to perceive alike the substantial worth and the inherent inadequacy of all formal doctrines of God. As to the former, all human qualities are constituted by God, and therefore contain within themselves a representation of His nature. They are founded in God, and are essential means of communion with Him. In and through them He is known; known therefore as akin to, though transcending, them. It is through their activity in history and in finite individuals that His purposes are wrought out. Therefore the conception of God as revealed to man in and through the experiences of spiritual and ethical life is that He is the infinite perfection to which all human powers and virtues testify, the perfect order in which all divergent values receive their due. Such is the positive testimony of the religious consciousness.

On the other hand, it is clear that this testimony is inadequate. Man at his best is quite unable fully to realize what his own unattained perfection would be like. He cannot clearly present it to himself as an objective state of being; still less can he enter into the state of satisfaction

which would accompany it. The secret of such complete satisfaction can only be read when self-fulfilment is finally reached. How much less competent, therefore, must man be to represent to himself what is involved in the perfection of God! Not only must God be conceived as free from the imperfection of moral evil, but in addition His eternal existence is entirely free from creaturely limitations, and knows nothing of the finite struggle towards self-realization; while as creator of the instruments of His eternal purposes He stands in relations to them which no mere creature can conceive. Hence it is impossible to represent to ourselves in any satisfactory way what the divine perfections are as eternally free from all those limitations through which they are revealed to man.

Yet this does not imply that our nature and what is revealed to us in and through it contains no revelation of the nature of God. The controversy between Mansel and J. S. Mill may be harmonized by avoiding the extremes into which each fell. Because man is no adequate measure of the divine nature, it by no means follows that his spiritual and moral intuitions are merely regulative as Mansel thought. As the latter understood them they contained no real revelation of the nature of God. On the other hand, the impatient retort of Mill seems unduly to minimize the difficulty of comprehending the nature of God that is intrinsically bound up with the limitations of human faculties. The truth lies between the extreme contentions. Our doctrine of God is founded on the revelation given to the intuitive faculties of our spiritual and moral being. It has been given in special measure to those who have most fully attained the perfection of those faculties in the spiritual history of mankind. Such a revelation is more than regulative, for the divine life is immanent in human nature, and constitutes it capable of entering into fellowship with God.

On the other hand, the divine perfection is exhibited to us under the limitations which our imperfect development and our creaturely finitude impose. The highest intuitions of God are therefore true, but cannot adequately present to us the whole truth; for if this latter were possible we must,

as has already been observed, become God and not men. Hence the Christian doctrine of God necessitates the most careful reflection lest our formal theology should magnify exactly the human limitations of our conceptions instead of seeing clearly that they are limitations. For example, the exaggeration of power as an attribute of God which is found in all extreme doctrines of His sovereignty, exhibits a lack of true proportion in our conception of the divine nature due largely to our dissatisfaction with our own want of mastery over inert or refractory material. Under such conditions the omnipotence of God may appear to us as a power to break down such opposition by an overwhelming exercise of force. Yet this would be to extend to Him in thought the condition of our own mere externality to the desired instruments of our will, and cannot be a true indication of the real inwardness and influence of His relation, as Creator, to His creatures.

Many similar illustrations could easily be afforded. But sufficient has been said to show that the conception of the divine attributes given in and to the spiritual consciousness of man is a real guide to the nature of God, though it must remain incommensurate with the divine perfection, and that human reflection cannot remove that incommensurateness because its highest exercise is bounded by the limitations from which it took its rise.

III. *The transcendence and immanence of God.*—God is eternal and all-perfect personality. He is the supreme existence on whom all things depend, and in whom they find their ultimate explanation. Their source, meaning, law, and end are all in Him. In a word, He constitutes their reality. Their existence, order, and development are all due to Him. They so derive their existence from Him that His reason makes them intelligible, His character appoints their end, His will alike creates and sustains them. This involves, to begin with, the transcendence of God. He is the First Cause, the rational principle, and the sustaining life of all things. He is not an aspect of them, as Pantheism involves. On the contrary, He is their only and sufficient explanation. Hence, He is not dependent upon them, but they upon Him. The

spiritual has primacy of existence. The material, as such, is but secondary and subordinate to it. God is absolute, not in the sense that He cannot or will not enter into relations with the universe, but in the sense that such relations are due to the act of His own will, and depend upon the perfection of His own nature.

In the same way that His transcendence involves His absoluteness, it also implies His infinity. The infinite riches of His life are not completely manifest in the world which we know as it already exists. The deeper and the wider fulfilments of the future are already real to Him. What they ultimately become will only be a manifestation of what He eternally is. Moreover, for all we know, there may be countless other universes, the very existence of which is beyond the conception of our limited faculties. If this be so, His being must be as completely their explanation as it is of the only universe which is apprehensible by us.

It is impossible, therefore, to set bounds to the fullness and perfection of the divine nature, though the authority of the highest spiritual and moral intuitions of the race reveal a holiness and consistency in the divine character which cannot possibly be contradicted in any possible universe which may owe its origin to Him. Hence the transcendence of God means both the absoluteness of His relation to the world in the sense that has been defined and the infinity of His perfections as not limited by the world which He creates. Yet, if God is transcendent over the universe, He is also immanent throughout it. The world is an expression of His mind and will; an instrument of His purposes, the scene and medium of His self-revelation. All this implies its dependence upon Him and its distinction from Him. Yet the very fact that it stands in such vital relations to Him is a proof that its ultimate nature is spiritual. His law is not imposed upon it from without, nor is His power over it external, as is the power which man imperfectly exercises over his material instruments. Without the divine thought, purpose, and act, the world, both in whole and in all its parts, has neither meaning nor existence. The divine character is implicit in all things, though their finitude, in all the

untold varieties of limitation in which it is manifested, prevents each and all from displaying, except in the most inadequate way, the divine glory.

The analogy of the relation between God and the world is not to be found in the relation of man to the external and material instruments which he uses, but in his relation to the states of his own mental and moral life. These, while they cannot be severed from the personality which they manifest and to which they are relative, yet tend to possess a limited independence of their own. They constitute a systematic series; they have a power and persistence which may be independent of, or may even resist, the direct fiat of the human will. Such a state of existence is manifest in various fixed ideas, trains of thought, tendencies of action and the like, which cannot exist without our personality, are immanent in it, and yet seem to have relative independence of our will.

It is clear that no such analogy can be adequate to set forth the relationship in which God stands to the universe, but at least it is more relevant, and therefore more suggestive of the reality, than the merely external use of instruments can possibly be. We may gather from it some suggestion of the way in which God stands related to His works, though the transcendent reality can never be completely represented either by human imagination or by reflection. Two aspects of creaturely existence are apprehended by us: its dependence upon God, and, at the same time, its measure of independence. Each is entitled to be believed, though the relation of the one to the other cannot be completely explained. The analogy from our own conscious states furnishes a suggestion of the way in which the ultimate harmony may exist. It can hardly be expected that human thought should have power to do more. The one thing which is fatal to truth is the sacrifice of either aspect of the whole to the other, because human thought finds it impossible completely to harmonize them.

IV. *The Sovereignty of God in accordance with, and for the sake of the highest ends.*—The fact that the meaning, purpose, and order of things are not merely imposed upon

them from without, but constitute their divinely given nature, shows how complete is the divine sovereignty over them. Any mere external sovereignty of bare will and effective power is poor compared with such an internal and constitutive relationship.

Again, the measure of our own control over the states of our inner life is the nearest, though an imperfect analogy to that which is meant by the sovereignty of God. Yet the end determines the means, the character prescribes the method of the divine sovereignty. The highest end of God is, as has been seen, spiritual and moral. It is fulfilled by the constitution and education of spiritual and moral personalities. Hence, this is the highest act of God's creative and providential sovereignty. The fullest revelation of Himself is contained in His creating such personalities, laying down the conditions which are necessary to their existence and to their perfecting. Looked at from one standpoint this is the limitation of His sovereignty by the gift of freedom. From a higher standpoint it is the noblest manifestation of His sovereignty and of the spiritual attributes which characterize it.

If the constitution of such personalities be the highest end sought by God's sovereignty, the whole of His method throughout a coherent universe must be in keeping with this culminating purpose. The individuality which has its highest manifestation in the freedom of moral personalities must be foreshadowed in the general relations in which all created existences stand to the Creator. The immanence in the divine nature which gives to them alike their existence and the laws of their external relations, cannot be incompatible with the foreshadowing of that being-for-self which characterizes moral individuality. The sovereignty of God cannot be inconsistent with the ascription of a measure of intrinsic worth and independence to all that exists in a universe that is to be consummated by the introduction of spiritual and moral personality.

If, then, the divine end prescribes the method and meaning of the whole process of creation it also defines the subsequent manifestation of God's sovereignty. From beginning to end

its object must be to maintain and perfect that which has been set up under the conditions necessary to, and embodied in, its existence. If the constitution of spiritual and moral beings, and the securing of their perfection be the divine end, then the development of all that is involved in individuality and freedom must be the condition of it. Hence the method of the divine sovereignty must be one which not only confers the gift of moral freedom to begin with, but respects it throughout the whole course of the divine dealings.

The divine sovereignty which enacts the freedom of moral individuality must make all the ways of the divine approach to men not only consistent with that freedom, but favourable to its development. Herein lies the possibility of sin in a divinely ordered world. There can be no such thing as holiness unless there be the possibility of sin. The holy character which sets up holiness as the great end to be attained by the creature must thereby admit conditions which, in opening the way to moral goodness, equally open it to moral evil. No definitions of the divine sovereignty must exclude the real existence of moral freedom and the consequences which are bound up in it. Nor must they evade the practical difficulties by the supposition that the consciousness of sin is a salutary illusion, and that all life must be equally pleasing to God simply because it exists. The disposition to fall into this error is due to a misinterpretation of what is meant by the sovereignty of God. It is an attempt to magnify the mere element of power till it is understood to mean a control which renders moral personality impossible.

The whole consciousness of man refutes this interpretation. It is better to admit that all speculative endeavour adequately to realize the nature of the divine sovereignty must remain imperfect, than in the interests of such endeavours to suppress those essential facts of spiritual and moral history in which the nature of the divine sovereignty is revealed. The sovereignty which issues in a moral history must, from first to last, be compatible with the moral freedom which is its highest end. The difficulty of representing this, and all that it involves, to human thought does not entitle us

to set aside the prevailing facts by which its reality is brought home.

V. *The Supremacy of Love in God.*—The Christian doctrine of God involves the supremacy of love in the divine nature. By this is meant that the supreme principle in the divine character is that which eternally prompts to self-giving in order to create, to sustain, and to satisfy objects of divine fellowship. The essential of all love is self-giving in order to fellowship and satisfaction in fellowship. The peculiarity of the divine love as manifested in the universe is that it is creative, that it is the source and ground of the objects which it constitutes for fellowship and satisfies with it. The statement of St. John that ‘God is Love,’ is an inference from the whole content of the Christian revelation and from the whole effect of that revelation on human life.

1. In the first place the entire meaning of the fellowship with God, which is realized in true religion, rests upon this great truth. Religion, as it manifests itself in its highest forms, whether as preparatory to Christianity, or within Christianity, consists in the personal fellowship which manifests grace on the part of God and free self-surrender on the part of man. It emphasizes personality on the side of God; it involves the steady perfecting of personality on the side of man. All fellowship is the alliance of personalities. So far is the principle of personality from being hostile to fellowship, that it is indispensable to it. The triumph of personality is that it exists, not in isolation, but in the free self-surrender, which enables it to share thoughts, affections, desires, and purposes with others. The highest manifestation of this is found in the religious relationship. In the case of human fellowship, that which at once emphasizes personality, and removes its isolation is the power of love. Above all, therefore, is love manifest in the essential conditions of the religious consciousness and throughout its development.

2. If love is involved in the general conditions of the religious relationship, still more is it revealed in the character and work of Christ, in whom and by whom the religious

relationship is perfected. Christ, as the Son of God, stands in the perfect relationship of fellowship with the Father. In Him, for the first time, is the divine fellowship so perfectly manifested that its perfection in degree involves a unique distinction in kind.

Yet, impassable as is this distinction, Christ as the Son of the Father, in a most real way represents the spiritual ideal for all men; that which they tend to become in so far as they are delivered from sinfulness and frailty. From this sinfulness and frailty He is their Redeemer, and His redemptive work is accomplished by the limitless self-sacrifice of His love on their behalf. In so far as the effect of that redemptive love is produced in their hearts and lives, they become possessed by His own spirit of love to the Father and to mankind. The whole motive, method, and end of redemption is therefore to be found in the love of God manifest in and through Christ.

3. In a world so consummated it becomes evident that the highest and best quality is love. Despite all the opposition which it has to overcome it is not only the best, but the mightiest thing in the world. The one thing which is indispensable, not merely to the well-being, but even to the being of the world as we know it, is love. The progress of civilization depends upon the ever-increasing influence of love in moulding the ideals, the relationships and the desires of mankind.

4. This principle, which manifests itself as the culmination of human life, strikes deep down beneath the surface and extends far back beyond the human in the constitution of the world. It emerges, so to speak, from beneath. The spiritual in which it is perfected is prepared for in the animal, and even in the physical.

Such, generally speaking, is the constitutive function of love in the world. The counterpart and explanation of this function is the supremacy of love in God. None of these things could be, still less could they be as part of one inter-related system, were it not that God is love. No other attribute could constitute such a world. All the other attributes of God which can be named or thought of will

be seen by reflection upon their definition to be inadequate to explain the motive of the divine activity. Power may bring a world into being where the motive for its existence is present, but the motive for using the power, and still more for using it in constituting a spiritual universe, must be found elsewhere. Wisdom may order it, but wisdom consists in selecting the highest ends, and directing the means of their realization. The highest ends which wisdom selects and maintains are to be found in the spiritual treasures or possibilities of a character which supplies the material to wisdom. Righteousness respects and maintains that which is committed to its care. But there its powers begin and end. It does not explain the presence or nature of that which it safeguards. That which supplies the motive to power, the end to wisdom, and the trust to righteousness is love. It is love also which creates the sanctity which holiness reverences. Hence, the universe consummated in Christ is the witness to the supremacy of love in God.

Hence, also, reflection upon the divine attributes by which the world thus constituted is maintained again witnesses to the supremacy of love. Love can be conceived as begetting and inspiring all the rest. None of the rest, nor all combined, can be treated as the source or explanation of love. Nor can all these attributes be treated as independent springs of action, existing and working independently of one another. That which is achieved by their co-operation is the supreme manifestation and satisfaction of love. All the rest are ancillary to this. Hence, love comes—if the expression may be used—nearer to the heart of the Divine Personality than any of those other attributes, which, however august their nature and important their office, do but take their instructions from love and perfect its work.

Therefore ultimately love rather than reason is the explanation of the system of the world. The system satisfies reason only so far as it subserves love. For man as he is constituted perplexity begins where it is impossible clearly to trace the handiwork of love. The very tenacity with which he interrogates system, however conclusively laid bare, until he finds love as its final cause is an additional witness

to the supremacy of love in the constitution of the world. It is the one inexorable principle which must be satisfied, if a reasonable explanation of the universe is to be found.

Herein, finally, does the Christian consciousness supplement the onesidedness of the Aristotelian conception of God. For Aristotle, the Divine Being is the source of attraction to the whole creation; hence all things move in harmony towards the divine centre of their being, Himself unmoved. A fuller revelation of the spiritual consciousness, and a truer knowledge of what is involved in it, shows that the spiritual movement of creation towards its source is the outcome of the divine movement of love towards the creatures. God is the centre of attraction, the principle alike of coherence and progress for all things, because the fullness of His self-giving reveals His spiritual perfection as boundless love.

VI. *The unity in the Godhead of internal self-realization, of external self-communication, and of satisfaction in the return of creation to Himself in fellowship and service.*—This threefold unity is involved in the supremacy of love. It is obvious that that which first becomes manifest to man is the divine self-communication. Without such revelation not only can there be no knowledge of God, but no conception of Him. In this respect it may well prove to be true, as is urged by the ontological argument, that the thought of God proves His existence. This does not imply that the thought of God is, or even can be, adequate to His perfection. But the very fact that the human mind is constrained to pass beyond itself and beyond the sum-total of things to conceive a Supreme Cause and a Sufficient Reason for their existence reveals a constitution of the human mind which is the necessary result and manifestation of its origination by a divine source, and can only be explained on that ground. In short, a Godless world could not be a God-conceiving and a God-worshipping world. The conception and the worship may both be imperfect, but the impulse, both to the one and to the other, inspired alike by the spiritual, moral, rational, and affectional elements which unite in human personality, can only be rationally explained on the ground that it is a revelation of the divine reality. The spiritual history of the

human race, which is religious to its core, must possess an inner reason which justifies it.

Above all, the self-communication of God is found in the work and influence of our Lord Jesus Christ. He is the supreme personality in the history of the world; revealing God in and to the world. Hence from His historic revelation there follows a new and deeper experience of God. A new and larger conception of Him, a holier and more spiritual worship, grow out of the experienced relationship of sonship. Under the combined influence of the historic manifestation and the inner experience of Christ men become conscious that they are face to face with God in His final and human manifestation in the Divine Son of Man. The appearance of Christ, therefore, and His spiritual work, are the evidence that self-communication is the law of the divine life.

This principle thus clearly manifested casts a light upon the whole range of reality.

1. The perfect act of divine self-communication in Christ is seen to stand in closest relation with the whole work of creation, and to have the most important consequences for the consummation of all things. It sheds light upon the relation of all things to God, upon the meaning of the history which is being wrought out in and through them, and upon the spiritual goal towards which they proceed. The manifestation of God in Christ, though unique, is not an isolated action. In its connexion with all that has been, and all that is to be, it is a clear indication that self-communication is of the very life of God.

2. The God who makes this self-communication is revealed in it as eternally possessing spiritual perfection, and especially as freely acting from the eternal motive of love. He did not become love as the consequence of a creative act. The fact that He is love cannot depend upon His temporal relation to any finite being, but upon His own infinite and eternal perfection. Hence the creative relationship of God to the world involves His eternal self-realization. He could not become perfect by creating; He must be perfect in order to create. And this eternal and infinite perfection, which is necessary in order to creation, must be, as has been seen, the

perfection of love, which is the only motive to the creation of a spiritual universe.

Hence, the eternal self-realization of God is the realization within the divine nature of love. A loveless God cannot create, and the prevision of a universe which He can love if He creates it, is an insufficient object to enable us to say that God is love. For the object of love is as eternal as love. Love as an abstract possibility waiting for a future object and pre-conceiving it is unthinkable. Love is essentially social, and cannot exist, save in and for the fellowship which calls it forth and satisfies it. Hence that the nature of God may be eternal love, and may, therefore, have the principle which is essential to creative self-communication, it is necessary that the nature of God should, in some way not fully comprehensible by us, be social.

3. The relation between the Creator and the created is, as has been seen, not one of pure externality. The transcendence of God cannot conflict with His immanence. The world as it exists and becomes conscious of the divine must proceed from and rest upon the nature of the Godhead. The modes of its consciousness of God must correspond with the nature of the God of whom it is conscious. That consciousness is threefold; of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The perfected Christian consciousness subsists in a relationship to God which holds these modes or aspects in unity. The God whom it seeks to find is the source and goal, the law and meaning, the impulse and inspiration, of religious consciousness. That consciousness points to the Father as the source and goal, to the Son as the law and meaning, to the Spirit as the impulse and inspiration of its life.

Hence, the Christian doctrine of the Godhead as triune is the joint result of all these factors. It is made known in the self-communication of Christ. It is a condition of the eternal perfection of God as love without which creation and redemption are alike unthinkable, and it is reflected in the characteristic consciousness of God which grows out of the faith of Christ.

Such are the roots and the essential justification of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Its speculative

development and its dogmatic definition have of necessity passed through many stages. There is no more reason to suppose that finality has been obtained in this than in any other great object of human thought. We may reasonably suppose on so high and difficult a matter that the reverse is true. Many human analogies have been offered by theologians as helping men to appreciate the internal and external relationships of the Godhead. These can never be more than faint suggestions, at the best, of something which is unique. The definition of the sense in which there can be Three Persons in the one Godhead without an arithmetical contradiction—which would be as absurd to the highest Christian thought as to that of its opponents—is still the subject of much dispute. The place for the discussion of this subject is in Christian dogmatics, and not in a book on Christian Evidences. But while human thought can only approximate as the result of much reflection and discussion to a divine reality, which it can never reach, the main lines of the doctrine and the abiding grounds of its justification are found in revelation; on the one hand, as reflected in the spiritual experience of Christians, and, on the other, in those speculative considerations which, in ascertaining what is necessary to the nature of the Godhead in order that He may be what is manifest in the world, confirm the spiritual experience of believers in Christ.

VII. In conclusion, the doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood, when properly understood, affords the most satisfactory conception of the nature of God and of His relationship to mankind, and in a sense to creation as a whole. The following features in the divine relationship to creation, and, above all, to spiritual beings, must be borne in mind.

In the first place, it is *svi generis*. However it may be illustrated, and in a measure reproduced in the relations between the creatures themselves, such relations can only partially shadow forth what is in its nature unique. Only one being, that is God, stands related to all things as their creative source, ground, and end.

In the next place, the relationship in which God stands to creation has a positive character of its own. Frequent

attempts have been made to characterize God by negatives. It is sometimes argued that we cannot have any positive conception of Him, and that the best we can do is to attempt to describe Him by negating all the characteristics of the creature, as, for example, by declaring Him to be infinite in contrast with the finitude of the creature. Such a contention has a measure of validity, but it does not represent the final truth of the matter. God is revealed to us in a relationship which manifests positive characteristics. The merely logical contradictory of all that the creature is, would in itself give us no grounds for believing in the existence of God. This must be found, not by way of contrast to the creature, but by means of the positive qualities which are unfolded in God's dealings with the universe. Undoubtedly the final fact of this positive revelation is to show that God is free from the limitations which creaturely imperfection imposes upon mankind. But the vital concern for religion lies not so much in the negative as in the positive, which is thus revealed.

In the next place, the relationship of God to spiritual beings must be so vital and comprehensive as to include the varying functions by which He deals with the varying spiritual and moral conditions that prevail in individual men. All that God does and is towards them in the changing conditions of their spiritual, moral, and physical life, must be seen to be the natural outcome of the all-embracing relationship in which He originally stands to them. Men may stand in totally different relations to one another at different times of their life and under different conditions. This is because their contact with one another is, for the most part, comparatively external and accidental. Occasionally they stand in a closer relationship, which may be so comprehensive as to be the spring of all their mutual dealings. This is so peculiarly the case with the parental relationship. The human father stands in many transitory relations to his child. He is by turns guardian, sovereign, judge, teacher and the rest. Yet all these functions do but fulfil the nature and end of the deep and comprehensive relationship of fatherhood, which can never be set aside and held in suspense. The justification of all other functions is not merely that they are compatible

with fatherhood, but that they spring out of it and serve its purposes. If this be the case with the intimate human relationship, *a fortiori* it must be the case with the relations in which God stands to the creature. Being the source and ground of their being, the relationship in which He stands to them must be large enough to comprehend all His dealings with them, and to unfold the fullness of its original meaning throughout all the changing experiences of their life-history, however various and however prolonged. Above all, this relationship, while it explains the creative activity of God, must be adequate to explain the grace and truth which were manifest in Jesus Christ.

There is only one conception of the divine relationship which approximately satisfies all these conditions. It is that of fatherhood. It is true that even this suffers from the imperfection which must mark the extension of all human analogies to God. The criticism of reflection must be exercised upon it, in order to clear it of suggestions which are obviously inapplicable to God, and to enrich it by the truth of His immanence, which is applicable to Him alone. Yet, when this is done, this relationship conforms to the reality in a degree which is unapproached by any other conception. It suggests divine perfection as being the motive of creation. It makes clear that the spring and end of all God's dealings is love. It is, as has been seen, so comprehensive as to include all the various manifestations of the divine mind and the activities of the divine will towards men, according to their changing needs and to the measure of their response to, or divergence from, the purposes of God. All that God is or can be to men throughout the whole of their life-history as Creator, Sustainer, Redeemer, Sovereign, Judge,—all that He can manifest to them as gracious and merciful, righteous or wrathful, springs out of and fulfils the meaning of the all-comprehending relationship of fatherhood. From the standpoint of men, this relationship, as has been seen, expresses their worth to God, and the end of their existence as being to attain complete and permanent likeness to and fellowship with God. There can be no prospect of this conception ever being superseded or merged in a higher. Human experience here below will

never unfold to us a higher, deeper, or more comprehensive relationship than that of fatherhood.

Hence the doctrine of God, derived by abstraction from the facts and experiences of the Christian religion, satisfies the highest tests to which it can fairly be subjected by formal thought. Revelation, religion, reflection, all unite in offering to us the content of the Christian religion, as being the supreme truth which verifies itself by affording the indispensable, complete, and only explanation of the meaning and end of the universe. The one fact which, in its relation to all other facts, reveals their meaning and end, is the fact of Christ. To come to Him is to enter into an experience of spiritual life which supplies a sufficient reason for all thought, inspiration for all duty, satisfaction for all spiritual need, in the revelation of the Divine Fatherhood and the realization of the human sonship, without which the universe is as baffling to the reason as it is disappointing to the heart, and unworthy of the moral ideals which it has fostered. To the end of time the demand made by the necessities of man, alike spiritual, moral, and intellectual, will be 'Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us.' To the end of time, also, the supreme verification of the Christian religion will lie in the challenge of Christ, 'I am the way, and the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father but by Me,' and in the continuous fulfilment in Christian experience of His word, 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father.'

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